Maintaining One Percent Growth:
The Worst is Yet to Come
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 30, 2012
Summary: The year 2012 is coming to an end. We thought we could make a full recovery. But a series of "unforseen eventualities" scotched that. Even maintaining a 1% growth rate is no longer a certainty. But suppose we are successful in maintaining a 1% growth rate? The worst is yet to come. The government cannot afford to let down its guard.
Full Text below:
The year 2012 is coming to an end. We thought we could make a full recovery. But a series of "unforseen eventualities" scotched that. Even maintaining a 1% growth rate is no longer a certainty. But suppose we are successful in maintaining a 1% growth rate? The worst is yet to come. The government cannot afford to let down its guard.
Last week, the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) released its latest economic forecast. It revised its economic growth rate for the year slightly upward, to 1.13%. Barring unforseen eventualities, we should be able to achieve a 1% growth rate. The embarrassing string of nine downward growth rate revisions should end here. More importantly, the DGBAS forecast for next year's economic growth rate may be raised to 3.15%. The main reason is a palpable economic recovery in the US and Mainland China. This and the rapid introduction of new technology products may increase Taiwan's exports and lead to renewed investments. Perhaps the worst is over. But such a conclusion does not explain the struggle to survive that domestic industries are undergoing today. The glowing DGBAS forecasts for this year are far from persuasive.
Consider the unemployment rate. We thought seasonal unemployment for new job seekers had peaked. The October unemployment rate was supposed to drop back down. Instead it went even higher. The magnitude was not large. But it was still an aberration. Workplace business contractions or closures led to drastic increases in unemployment for four straight months. The layoffs at ProMOS Technologies and other companies are cold, hard numbers. They constitute a warning signal. None of these are isolated events. The economy is deteriorating. The end of the year is looming. We hoped to stall for time, but time has run out. More and more companies are being forced to lay off their workforce. Will the unemployment rate increase even more before the year is out? That remains to be seen.
Consider economic growth. The unemployment rate is considered a trailing economic indicator. When the economy bottoms out and begins its recovery, cyclical unemployment improves, but two, three, or even more months later. We are now approaching the new year. Businesses weed out the unfit. Even those who are employed are seeking better jobs. Therefore they are entering and exiting the labor market at a rapid rate. This leads to frictional unemployment. Also, the Executive Yuan's four year employment promotion programs will expire at the end of this year. Many wage subsidies promoting employment will be canceled. Not all impacted jobs will be eliminated. But some will. Therefore unemployment will increase. Unemployment policy is a top priority for any government. Unemployment impacts more than income level and consumption. It undermines social harmony and social stability. Needless to say, the worst is yet to come.
DBGAS officials have belatedly begun describing Taiwan's sluggish and stalled economic growth as "anemic growth." The attempt to maintain a 1% growth rate is merely a pro forma ritual. Substantively it will not offset the inflation rate. Still less will it promote employment, increase consumption, or prosperity. We may be surviving. But we are not thriving. At any time an unforseen eventuality could throw us into recession. World Bank president Robert Zoellick spoke of "anemic growth." He stressed that the course of the world economic recovery would be very slow. That means a solid recovery for Taiwan will take time. Taiwan itself must be strong. It must also confront changes in the international situation.
Making ourselves strong is within our control. The economic momentum upgrade program, Taiwan business reinvestment in Taiwan program, and upcoming free trade zone pilot program, all have merit. But the government must not have only plans and programs. For one, personnel changes mean a lack of follow through. For another, being trapped in one's own framework means a lack of flexibility. The end result could be empty talk. Every year people on Taiwan shout slogans about "growing the economy." But in the end all we have to show for it is anemic growth.
Consider changes in the international situation. This is an even greater challenge. It is also the main reason the DBGAS repeatedly missed its economic forecasts for this year. At the end of last year, the international community was most concerned about the European debt crisis, specifically the debt service peak at the beginning of the year. They thought the global economy might be able to squeak by in 2002. The European debt crisis subsided because everyone anticipated it. But the most promising emerging Asian countries slowed sharply. The benefits from ruling administration changes in economic giants such as the U.S. and Mainland China failed to appear. The anticipated global recovery did not take place. The economic growth rate was adjusted downward, repeatedly. Similar changes may occur in 2013. The visible risks are the U.S. fiscal cliff and the severe debt crisis. But what about the invisible risks? Governments say the worst is over. They are attempting to calm the public. But they must not let their guard down.
慘烈「保一」：最壞時刻還沒過去
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.30
二○一二年進入尾聲，原本充滿復甦契機的一年，卻因一連串的「意外」而走調，經濟成長率連「保一」都竟成了岌岌可危的最卑微渴求。然而，即使成功「保一」，最壞時刻仍然沒有完全過去，政府絲毫不能鬆懈。
主計總處上周發布最新經濟預測，將今年全年經濟成長率微幅上修到百分之一‧一三，如無重大意外，應可保住「一」字頭，難堪的連續下修「九降風」或將就此止步；更重要的是，主計總處預測明年經濟成長率可拉高到百分之三‧一五，主因是近期美國、中國大陸的景氣復甦能見度提高，加上科技新品的上市腳步加速，可望帶動台灣出口、投資回溫，因而也由此做出「最壞的時候已經過去了」的結論。然而，此言不只偏離現今國內百業慘淡經營的景況，再對照主計總處今年不太光彩的預測紀錄，實在不具說服力。
就以失業率而言，原以為已安度社會新鮮人大量求職的季節性失業高峰，理應回降的十月失業率卻反向走高，幅度雖不大，卻已脫離常軌；究其原因，則是因為工作場所業務緊縮或歇業而導致的失業人數大增，而且是連四個月上升，顯示如茂德科技等大量解僱事件正化為冷酷的數字向社會示警：這些均不是單一事件；隨著景氣惡化及年關迫近，原想以拖待變但撐不下去、終被迫裁員的企業可能愈來愈多，失業率能否安度這個年關，仍是未知數。
從經濟活動的發展順序而言，失業率被視為落後景氣表現的指標，也就是說，景氣即使已觸底回升，這種循環性失業想要好轉，也是二、三個月以後、甚至更久的事；如今又到了年度交替之際，不只企業汰弱留強，受僱者也重覓良木，故而勞動市場進入、退出頻繁，摩擦性失業也將出現；再者，行政院推動四年的「促進就業方案」將於今年底到期，多項為促進就業而提供的工資補貼即將取消，與其關聯的工作就算不會全部撤減，也可能部分消除，如此一來，失業情勢不免會更加險峻。失業問題對任何政府而言都是最優先的政策課題，其衝擊的不只是經濟層面的所得與消費，更會傷害社會和諧與安定。準此而言，最壞時刻當然還沒過去。
尤其，主計總處官員最近才以「貧血式成長」，形容台灣經濟成長遲滯、動能不足的現象，「保一」只是形式上保住了成長局面，實質上抵銷不了物價上漲率，更不足以促進就業、增加消費及安居樂業，雖然續了命，但活得並不好，隨時可能因一個意外事件的突擊而陷入衰退。此外，語出世界銀行總裁佐立克的「貧血式成長」，原是要強調世界經濟復甦的歷程將十分緩慢，代表台灣經濟想要迎接堅實的復甦，將是一場長期戰，既須強健自身體質，也須應戰國際變局。
其中，強健自身體質的努力，可操之在己，目前擬就的經濟動能推升方案、吸引台商回台投資方案，以及即將公布的自由經濟示範區計畫等，都有可觀之處；但政府施政最怕只有計畫及方案，一來人事更迭、後繼無力，二來自陷框架、缺乏彈性，最終留下的仍是空談泛議；也正因如此，台灣才會年年高喊拚經濟，卻喊到陷入貧血式成長的不堪境地。
至於國際變局，則是更大的挑戰，也是主計總處今年經濟預測步步失算的主因。去年底時，國際間最擔心的經濟風險是歐債危機在年初進入償債高峰，咸認二○一二年全球經濟是「頭過身就過」；孰料，歐債危機的威脅因各方提早準備而消退，最被看好的亞洲新興國家卻大幅減速，預期中的美國復甦也推遲，加以美中兩大經濟體的政治換屆利多未現等，非但期待中的全球復甦未現蹤，經濟成長率更一再下調。類似但不同的變局也可能發生在二○一三年，看得到的風險是美國財政懸崖及纏綿病榻的歐債危機，但看不到的呢？政府此時說最壞時機已過，固是為了穩定民心，卻萬不可鬆了戒心。
Thursday, November 29, 2012
Xi Jinping's Cross-Strait Challenge: Upgrading the 1992 Consensus
Xi Jinping's Cross-Strait Challenge: Upgrading the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 29, 2012
Summary: CCP Central Committee & State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi spoke during the 20th anniversary celebration of the 1992 consensus. He summarized the Hu Jintao administration's 1992 consensus achievements. He also revealed the blueprint for the Xi Jinping administration's next step for the 1992 consensus. We suggest that the 1992 consensus be upgraded. It should be transformed into "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of China."
Full Text below:
CCP Central Committee & State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi spoke during the 20th anniversary celebration of the 1992 consensus. He summarized the Hu Jintao administration's 1992 consensus achievements. He also revealed the blueprint for the Xi Jinping administration's next step for the 1992 consensus.
For the sake of continuity, we suggest that the 1992 consensus be upgraded. It should be transformed into "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of China."
Wang Yi defined the 1992 consensus. He said "each side of the Taiwan Strait has verbally declared that both sides of the Strait adhere to the one China principle." This is historical fact. But it is only part of the story. It cites only Beijing's interpretation in 1992. Another part of the story revealed itself during in the March 26, 2008 hotline conversation between President Hu Jintao and President George W. Bush."The (1992 consensus) means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but agree that each side has its own definition of one China." This is also how the Taipei side interprets the 1992 consensus. Over the past four years, the 1992 consensus has gathered energy. The energy comes from the aforementioned endorsement of "one China, different interpretations" by Bush and Hu on the Beijing/Washington Hotline. Alas, the 1992 consensus contains a bottleneck. No one knows for certain what the "one China" in "one China principle" refers to.
Wang Yi mentioned both this "energy" and this "bottleneck" during his talk. Take the "energy" part. Wang said, "The key to the 1992 consensus is the one-China principle. The essence of the 1992 consensus is seeking common ground while shelving differences." In fact, he was referring to "seeking common ground while shelving differences under the one-China principle." He spoke of "seeking common ground in one China, while both sides shelve their political differences." He even spoke of "the ability to seek common ground while shelving minor differences. He even spoke of "the ability to seek common ground while shelving major differences." In fact, he was referring to "seeking common ground in one China, while shelving the differences in different expressions." One China is the greatest common ground. Whereas different interpretations is the greatest difference. The spirit of "one China, different interpretations" and "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is embodied in the 1992 consensus.
Now take the "bottleneck" part. Wang Yi said, "Seeking only common ground is unrealistic. It is also infeasible." Apply Wang's own logic to this dilemma. Wang's remark could be interpreted as, "Seeking only common ground in one China is unrealistic. Talking only about political differences is infeasible." Consider Beijing's perspective. "Talking only about political differences is infeasible." So far, so good. But why is is "Seeking only common ground in one China" unrealistic? Clearly Beijing's thinking about "seeking common ground while shelving differences" requires closer scrutiny.
The problem arises as a result of doubts over "one China." If Beijing sees "one China" as an abstraction transcending the cross-Strait status quo, then "one China" becomes "a third concept of China, a big roof concept of China." That enables the two sides to "shelve their political differences." But if Beijing sees "one China" as the "People's Republic of China," then it is being unrealistic. Then there is no room for "shelving differences." This conflict must be resolved. Otherwise the 1992 consensus will contain a bottleneck. To resolve this conflict, the 1992 consensus should be upgraded. Now is the time to remove the bottleneck. The opportunity must not be missed.
The opportunity revealed itself in the CCP 18th National Congress Political Report. It includes a call to "Investigate cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and make reasonable arrangements." The three keys were "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, and political relations." Given the three keys, "one China" cannot possibly be the "People's Republic of China." It has to be the "big roof concept of one China." This must the foundation for all "reasonable arrangements".
Wang Yi said that the term "reasonable" means not coercing others. Reasonable means abiding by existing legal provisions. The "legal provisions" referred to would be the "Hu Six Points," the provisions of the Wu-Hu Summit of March, and Wang Yi's statement, "in compliance with the legal provisions (constitutions) for both sides." Shelving differences between the constitutional provisions of the two sides, and seeking the common ground of one China, requires the big roof concept of one China. Without this big roof concept of one China, nothing can accomodate a nation that has "yet to be reunified," and maintain "political relations under special circumstances."
The Hu Jintao administration made a critical contribution to cross-Strait relations. It shifted the focus of policy to the signing of a peace agreement. It did this under special circumstances. Cross-Strait political relations were being conducted even though the nation has yet to be reunified. This policy was innovative because it established "yet to be reunified" as an official policy challenge. Without such thinking, cross-Strait peaceful development would be impossible.
Wang Yi said, "We must have a good grasp of the common ground and the differences in our relationship. We must be adept at seeking common ground while shelving minor differences. We must even be adept at seeking common ground while shelving major differences." The "major difference" is the thing we mentioned earlier. We must upgrade the 1992 consensus. Major common ground is the "big roof concept of one China." The major difference refers to the two sides' legal provisions, specifically the constitutions of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. When the big roof China principle becomes the one China principle, only then can we "seek common ground while shelving major differences." Under the big roof concept of one China, The Republic of China is a democratic China, the People's Republic of China is a socialist China.
In this respect the big roof concept of one China may be the link connecting Wang Yi's one China. This link may be, as he said, an "effort to seek common ground, and properly handle the points of disagreement." To "increase common ground, and increase mutual tolerance" is the way to "seek common ground while shelving major differences."
The Xi Jinping administration has inherited the 1992 consensus. If it wishes to transcend it, it must upgrade it, to different interpretations under the big roof concept of one China, and seeking common ground while shelving differences.
習近平的兩岸課題：九二共識的升級版
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.29
中共中央台辦暨國務院台辦主任王毅日前在「九二共識廿周年座談會」中的談話，一方面總結了胡錦濤團隊對九二共識的經營成果，另一方面也揭示了習近平團隊對九二共識的開發藍圖。
我們提出的相對主張是：為承先啟後，繼往開來，九二共識應當有一個升級版，亦即：「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」。
王毅將「九二共識」定義為「（兩岸）各自以口頭方式表述『海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則』的共識」。這是歷史事實，卻只是一部分的事實，僅引據了北京在一九九二當年的「表述」。另一部分的事實，則呈現在二○○八年三月廿六日胡錦濤主席在熱線電話對小布希總統所言：「（九二共識）意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義不同。」這也正是台灣方面在一九九二當年的「表述」。四年多來，九二共識真正的動能，即是來自前述「布胡熱線」也贊同的「一中各表」；九二共識的瓶頸，則在「一個中國原則」所稱的「一個中國」不知究何所指？
王毅的談話數度提及這種「動能」與「瓶頸」的對比關係。關於「動能」部分，王毅說，「九二共識的核心是一個中國原則，九二共識的精髓是求同存異」，其實就是指「在一個中國原則下的求同存異」；他又進一步指出，「求一個中國之同，存雙方政治分歧之異」，甚至說「善於求大同、存小異，乃至求大同，存大異」，其實就是「求一中之同，存各表之異」，因為「一中是最大之同，各表是最大之異」。此種「一中各表／求同存異」的精神，正是「九二共識」的最大動能所在。
關於「瓶頸」部分，王毅說，「只求同，是不現實的；只講異，更是不可行的」，如果以此套入王毅自己的邏輯，或可解釋為：「只求一個中國之同，是不現實的；只講雙方政治分歧之異，是不可行的。」固然，站在北京立場，只講「雙方政治分歧之異」是不可行的，但為何「只求一個中國之同」也是不現實的？可見，北京「求同存異」的思維仍有可以推敲之處。
一切均因「一個中國」的疑義而起。主要的問題是：當北京若將「一個中國」視為超越兩岸現狀的抽象原則之時，亦即將「一個中國」定位為「第三概念的大屋頂中國」之時，就能「存雙方政治分歧之異」；但是，當北京倘將「一個中國」視為「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」之時，卻是「不現實的」，因為這就完全失去了「存異」的空間。若不解決這個矛盾，「九二共識」就有「瓶頸」；倘要解決這個矛盾，「九二共識」就應有「升級版」。當下，突破「瓶頸」的契機已現，不可錯過。
契機即在中共十八大政治報告所揭「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，並對此作出合情合理的安排」。其中的三個關鍵字是：「尚未統一／特殊情況／政治關係」；在這三個關鍵字下，所謂的「一個中國」，即絕無可能是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而當然應是一個「大屋頂中國」，這也始是一切「合情合理的安排」的基礎。
王毅說：合情，就是不搞強加於人；合理，就是恪守法理基礎。而所謂的「法理基礎」，應是指胡六點、今年三月「吳胡會」及王毅此次談話中所稱的「符合雙方各自（憲法）規定」；而倘若要「存雙方憲法規定之異，以求一個中國之同」，則這個「一個中國」，除了「大屋頂中國」之外，豈有可能一方面「尚未統一」，另一方面又維持「特殊情況下的政治關係」？
我們認為，歸結胡錦濤團隊在兩岸關係上最關鍵的「政策創新」，就是將政策焦點轉移至「尚未統一前的特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，而以議簽《和平協議》為目標；此一政策的創新處在於，將「尚未統一」確立為正式的政策課題，並認為應當發展出「尚未統一的政治關係」，若無此種思維，兩岸的「和平發展」即無可能。
王毅說：「必須把握好同與異的關係，善於求大同，存小異；乃至求大同，存大異。」其中，「大異」是首見的說法。若就「九二共識」的升級版而言：大同，即是「大屋頂中國」，「大異」即是「依各自規定（憲法）運行的中華民國與中華人民共和國」。當「大屋頂中國原則」成了「一個中國原則」，始有可能「求大同，存大異」。在大屋頂中國之下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國。
準此以論，「大屋頂中國」，或許即是王毅正在「尋求」的「一個中國」的「連接點」；在此「連接點」上，始可能如他所言，「努力尋求認知的共同點，妥善處理好分歧點」、「擴大彼此的共同點，增強相互的包容性」，如此方是「求大同，存大異」。
習近平團隊若要承繼並超越「九二共識」，應當推動升級版：在大屋頂中國下一中各表，求同存異。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 29, 2012
Summary: CCP Central Committee & State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi spoke during the 20th anniversary celebration of the 1992 consensus. He summarized the Hu Jintao administration's 1992 consensus achievements. He also revealed the blueprint for the Xi Jinping administration's next step for the 1992 consensus. We suggest that the 1992 consensus be upgraded. It should be transformed into "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of China."
