Will Accommodating the US Enable Tsai Ing-wen to Pass Muster?

Will Accommodating the US Enable Tsai Ing-wen to Pass Muster?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 20, 2015

Executive Summary: If she is not to stumble along the final mile, Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency requires winning US trust. But the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must amend the Taiwan independence party platform. They must improve relations with the CCP. They cannot simply accommodate the United States while ignoring Beijing/Washington/Taipei relations. If they do, they will shoot themselves in the foot, and find it impossible to walk the final mile.

Full Text below:

The KMT has been routed. Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency appears clear. In response to a reporter's question, Tsai Ing-wen boasted, "No matter who represents the KMT in the 2016 presidential elections, it's all the same to the DPP." Tsai Ing-wen is right to be confident. But Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency does not hinge solely on favorable conditions within Taiwan. Cross-Strait and international factors also play a decisive role. From that perspective, Tsai Ing-wen's "final mile" remains rife with uncertainty.

To tell this story, we must return to September 16, 2011, more than three years ago. Then DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen was visiting Washington. The US government let its feelings be known through Britain's Financial Times, which published an article entitled, "US concerned about Taiwan candidate", saying "a victory by Tsai Ing-wen... could raise tensions with China". This seriously undermined Tsai Ing-wen's campaign. The article was blunt. US officials said that Tsai Ing-wen met with Obama administration officials, and that “She left us with distinct doubts about whether she is both willing and able to continue the stability in cross-Strait relations the region has enjoyed in recent years,”

Of course we cannot determine how many voters decided to give Ma Ying-jeou a second term because of US government doubts. But cross-Strait relations and trust between Mainland China and the United States are indeed key factors. Tsai Ing-wen lost the election. Three years later, Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States again. According to Tsai's official statement, one of the three purposes was to visit Washington and exchange views on Taipei/Washington relations and Asian-Pacific regional security with various US government agencies, including the executive branch, congress, and think tanks. Tsai Ing-wen said, "For some time communications between the DPP and the US have been good. I hope that sitting down and talking face to face during this trip will further clarify the various parties' positions". Signals from all quarters suggested that during this visit Tsai Ing-wen avoided old mistakes and clearly "accomodated the US".

Tsai Ing-wen has been promoting the DPP's "maintain the status quo" theory of cross-Strait relations. This theory has been criticized as "still hollow". It fails to make clear what the status quo is and how it would be maintained. Confronted with outside criticism, Tsai Ing-wen offers stock answers. Tsai told Yao Chia-wen and other Taiwan independence elders that her "status quo" is "the same as the US government's."

Tsai Ing-wen's explanation provoked criticism from the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen is running for the presidency of the Republic of China. How can she allow her cross-Strait policy to be determined by the US government? Tsai Ing-wen will of course say that she has her own strategic considerations. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, Huang Wei-feng, the MAC Vice Chairman and Deputy Representative to the United States, was blunt. He said that in trilateral Washington/Beijing/Taipei relations, Taipei was the weakest party. Therefore It is incapable of maintaining the status quo. All it can do is "go with the flow" and "not disrupt the status quo". He said the status quo is defined and maintained by the great powers, and that the current status quo is defined and maintained by the United States. Taipei cannot follow Beijing's definition of the status quo. That is why Tsai Ing-wen argued that the cross-Strait status quo should be "the status quo according to the United States."

Huang Wei-feng said that when Tsai Ing-wen visited the US, she was merely seeking agreement between Taipei and Washington on the definition of the status quo and proposing concrete solutions. She was most assuredly not disrupting the status quo as understood by Taipei and Washington. But she also wanted to voice the concerns of the people of Taiwan. She said, "This would preclude any major problems, and therefore pass muster". Clearly Huang Wei-feng's optimistic calculation is based on the dynamic relationship between Beijing and Washington.