Full Text below:
CCP Central Committee & State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi spoke during the 20th anniversary celebration of the 1992 consensus. He summarized the Hu Jintao administration's 1992 consensus achievements. He also revealed the blueprint for the Xi Jinping administration's next step for the 1992 consensus.
For the sake of continuity, we suggest that the 1992 consensus be upgraded. It should be transformed into "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of China."
Wang Yi defined the 1992 consensus. He said "each side of the Taiwan Strait has verbally declared that both sides of the Strait adhere to the one China principle." This is historical fact. But it is only part of the story. It cites only Beijing's interpretation in 1992. Another part of the story revealed itself during in the March 26, 2008 hotline conversation between President Hu Jintao and President George W. Bush."The (1992 consensus) means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but agree that each side has its own definition of one China." This is also how the Taipei side interprets the 1992 consensus. Over the past four years, the 1992 consensus has gathered energy. The energy comes from the aforementioned endorsement of "one China, different interpretations" by Bush and Hu on the Beijing/Washington Hotline. Alas, the 1992 consensus contains a bottleneck. No one knows for certain what the "one China" in "one China principle" refers to.
Wang Yi mentioned both this "energy" and this "bottleneck" during his talk. Take the "energy" part. Wang said, "The key to the 1992 consensus is the one-China principle. The essence of the 1992 consensus is seeking common ground while shelving differences." In fact, he was referring to "seeking common ground while shelving differences under the one-China principle." He spoke of "seeking common ground in one China, while both sides shelve their political differences." He even spoke of "the ability to seek common ground while shelving minor differences. He even spoke of "the ability to seek common ground while shelving major differences." In fact, he was referring to "seeking common ground in one China, while shelving the differences in different expressions." One China is the greatest common ground. Whereas different interpretations is the greatest difference. The spirit of "one China, different interpretations" and "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is embodied in the 1992 consensus.
Now take the "bottleneck" part. Wang Yi said, "Seeking only common ground is unrealistic. It is also infeasible." Apply Wang's own logic to this dilemma. Wang's remark could be interpreted as, "Seeking only common ground in one China is unrealistic. Talking only about political differences is infeasible." Consider Beijing's perspective. "Talking only about political differences is infeasible." So far, so good. But why is is "Seeking only common ground in one China" unrealistic? Clearly Beijing's thinking about "seeking common ground while shelving differences" requires closer scrutiny.
The problem arises as a result of doubts over "one China." If Beijing sees "one China" as an abstraction transcending the cross-Strait status quo, then "one China" becomes "a third concept of China, a big roof concept of China." That enables the two sides to "shelve their political differences." But if Beijing sees "one China" as the "People's Republic of China," then it is being unrealistic. Then there is no room for "shelving differences." This conflict must be resolved. Otherwise the 1992 consensus will contain a bottleneck. To resolve this conflict, the 1992 consensus should be upgraded. Now is the time to remove the bottleneck. The opportunity must not be missed.
The opportunity revealed itself in the CCP 18th National Congress Political Report. It includes a call to "Investigate cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and make reasonable arrangements." The three keys were "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, and political relations." Given the three keys, "one China" cannot possibly be the "People's Republic of China." It has to be the "big roof concept of one China." This must the foundation for all "reasonable arrangements".
Wang Yi said that the term "reasonable" means not coercing others. Reasonable means abiding by existing legal provisions. The "legal provisions" referred to would be the "Hu Six Points," the provisions of the Wu-Hu Summit of March, and Wang Yi's statement, "in compliance with the legal provisions (constitutions) for both sides." Shelving differences between the constitutional provisions of the two sides, and seeking the common ground of one China, requires the big roof concept of one China. Without this big roof concept of one China, nothing can accomodate a nation that has "yet to be reunified," and maintain "political relations under special circumstances."
The Hu Jintao administration made a critical contribution to cross-Strait relations. It shifted the focus of policy to the signing of a peace agreement. It did this under special circumstances. Cross-Strait political relations were being conducted even though the nation has yet to be reunified. This policy was innovative because it established "yet to be reunified" as an official policy challenge. Without such thinking, cross-Strait peaceful development would be impossible.
Wang Yi said, "We must have a good grasp of the common ground and the differences in our relationship. We must be adept at seeking common ground while shelving minor differences. We must even be adept at seeking common ground while shelving major differences." The "major difference" is the thing we mentioned earlier. We must upgrade the 1992 consensus. Major common ground is the "big roof concept of one China." The major difference refers to the two sides' legal provisions, specifically the constitutions of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. When the big roof China principle becomes the one China principle, only then can we "seek common ground while shelving major differences." Under the big roof concept of one China, The Republic of China is a democratic China, the People's Republic of China is a socialist China.
In this respect the big roof concept of one China may be the link connecting Wang Yi's one China. This link may be, as he said, an "effort to seek common ground, and properly handle the points of disagreement." To "increase common ground, and increase mutual tolerance" is the way to "seek common ground while shelving major differences."
The Xi Jinping administration has inherited the 1992 consensus. If it wishes to transcend it, it must upgrade it, to different interpretations under the big roof concept of one China, and seeking common ground while shelving differences.
習近平的兩岸課題：九二共識的升級版
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.29
中共中央台辦暨國務院台辦主任王毅日前在「九二共識廿周年座談會」中的談話，一方面總結了胡錦濤團隊對九二共識的經營成果，另一方面也揭示了習近平團隊對九二共識的開發藍圖。
我們提出的相對主張是：為承先啟後，繼往開來，九二共識應當有一個升級版，亦即：「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」。
王毅將「九二共識」定義為「（兩岸）各自以口頭方式表述『海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則』的共識」。這是歷史事實，卻只是一部分的事實，僅引據了北京在一九九二當年的「表述」。另一部分的事實，則呈現在二○○八年三月廿六日胡錦濤主席在熱線電話對小布希總統所言：「（九二共識）意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義不同。」這也正是台灣方面在一九九二當年的「表述」。四年多來，九二共識真正的動能，即是來自前述「布胡熱線」也贊同的「一中各表」；九二共識的瓶頸，則在「一個中國原則」所稱的「一個中國」不知究何所指？
王毅的談話數度提及這種「動能」與「瓶頸」的對比關係。關於「動能」部分，王毅說，「九二共識的核心是一個中國原則，九二共識的精髓是求同存異」，其實就是指「在一個中國原則下的求同存異」；他又進一步指出，「求一個中國之同，存雙方政治分歧之異」，甚至說「善於求大同、存小異，乃至求大同，存大異」，其實就是「求一中之同，存各表之異」，因為「一中是最大之同，各表是最大之異」。此種「一中各表／求同存異」的精神，正是「九二共識」的最大動能所在。
關於「瓶頸」部分，王毅說，「只求同，是不現實的；只講異，更是不可行的」，如果以此套入王毅自己的邏輯，或可解釋為：「只求一個中國之同，是不現實的；只講雙方政治分歧之異，是不可行的。」固然，站在北京立場，只講「雙方政治分歧之異」是不可行的，但為何「只求一個中國之同」也是不現實的？可見，北京「求同存異」的思維仍有可以推敲之處。
一切均因「一個中國」的疑義而起。主要的問題是：當北京若將「一個中國」視為超越兩岸現狀的抽象原則之時，亦即將「一個中國」定位為「第三概念的大屋頂中國」之時，就能「存雙方政治分歧之異」；但是，當北京倘將「一個中國」視為「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」之時，卻是「不現實的」，因為這就完全失去了「存異」的空間。若不解決這個矛盾，「九二共識」就有「瓶頸」；倘要解決這個矛盾，「九二共識」就應有「升級版」。當下，突破「瓶頸」的契機已現，不可錯過。
契機即在中共十八大政治報告所揭「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，並對此作出合情合理的安排」。其中的三個關鍵字是：「尚未統一／特殊情況／政治關係」；在這三個關鍵字下，所謂的「一個中國」，即絕無可能是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而當然應是一個「大屋頂中國」，這也始是一切「合情合理的安排」的基礎。
王毅說：合情，就是不搞強加於人；合理，就是恪守法理基礎。而所謂的「法理基礎」，應是指胡六點、今年三月「吳胡會」及王毅此次談話中所稱的「符合雙方各自（憲法）規定」；而倘若要「存雙方憲法規定之異，以求一個中國之同」，則這個「一個中國」，除了「大屋頂中國」之外，豈有可能一方面「尚未統一」，另一方面又維持「特殊情況下的政治關係」？
我們認為，歸結胡錦濤團隊在兩岸關係上最關鍵的「政策創新」，就是將政策焦點轉移至「尚未統一前的特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，而以議簽《和平協議》為目標；此一政策的創新處在於，將「尚未統一」確立為正式的政策課題，並認為應當發展出「尚未統一的政治關係」，若無此種思維，兩岸的「和平發展」即無可能。
王毅說：「必須把握好同與異的關係，善於求大同，存小異；乃至求大同，存大異。」其中，「大異」是首見的說法。若就「九二共識」的升級版而言：大同，即是「大屋頂中國」，「大異」即是「依各自規定（憲法）運行的中華民國與中華人民共和國」。當「大屋頂中國原則」成了「一個中國原則」，始有可能「求大同，存大異」。在大屋頂中國之下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國。
準此以論，「大屋頂中國」，或許即是王毅正在「尋求」的「一個中國」的「連接點」；在此「連接點」上，始可能如他所言，「努力尋求認知的共同點，妥善處理好分歧點」、「擴大彼此的共同點，增強相互的包容性」，如此方是「求大同，存大異」。
習近平團隊若要承繼並超越「九二共識」，應當推動升級版：在大屋頂中國下一中各表，求同存異。
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
1992 Consensus Means Different Interpretations
1992 Consensus Means Different Interpretations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 28, 2012
Summary: Everyone on Taiwan has heard the term "1992 consensus." Many people refer to it, but few have an accurate undestanding of it. Few are able to explain what it really means. Some would deny its existence altogether. For the sake of Taiwan's future, we would like to take some time to explain what it means. The 1992 consensus appears complex. In fact, it is quite simple, All that is required is good faith.
Full Text below:
Everyone on Taiwan has heard the term "1992 consensus." Many people refer to it, but few have an accurate undestanding of it. Few are able to explain what it really means. Some would deny its existence altogether. For the sake of Taiwan's future, we would like to take some time to explain what it means.
In 1993, the Koo-Wang Meetings threw open the doors to official cross-Strait negotiations. The two sides took their first steps towards mutually beneficial exchanges. But all of the negotiations that took place had a mutually agreed upon premise. Without this premise, the two sides would not have been able to sit down at the same table. The premise of the Koo-Wang Meetings was summed up by former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi, who referred to it as the "1992 consensus." As long as both parties accepted this premise, a consensus existed. Whether the premise was written into the official results of the negotiations, whether it was explicitly referred to as the "1992 consensus," the "Spirit of '92," or any other name, makes no difference. None of these undermine the fact that such a consensus exists.
Taiwan independence elements always say the 1992 consensus does not exist. They even insinuate that Su fabricated it. They are merely seizing on the fact that when the two sides exchanged documents, the words "1992" and "consensus" never appeared. But none of this changes the fact that a meeting was held in 1992, and a consensus emerged from this meeting. Therefore it is perfectly reasonable to abide by convention and refer to this consensus as the 1992 consensus.
Consider the contents of the 1992 consensus. Beijing has seized upon the "one China" principle and neglected other aspects. Taipei meanwhile, refers to it as "one China, different interpretations." Consider Taipei's perspective for the moment. Taipei's take on "one China" can be seen in the language used in the National Unification Council proceedings of 1992. It read: 'Concerning the meaning of "one China," the two sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one China principle. But both sides ascribe different meanings to the term. The Chinese Communist authorities understands "one China" to mean the "People's Republic of China." They think that after reunification, Taiwan will be a "Special Administrative Region." We think that "one China" means the Republic of China, founded in 1912. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. But its current jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China. But the Chinese mainland is also a part of China.'
We subscribe to the resolutions of the National Unification Council. Therefore the two sides have no disagreement over the territorial sovereignty of "one China." Both say that "China" includes the Mainland and Taiwan. They disagree only over how sovereignty and jurisdiction should be exercised. That is the only part over which they disagree. That is the only part over which there is no consensus. That is the only part over which they are compelled to have "different interpretations." There is no disagreement over the "one China" part of the 1992 consensus. There is only disagreement over the "different interpretations" part. This part pertains to jurisdiction, and includes the national title and the structure of the government. This is why Beijing says that the 1992 consensus means "one China," but that each side has its own interpretation about "the part about which no consensus has been reached." For this part, "different interpretations" persist, and of course, no consensus exists.
As we can see, China under the 1992 consensus is a nation with unified sovereignty but divided jurisdiction. The ROC Constitution's "Articles on Relations between People Across the Strait" clearly specifies "one country, two regions." Both Mainland China and Taiwan are included in ROC sovereignty claims. That is why over the years, the Mainland has never complained that Taiwan is taking advantage of it, or that Taiwan has demeaned the Mainland by classifying it as a region.
President Ma said the two sides "do not recognize each others' sovereignty, but do not deny each others' jurisdiction." This remark is particularly significant. The term "sovereignty" implies exclusivity. The two cannot coexist in the same territory. If the two sides recognize each others' sovereignty, then China would immediately be split into two sovereign states. Therefore having the two sides "not recognize each others' sovereignty" is essential. But within "one China" there are two regimes. Each regime must face the fact that the other exists. Only then can they have peaceful contacts. Therefore they must not deny each others' jurisdiction. The former, "one China," is legal consensus. The latter, "different interpretations," is realpolitik.
The 1992 consensus must be clarified and honored. Only then can cross-Strait conflicts be resolved. For example, the Mainland's new passports include scenes of Taiwan. The Mainland authorities' jurisdiction may not be as compelling as the Taiwan authorities'. But that does not negate its sovereignty over Taiwan. This is the Mainland's "one China, different interpretations." The Mainland Affairs Council has complained about the Mainland's new passport. It has called upon the Mainland to "shelve disputes and face reality." But the MAC is confused. Is the MAC saying that the Republic of China cannot include the Yangtze River and the Yellow River in official Republic of China documents? The MAC has apparently confused sovereignty with jurisdiction. The two sides have no dispute over territorial sovereignty, Therefore what is there to shelve? Beijing did not ask the public on Taiwan to apply for Mainland passports. Clearly Beijing recognizes the reality of divided jurisdiction.
The cross-Strait situation is like two brothers separated by a courtyard wall. They had no contact with each other. They even asked foreign powers to intervene. With the passage of time however, the two have let go of their resentments. They have begun talking to each other. They have realized that the wise course of action is to heal the rifts within the family.
The 1992 consensus appears complex. In fact, it is quite simple, All that is required is good faith.
「九二共識」的真義 在「一個各表」
2012-11-28
中國時報
在台灣，「九二共識」這個名詞大家都聽過，許多人都在引用，但是它的準確涵義卻少有人說得清楚，甚至還有人想否定它的存在。對於這個攸關台灣前途的概念與主張，我們不厭其煩願意詳加闡述如下。
一九九三年辜汪會談開啟了兩岸正式協商大門，踏出兩岸緊密來往與互利互惠的關鍵第一步。但所有談判都必有共同接受的前提。沒前提，雙方不可能坐上談判桌。辜汪會談的前提，就是後來被前陸委會主委蘇起概括為「九二共識」的原則。只要談判雙方共同接受會談的前提條件，共識就已存在。至於此一共識是否寫入談判結果的文件，或是否被稱為「九二共識」、「九二精神」，或其他名稱，都無礙於此一共識存在之事實。
獨派人物總說「九二共識」不存在，甚至暗示這是蘇起捏造的，其實都只抓住「當年兩岸往還文件中沒出現這四個字」而死纏爛打，並不能否定某種共識確已存在之事實。這裡我們依循慣例，將此共識稱為「九二共識」。
「九二共識」的內容，北京方面認定是「一個中國」原則而不追究其內涵，台北則稱是「一個中國，各自表述」。僅就台北這方而論，台灣方面對「一個中國」的表述方式可見於國統會在一九九二年通過《關於〈一個中國〉的涵義》：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同。中共當局認為『一個中國』即為『中華人民共和國』，將來統一以後，台灣將成為其轄下的一個『特別行政區』。我方則認為「一個中國」應指一九一二年成立迄今之中華民國，其主權及於整個中國，但目前之治權，則僅及於臺澎金馬。台灣固為中國之一部分，但大陸亦為中國之一部分。」
我們即使僅依國統會決議，也可看出兩岸對「一個中國」的主權範圍是沒爭議的，亦即都把「中國」視為包含大陸和台灣。雙方存在歧異而不得不「各自表述」的部分（亦即沒達成共識的部分），只是對這個「中國」的「主權」如何透過「治權」來實現，各自立場不同。所以，「九二共識」中的「一中」是指無爭議的主權範圍，「各表」則是雙方各自對治權立場（如國號、政體）進行表述。準此而論，北京自然會說「九二共識」是「一中」，而「對未達成共識的部分（不得不）各自表述」，既是「各自表述」，當然不存共識。
由此可見，「九二共識」下的中國，是主權統一、治權分裂的國家。我方的《兩岸人民關係條例》，就是基於憲法增修條文和此一共識而明定「一國兩區」，將大陸地區和台灣地區都納入我方主張的主權範圍內。因此多年來，大陸從未抗議台灣吃他們豆腐，或是台灣把大陸矮化為一個區。
至於馬總統所說兩岸「互不承認主權、互不否認治權」，此話尤有深意。「主權」具有排他性，在同一領土內無法並存兩個主權。若兩岸互相承認主權，則中國立即分裂成兩個主權國家，故「互不承認主權」本屬應然。但在「一個中國」內，現有兩個政權，彼此必須正視事實，雙方才能和平交往，因此又需「互不否認治權」。前者是「一中」之法理共識，後者仍是「各表」之面對事實。
釐清、遵守「九二共識」之後，兩岸間的紛紛擾擾都可化解。以大陸護照印有台灣風景為例，大陸的治權雖不及於台灣，但無礙其法理主權及於台灣，這正是大陸的「一中各表」。如今陸委會針對大陸新護照，要求大陸「擱置爭議、正視現實」，那麼中華民國是不是也不能把長江、黃河列入我國官文書呢？這似乎把主權、治權混為一談。因為兩岸對主權範圍本無爭議，如何擱置？北京並未要求台灣人民申請大陸護照，可見他們也沒有漠視治權分裂之現實。
兩岸局勢如兄弟鬩牆。早年不但互不往來，甚至援引外力與對方對抗。時過境遷後，兩人放下仇恨，深覺互動往來、恢復家人關係才屬明智。
「九二共識」看似複雜，其實也很簡單，誠意而已矣。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 28, 2012
Summary: Everyone on Taiwan has heard the term "1992 consensus." Many people refer to it, but few have an accurate undestanding of it. Few are able to explain what it really means. Some would deny its existence altogether. For the sake of Taiwan's future, we would like to take some time to explain what it means. The 1992 consensus appears complex. In fact, it is quite simple, All that is required is good faith.
Full Text below:
Everyone on Taiwan has heard the term "1992 consensus." Many people refer to it, but few have an accurate undestanding of it. Few are able to explain what it really means. Some would deny its existence altogether. For the sake of Taiwan's future, we would like to take some time to explain what it means.
In 1993, the Koo-Wang Meetings threw open the doors to official cross-Strait negotiations. The two sides took their first steps towards mutually beneficial exchanges. But all of the negotiations that took place had a mutually agreed upon premise. Without this premise, the two sides would not have been able to sit down at the same table. The premise of the Koo-Wang Meetings was summed up by former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi, who referred to it as the "1992 consensus." As long as both parties accepted this premise, a consensus existed. Whether the premise was written into the official results of the negotiations, whether it was explicitly referred to as the "1992 consensus," the "Spirit of '92," or any other name, makes no difference. None of these undermine the fact that such a consensus exists.
Taiwan independence elements always say the 1992 consensus does not exist. They even insinuate that Su fabricated it. They are merely seizing on the fact that when the two sides exchanged documents, the words "1992" and "consensus" never appeared. But none of this changes the fact that a meeting was held in 1992, and a consensus emerged from this meeting. Therefore it is perfectly reasonable to abide by convention and refer to this consensus as the 1992 consensus.
Consider the contents of the 1992 consensus. Beijing has seized upon the "one China" principle and neglected other aspects. Taipei meanwhile, refers to it as "one China, different interpretations." Consider Taipei's perspective for the moment. Taipei's take on "one China" can be seen in the language used in the National Unification Council proceedings of 1992. It read: 'Concerning the meaning of "one China," the two sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one China principle. But both sides ascribe different meanings to the term. The Chinese Communist authorities understands "one China" to mean the "People's Republic of China." They think that after reunification, Taiwan will be a "Special Administrative Region." We think that "one China" means the Republic of China, founded in 1912. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. But its current jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China. But the Chinese mainland is also a part of China.'
We subscribe to the resolutions of the National Unification Council. Therefore the two sides have no disagreement over the territorial sovereignty of "one China." Both say that "China" includes the Mainland and Taiwan. They disagree only over how sovereignty and jurisdiction should be exercised. That is the only part over which they disagree. That is the only part over which there is no consensus. That is the only part over which they are compelled to have "different interpretations." There is no disagreement over the "one China" part of the 1992 consensus. There is only disagreement over the "different interpretations" part. This part pertains to jurisdiction, and includes the national title and the structure of the government. This is why Beijing says that the 1992 consensus means "one China," but that each side has its own interpretation about "the part about which no consensus has been reached." For this part, "different interpretations" persist, and of course, no consensus exists.
As we can see, China under the 1992 consensus is a nation with unified sovereignty but divided jurisdiction. The ROC Constitution's "Articles on Relations between People Across the Strait" clearly specifies "one country, two regions." Both Mainland China and Taiwan are included in ROC sovereignty claims. That is why over the years, the Mainland has never complained that Taiwan is taking advantage of it, or that Taiwan has demeaned the Mainland by classifying it as a region.
President Ma said the two sides "do not recognize each others' sovereignty, but do not deny each others' jurisdiction." This remark is particularly significant. The term "sovereignty" implies exclusivity. The two cannot coexist in the same territory. If the two sides recognize each others' sovereignty, then China would immediately be split into two sovereign states. Therefore having the two sides "not recognize each others' sovereignty" is essential. But within "one China" there are two regimes. Each regime must face the fact that the other exists. Only then can they have peaceful contacts. Therefore they must not deny each others' jurisdiction. The former, "one China," is legal consensus. The latter, "different interpretations," is realpolitik.
The 1992 consensus must be clarified and honored. Only then can cross-Strait conflicts be resolved. For example, the Mainland's new passports include scenes of Taiwan. The Mainland authorities' jurisdiction may not be as compelling as the Taiwan authorities'. But that does not negate its sovereignty over Taiwan. This is the Mainland's "one China, different interpretations." The Mainland Affairs Council has complained about the Mainland's new passport. It has called upon the Mainland to "shelve disputes and face reality." But the MAC is confused. Is the MAC saying that the Republic of China cannot include the Yangtze River and the Yellow River in official Republic of China documents? The MAC has apparently confused sovereignty with jurisdiction. The two sides have no dispute over territorial sovereignty, Therefore what is there to shelve? Beijing did not ask the public on Taiwan to apply for Mainland passports. Clearly Beijing recognizes the reality of divided jurisdiction.
The cross-Strait situation is like two brothers separated by a courtyard wall. They had no contact with each other. They even asked foreign powers to intervene. With the passage of time however, the two have let go of their resentments. They have begun talking to each other. They have realized that the wise course of action is to heal the rifts within the family.
The 1992 consensus appears complex. In fact, it is quite simple, All that is required is good faith.
「九二共識」的真義 在「一個各表」
2012-11-28
中國時報
在台灣，「九二共識」這個名詞大家都聽過，許多人都在引用，但是它的準確涵義卻少有人說得清楚，甚至還有人想否定它的存在。對於這個攸關台灣前途的概念與主張，我們不厭其煩願意詳加闡述如下。
一九九三年辜汪會談開啟了兩岸正式協商大門，踏出兩岸緊密來往與互利互惠的關鍵第一步。但所有談判都必有共同接受的前提。沒前提，雙方不可能坐上談判桌。辜汪會談的前提，就是後來被前陸委會主委蘇起概括為「九二共識」的原則。只要談判雙方共同接受會談的前提條件，共識就已存在。至於此一共識是否寫入談判結果的文件，或是否被稱為「九二共識」、「九二精神」，或其他名稱，都無礙於此一共識存在之事實。
獨派人物總說「九二共識」不存在，甚至暗示這是蘇起捏造的，其實都只抓住「當年兩岸往還文件中沒出現這四個字」而死纏爛打，並不能否定某種共識確已存在之事實。這裡我們依循慣例，將此共識稱為「九二共識」。
「九二共識」的內容，北京方面認定是「一個中國」原則而不追究其內涵，台北則稱是「一個中國，各自表述」。僅就台北這方而論，台灣方面對「一個中國」的表述方式可見於國統會在一九九二年通過《關於〈一個中國〉的涵義》：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同。中共當局認為『一個中國』即為『中華人民共和國』，將來統一以後，台灣將成為其轄下的一個『特別行政區』。我方則認為「一個中國」應指一九一二年成立迄今之中華民國，其主權及於整個中國，但目前之治權，則僅及於臺澎金馬。台灣固為中國之一部分，但大陸亦為中國之一部分。」
我們即使僅依國統會決議，也可看出兩岸對「一個中國」的主權範圍是沒爭議的，亦即都把「中國」視為包含大陸和台灣。雙方存在歧異而不得不「各自表述」的部分（亦即沒達成共識的部分），只是對這個「中國」的「主權」如何透過「治權」來實現，各自立場不同。所以，「九二共識」中的「一中」是指無爭議的主權範圍，「各表」則是雙方各自對治權立場（如國號、政體）進行表述。準此而論，北京自然會說「九二共識」是「一中」，而「對未達成共識的部分（不得不）各自表述」，既是「各自表述」，當然不存共識。
由此可見，「九二共識」下的中國，是主權統一、治權分裂的國家。我方的《兩岸人民關係條例》，就是基於憲法增修條文和此一共識而明定「一國兩區」，將大陸地區和台灣地區都納入我方主張的主權範圍內。因此多年來，大陸從未抗議台灣吃他們豆腐，或是台灣把大陸矮化為一個區。
至於馬總統所說兩岸「互不承認主權、互不否認治權」，此話尤有深意。「主權」具有排他性，在同一領土內無法並存兩個主權。若兩岸互相承認主權，則中國立即分裂成兩個主權國家，故「互不承認主權」本屬應然。但在「一個中國」內，現有兩個政權，彼此必須正視事實，雙方才能和平交往，因此又需「互不否認治權」。前者是「一中」之法理共識，後者仍是「各表」之面對事實。
釐清、遵守「九二共識」之後，兩岸間的紛紛擾擾都可化解。以大陸護照印有台灣風景為例，大陸的治權雖不及於台灣，但無礙其法理主權及於台灣，這正是大陸的「一中各表」。如今陸委會針對大陸新護照，要求大陸「擱置爭議、正視現實」，那麼中華民國是不是也不能把長江、黃河列入我國官文書呢？這似乎把主權、治權混為一談。因為兩岸對主權範圍本無爭議，如何擱置？北京並未要求台灣人民申請大陸護照，可見他們也沒有漠視治權分裂之現實。
兩岸局勢如兄弟鬩牆。早年不但互不往來，甚至援引外力與對方對抗。時過境遷後，兩人放下仇恨，深覺互動往來、恢復家人關係才屬明智。
「九二共識」看似複雜，其實也很簡單，誠意而已矣。
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
The ROC Must Rebalance Too
The ROC Must Rebalance Too
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 27, 2012
Summary: U.S. President Barack Obama's "rebalancing" act is affecting the Asian-Pacific strategic picture. We on Taiwan should not exaggerate its political or military significance. Instead, we should pay close attention to the economic situation. We should be vigilant. We should do some "rebalancing" of our own.
Full Text below:
U.S. President Barack Obama's "rebalancing" act is affecting the Asian-Pacific strategic picture. We on Taiwan should not exaggerate its political or military significance. Instead, we should pay close attention to the economic situation. We should be vigilant. We should do some rebalancing of our own.
Obama's rebalancing has political and military undertones. He uses such terms as "returning to Asia," "entering China's backyard," and "neo-containment." We need not repudiate such perspectives. But they overlook the forest for the trees. They use 60s era Cold War rhetoric to interpret 21st century world events.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other, primarily in Europe. The United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact. One military alliance pitted itself against the other. Today, the Asian mainland has become the rebalancing arena for the United States and Mainland China. The US-led TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) is emerging. Mainland China is the hub of the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). These two economic organizations cooperate as well as compete.
Obama has held high the banner of "returning to Asia." Intentionally or otherwise, he has implied that the US is "resisting the rise of China." But Obama knows that military force is not the solution. The solution to the problem is economic. The TPP is the economic means by which Obama seeks to achieve rebalancing.
By the same token, Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea announced a tripartite FTA in Phnom Penh. They are jointly promoting the RCEP. Japan and South Korea have clashed over Dokdo. Japan and Mainland China have clashed over Diaoyutai. These clashes were necessary responses to nationalist sentiments at home. But the RCEP shows that the three governments realize that the future requires economic coopetition. Disputes over islands are trees. Economic alliances are the forest. One must not destroy the forest for the sake of the trees.
This requires a broader view of history. The wars of the 19th century arose due to economic factors. In extreme cases, one side seized territory from the other, and turned them into colonies or foreign concessions. The main cause of wars during the twentieth century was ideology. The themes of the Cold War were "containment" and "exporting revolution." But since the twentieth century, forcible economic colonization is no longer possible. Communist regimes have disintegrated, one after the other. Either that, or they have undergone glasnost and perestroika. Rebalancing is less and less likely to lead to war. It is more likely to involve economic and trade coopetition. Obama's rebalancing is no exception.
NATO confronted the Warsaw Pact. Now the RCEP is confronting the TPP. Paradoxically this is "ASEAN plus six." ASEAN was seen as a military alliance to confront Beijing. Clearly the political climate has changed. It has presented nations the world over with new challenges. Future world powers and world leaders can no longer rely on military means to achieve their ends. They must be creative. They must depend on trade and economics. The US-led TPP is attempting to use stringent labor conditions and environmental conditions to weaken backward economies, in order to gain an advantage. Will it prevent the Mainland Chinese led RCEP, a relative latecomer, from catching up? This will be the acid test for the United States' rebalancing act.
The Asian-Pacific region is undergoing rebalancing. We on Taiwan must also think about rebalancing. We need not harbor fantasies about rebalancing the military picture in the Asian-Pacific region. Instead, we should give serious thought to affecting the economic and trade picture. We should try to join both the TPP and the RCEP. If we fail, we will become "economic orphans." The political implications would be unimaginable. We on Taiwan should respond to the new strategic picture in two ways.
One. We must establish more peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations. We should upgrade. We should trade the 1992 consensus in for "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of one China." Together with the Mainland, we should seek a shared definition of "one China." This would stabilize cross-Strait relations. The Mainland must realize that Taiwan is willing to participate. We may not be able to participate in the TPP and RCEP. But Beijing is hardly the only party that could exclude us. If Mainland China forces other countries to persecute Taiwan, politically and economically, it will surely harm cross-Strait relations.
Two. We on Taiwan must establish a political and economic consensus between the ruling and opposition parties. Refusal to liberalize economically, will make it impossible for us to survive. Liberalizing economically, on the other hand, will inflict pain. The ruling and opposition parties must work together to minimize the pain of economic liberalization. They must avoid turning the pain caused by economic liberalization into a bargaining chip in a political struggle. Politically speaking, the DPP has been taken hostage by Taiwan independence hardliners. Its concepts of national and constitutional allegiance, and its cross-Strait policy, must be replaced. It must not cling to fantasies that it can benefit from "rebalancing" and "neo-containment." Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen must not be even more blind to history than Shintaro Ishihara. They must not remain blind to the bigger picture.
The global political and economic picture is changing dramatically. Governments the world over are attempting to rebalance themselves. We on Taiwan must give careful thought to rebalancing our nation's governance and cross-Strait relations.
深思慎擇：台灣也有自己的「再平衡」
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.27
美國總統歐巴馬標舉「再平衡」所牽動的亞太新局，就台灣的立場言，不宜過度強調其在政治或軍事上的意義，而應特別關注其漸將驅動的經濟情勢演變。國人必須警覺：台灣也需有自己的「再平衡」。
歐巴馬的「再平衡」，被附加了許多政治性或軍事性的註腳，如「重返亞洲」、「進入中國的後花園」、「新圍堵」等；人們或許不必完全否認此類觀點，但這卻是見樹不見林的說法，也是誤以二十世紀六○年代的冷戰語言來解釋廿一世紀的世局。
冷戰年代，美蘇的對立以歐洲為主要舞台，當時的情勢是，美國主持北大西洋公約，蘇聯主持華沙公約，亦即以軍事聯盟對抗軍事聯盟；如今，亞洲若成為美國與中國大陸兩強「再平衡」的舞台，正在浮現的則是美國主導的ＴＰＰ（泛太平洋夥伴協議），與以中國大陸為樞紐的ＲＣＥＰ（區域全面經濟夥伴關係），這卻是兩個有競有合的經濟組織。
歐巴馬高舉「重返亞洲」的旗幟，並有意無意地渲染「抵制中國崛起」的意味；但歐巴馬自己確知，軍事不應也不會是解決未來問題的手段，關鍵仍在經濟，而ＴＰＰ即是歐巴馬提出的經濟手段，亦即主要欲以經濟方法去實現「再平衡」之目的。
同樣的道理，也見諸中日韓三國在金邊宣布啟動三國議簽ＦＴＡ，及共同推進ＲＣＥＰ；足見日韓的獨島爭議與中日的釣魚台爭議，雖也皆是各自回應國內民族主義的必要戲碼，但三國亦均知，未來世局演進的關鍵仍在經濟競合。畢竟，島嶼之爭只是「樹」，經濟結盟才是「林」，不能因樹毀林。
這牽涉到「大歷史觀」的認知，十九世紀的戰爭大多出自經濟動機，嚴重者甚至以武力強奪他人領土而據為殖民地或租界；廿世紀的戰爭主因，則在意識形態，冷戰的主題是「圍堵」與「相互輸出革命」。然而，自廿世紀末葉，由於武力經濟殖民已無可能，而共產政權又相繼崩解或進行「改革開放」，世界的「再平衡」即愈來愈不應亦不會訴諸戰爭，而必須循由經貿競合的途徑，歐巴馬的「再平衡」也不例外。
由北大西洋公約對抗華沙公約，轉到以ＴＰＰ對抗ＲＣＥＰ（弔詭的是，此為「東協加六」，而東協卻是被認為有與北京抗衡意味的軍事聯盟）；顯示了歷史氛圍的大改變，也給了世界各國一個新課題。未來世界的強國或領導國，將愈來愈不再能徒以軍事為憑藉，而須以經貿的創造力及經營力為張本。準此以論，美國主導的ＴＰＰ欲以高勞動條件與高環保條件等為門檻，來「削弱」後進國家的「優勢」；卻會否因此使中國大陸主導的ＲＣＥＰ後發先至且後來居上，這也許就是美國能否「再平衡」的考驗。
在亞太「再平衡」的大局中，台灣必須思考自己的「再平衡」。不要過度幻想亞太「再平衡」的軍事意義，而應嚴重關切其所必將牽動的經貿情勢；對台灣而言，ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ都應設法加入，倘若二者皆落空，將成「經濟孤兒」，其政治性效應尤不堪想像。為因應新局，台灣的關鍵作為有二：
一、對外言，必須建構更為和平穩定的兩岸關係：在台灣方面，應試以「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」為「九二共識」的升級版，努力與中國大陸尋求「一個中國」的定義共識，以穩定兩岸關係。在大陸方面亦應知，台灣並非無意願參與，或無資格參與ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，而倘若完全只因北京的阻撓杯葛而不能參與，這將是中國挾持外國對台灣的巨大政經迫害，必然不利兩岸之將來。
二、對內言，必須建構朝野一致的政經共識：就經濟言，不開放，不能活；要開放，又有痛苦。朝野應共同克服、化解開放的痛苦，不宜以開放必將面臨的痛苦作為政治鬥爭的籌碼。就政治言，民進黨被台獨挾持的國憲認同與兩岸政策必須轉型，不能又陷於「再平衡／新圍堵」的迷夢中，而蘇貞昌、蔡英文等，尤不能成為比石原慎太郎更「史盲」、更不識大體的政治人物。
其實，在世界政經情勢發生如此巨變的今日，全球各國皆在尋求自己的「再平衡」；對台灣而言，無論就國家治理或兩岸關係的「再平衡」，亦應深思慎擇。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 27, 2012
Summary: U.S. President Barack Obama's "rebalancing" act is affecting the Asian-Pacific strategic picture. We on Taiwan should not exaggerate its political or military significance. Instead, we should pay close attention to the economic situation. We should be vigilant. We should do some "rebalancing" of our own.