The dispute between the United States and Mainland China in the South China Sea has recently intensified. DPP cross-Strait and international policy think-tanks consider this a golden opportunity for the DPP. They think that US vs. Mainland China confrontation in the East China Sea and South China Sea, along with Mainland China's growing political and economic strength, is changing US attitudes toward Taiwan. For example, during Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the United States, it said "Taiwan should commit itself to economic independence." The United States is now more eager for Taiwan to join the TPP.

Lai Yi-chung, former head of the DPP Delegation to the United States, expressed optimism. In 2011, the DPP was considered the troublemaker in the Taiwan Strait. Mainland China land reclamation on South China Sea islands and reefs, and its stance on the nine-dotted line, are seen by the United States as a "desire to change the status quo". When Sino-US strategic conflicts arise, the "balance appears to favor the green camp," Tsai Ing-wen's "maintaining the cross-Strait status quo" comports with US strategic interests. The US should welcome this. As one can imagine, when Tsai visits the US, she is likely to offer all sorts of concessions to the United States to win its support, on cross-Strait relations, US arms sales, the Asia-Pacific region and sensitive issues such as Taipei's support for the nine-dotted line in the South China Sea. 

On the other hand, on matters of concern for the Mainland, such as the 1992 consensus and one China, the DPP will find it nearly impossible to offer any clean breakthroughs. DPP officials may imagine that as long as they accomodate the United States, Tsai can win even if the DPP fails to improve relations with the CCP. If the DPP is really that naive, it may fail yet again. When Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States in 2011, US officials criticized her, saying that it was “far from clear... that she and her advisers fully appreciate the depth of [Mainland Chinese] mistrust of her motives and DPP aspirations”.

The United States may wish to maintain influence in East Asia. Perhaps it hopes that Taiwan can help it counterbalance Mainland China. But relations between Beijing and Washington have long been a struggle without end. In September of this year, Xi Jinping will make a state visit to the United States, and firm up Sino-US relations. No matter what, the United States is unwilling to risk a break with Mainland China by supporting Chen Shui-bian's brinksmanship.

If she is not to stumble along the final mile, Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency requires winning US trust. But the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must amend the Taiwan independence party platform. They must improve relations with the CCP. They cannot simply accomodate the United States while ignoring Beijing/Washington/Taipei relations. If they do, they will shoot themselves in the foot, and find it impossible to walk the final mile.