Full Text below:
U.S. President Barack Obama's "rebalancing" act is affecting the Asian-Pacific strategic picture. We on Taiwan should not exaggerate its political or military significance. Instead, we should pay close attention to the economic situation. We should be vigilant. We should do some rebalancing of our own.
Obama's rebalancing has political and military undertones. He uses such terms as "returning to Asia," "entering China's backyard," and "neo-containment." We need not repudiate such perspectives. But they overlook the forest for the trees. They use 60s era Cold War rhetoric to interpret 21st century world events.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other, primarily in Europe. The United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact. One military alliance pitted itself against the other. Today, the Asian mainland has become the rebalancing arena for the United States and Mainland China. The US-led TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) is emerging. Mainland China is the hub of the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). These two economic organizations cooperate as well as compete.
Obama has held high the banner of "returning to Asia." Intentionally or otherwise, he has implied that the US is "resisting the rise of China." But Obama knows that military force is not the solution. The solution to the problem is economic. The TPP is the economic means by which Obama seeks to achieve rebalancing.
By the same token, Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea announced a tripartite FTA in Phnom Penh. They are jointly promoting the RCEP. Japan and South Korea have clashed over Dokdo. Japan and Mainland China have clashed over Diaoyutai. These clashes were necessary responses to nationalist sentiments at home. But the RCEP shows that the three governments realize that the future requires economic coopetition. Disputes over islands are trees. Economic alliances are the forest. One must not destroy the forest for the sake of the trees.
This requires a broader view of history. The wars of the 19th century arose due to economic factors. In extreme cases, one side seized territory from the other, and turned them into colonies or foreign concessions. The main cause of wars during the twentieth century was ideology. The themes of the Cold War were "containment" and "exporting revolution." But since the twentieth century, forcible economic colonization is no longer possible. Communist regimes have disintegrated, one after the other. Either that, or they have undergone glasnost and perestroika. Rebalancing is less and less likely to lead to war. It is more likely to involve economic and trade coopetition. Obama's rebalancing is no exception.
NATO confronted the Warsaw Pact. Now the RCEP is confronting the TPP. Paradoxically this is "ASEAN plus six." ASEAN was seen as a military alliance to confront Beijing. Clearly the political climate has changed. It has presented nations the world over with new challenges. Future world powers and world leaders can no longer rely on military means to achieve their ends. They must be creative. They must depend on trade and economics. The US-led TPP is attempting to use stringent labor conditions and environmental conditions to weaken backward economies, in order to gain an advantage. Will it prevent the Mainland Chinese led RCEP, a relative latecomer, from catching up? This will be the acid test for the United States' rebalancing act.
The Asian-Pacific region is undergoing rebalancing. We on Taiwan must also think about rebalancing. We need not harbor fantasies about rebalancing the military picture in the Asian-Pacific region. Instead, we should give serious thought to affecting the economic and trade picture. We should try to join both the TPP and the RCEP. If we fail, we will become "economic orphans." The political implications would be unimaginable. We on Taiwan should respond to the new strategic picture in two ways.
One. We must establish more peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations. We should upgrade. We should trade the 1992 consensus in for "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of one China." Together with the Mainland, we should seek a shared definition of "one China." This would stabilize cross-Strait relations. The Mainland must realize that Taiwan is willing to participate. We may not be able to participate in the TPP and RCEP. But Beijing is hardly the only party that could exclude us. If Mainland China forces other countries to persecute Taiwan, politically and economically, it will surely harm cross-Strait relations.
Two. We on Taiwan must establish a political and economic consensus between the ruling and opposition parties. Refusal to liberalize economically, will make it impossible for us to survive. Liberalizing economically, on the other hand, will inflict pain. The ruling and opposition parties must work together to minimize the pain of economic liberalization. They must avoid turning the pain caused by economic liberalization into a bargaining chip in a political struggle. Politically speaking, the DPP has been taken hostage by Taiwan independence hardliners. Its concepts of national and constitutional allegiance, and its cross-Strait policy, must be replaced. It must not cling to fantasies that it can benefit from "rebalancing" and "neo-containment." Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen must not be even more blind to history than Shintaro Ishihara. They must not remain blind to the bigger picture.
The global political and economic picture is changing dramatically. Governments the world over are attempting to rebalance themselves. We on Taiwan must give careful thought to rebalancing our nation's governance and cross-Strait relations.
深思慎擇：台灣也有自己的「再平衡」
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.27
美國總統歐巴馬標舉「再平衡」所牽動的亞太新局，就台灣的立場言，不宜過度強調其在政治或軍事上的意義，而應特別關注其漸將驅動的經濟情勢演變。國人必須警覺：台灣也需有自己的「再平衡」。
歐巴馬的「再平衡」，被附加了許多政治性或軍事性的註腳，如「重返亞洲」、「進入中國的後花園」、「新圍堵」等；人們或許不必完全否認此類觀點，但這卻是見樹不見林的說法，也是誤以二十世紀六○年代的冷戰語言來解釋廿一世紀的世局。
冷戰年代，美蘇的對立以歐洲為主要舞台，當時的情勢是，美國主持北大西洋公約，蘇聯主持華沙公約，亦即以軍事聯盟對抗軍事聯盟；如今，亞洲若成為美國與中國大陸兩強「再平衡」的舞台，正在浮現的則是美國主導的ＴＰＰ（泛太平洋夥伴協議），與以中國大陸為樞紐的ＲＣＥＰ（區域全面經濟夥伴關係），這卻是兩個有競有合的經濟組織。
歐巴馬高舉「重返亞洲」的旗幟，並有意無意地渲染「抵制中國崛起」的意味；但歐巴馬自己確知，軍事不應也不會是解決未來問題的手段，關鍵仍在經濟，而ＴＰＰ即是歐巴馬提出的經濟手段，亦即主要欲以經濟方法去實現「再平衡」之目的。
同樣的道理，也見諸中日韓三國在金邊宣布啟動三國議簽ＦＴＡ，及共同推進ＲＣＥＰ；足見日韓的獨島爭議與中日的釣魚台爭議，雖也皆是各自回應國內民族主義的必要戲碼，但三國亦均知，未來世局演進的關鍵仍在經濟競合。畢竟，島嶼之爭只是「樹」，經濟結盟才是「林」，不能因樹毀林。
這牽涉到「大歷史觀」的認知，十九世紀的戰爭大多出自經濟動機，嚴重者甚至以武力強奪他人領土而據為殖民地或租界；廿世紀的戰爭主因，則在意識形態，冷戰的主題是「圍堵」與「相互輸出革命」。然而，自廿世紀末葉，由於武力經濟殖民已無可能，而共產政權又相繼崩解或進行「改革開放」，世界的「再平衡」即愈來愈不應亦不會訴諸戰爭，而必須循由經貿競合的途徑，歐巴馬的「再平衡」也不例外。
由北大西洋公約對抗華沙公約，轉到以ＴＰＰ對抗ＲＣＥＰ（弔詭的是，此為「東協加六」，而東協卻是被認為有與北京抗衡意味的軍事聯盟）；顯示了歷史氛圍的大改變，也給了世界各國一個新課題。未來世界的強國或領導國，將愈來愈不再能徒以軍事為憑藉，而須以經貿的創造力及經營力為張本。準此以論，美國主導的ＴＰＰ欲以高勞動條件與高環保條件等為門檻，來「削弱」後進國家的「優勢」；卻會否因此使中國大陸主導的ＲＣＥＰ後發先至且後來居上，這也許就是美國能否「再平衡」的考驗。
在亞太「再平衡」的大局中，台灣必須思考自己的「再平衡」。不要過度幻想亞太「再平衡」的軍事意義，而應嚴重關切其所必將牽動的經貿情勢；對台灣而言，ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ都應設法加入，倘若二者皆落空，將成「經濟孤兒」，其政治性效應尤不堪想像。為因應新局，台灣的關鍵作為有二：
一、對外言，必須建構更為和平穩定的兩岸關係：在台灣方面，應試以「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」為「九二共識」的升級版，努力與中國大陸尋求「一個中國」的定義共識，以穩定兩岸關係。在大陸方面亦應知，台灣並非無意願參與，或無資格參與ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，而倘若完全只因北京的阻撓杯葛而不能參與，這將是中國挾持外國對台灣的巨大政經迫害，必然不利兩岸之將來。
二、對內言，必須建構朝野一致的政經共識：就經濟言，不開放，不能活；要開放，又有痛苦。朝野應共同克服、化解開放的痛苦，不宜以開放必將面臨的痛苦作為政治鬥爭的籌碼。就政治言，民進黨被台獨挾持的國憲認同與兩岸政策必須轉型，不能又陷於「再平衡／新圍堵」的迷夢中，而蘇貞昌、蔡英文等，尤不能成為比石原慎太郎更「史盲」、更不識大體的政治人物。
其實，在世界政經情勢發生如此巨變的今日，全球各國皆在尋求自己的「再平衡」；對台灣而言，無論就國家治理或兩岸關係的「再平衡」，亦應深思慎擇。
Monday, November 26, 2012
Taipei and Beijing are Pursuing Peace: Is the DPP Ready?
Taipei and Beijing are Pursuing Peace: Is the DPP Ready?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 26, 2012
Summary: The DPP has long boasted that it is diligent, close to the people, and close to the land. It has used every trick in the book to seize power. Perhaps this is normal for partisan politics under a democracy. But the DPP should adopt a more elevated perspective. It should think about how to promote win-win cross-strait relations, about how to coexist and prosper. This is the solution to the problem. But it involves issues of national identity and personal identity. Is the DPP really ready? Probably not.
Full Text below:
On the 22nd of this month, the DPP established a "China Affairs Committee." Su Tseng-chang will be its convener. The committee will "develop strategies for cross-Strait exchanges between Taiwan and China." The consensus is that this committee was established in response to former Chairman Frank Hsieh's Mainland visit. The consensus is that the DPP established this committee hurriedly, under duress. Its establishment led to public concern and shared concern among party factions. It was originally meant to be a permanent body. Now party members want to make it an ad hoc entity. They want to formulate a new response to Beijing's strategies and tactics. It appears a new round of internecine struggles is brewing within the DPP.
The result of the January presidential election showed that cross-Strait relations remains the DPP's biggest Achilles Heel. The public on Taiwan feels the DPP's policy of enmity toward the Chinese mainland is at odds with political stability, economic growth, and cross-Strait peace. No wonder even Tsai Ing-wen said that the DPP must increase its interaction with, and its understanding of, the Chinese mainland. Following the election everyone hoped the DPP would promptly initiate an intraparty policy debate on cross-Strait relations. This would enable it to determine the cause for its defeat. It would enable it to adopt a new policy path. Obviously this never happened.
The DPP must be rational and pragmatic. It must gradually alter its separatist ideology, and its relentlessly Sinophobic political calculations. Outsiders should not expect the DPP to alter its Mainland policy any time soon. It will take time for the DPP to adopt a pragmatic attitude. But everyone agrees that the DPP should change some of its practices. For example, it should establish a Mainland Affairs Department or Cross-Strait Relations Committee. This would tell the public on Taiwan that it is changing. It would amount to an expression of goodwill toward the Chinese mainland. Alas, this proposal has also fallen on barren ground.
Su Tseng-chang hurriedly established a China Affairs Committee. Most people on Taiwan think Chairman Su was pandering to Taiwan independence hardliners, that they hijacked him. Cooperation between Su and Frank Hsieh was aborted. Actually, Su was probably attempting to block both Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. He was appealing to Yu Hsi-kun and sidelining Annette Lu. No wonder people are blasting Su Tseng-chang as self-serving. They are saying "He wants to control everything. But in the end he will end up with nothing." The leader of a major political party is thinking only about how to promote himself. Is this any way to begin anew?
The veiled rivalry between Su and Hsieh is hardly news. Frank Hsieh once argued that Kaohsiung and Xiamen were two cities within the same nation. He now argues that the ROC Constitution stipulates that there is only one China. This led to veiled criticisms from Su, who said, "Anyone who wants to cozy up to China for the sake of votes should join the KMT." Clearly the DPP is refusing to support Frank Hsieh's cross-Strait policy. This is a struggle between two paths. It is difficult to avoid comparisons with Su's criticism of Hsieh four years ago. Su said changing the subject would not change the facts of the case. His criticism of Hsieh was devious. It left people in shock. With friends like this, does the DPP need enemies?
The DPP has long been criticized for its McCarthyite political smears. It is willing to do anything for power. It has no qualms about violating society's ethical standards, in order to incite class antagonisms. It has no problem ignoring right and wrong. Its Taiwan Independence Party Platform and its Resolution on Taiwan's Future, have proven to be dead ends, impossible to realize. Frank Hsieh's "constitutional one China" has been relatively progressive. But the Su Tseng-chang-led DPP will not tolerate any such proposals. Therefore who dares to put his hopes on the DPP?
The DPP's current plight involves more than the question of whether to recognize the 1992 consensus. It involves how to handle relations with the Chinese mainland. Mainland reform began in 1978. In 1988, the government on Taiwan allowed the public on Taiwan to visit their relatives on the Mainland. For several decades, the two sides pitted their strength against each other. Now bilateral exchanges have expanded to unimaginable proportions. The international environment is also very different from what it was back then. President Chiang Ching-kuo said the times are changing. Frank Hsieh also says the situation has changed. If people refuse to change, they will precipate tragedy. The DPP must beware.
Whether the KMT or DPP is in office does not matter. The ROC needs a rational, moderate, and healthy system of checks and balances. This is something about which everyone agrees. One must change with the times. One must liberate one's thinking. The CCP succeeeded over the past thirty years because it liberalized. Anyone who understands the international situation, anyone with any diplomatic experience, knows that Taiwan independence separatism is an unachievable dead end. Otherwise, Chen Shui-bian would not have complained that "It can't be done means it can't be done. There is no need to deceive ourselves." Where will the DPP go from here? The answer should be self-evident. But has Su Tseng-chang heard or understood?
The DPP has long boasted that it is diligent, close to the people, and close to the land. It has used every trick in the book to seize power. Perhaps this is normal for partisan politics under a democracy. But the DPP should adopt a more elevated perspective. It should pursue cross-Strait coexistence and coopetition. It should undergoe a peaceful transition. It should seek solutions acceptable to both sides. It should think about how to promote win-win cross-strait relations, about how to coexist and prosper. This is the solution to the problem. But it involves issues of national identity and personal identity. Is the DPP really ready? Probably not.
兩岸追求和平 民進黨準備好了？
2012-11-26
中國時報
二十二日民進黨成立中國事務委員會，由蘇貞昌出任召集人，並將其定位為「制定台灣有關中國政策與兩岸交流策略。」一般認為，這是為了因應前主席謝長廷訪陸而來，臨時在不得不成立的情況下倉促上路，結果引來社會疑慮及黨內跨派系之間的結合，要把這個原本定位為常設組織的機構變為任務編組，要求從新擬定應對北京的戰略與策略。看來新一回合的民進黨內鬥爭恐將再起。
今年一月總統大選結果顯示，兩岸關係仍是民進黨最大罩門，台灣民眾並不認為民進黨對中國大陸具有強烈敵意的政策符合大多數人民求安定、要發展、重和平的最大利益。難怪連蔡英文事後也說，民進黨須在互動中加強對中國大陸的了解。選後各界期望，民進黨早日進行黨內中國政策大辯論，不但要找出敗選的癥結，也更要擬定新的發展方向，但顯然事與願違。
除非民進黨能夠漸進、理性、務實的改變其分離主義的意識形態及其逢中必反的政治算計和權力邏輯，外界對於民進黨短期內調整其大陸政策並無太高期望，畢竟事務的發展得有一段過程，但各界確曾主張，民進黨如果能夠先在某些做法上微調，比如說成立大陸事務部或兩岸關係委員會，這也是對台灣民眾釋放漸變的訊息，對中國大陸表達善意的一種方式，但這種建議同樣泥牛入海。
對這次蘇貞昌倉促成立中國事務委員會，台灣各界多半認為，這是蘇主席對獨派的交心或受彼等綁架，與謝長廷的合作破局，但究其實際，其中恐怕更大的程度是要堵蔡（英文）、卡謝（長廷）、拉游（錫?）、忘呂（秀蓮）。難怪有人要痛批蘇貞昌師心自用，「什麼都要自己來，最後反而什麼都沒有」。一個主要政黨的領導人如果一心想的只是要為自己尋找熱帶氣旋，從新出發，這樣豈是正道？
蘇、謝之間的瑜亮情節早為眾所皆知，謝長廷過去主張一國兩市，如今又有憲法一中的看法，結果被蘇暗批，「如為選舉親中，那就去國民黨」，表明了民進黨拒絕謝長廷所支持的兩岸政策，這就是一種路線鬥爭，這難免又讓人想起四年多前，蘇對於謝的批評，竟指其轉移焦點不能改變涉案的事實，批評謝的奸巧，簡直讓人瞠目結舌，有這樣的朋友（或同志），民進黨哪還需要再有任何敵人？
民進黨向來為人所詬病的是擅長給人戴帽子、打棍子，為了權力不擇手段，即使破壞社會倫常，製造階級對立，不講是非道理也都在所不惜。不管是台獨黨綱、或台灣前途決議文已經證明窒礙難行、沒有出路，而如謝長廷憲法一中這種相對較為進步，雖然還有進一步思辯空間的主張也不能見容於蘇貞昌所主導的民進黨，今後有誰還敢再對民進黨寄予希望？
其實，民進黨今天的困境不但牽涉到認同九二共識與否的問題，更在究竟要如何正確處理、面對與中國大陸之間的關係。一九七八年中共改革開放，一九八八年台灣開放探親，幾十年來兩岸實力對比，雙邊交流已經深化到難以想像的地步，而國際大環境與當年已有非常大的不同。蔣經國總統當年說過，時代在變、潮流在變，謝長廷也引述說，情勢已變，人若不變將釀悲劇，民進黨可不慎乎？
其實，不管國、民兩黨是誰執政，台灣需要一個理性、中道、健康的監督制衡力量這已成全民共識，如果說與時俱進、解放思想、對外開放是過去三十多年中共成功的原因，而所有具有國際知識與涉外經驗的人都知道，台獨分離主義已是一條行不通的死路，否則陳水扁也不會有做不到就是做不到，不要再自欺欺人的講話，民進黨的何去何從已經不言自明，蘇貞昌聽到或聽懂了嗎？
勤政、愛民、愛鄉土理所當然，機關算盡、黨同伐異或許也是民主政治常態，但如民進黨能由更宏觀戰略高度出發，由追求兩岸和平共處及和平競賽出發，再和平過渡到一個雙方都能接受的最終解決，思考如何將兩岸關係進一步引領往互利雙贏、共存共榮境地，這才是一切問題根本。但這裡面牽涉到的國家定位及自我認同問題，民進黨真的準備好了嗎？恐怕沒有！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 26, 2012
Summary: The DPP has long boasted that it is diligent, close to the people, and close to the land. It has used every trick in the book to seize power. Perhaps this is normal for partisan politics under a democracy. But the DPP should adopt a more elevated perspective. It should think about how to promote win-win cross-strait relations, about how to coexist and prosper. This is the solution to the problem. But it involves issues of national identity and personal identity. Is the DPP really ready? Probably not.
Full Text below:
On the 22nd of this month, the DPP established a "China Affairs Committee." Su Tseng-chang will be its convener. The committee will "develop strategies for cross-Strait exchanges between Taiwan and China." The consensus is that this committee was established in response to former Chairman Frank Hsieh's Mainland visit. The consensus is that the DPP established this committee hurriedly, under duress. Its establishment led to public concern and shared concern among party factions. It was originally meant to be a permanent body. Now party members want to make it an ad hoc entity. They want to formulate a new response to Beijing's strategies and tactics. It appears a new round of internecine struggles is brewing within the DPP.
The result of the January presidential election showed that cross-Strait relations remains the DPP's biggest Achilles Heel. The public on Taiwan feels the DPP's policy of enmity toward the Chinese mainland is at odds with political stability, economic growth, and cross-Strait peace. No wonder even Tsai Ing-wen said that the DPP must increase its interaction with, and its understanding of, the Chinese mainland. Following the election everyone hoped the DPP would promptly initiate an intraparty policy debate on cross-Strait relations. This would enable it to determine the cause for its defeat. It would enable it to adopt a new policy path. Obviously this never happened.
The DPP must be rational and pragmatic. It must gradually alter its separatist ideology, and its relentlessly Sinophobic political calculations. Outsiders should not expect the DPP to alter its Mainland policy any time soon. It will take time for the DPP to adopt a pragmatic attitude. But everyone agrees that the DPP should change some of its practices. For example, it should establish a Mainland Affairs Department or Cross-Strait Relations Committee. This would tell the public on Taiwan that it is changing. It would amount to an expression of goodwill toward the Chinese mainland. Alas, this proposal has also fallen on barren ground.
Su Tseng-chang hurriedly established a China Affairs Committee. Most people on Taiwan think Chairman Su was pandering to Taiwan independence hardliners, that they hijacked him. Cooperation between Su and Frank Hsieh was aborted. Actually, Su was probably attempting to block both Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. He was appealing to Yu Hsi-kun and sidelining Annette Lu. No wonder people are blasting Su Tseng-chang as self-serving. They are saying "He wants to control everything. But in the end he will end up with nothing." The leader of a major political party is thinking only about how to promote himself. Is this any way to begin anew?
The veiled rivalry between Su and Hsieh is hardly news. Frank Hsieh once argued that Kaohsiung and Xiamen were two cities within the same nation. He now argues that the ROC Constitution stipulates that there is only one China. This led to veiled criticisms from Su, who said, "Anyone who wants to cozy up to China for the sake of votes should join the KMT." Clearly the DPP is refusing to support Frank Hsieh's cross-Strait policy. This is a struggle between two paths. It is difficult to avoid comparisons with Su's criticism of Hsieh four years ago. Su said changing the subject would not change the facts of the case. His criticism of Hsieh was devious. It left people in shock. With friends like this, does the DPP need enemies?
The DPP has long been criticized for its McCarthyite political smears. It is willing to do anything for power. It has no qualms about violating society's ethical standards, in order to incite class antagonisms. It has no problem ignoring right and wrong. Its Taiwan Independence Party Platform and its Resolution on Taiwan's Future, have proven to be dead ends, impossible to realize. Frank Hsieh's "constitutional one China" has been relatively progressive. But the Su Tseng-chang-led DPP will not tolerate any such proposals. Therefore who dares to put his hopes on the DPP?
The DPP's current plight involves more than the question of whether to recognize the 1992 consensus. It involves how to handle relations with the Chinese mainland. Mainland reform began in 1978. In 1988, the government on Taiwan allowed the public on Taiwan to visit their relatives on the Mainland. For several decades, the two sides pitted their strength against each other. Now bilateral exchanges have expanded to unimaginable proportions. The international environment is also very different from what it was back then. President Chiang Ching-kuo said the times are changing. Frank Hsieh also says the situation has changed. If people refuse to change, they will precipate tragedy. The DPP must beware.
Whether the KMT or DPP is in office does not matter. The ROC needs a rational, moderate, and healthy system of checks and balances. This is something about which everyone agrees. One must change with the times. One must liberate one's thinking. The CCP succeeeded over the past thirty years because it liberalized. Anyone who understands the international situation, anyone with any diplomatic experience, knows that Taiwan independence separatism is an unachievable dead end. Otherwise, Chen Shui-bian would not have complained that "It can't be done means it can't be done. There is no need to deceive ourselves." Where will the DPP go from here? The answer should be self-evident. But has Su Tseng-chang heard or understood?
The DPP has long boasted that it is diligent, close to the people, and close to the land. It has used every trick in the book to seize power. Perhaps this is normal for partisan politics under a democracy. But the DPP should adopt a more elevated perspective. It should pursue cross-Strait coexistence and coopetition. It should undergoe a peaceful transition. It should seek solutions acceptable to both sides. It should think about how to promote win-win cross-strait relations, about how to coexist and prosper. This is the solution to the problem. But it involves issues of national identity and personal identity. Is the DPP really ready? Probably not.
兩岸追求和平 民進黨準備好了？
2012-11-26
中國時報
二十二日民進黨成立中國事務委員會，由蘇貞昌出任召集人，並將其定位為「制定台灣有關中國政策與兩岸交流策略。」一般認為，這是為了因應前主席謝長廷訪陸而來，臨時在不得不成立的情況下倉促上路，結果引來社會疑慮及黨內跨派系之間的結合，要把這個原本定位為常設組織的機構變為任務編組，要求從新擬定應對北京的戰略與策略。看來新一回合的民進黨內鬥爭恐將再起。
今年一月總統大選結果顯示，兩岸關係仍是民進黨最大罩門，台灣民眾並不認為民進黨對中國大陸具有強烈敵意的政策符合大多數人民求安定、要發展、重和平的最大利益。難怪連蔡英文事後也說，民進黨須在互動中加強對中國大陸的了解。選後各界期望，民進黨早日進行黨內中國政策大辯論，不但要找出敗選的癥結，也更要擬定新的發展方向，但顯然事與願違。
除非民進黨能夠漸進、理性、務實的改變其分離主義的意識形態及其逢中必反的政治算計和權力邏輯，外界對於民進黨短期內調整其大陸政策並無太高期望，畢竟事務的發展得有一段過程，但各界確曾主張，民進黨如果能夠先在某些做法上微調，比如說成立大陸事務部或兩岸關係委員會，這也是對台灣民眾釋放漸變的訊息，對中國大陸表達善意的一種方式，但這種建議同樣泥牛入海。
對這次蘇貞昌倉促成立中國事務委員會，台灣各界多半認為，這是蘇主席對獨派的交心或受彼等綁架，與謝長廷的合作破局，但究其實際，其中恐怕更大的程度是要堵蔡（英文）、卡謝（長廷）、拉游（錫?）、忘呂（秀蓮）。難怪有人要痛批蘇貞昌師心自用，「什麼都要自己來，最後反而什麼都沒有」。一個主要政黨的領導人如果一心想的只是要為自己尋找熱帶氣旋，從新出發，這樣豈是正道？
蘇、謝之間的瑜亮情節早為眾所皆知，謝長廷過去主張一國兩市，如今又有憲法一中的看法，結果被蘇暗批，「如為選舉親中，那就去國民黨」，表明了民進黨拒絕謝長廷所支持的兩岸政策，這就是一種路線鬥爭，這難免又讓人想起四年多前，蘇對於謝的批評，竟指其轉移焦點不能改變涉案的事實，批評謝的奸巧，簡直讓人瞠目結舌，有這樣的朋友（或同志），民進黨哪還需要再有任何敵人？
民進黨向來為人所詬病的是擅長給人戴帽子、打棍子，為了權力不擇手段，即使破壞社會倫常，製造階級對立，不講是非道理也都在所不惜。不管是台獨黨綱、或台灣前途決議文已經證明窒礙難行、沒有出路，而如謝長廷憲法一中這種相對較為進步，雖然還有進一步思辯空間的主張也不能見容於蘇貞昌所主導的民進黨，今後有誰還敢再對民進黨寄予希望？
其實，民進黨今天的困境不但牽涉到認同九二共識與否的問題，更在究竟要如何正確處理、面對與中國大陸之間的關係。一九七八年中共改革開放，一九八八年台灣開放探親，幾十年來兩岸實力對比，雙邊交流已經深化到難以想像的地步，而國際大環境與當年已有非常大的不同。蔣經國總統當年說過，時代在變、潮流在變，謝長廷也引述說，情勢已變，人若不變將釀悲劇，民進黨可不慎乎？
其實，不管國、民兩黨是誰執政，台灣需要一個理性、中道、健康的監督制衡力量這已成全民共識，如果說與時俱進、解放思想、對外開放是過去三十多年中共成功的原因，而所有具有國際知識與涉外經驗的人都知道，台獨分離主義已是一條行不通的死路，否則陳水扁也不會有做不到就是做不到，不要再自欺欺人的講話，民進黨的何去何從已經不言自明，蘇貞昌聽到或聽懂了嗎？
勤政、愛民、愛鄉土理所當然，機關算盡、黨同伐異或許也是民主政治常態，但如民進黨能由更宏觀戰略高度出發，由追求兩岸和平共處及和平競賽出發，再和平過渡到一個雙方都能接受的最終解決，思考如何將兩岸關係進一步引領往互利雙贏、共存共榮境地，這才是一切問題根本。但這裡面牽涉到的國家定位及自我認同問題，民進黨真的準備好了嗎？恐怕沒有！
Thursday, November 22, 2012
Asian Free Trade Circle: Taiwan Must Not be Excluded
Asian Free Trade Circle: Taiwan Must Not be Excluded
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 23, 2012
Summary: Recently ASEAN leaders held a summit in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. Each of these governments evinced a pragmatic "economics first" attitude. They actively promoted free trade agreements (FTAs). An Asian free trade bloc is rapidly forming. The Republic of China government must not allow Taiwan to be excluded from this bloc, and isolated. Otherwise it will be increasingly marginalized. Exclusion from this bloc will be highly detrimental to its national growth.
Full Text below:
Not long ago several Asian governments found themselves facing off against each other over the sovereignty of Dokdo Island, the Diaoyutai Islands, and other islands in the South China Sea. But recently ASEAN leaders held a summit in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. Each of these governments evinced a pragmatic "economics first" attitude. They actively promoted free trade agreements (FTAs). An Asian free trade bloc is rapidly forming. The Republic of China must not allow itself to be excluded from this bloc, and isolated. Otherwise it will be increasingly marginalized. Exclusion from this bloc will be highly detrimental to its national growth.
Recently South Korean President Lee Myung-bak landed on the island of Dokdo. The Japanese refer to the island as Takeshima. His landing touched off a sovereignty dispute between Japan and South Korea. Relations between Mainland China and Japan are tense due to a sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. Observers initially assumed that free trade negotiations between Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea would run aground due to these disputes. But the three governments were not deterred by the territorial sovereignty disputes. They announced the official start of trilateral FTA negotiations during an ASEAN meeting between Mainland Chinese, Japanese, and Korean trade ministers.
Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea will begin the first round of negotiations next year, in March and April. They will establish a Free Trade Region encompassing Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea. It will be the third-largest regional market in the world. It will include a population of 1.5 billion. It will include the world's second and third largest economies. Its gross domestic product (GDP) will be valued at 14.3 trillion US dollars. South Korea estimates that over the medium to long term, its GDP growth rate will increase by 1.45 percentage points.
Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea and other ASEAN members, sixteen altogether, will officially begin negotiations over a comprehensive regional economic partnership (RCEP) early next year. Those ready to join the RCEP include 10 ASEAN nations, Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.
The United States has been promoting its Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). It hopes to deepen economic cooperation and trade relations with countries in this region. It hopes to consolidate U.S. influence in Asia. It hopes to avoid a shift in power from the US to Mainland China. But Mainland China and South Korea chose not to join. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda made membership part of his election platform. But the Democratic Party may lose and be forced to hand over power after the general election in December.
To avoid losing the upper hand, U.S. President Barack Obama spoke with ASEAN leaders. He approved the expansion of economic exchanges between the US and ASEAN. He hopes to increase trade and investment relations between the United States and the 10 ASEAN countries. He hopes the TPP will pave the way for ASEAN countries to participate in this United States initiative. Current TPP members include Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. The United States hopes that the other six ASEAN countries will join as well.
But for other countries in Asia, strategically and economically, Mainland China is becoming more important than the United States. One reason is geographical. Mainland China is right in front of them. Exchanges are extremely convenient. Another reason is economic. The US has been in recession for years. Its fiscal house is not in order. It pays less than Mainland China. A third reason is markets. The population of Mainland China is enormous, its buying power is great. Governments make trade-offs. They have their own calculations. They look to see who can offer them the best deal.
Political struggles call for one to take a stand on principle. But to promote the national interest, one must often avoid confrontation. One must actively and pragmatically promote economic and trade relations. One must demonstrate flexibility. One must use one's chips as effectively as possible, to ensure national prosperity. For example, Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea are fighting bitterly over the Dokdo and Diaoyutai Islands. But this has not prevented their fiscal and economic officials from participating in free trade negotiations.
Now take Taiwan. It has expressed a desire to join the TPP. But TIFA negotiations with the United States must be restarted. A Taiwan-US free trade agreement is a long way off. It is even farther off than the TPP. Singapore was the first country to begin signing FTAs with others. But so far negotiations have not led to agreements. The only completed agreements have been ECFA between Taiwan and the Mainland.
FTA negotiations are complex. In particular, imports of agricultural products are sure to impact local industry. Negotiations must proceed cautiously. Otherwise they may lead to a domestic backlash. Taiwan's FTA negotiations have been so slow that people have become impatient.
Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea are officially launching free trade negotiations. Negotiations over RCEP are also set to begin. An Asian free trade bloc is forming. Taiwan's economy is heavily dependent upon trade. It must not allow itself to be excluded from these FTA circles. Otherwise its plight will be even more difficult. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea FTA will cause Taiwan's exports to fall by 1.17%. The decrease in real GDP will be 1.155%. That is over 130 billion NT dollars. Once the RCEP is signed, the estimated impact on Taiwan will increase to between five and ten percent. This is a time of economic recession. Such numbers are salt rubbed into the wound. How can one not be frightened?
Other economies are benefitting from dramatically reduced tariffs. Taiwan meanwhile, must cope with higher capital costs and barriers to trade. Other economies are benefitting and assisting each other. Taiwan meanwhile, must go it alone. Our economic competitiveness is being affected. The government must accelerate the pace of FTA negotiations. It must seek participation in regional free trade blocs. Time waits for no man. We cannot afford to fall behind. An Asian free trade circle is forming. Taiwan cannot afford to wait. He who hesistates is lost.