倒向美國 蔡英文就能過關？ 2015年05月20日 中國時報 蔡英文的總統路，因國民黨似已潰不成軍而顯得十分「坦蕩」，令蔡英文在面對記者提問時，不無傲慢地說：「我覺得國民黨究竟是誰要出來參選2016年總統的選舉，對民進黨來講，其實都沒有太大的差別。」蔡英文的自信自有其道理，但蔡英文的總統路絕不只要理順台灣內部環境，兩岸及國際兩個因素也有決定性的影響，從這個角度，蔡英文的最後一哩路就充滿不確定性。 要說清楚這個故事，得回到3年多前的2011年9月16日。當時，蔡英文作為民進黨總統候選人正在華盛頓訪問，美國官方卻透過管道放話，讓國際知名的英國《金融時報》刊登題為〈美國：蔡英文勝選可能加劇台海緊張〉的報導，給蔡英文造成極其嚴重的傷害。該篇報導明確寫到：美國高官在蔡英文與歐巴馬政府官員會晤後清楚表示，「她給我們留下一些很大的疑問，即她是否願意並且能夠繼續維持台海兩岸近年享有的穩定關係。」 當然，我們無法確定有多少選民因為美國政府的疑問與放話，決定投票給當時爭取連任的馬英九，不過，兩岸關係與大陸和美國的信任感，確實是蔡英文輸掉選舉的關鍵因素。3年多以後，蔡英文又將訪問美國，根據蔡英文的官方說法，她訪美的3個目的之一，就是要到華盛頓，與美國各部門，包括行政、國會、智庫，就台美關係、亞太區域安全交換意見，蔡英文說，「過去一段時間民進黨與美國各方溝通的狀況都不錯，希望透過此行，面對面地坐下來談，能夠談得更徹底，對雙方立場的理解能更進一步釐清。」各方面的訊息顯示，這一次的訪美行，為了避免重蹈覆轍，蔡英文明顯採取了更清晰的「對美一邊倒」政策。 蔡英文提出民進黨兩岸關係的「維持現狀論」後，被批評為「依舊空洞」，說不清楚是怎樣的「現狀」，以及如何「維持」。然而，面對外界的抨擊，蔡英文卻有其定見。蔡向獨派大老姚嘉文等表示，她的「維持現狀」就是「與美國政府立場一樣」。 蔡英文的說法引起了國民黨方面的批評，認為蔡英文選的是中華民國總統，她的兩岸政策豈能由美國政府來解釋？然而蔡英文會這樣說，顯然有她的戰略性思考。民進黨執政時曾任陸委會副主委、駐美副代表的黃偉峰就坦率指出，美中台三邊關係中，台灣是實力最小的一方，沒有能力去「維持」現狀，只能「追隨」現狀以及「不破壞」現狀。他認為，現狀是由大國定義並維持，而目前台海現狀是由美國定義並維持，台灣不可能追隨大陸定義的現狀，所以，蔡英文提出的維持兩岸現狀，應該就是「追隨美國的現狀」。 黃偉峰認為，蔡英文訪美時只要找出台灣與美國對現狀認知的交集，提出具體作法，並保證不會破壞台美共同認知的現狀，而且要強調台灣人民的心聲，「這樣就不會有太大問題，就算過關了」。黃偉峰的樂觀估計，顯然跟中美動態關係有很大關聯。 近來，中美兩強在南海的爭逐與摩擦愈來愈白熱化，對民進黨的兩岸與國際政策智囊來說，這是民進黨的最佳時機，他們判斷由於中美在東海、南海爭端以及中國政經實力的增強，美國對台灣的態度開始有所轉變。例如，美方對蔡英文訪美，特別提到「台灣應該致力經濟自主」，美國對台灣加入TPP的問題也展現更積極的態度。 曾任民進黨駐美代表處主任的賴怡忠就樂觀表示，2011年時民進黨被視為台海麻煩製造者的一方，如今，大陸在九段線以及南海島礁建設上的立場與作為，會被美方認定是「有意改變現狀」，在中美戰略出現矛盾衝突時，「天平似乎朝向有利於綠營的一方」，蔡英文「維持兩岸現狀」的主張與美國的戰略利益相符，美方應該是樂見的。可以想像，蔡英文訪美時，很可能針對兩岸關係、台美軍售，甚至亞太區域的敏感議題，包括台灣是否在南海九段線爭議問題上退讓，向美方示好，爭取美國的支持。 另一方面，針對大陸方面的關切，如九二共識、一個中國等問題，民進黨方面幾乎已不可能提出更清晰、更突破性的主張。民進黨人士可能認定，只要向美一邊倒，不處理、不改善民共關係，蔡英文仍能獲得勝選。如果民進黨人士真的如此天真，那麼民進黨有可能再度跌跤。在2011年蔡英文訪美時，美方官員對蔡英文的批評就是：「對於她和她的顧問們是否充分領悟（大陸方面）對她的動機和民進黨的抱負，不信任到什麼程度…遠遠不那麼清楚。」 美國也許希望在東亞地區繼續維持強大影響力，也許希望台灣能對中國多少產生一些平衡作用，但中美兩國的關係始終鬥而不破，今年9月，習近平就要赴美進行國是訪問，鞏固中美關係，無論如何美國不會甘冒與中國決裂的風險，支持類似陳水扁的冒進主義路線。 蔡英文的總統路仍然需要取得美國的信賴，才不會在最後一哩馬失前蹄。但如果民進黨和蔡英文再不修正台獨黨綱、不改善民共關係前提下，只想對美一邊倒，忽視陸美台三方關係的平衡點，極有可能是搬石頭砸自己的腳，走不好最後一哩路。