亞洲自由貿易圈成形 台灣切莫落單
2012-11-23
中國時報
前不久的亞洲，才為了南海、獨島和釣魚台主權爭議，相關國家針鋒相對、劍拔弩張，但日前在柬埔寨首都金邊召開的東南亞國協領袖峰會上，各國卻展現經濟優先的務實態度，積極推動自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）。面對亞洲自由貿易區塊的迅速成形，台灣如果一直落單在外，恐將日趨邊緣化，對未來國家發展相當不利。
近來日韓之間因南韓總統李明博登獨島（日稱竹島）而再度挑動主權之爭，中日之間則為了釣魚台主權爭議關係緊張，原本外界認為中日韓自由貿易談判會因此擱淺，但三國仍然決定不受領土主權之爭影響，在東亞領袖會議的中日韓貿易部長級會議上宣布，正式啟動洽簽三國ＦＴＡ談判。
中日韓預定明年三、四月間展開第一輪談判；一旦中日韓自由貿易區成立，將成為世界第三大區域統合市場，涵蓋十五億人口、全球第二及第三大經濟體，名目國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）總值達十四．三兆美元。南韓估計，中期至長期而言，南韓ＧＤＰ成長率可望增加一．四五個百分點。
接著，中日韓與東協等亞洲十六個國家，也決定明年初正式啟動「區域全面經濟夥伴關係」（ＲＣＥＰ）談判，準備加入「ＲＣＥＰ」的國家包括東協十國、中國、日本、南韓、澳洲、紐西蘭及印度。
過去以來美國一直想推動「跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協議」（ＴＰＰ），顯然是想藉此深化與此區國家的經貿合作關係，鞏固美國在亞洲的影響力，以免美中勢力此消彼長。但是中、韓都不參加，日本首相野田佳彥表示願以此為選舉訴求，不過民主黨恐將在十二月的大選落敗而交出政權。
而為了不落入下風，美國總統歐巴馬與東協領袖會談時，也敲定啟動「美國─東協擴大經濟交往」方案，以擴大美國與東協十國間的貿易與投資關係，並希望為東協國家參與美國倡議的ＴＰＰ鋪路。目前ＴＰＰ已有新加坡、汶萊、馬來西亞和越南參與，美國希望其他東協六國也都能加入。
不過，對亞洲其他國家來說，無論就戰略還是經濟發展，中國的重要性逐漸取代美國。一來在地理上，中國近在眼前，交流極為方便。二來在經濟籌碼上，美國這些年來景氣低迷，財政自顧不暇，手筆不比中國。三來在市場上，中國大陸人口多、買力強。取捨之間，各國自有盤算，但看哪個方案對自己最實惠。
的確，政治之爭固有必須堅持的立場，但為了增進國家利益，必要時暫時擱下對立，積極務實地推動經貿關係，才能靈活運用籌碼為國家開創生機。例如中日韓雖然為獨島和釣魚台吵得不可開交，但仍無礙於財經部門推動自由貿易談判。
反觀台灣，雖然已經表示希望加入ＴＰＰ，但和美國的ＴＩＦＡ談判才要重啟，離台美自由貿易協定還有一段距離，離ＴＰＰ則更遠。在和其他國家洽簽ＦＴＡ方面，最早啟動的新加坡談判到現在還沒完成簽署，至今真正完成的只有與大陸的ＥＣＦＡ。
雖說自貿談判內容複雜，尤其農產品進口勢將對本地產業造成衝擊，談判必須步步為營，否則恐將引發國內反彈，但就台灣的自貿談判進度來說，也實在慢得讓人心急。
尤其，眼見中日韓正式啟動自由貿易談判，ＲＣＥＰ也要開始推動，亞洲自由貿易區塊紛紛成形，台灣經濟仰賴貿易至深，如果被這些大大小小的自貿圈排擠在外，處境會更加艱難。據經濟部評估，中日韓ＦＴＡ將使台灣出口最高下降一．一七％，實質ＧＤＰ減少一．一五五％（一千三百多億台幣）；如果ＲＣＥＰ談成，預估對台灣的衝擊更增加五％到十％。在不景氣中，這樣的數字宛如雪上加霜的風暴，能不令人心驚嗎？
當其他國家可以因為關稅大減而獲利時，台灣卻得面對成本負擔與貿易障礙；當其他國家互利互助，台灣卻必須單打獨鬥時，我國的經濟競爭力一定會受到影響。政府除了加快腳步進行既有的ＦＴＡ談判外，也必須努力尋找參與區域自貿集團的管道。機會是不等人的，競爭不能落後，面對亞洲自由貿易圈的成形，台灣不能再觀望躊躇了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 23, 2012
Summary: Recently ASEAN leaders held a summit in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. Each of these governments evinced a pragmatic "economics first" attitude. They actively promoted free trade agreements (FTAs). An Asian free trade bloc is rapidly forming. The Republic of China government must not allow Taiwan to be excluded from this bloc, and isolated. Otherwise it will be increasingly marginalized. Exclusion from this bloc will be highly detrimental to its national growth.
Full Text below:
Not long ago several Asian governments found themselves facing off against each other over the sovereignty of Dokdo Island, the Diaoyutai Islands, and other islands in the South China Sea. But recently ASEAN leaders held a summit in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. Each of these governments evinced a pragmatic "economics first" attitude. They actively promoted free trade agreements (FTAs). An Asian free trade bloc is rapidly forming. The Republic of China must not allow itself to be excluded from this bloc, and isolated. Otherwise it will be increasingly marginalized. Exclusion from this bloc will be highly detrimental to its national growth.
Recently South Korean President Lee Myung-bak landed on the island of Dokdo. The Japanese refer to the island as Takeshima. His landing touched off a sovereignty dispute between Japan and South Korea. Relations between Mainland China and Japan are tense due to a sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. Observers initially assumed that free trade negotiations between Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea would run aground due to these disputes. But the three governments were not deterred by the territorial sovereignty disputes. They announced the official start of trilateral FTA negotiations during an ASEAN meeting between Mainland Chinese, Japanese, and Korean trade ministers.
Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea will begin the first round of negotiations next year, in March and April. They will establish a Free Trade Region encompassing Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea. It will be the third-largest regional market in the world. It will include a population of 1.5 billion. It will include the world's second and third largest economies. Its gross domestic product (GDP) will be valued at 14.3 trillion US dollars. South Korea estimates that over the medium to long term, its GDP growth rate will increase by 1.45 percentage points.
Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea and other ASEAN members, sixteen altogether, will officially begin negotiations over a comprehensive regional economic partnership (RCEP) early next year. Those ready to join the RCEP include 10 ASEAN nations, Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.
The United States has been promoting its Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). It hopes to deepen economic cooperation and trade relations with countries in this region. It hopes to consolidate U.S. influence in Asia. It hopes to avoid a shift in power from the US to Mainland China. But Mainland China and South Korea chose not to join. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda made membership part of his election platform. But the Democratic Party may lose and be forced to hand over power after the general election in December.
To avoid losing the upper hand, U.S. President Barack Obama spoke with ASEAN leaders. He approved the expansion of economic exchanges between the US and ASEAN. He hopes to increase trade and investment relations between the United States and the 10 ASEAN countries. He hopes the TPP will pave the way for ASEAN countries to participate in this United States initiative. Current TPP members include Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. The United States hopes that the other six ASEAN countries will join as well.
But for other countries in Asia, strategically and economically, Mainland China is becoming more important than the United States. One reason is geographical. Mainland China is right in front of them. Exchanges are extremely convenient. Another reason is economic. The US has been in recession for years. Its fiscal house is not in order. It pays less than Mainland China. A third reason is markets. The population of Mainland China is enormous, its buying power is great. Governments make trade-offs. They have their own calculations. They look to see who can offer them the best deal.
Political struggles call for one to take a stand on principle. But to promote the national interest, one must often avoid confrontation. One must actively and pragmatically promote economic and trade relations. One must demonstrate flexibility. One must use one's chips as effectively as possible, to ensure national prosperity. For example, Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea are fighting bitterly over the Dokdo and Diaoyutai Islands. But this has not prevented their fiscal and economic officials from participating in free trade negotiations.
Now take Taiwan. It has expressed a desire to join the TPP. But TIFA negotiations with the United States must be restarted. A Taiwan-US free trade agreement is a long way off. It is even farther off than the TPP. Singapore was the first country to begin signing FTAs with others. But so far negotiations have not led to agreements. The only completed agreements have been ECFA between Taiwan and the Mainland.
FTA negotiations are complex. In particular, imports of agricultural products are sure to impact local industry. Negotiations must proceed cautiously. Otherwise they may lead to a domestic backlash. Taiwan's FTA negotiations have been so slow that people have become impatient.
Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea are officially launching free trade negotiations. Negotiations over RCEP are also set to begin. An Asian free trade bloc is forming. Taiwan's economy is heavily dependent upon trade. It must not allow itself to be excluded from these FTA circles. Otherwise its plight will be even more difficult. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea FTA will cause Taiwan's exports to fall by 1.17%. The decrease in real GDP will be 1.155%. That is over 130 billion NT dollars. Once the RCEP is signed, the estimated impact on Taiwan will increase to between five and ten percent. This is a time of economic recession. Such numbers are salt rubbed into the wound. How can one not be frightened?
Other economies are benefitting from dramatically reduced tariffs. Taiwan meanwhile, must cope with higher capital costs and barriers to trade. Other economies are benefitting and assisting each other. Taiwan meanwhile, must go it alone. Our economic competitiveness is being affected. The government must accelerate the pace of FTA negotiations. It must seek participation in regional free trade blocs. Time waits for no man. We cannot afford to fall behind. An Asian free trade circle is forming. Taiwan cannot afford to wait. He who hesistates is lost.
亞洲自由貿易圈成形 台灣切莫落單
2012-11-23
中國時報
前不久的亞洲，才為了南海、獨島和釣魚台主權爭議，相關國家針鋒相對、劍拔弩張，但日前在柬埔寨首都金邊召開的東南亞國協領袖峰會上，各國卻展現經濟優先的務實態度，積極推動自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）。面對亞洲自由貿易區塊的迅速成形，台灣如果一直落單在外，恐將日趨邊緣化，對未來國家發展相當不利。
近來日韓之間因南韓總統李明博登獨島（日稱竹島）而再度挑動主權之爭，中日之間則為了釣魚台主權爭議關係緊張，原本外界認為中日韓自由貿易談判會因此擱淺，但三國仍然決定不受領土主權之爭影響，在東亞領袖會議的中日韓貿易部長級會議上宣布，正式啟動洽簽三國ＦＴＡ談判。
中日韓預定明年三、四月間展開第一輪談判；一旦中日韓自由貿易區成立，將成為世界第三大區域統合市場，涵蓋十五億人口、全球第二及第三大經濟體，名目國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）總值達十四．三兆美元。南韓估計，中期至長期而言，南韓ＧＤＰ成長率可望增加一．四五個百分點。
接著，中日韓與東協等亞洲十六個國家，也決定明年初正式啟動「區域全面經濟夥伴關係」（ＲＣＥＰ）談判，準備加入「ＲＣＥＰ」的國家包括東協十國、中國、日本、南韓、澳洲、紐西蘭及印度。
過去以來美國一直想推動「跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協議」（ＴＰＰ），顯然是想藉此深化與此區國家的經貿合作關係，鞏固美國在亞洲的影響力，以免美中勢力此消彼長。但是中、韓都不參加，日本首相野田佳彥表示願以此為選舉訴求，不過民主黨恐將在十二月的大選落敗而交出政權。
而為了不落入下風，美國總統歐巴馬與東協領袖會談時，也敲定啟動「美國─東協擴大經濟交往」方案，以擴大美國與東協十國間的貿易與投資關係，並希望為東協國家參與美國倡議的ＴＰＰ鋪路。目前ＴＰＰ已有新加坡、汶萊、馬來西亞和越南參與，美國希望其他東協六國也都能加入。
不過，對亞洲其他國家來說，無論就戰略還是經濟發展，中國的重要性逐漸取代美國。一來在地理上，中國近在眼前，交流極為方便。二來在經濟籌碼上，美國這些年來景氣低迷，財政自顧不暇，手筆不比中國。三來在市場上，中國大陸人口多、買力強。取捨之間，各國自有盤算，但看哪個方案對自己最實惠。
的確，政治之爭固有必須堅持的立場，但為了增進國家利益，必要時暫時擱下對立，積極務實地推動經貿關係，才能靈活運用籌碼為國家開創生機。例如中日韓雖然為獨島和釣魚台吵得不可開交，但仍無礙於財經部門推動自由貿易談判。
反觀台灣，雖然已經表示希望加入ＴＰＰ，但和美國的ＴＩＦＡ談判才要重啟，離台美自由貿易協定還有一段距離，離ＴＰＰ則更遠。在和其他國家洽簽ＦＴＡ方面，最早啟動的新加坡談判到現在還沒完成簽署，至今真正完成的只有與大陸的ＥＣＦＡ。
雖說自貿談判內容複雜，尤其農產品進口勢將對本地產業造成衝擊，談判必須步步為營，否則恐將引發國內反彈，但就台灣的自貿談判進度來說，也實在慢得讓人心急。
尤其，眼見中日韓正式啟動自由貿易談判，ＲＣＥＰ也要開始推動，亞洲自由貿易區塊紛紛成形，台灣經濟仰賴貿易至深，如果被這些大大小小的自貿圈排擠在外，處境會更加艱難。據經濟部評估，中日韓ＦＴＡ將使台灣出口最高下降一．一七％，實質ＧＤＰ減少一．一五五％（一千三百多億台幣）；如果ＲＣＥＰ談成，預估對台灣的衝擊更增加五％到十％。在不景氣中，這樣的數字宛如雪上加霜的風暴，能不令人心驚嗎？
當其他國家可以因為關稅大減而獲利時，台灣卻得面對成本負擔與貿易障礙；當其他國家互利互助，台灣卻必須單打獨鬥時，我國的經濟競爭力一定會受到影響。政府除了加快腳步進行既有的ＦＴＡ談判外，也必須努力尋找參與區域自貿集團的管道。機會是不等人的，競爭不能落後，面對亞洲自由貿易圈的成形，台灣不能再觀望躊躇了。
Wednesday, November 21, 2012
Major Defeat for Frank Hsieh, Major Setback for DPP Reform
Major Defeat for Frank Hsieh, Major Setback for DPP Reform
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 22, 2012
Summary: The DPP has decided. It will refer to its new body as the "China Affairs Committee." Its Chief Convener will be Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang. Frank Hsieh will be pushed off the stage. A "one nation on each side" framework will make the "one China constitution" impossible. Recall Frank Hsieh's "bartending trip." He spoke of a "constitutional one China." He spoke of a "one China constitution." But in the end the only drink he could mix was a glass of bitter wine. He remained a solitary figure, drinking alone in the shadows. This is Frank Hsieh's bitter fruit. It is also the sorry fate of the Democratic Progressive Party.
Full Text below:
The DPP has decided. It will refer to its new body as the "China Affairs Committee." Its Chief Convener will be Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang. This constitutes a major defeat for Frank Hsieh. It also shrouds DPP reform amidst dark clouds. This editorial attempts to trace the evolution of Frank Hsieh's reasoning. It investigates why the DPP has been unable to undergo reform.
In July 2000 Frank Hsieh declared that "Kaohsiung and Xiamen are two cities within the same country." This amounted to "one China, different interpretations," "one country, two regions," or a "constitutional one China." This amounted to "opposition to Taiwan independence," or at least "A commitment to something other than Taiwan independence." These two points can be regarded as the prototype for Frank Hsieh's cross-Strait framework. It was the broadest and most balanced framework he has ever elucidated. The prototype and a "constitutional one China" naturally lead to "one China, different interpretations." . Therefore one need no longer oppose the 1992 consensus.
Alas, Taiwan independence elements would not allow Frank Hsieh to recognize one China. Their backlash was intense. The 1992 consensus implies "one China, different interpretations." Therefore they would not allow him to recognize the 1992 consensus either. As a result Frank Hsieh cast about for alternatives. He argued that the term "1992 consensus" was never actually used back then. Therefore he did not recognize the "1992 consensus." But he recognized the "spirit of the 1992 talks." He said that the "spirit" was not the same as the "1992 consensus." This was his own "constitutional consensus," which he invented two decades after the 1992 talks. This was of course an anachronism. It was akin to Yue Fei returning to the Three Kingdoms era to fight Zhang Fei. Frank Hsieh was surrounded and "gang-banged" by Taiwan independence hardliners, to the point where he lost his composure.
Frank Hsieh used "constitutional consensus" as a stepping stone. But he was evasive about the "one China constitution." He clearly advocated a "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutions, different interpretations." But he denied advocating the "one China Constitution" or a "constitutional one China." He even denied advocating "one China, different interpretatios." He avoided the taboo "one China" framework altogether. But how can one depart from the Republic of China Constitution's "one China" framework? That would mean departing from the aforementioned prototype. When Frank Hsieh invokes the "constitution," just exactly which constitution is he referring to? When Frank Hsieh invokes the "Republic of China," just exactly what Republic of China is he referring to?
The Taiwan independence hardliners' bullying obliterated Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus." Some of them flatly repudiated the Constitution of the Republic of China. They wanted the DPP to promote the "rectification of names." Others asserted that the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" merely championed "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence as a nation. It says we can use the Republic of China name. Nothing more. It did not imply "one China, different interpretations." In other words, the DPP's bottom line was the repudiation of any "one China framework." It was a denial of the "one China constitution." It was a denial of "one China, different interpretations." It was even a denial that "one China is the Republic of China." This compelled Frank Hsieh to distance himself from the prototype he himself proposed in July 2000. But suppose he distances himself from his "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations" prototype? What difference if any would remain between Frank Hsieh's rhetoric and the "backdoor listing" rhetoric of Taiwan independence hardliners?
The two sides are currently commemorating the "20th Anniversary of the 1992 consensus." The 1992 consensus is already part of the CCP's 18th National Congress Official Report. Frank Hsieh knows he is in a quandary. He says the DPP should engage in talks based on "the spirit of 1992." He wants to accept the 1992 consensus indirectly.
For Taipei, the 1992 consensus or "spirit of the 1992 talks" is the same as "one China, different interpretations in accordance with the one China constitution" for Beijing, It is the same as the verbal declaration made during the March, 2008 Hotline conversation between Hu Jintao and George W. Bush: "The two sides (of the Taiwan Strait) acknowledge that there is only one China, but agree that each side has its own definition of one China." Therefore if Frank Hsieh repudiates the "one China constitution," he is also repudiating the 1992 consensus. Conversely, if he affirms the "one China constitution," he has no reason to repudiate the 1992 consensus. That is because the "one China constitution" inevitably implies "one China, different interpretations." Alas, Frank Hsieh caught himself in a contradiction. He affirmed a "constitutional consensus." But he simultaneously repudiated a "constitutional one China." What was this but a case of his left hand fighting his right?
Frank Hsieh wants DPP reform. His first step should be to return to his own prototype, to the "constitutional one China" of July 2000. He may choose not to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But he must accept the "spirit of the 1992 talks." The talks included a consensus regarding "one China, different interpretations" or "different interpretations of one China." This is Taiwan's "one China, different interpretations, according to the one China constitution." Otherwise, one cannot talk about reform. Otherwise, one cannot sever the DPP's cross-Strait policy Gordian Knot. What should be done about the term "1992 consensus?" Frank Hsieh can say he did not recognize the term, because it was never used back then. He can say that if someone wants to refer to its as the "1992 consensus" after the fact, he can won't object too strongly. He could compare it to ECFA. It was initially denounced as "forfeiting our sovereignty and humiliating our nation." But eventually it was "accepted unconditionally."
Frank Hsieh added that the DPP must resolve the contradictions betweeen its "three resolutions." Actually it must do more than that. It must also resolve the contradictions between its party platform and the three resolutions. Only then will its reform be complete.
In short, if the DPP persists in disavowing the "one China constitution," its transformation will be stillborn. It will become yet another form of "backdoor listing." Without the "one China constitution" there can be no "constitutional consensus," let alone "different constitutions, different interpretations." Conversely, if one recognizes the "one China constitution," then the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations" follow, as a matter of course. In which case one need not and ought not refuse to recognize the 1992 consensus. As an alternative, the DPP can refuse to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But it must recognize "one China, different interpretations according to the one China constitution." That remains Taiwan's best cross-Strait policy. It must recognize the "spirit of the 1992 talks."
But this is all water under the bridge. The DPP has decided to use the name "China Affairs Committee." Frank Hsieh will be pushed off the stage. A "one nation on each side" framework will make the "one China constitution" impossible. Recall Frank Hsieh's "bartending trip." He spoke of a "constitutional one China." He spoke of a "one China constitution." But in the end the only drink he could mix was a glass of bitter wine. He remained a solitary figure, drinking alone in the shadows. This is Frank Hsieh's bitter fruit. It is also the sorry fate of the Democratic Progressive Party.
謝長廷重大挫敗 民進黨轉型困境
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.22
民進黨決定採用「中國事務委員會」的名稱，並由黨主席蘇貞昌自兼召集人。這不僅是謝長廷的重大挫敗，也使民進黨的轉型憧憬佈滿烏雲。本文試回溯謝長廷論述理路的演變，來探討民進黨轉型工程的困境。
二○○○年七月，謝長廷一方面主張「高雄與廈門是一個國家的兩個城市」（這其實是「一中各表」與「一國兩區」），另一方面又稱「憲法一中」（可解讀為「反台獨」或「非台獨」）；這兩點可視為謝長廷現持兩岸論述的「原型」，也是他迄今施展得最開闊與均衡的架構。倘若以此一「原型」為準據，在「憲法一中」之下，「一中各表」即為理所當然的演繹，亦無反對「九二共識」之理。
但是，獨派不容謝長廷承認「一中」，反撲力道甚大；又由於「九二共識」涉及「一中（各表）」，因而亦不容他承認「九二共識」。於是，謝長廷開始東挖西補：他說，一九九二年沒有「九二共識」這「四個字」，所以他不承認「九二共識」；但他又承認有「九二年會談精神」，卻稱這個「精神」不是「九二共識」，而竟然是他在會談二十年後所發明的「憲法共識」。這簡直是讓岳飛跑到三國時代去打張飛，謝長廷被獨派圍剿，堪謂已至慌不擇路的地步。
謝長廷以「憲法共識」為敲門磚，卻對「一中憲法」閃爍其詞。他明明主張「憲法共識」與「憲法各表」，卻竟諱言「一中憲法」或「憲法一中」，甚至否認「一中各表」，處處皆在避諱「一中」架構；但若違離了中華民國憲法的「一中」架構，亦即違離了前述的「原型」，請問謝長廷所說的「憲法」是哪一部「憲法」？而謝長廷所指的「中華民國」又是什麼「中華民國」？
獨派的氣焰壓倒謝長廷的「憲法共識」。有人根本否定「中華民國憲法」，而主張民進黨的目標是「正名制憲」；另有人說，《台灣前途決議文》只是主張「台灣這個主權獨立的國家，可以使用中華民國這個名字」而已，並無「一中各表」的意思。也就是說，這類的說法皆主張，民進黨的「底線」應當否認任何的「一中架構」，否認「一中憲法」，否認「一中各表」，亦否認「一個中國是中華民國」；這也就逼使謝長廷試圖跳離二○○○年七月他自己提出的「原型」，但倘若跳離「一中憲法／一中各表」的「原型」，謝長廷的論述與其他「借殼上市」的台獨論述有何差異？
兩岸正在「紀念九二共識二十周年」，且「九二共識」也已正式載入中共十八大政治報告；謝長廷自知陷入困境，於是他主張民進黨應對「九二年會談精神」給一個說法，亦即想要轉一個彎來接受「九二共識」。
「九二共識」或「九二年會談精神」，對台灣而言，就是「根據一中憲法的一中各表」；對北京而言，即是二○○八年三月胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中親口宣示的：「（兩岸）雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義不同。」所以，謝長廷如果否定「一中憲法」，當然即應否定「九二共識」；反之，倘若承認「一中憲法」，即無否定「九二共識」的道理，因為「一中憲法」的必然政策選擇即是「一中各表」。然而，謝長廷卻陷於自我矛盾之中，又要主張「憲法共識」，又要否定「憲法一中」，這難道是周伯通的左右互搏之術？
謝長廷若要引導民進黨轉型，第一步應當回到二○○○年七月他的「憲法一中」原型。他或許仍可不承認「九二共識」這「四個字」，但他必須接受「九二年會談精神」在兩岸存有「一中各表」或「各表一中」的「共識」，在台灣則是「根據一中憲法的一中各表」。非如此，不能言轉型；非如此，不能破解民進黨兩岸策的困境。至於「九二共識」這「四個字」怎麼辦？謝長廷或許可以說，我不承認當年有「這四個字」，但如果你們在後來要稱它「九二共識」，我雖不滿意，但也可以接受。不妨比照ＥＣＦＡ，由「喪權辱國」，轉到「概括承受」即可。
再者，謝長廷說，民進黨必須將「三個決議文」加以整合；其實不止如此，除了「三個決議文」以外，別忘了還有「台獨黨綱」。民進黨必須做到「一綱三文」的「整合」，轉型工程才算大功告成。
總之，若違離「一中憲法」的主軸，民進黨整個轉型工程即失去準據，而必將再淪為又一形態的「借殼上市」。因為，若無「一中憲法」，即不可能有「憲法共識」，遑論「憲法各表」；反之，若有「一中憲法」，則「九二共識」的「一中各表」即是應然與實然的歸趨，也就不必且不應否認「九二共識」。或者，民進黨可以不承認「九二共識」這「四個字」，但必須承認，「根據一中憲法的一中各表」，是台灣兩岸政策的最佳選擇，此即「九二年會談精神」的台灣觀點。
然而，俱往矣。民進黨決定採用「中國事務委員會」的名稱，且將謝長廷推下舞台，在「一邊一國」的思維架構下，自然難有「一中憲法」的空間；回頭看謝長廷的「調酒行」，一下子注入「憲法一中」，一下子倒出「一中憲法」，但最後仍是調出一杯苦酒，留給自己孤影獨酌。這是謝長廷的苦果，也是民進黨的宿命。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 22, 2012
Summary: The DPP has decided. It will refer to its new body as the "China Affairs Committee." Its Chief Convener will be Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang. Frank Hsieh will be pushed off the stage. A "one nation on each side" framework will make the "one China constitution" impossible. Recall Frank Hsieh's "bartending trip." He spoke of a "constitutional one China." He spoke of a "one China constitution." But in the end the only drink he could mix was a glass of bitter wine. He remained a solitary figure, drinking alone in the shadows. This is Frank Hsieh's bitter fruit. It is also the sorry fate of the Democratic Progressive Party.
Full Text below:
The DPP has decided. It will refer to its new body as the "China Affairs Committee." Its Chief Convener will be Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang. This constitutes a major defeat for Frank Hsieh. It also shrouds DPP reform amidst dark clouds. This editorial attempts to trace the evolution of Frank Hsieh's reasoning. It investigates why the DPP has been unable to undergo reform.
In July 2000 Frank Hsieh declared that "Kaohsiung and Xiamen are two cities within the same country." This amounted to "one China, different interpretations," "one country, two regions," or a "constitutional one China." This amounted to "opposition to Taiwan independence," or at least "A commitment to something other than Taiwan independence." These two points can be regarded as the prototype for Frank Hsieh's cross-Strait framework. It was the broadest and most balanced framework he has ever elucidated. The prototype and a "constitutional one China" naturally lead to "one China, different interpretations." . Therefore one need no longer oppose the 1992 consensus.
Alas, Taiwan independence elements would not allow Frank Hsieh to recognize one China. Their backlash was intense. The 1992 consensus implies "one China, different interpretations." Therefore they would not allow him to recognize the 1992 consensus either. As a result Frank Hsieh cast about for alternatives. He argued that the term "1992 consensus" was never actually used back then. Therefore he did not recognize the "1992 consensus." But he recognized the "spirit of the 1992 talks." He said that the "spirit" was not the same as the "1992 consensus." This was his own "constitutional consensus," which he invented two decades after the 1992 talks. This was of course an anachronism. It was akin to Yue Fei returning to the Three Kingdoms era to fight Zhang Fei. Frank Hsieh was surrounded and "gang-banged" by Taiwan independence hardliners, to the point where he lost his composure.
Frank Hsieh used "constitutional consensus" as a stepping stone. But he was evasive about the "one China constitution." He clearly advocated a "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutions, different interpretations." But he denied advocating the "one China Constitution" or a "constitutional one China." He even denied advocating "one China, different interpretatios." He avoided the taboo "one China" framework altogether. But how can one depart from the Republic of China Constitution's "one China" framework? That would mean departing from the aforementioned prototype. When Frank Hsieh invokes the "constitution," just exactly which constitution is he referring to? When Frank Hsieh invokes the "Republic of China," just exactly what Republic of China is he referring to?
The Taiwan independence hardliners' bullying obliterated Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus." Some of them flatly repudiated the Constitution of the Republic of China. They wanted the DPP to promote the "rectification of names." Others asserted that the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" merely championed "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence as a nation. It says we can use the Republic of China name. Nothing more. It did not imply "one China, different interpretations." In other words, the DPP's bottom line was the repudiation of any "one China framework." It was a denial of the "one China constitution." It was a denial of "one China, different interpretations." It was even a denial that "one China is the Republic of China." This compelled Frank Hsieh to distance himself from the prototype he himself proposed in July 2000. But suppose he distances himself from his "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations" prototype? What difference if any would remain between Frank Hsieh's rhetoric and the "backdoor listing" rhetoric of Taiwan independence hardliners?
The two sides are currently commemorating the "20th Anniversary of the 1992 consensus." The 1992 consensus is already part of the CCP's 18th National Congress Official Report. Frank Hsieh knows he is in a quandary. He says the DPP should engage in talks based on "the spirit of 1992." He wants to accept the 1992 consensus indirectly.
For Taipei, the 1992 consensus or "spirit of the 1992 talks" is the same as "one China, different interpretations in accordance with the one China constitution" for Beijing, It is the same as the verbal declaration made during the March, 2008 Hotline conversation between Hu Jintao and George W. Bush: "The two sides (of the Taiwan Strait) acknowledge that there is only one China, but agree that each side has its own definition of one China." Therefore if Frank Hsieh repudiates the "one China constitution," he is also repudiating the 1992 consensus. Conversely, if he affirms the "one China constitution," he has no reason to repudiate the 1992 consensus. That is because the "one China constitution" inevitably implies "one China, different interpretations." Alas, Frank Hsieh caught himself in a contradiction. He affirmed a "constitutional consensus." But he simultaneously repudiated a "constitutional one China." What was this but a case of his left hand fighting his right?
Frank Hsieh wants DPP reform. His first step should be to return to his own prototype, to the "constitutional one China" of July 2000. He may choose not to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But he must accept the "spirit of the 1992 talks." The talks included a consensus regarding "one China, different interpretations" or "different interpretations of one China." This is Taiwan's "one China, different interpretations, according to the one China constitution." Otherwise, one cannot talk about reform. Otherwise, one cannot sever the DPP's cross-Strait policy Gordian Knot. What should be done about the term "1992 consensus?" Frank Hsieh can say he did not recognize the term, because it was never used back then. He can say that if someone wants to refer to its as the "1992 consensus" after the fact, he can won't object too strongly. He could compare it to ECFA. It was initially denounced as "forfeiting our sovereignty and humiliating our nation." But eventually it was "accepted unconditionally."
Frank Hsieh added that the DPP must resolve the contradictions betweeen its "three resolutions." Actually it must do more than that. It must also resolve the contradictions between its party platform and the three resolutions. Only then will its reform be complete.
In short, if the DPP persists in disavowing the "one China constitution," its transformation will be stillborn. It will become yet another form of "backdoor listing." Without the "one China constitution" there can be no "constitutional consensus," let alone "different constitutions, different interpretations." Conversely, if one recognizes the "one China constitution," then the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations" follow, as a matter of course. In which case one need not and ought not refuse to recognize the 1992 consensus. As an alternative, the DPP can refuse to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But it must recognize "one China, different interpretations according to the one China constitution." That remains Taiwan's best cross-Strait policy. It must recognize the "spirit of the 1992 talks."
But this is all water under the bridge. The DPP has decided to use the name "China Affairs Committee." Frank Hsieh will be pushed off the stage. A "one nation on each side" framework will make the "one China constitution" impossible. Recall Frank Hsieh's "bartending trip." He spoke of a "constitutional one China." He spoke of a "one China constitution." But in the end the only drink he could mix was a glass of bitter wine. He remained a solitary figure, drinking alone in the shadows. This is Frank Hsieh's bitter fruit. It is also the sorry fate of the Democratic Progressive Party.
謝長廷重大挫敗 民進黨轉型困境
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.22
民進黨決定採用「中國事務委員會」的名稱，並由黨主席蘇貞昌自兼召集人。這不僅是謝長廷的重大挫敗，也使民進黨的轉型憧憬佈滿烏雲。本文試回溯謝長廷論述理路的演變，來探討民進黨轉型工程的困境。
二○○○年七月，謝長廷一方面主張「高雄與廈門是一個國家的兩個城市」（這其實是「一中各表」與「一國兩區」），另一方面又稱「憲法一中」（可解讀為「反台獨」或「非台獨」）；這兩點可視為謝長廷現持兩岸論述的「原型」，也是他迄今施展得最開闊與均衡的架構。倘若以此一「原型」為準據，在「憲法一中」之下，「一中各表」即為理所當然的演繹，亦無反對「九二共識」之理。
但是，獨派不容謝長廷承認「一中」，反撲力道甚大；又由於「九二共識」涉及「一中（各表）」，因而亦不容他承認「九二共識」。於是，謝長廷開始東挖西補：他說，一九九二年沒有「九二共識」這「四個字」，所以他不承認「九二共識」；但他又承認有「九二年會談精神」，卻稱這個「精神」不是「九二共識」，而竟然是他在會談二十年後所發明的「憲法共識」。這簡直是讓岳飛跑到三國時代去打張飛，謝長廷被獨派圍剿，堪謂已至慌不擇路的地步。
謝長廷以「憲法共識」為敲門磚，卻對「一中憲法」閃爍其詞。他明明主張「憲法共識」與「憲法各表」，卻竟諱言「一中憲法」或「憲法一中」，甚至否認「一中各表」，處處皆在避諱「一中」架構；但若違離了中華民國憲法的「一中」架構，亦即違離了前述的「原型」，請問謝長廷所說的「憲法」是哪一部「憲法」？而謝長廷所指的「中華民國」又是什麼「中華民國」？
獨派的氣焰壓倒謝長廷的「憲法共識」。有人根本否定「中華民國憲法」，而主張民進黨的目標是「正名制憲」；另有人說，《台灣前途決議文》只是主張「台灣這個主權獨立的國家，可以使用中華民國這個名字」而已，並無「一中各表」的意思。也就是說，這類的說法皆主張，民進黨的「底線」應當否認任何的「一中架構」，否認「一中憲法」，否認「一中各表」，亦否認「一個中國是中華民國」；這也就逼使謝長廷試圖跳離二○○○年七月他自己提出的「原型」，但倘若跳離「一中憲法／一中各表」的「原型」，謝長廷的論述與其他「借殼上市」的台獨論述有何差異？
兩岸正在「紀念九二共識二十周年」，且「九二共識」也已正式載入中共十八大政治報告；謝長廷自知陷入困境，於是他主張民進黨應對「九二年會談精神」給一個說法，亦即想要轉一個彎來接受「九二共識」。
「九二共識」或「九二年會談精神」，對台灣而言，就是「根據一中憲法的一中各表」；對北京而言，即是二○○八年三月胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中親口宣示的：「（兩岸）雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義不同。」所以，謝長廷如果否定「一中憲法」，當然即應否定「九二共識」；反之，倘若承認「一中憲法」，即無否定「九二共識」的道理，因為「一中憲法」的必然政策選擇即是「一中各表」。然而，謝長廷卻陷於自我矛盾之中，又要主張「憲法共識」，又要否定「憲法一中」，這難道是周伯通的左右互搏之術？
謝長廷若要引導民進黨轉型，第一步應當回到二○○○年七月他的「憲法一中」原型。他或許仍可不承認「九二共識」這「四個字」，但他必須接受「九二年會談精神」在兩岸存有「一中各表」或「各表一中」的「共識」，在台灣則是「根據一中憲法的一中各表」。非如此，不能言轉型；非如此，不能破解民進黨兩岸策的困境。至於「九二共識」這「四個字」怎麼辦？謝長廷或許可以說，我不承認當年有「這四個字」，但如果你們在後來要稱它「九二共識」，我雖不滿意，但也可以接受。不妨比照ＥＣＦＡ，由「喪權辱國」，轉到「概括承受」即可。
再者，謝長廷說，民進黨必須將「三個決議文」加以整合；其實不止如此，除了「三個決議文」以外，別忘了還有「台獨黨綱」。民進黨必須做到「一綱三文」的「整合」，轉型工程才算大功告成。
總之，若違離「一中憲法」的主軸，民進黨整個轉型工程即失去準據，而必將再淪為又一形態的「借殼上市」。因為，若無「一中憲法」，即不可能有「憲法共識」，遑論「憲法各表」；反之，若有「一中憲法」，則「九二共識」的「一中各表」即是應然與實然的歸趨，也就不必且不應否認「九二共識」。或者，民進黨可以不承認「九二共識」這「四個字」，但必須承認，「根據一中憲法的一中各表」，是台灣兩岸政策的最佳選擇，此即「九二年會談精神」的台灣觀點。
然而，俱往矣。民進黨決定採用「中國事務委員會」的名稱，且將謝長廷推下舞台，在「一邊一國」的思維架構下，自然難有「一中憲法」的空間；回頭看謝長廷的「調酒行」，一下子注入「憲法一中」，一下子倒出「一中憲法」，但最後仍是調出一杯苦酒，留給自己孤影獨酌。這是謝長廷的苦果，也是民進黨的宿命。
Democracy and Progress: Goals more Pragmatic and Ambitious than Taiwan Independence
Democracy and Progress:
Goals more Pragmatic and Ambitious than Taiwan Independence
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 21, 2012
Summary: The Ma administration's record has been poor. But that does not mean the Green Camp will win the 2016 general election. The Green Camp is its own worst enemy. If the DPP cannot offer a cross-Strait policy that puts people at ease, voters may still cast their ballots for the KMT. Phasing out Taiwan independence is the DPP's lifeline. Democracy and progress are more pragmatic and ambitious goals than Taiwan independence. The shore is not far. The DPP need only turn its head.
Full Text below:
After a second change in ruling parties, the DPP watched as Chen Shui-bian entered prison, and Tsai Ying-wen lost the 2012 presidential election. These were major blows to its morale. The Ma administration's record has been poor. But that does not mean the Green Camp will win the 2016 general election. The Green Camp is its own worst enemy. If the DPP cannot offer a cross-Strait policy that puts people at ease, voters may still cast their ballots for the KMT.
Mainland China has risen. That is an incontrovertible fact. Taiwan and the Chinese mainland are in close proximity. Economic, trade, and social relations are close. But politically the two sides remain at loggerheads. This is a unique case that has no precedent, past or present, east or west. The primary task of anyone who assumes power on Taiwan is to deal with cross-Strait relations. Anyone who aspires to high office cannot afford to ignore or be cavalier about cross-Strait policy.
The facts are clear. The Democratic Progressive Party's hostility toward the Mainland makes it incapable of understanding the Mainland. It is incapable of dealing rationally with cross-Strait relations. The party must totally overhaul its Mainland policy. Otherwise it will remain an opposition party forever. The KMT will have to commit far more serious errors than merely being "clumsy." Otherwise it will not be displaced by the DPP. This is not merely something that Green Camp supporters do not want to see. This is something that everyone who cares about democracy on Taiwan do not want to see.
Today the DPP Central Standing Committee will discuss whether to establish a "China Affairs Committee." We would like to take this opportunity to express our hopes for the party.
The DPP is establishing a body dedicated to cross-Strait affairs. The gears are already in motion. But it has three hurdles to overcome. The first is the name of the body. The second is who will be in charge. The third is whether there will be a substantive change in the party's Mainland policy. Regarding who will be in charge, outsiders need not interfere. That is outside the scope of this article.
The DPP is considering three names for the body. They are "Mainland Affairs Department," "Cross-Strait Affairs Department," and "China Affairs Department." We recommend the first two alternatives. The DPP should not adopt the name "China Affairs Department." The name "China Affairs Department" implies "one nation on each side." This is something Beijing would have a hard time swallowing. What is the DPP's motive for establishing this body? Is it to carry one its confrontation with the Mainland? If so, then that is another matter. But if the DPP is genuine about wanting change, then it has no reason to put this stumbling block in its own way. Green Camp elder Huang Hsin-chieh once quipped, "We can promote Taiwan independence, but we cannot talk about it." Today, the Mainland is highly developed. The power gap between the two sides has widened. The situation is very different from the one Huang Hsin-chieh faced. DPP leaders today must be wiser than their predecessors.
The DPP may name the new body the "Mainland Affairs Department." But it still must confront the 1992 consensus. The CCP 18th National Congress Official Documents mentions the 1992 consensus. It is considered an important basis for cross-Strait consultations, mutual trust, and peaceful development. The DPP must offer a response. The party may establish a "Mainland Affairs Department." But if it refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, the DPP will not be able to establish relations with the CCP. When the 2016 election rolls around its cross-Strait policy will remain the Green Camp Achilles Heel. In other words, if the DPP refuses to fundamentally change in its attitude toward the Mainland, the new "Mainland Affairs Department" will remain an empty gesture.
DPP party members may assume that accepting the 1992 consensus and forsaking Taiwan independence will negate the party's raison d'etre. In fact, that is not the case.
When the DPP was first founded, its mission was to defy authoritarianism. Its clarion call was the pursuit of democracy and progress. It was not Taiwan independence and Sinophobia. As a result, it inspired high hopes among many who wanted Taiwan to move toward constitutional democracy.
But in 1991 the party approved the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. As a result, the DPP lost the opportunity to interact with the Mainland for the sake of peace. It destroyed its chance to promote constitutional rule. During Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office, cross-Strait relations and constitutional rule were put in jeopardy. This is still fresh in memories of the ruling and opposition parties. The DPP must make a fresh start. If it fails to do so, it will hold back Taiwan's progress. Its sole function will be to satisfy the emotional needs of voters dissatisfied with the KMT.
The public envies bipartisan politics in Europe and the United States. But it is unable to experience it. Why? Because in these advanced countries national identity is a non-issue. The two parties can compete with each other over public livelihood issues. The political arena is dominated by public livelihood issues. As a result their democracies mature, naturally. Public livelihood is an issue over which compromise is possible. Unfortunately the DPP has become a Taiwan independence party. Every election and every legislative battle becomes all about reunification vs. independence. No time remains to delve into the details of public livelihood. Worse still, national identity issues often hinder the implementation of policies relating to public livelihood. Cross-Strait relations are increasingly volatile as a result of the sudden and perplexing ups and downs of Taiwan independence. Taiwan is currently in a recession. The wealth gap is widening. If we could set aside the issue of reunification vs. independence, the KMT and DPP could advance different policies on public livelihood. They could make full use of cross-Strait economic synergies. They could lead Taiwan out of its current predicament.
The Democratic Progressive Party's middle name is "progressive." This implies concern for the socially disadvantaged. Unfortunately, over the years, the DPP has been preoccupied with Taiwan independence. No debate or compromise is possible between left and right. There is only internecine warfare over reunification vs. independence. The DPP should replace its "China Affairs Department" with a "Mainland Affairs Department." It should accept the 1992 consensus. This would benefit not just cross-Strait interaction, but also the DPP during the next general election. It would help Taiwan return to constitutional rule. It would improve the people's livelihood.
Phasing out Taiwan independence is the DPP's lifeline. Democracy and progress are more pragmatic and ambitious goals than Taiwan independence. The shore is not far. The DPP need only turn its head.
民主進步：比台獨更務實遠大的目標
2012-11-21
中國時報
二次政黨輪替之後，民進黨歷經陳水扁下獄、蔡英文二○一二敗選，氣勢大挫。雖然馬政府近來政績不佳，但並不代表二○一六大選必是綠營的天下。綠營的最大敵人，還是自己。如果民進黨拿不出讓人民放心的兩岸政策，選票可能還是流向國民黨。
中國崛起已是不爭的事實。台灣與大陸近在咫尺，經貿及民間往來如此緊密，但是政治上卻與彼岸如此扞格，這是古今中外絕無僅有的特例。任何台灣的執政者，首要任務都得處理好兩岸關係。任何有意角逐大位者，也都不能敷衍、避談他的兩岸政策。
事實擺在眼前，民進黨對大陸的敵意使其既無法了解對岸，也無從理順兩岸關係。該黨的大陸政策如不改弦更張，恐怕使它淪為永遠的在野黨。國民黨除非犯下比「笨拙」更嚴重的錯誤，將很難被民進黨取代。這不但是綠營支持者，也是關心台灣民主政治者不願看到的局面。
民進黨今天的中常會將討論是否設立「中國事務部」，我們想趁此機會表達對該黨的最深期許。
民進黨設立處理兩岸事務的專職機構，似乎已是箭在弦上，但下列三個關卡必須打通：第一是機構名稱，第二是主事者人選，第三是該黨大陸政策是否將有實質改變。有關人選問題，外人無須置喙，不屬本文討論範圍。
現有的三個名稱「大陸事務部」、「兩岸事務部」、「中國事務部」，我們建議在前兩者擇一，不要採用「中國事務部」。因為「中國事務部」隱含「一邊一國」，這是強北京所難，但又無力逼其吞下。民進黨設此機構的目的如果是要與對岸繼續對抗，那麼另當別論。如果民進黨覺今是而昨非，那就沒有理由自己搬個大石頭，擋在面前。綠營前輩黃信介且曾說「台獨只能做不能說」，今日大陸的發展，與兩岸的差距，已迥異於黃信介當年所見者，民進黨今天的領導人，理應較其前人採取更有智慧的行徑才是。
即便新設機構稱為「大陸事務部」，民進黨仍需務實面對「九二共識」。中共十八大正式文件已列入「九二共識」，將其作為開展協商、建立互信、推動兩岸關係和平發展的重要政治基礎。民進黨必須對此有所回應。該黨即使設了「大陸事務部」，若不承認九二共識，民共兩黨的交流仍舊無法展開。二○一六大選時，它仍是綠營的罩門。換言之，如果不根本改變對大陸態度，新設「大陸事務部」將缺少實質意義。
民進黨人或許認為接受「九二共識」、放棄台獨目標似乎是使該黨喪失它的存在價值，其實不然。
民進黨創黨之初，是以對抗威權體制、追求民主進步為號召，不是台獨反中。這使得許多希望見到台灣走向民主憲政的人士對其寄予厚望。
但是，自從一九九一年台獨黨綱通過後，這個黨不但失去了與對岸和平互動的機會，也斷送了與憲政同步發展的可能。陳水扁八年任內在兩岸關係和憲政運作上掀起的驚濤駭浪，朝野記憶猶新。如果民進黨不改弦更張，那麼這個黨除了滿足對國民黨不滿的選民之情緒需求外，對台灣的健全發展終將是一負面因素。
此外，國人羨慕歐美的兩黨政治而不可得。因為這些先進國家沒有國家認同問題，兩黨可以分據民生問題左右兩端，政治舞台長期都以民生議題為主軸。民主品質自然逐步提升，民生也可得到左右之間的妥協。然而，民進黨成為台獨黨後，台灣所有選舉以及國會對抗，都以統獨為主，不但無暇細論民生，更常因國家認同有異而阻礙民生政策推行。兩岸關係也因島內台獨勢力的起伏而陰晴不定、波譎雲詭。目前台灣社會經濟蕭條，貧富差距擴大，國內政治如果能放下統獨爭議，國民兩黨大可以提出不同的民生政策，充分運用兩岸經濟互補之處，帶領台灣脫離目前困境。
民主進步黨黨名當中所謂「進步」，隱含關懷弱勢族群的理想。可惜多年來，在民進黨的台獨掛帥之下，台灣都沒有左右的辯論與協調，只有統獨的內耗與空轉。民進黨若能以「大陸事務部」取代「中國事務部」，並能進而接受「九二共識」，不但有利兩岸互動，有利民進黨下次大選，更有利於台灣的憲政走回正軌、民生處境得到改善。
淡化台獨色彩是民進黨的生路。民主、進步更是比台獨更務實、更遠大的目標。彼岸不遠，回頭便是。
Goals more Pragmatic and Ambitious than Taiwan Independence
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 21, 2012
Summary: The Ma administration's record has been poor. But that does not mean the Green Camp will win the 2016 general election. The Green Camp is its own worst enemy. If the DPP cannot offer a cross-Strait policy that puts people at ease, voters may still cast their ballots for the KMT. Phasing out Taiwan independence is the DPP's lifeline. Democracy and progress are more pragmatic and ambitious goals than Taiwan independence. The shore is not far. The DPP need only turn its head.
Full Text below:
After a second change in ruling parties, the DPP watched as Chen Shui-bian entered prison, and Tsai Ying-wen lost the 2012 presidential election. These were major blows to its morale. The Ma administration's record has been poor. But that does not mean the Green Camp will win the 2016 general election. The Green Camp is its own worst enemy. If the DPP cannot offer a cross-Strait policy that puts people at ease, voters may still cast their ballots for the KMT.
Mainland China has risen. That is an incontrovertible fact. Taiwan and the Chinese mainland are in close proximity. Economic, trade, and social relations are close. But politically the two sides remain at loggerheads. This is a unique case that has no precedent, past or present, east or west. The primary task of anyone who assumes power on Taiwan is to deal with cross-Strait relations. Anyone who aspires to high office cannot afford to ignore or be cavalier about cross-Strait policy.
The facts are clear. The Democratic Progressive Party's hostility toward the Mainland makes it incapable of understanding the Mainland. It is incapable of dealing rationally with cross-Strait relations. The party must totally overhaul its Mainland policy. Otherwise it will remain an opposition party forever. The KMT will have to commit far more serious errors than merely being "clumsy." Otherwise it will not be displaced by the DPP. This is not merely something that Green Camp supporters do not want to see. This is something that everyone who cares about democracy on Taiwan do not want to see.
Today the DPP Central Standing Committee will discuss whether to establish a "China Affairs Committee." We would like to take this opportunity to express our hopes for the party.
The DPP is establishing a body dedicated to cross-Strait affairs. The gears are already in motion. But it has three hurdles to overcome. The first is the name of the body. The second is who will be in charge. The third is whether there will be a substantive change in the party's Mainland policy. Regarding who will be in charge, outsiders need not interfere. That is outside the scope of this article.
The DPP is considering three names for the body. They are "Mainland Affairs Department," "Cross-Strait Affairs Department," and "China Affairs Department." We recommend the first two alternatives. The DPP should not adopt the name "China Affairs Department." The name "China Affairs Department" implies "one nation on each side." This is something Beijing would have a hard time swallowing. What is the DPP's motive for establishing this body? Is it to carry one its confrontation with the Mainland? If so, then that is another matter. But if the DPP is genuine about wanting change, then it has no reason to put this stumbling block in its own way. Green Camp elder Huang Hsin-chieh once quipped, "We can promote Taiwan independence, but we cannot talk about it." Today, the Mainland is highly developed. The power gap between the two sides has widened. The situation is very different from the one Huang Hsin-chieh faced. DPP leaders today must be wiser than their predecessors.
The DPP may name the new body the "Mainland Affairs Department." But it still must confront the 1992 consensus. The CCP 18th National Congress Official Documents mentions the 1992 consensus. It is considered an important basis for cross-Strait consultations, mutual trust, and peaceful development. The DPP must offer a response. The party may establish a "Mainland Affairs Department." But if it refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, the DPP will not be able to establish relations with the CCP. When the 2016 election rolls around its cross-Strait policy will remain the Green Camp Achilles Heel. In other words, if the DPP refuses to fundamentally change in its attitude toward the Mainland, the new "Mainland Affairs Department" will remain an empty gesture.
DPP party members may assume that accepting the 1992 consensus and forsaking Taiwan independence will negate the party's raison d'etre. In fact, that is not the case.
When the DPP was first founded, its mission was to defy authoritarianism. Its clarion call was the pursuit of democracy and progress. It was not Taiwan independence and Sinophobia. As a result, it inspired high hopes among many who wanted Taiwan to move toward constitutional democracy.
But in 1991 the party approved the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. As a result, the DPP lost the opportunity to interact with the Mainland for the sake of peace. It destroyed its chance to promote constitutional rule. During Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office, cross-Strait relations and constitutional rule were put in jeopardy. This is still fresh in memories of the ruling and opposition parties. The DPP must make a fresh start. If it fails to do so, it will hold back Taiwan's progress. Its sole function will be to satisfy the emotional needs of voters dissatisfied with the KMT.
The public envies bipartisan politics in Europe and the United States. But it is unable to experience it. Why? Because in these advanced countries national identity is a non-issue. The two parties can compete with each other over public livelihood issues. The political arena is dominated by public livelihood issues. As a result their democracies mature, naturally. Public livelihood is an issue over which compromise is possible. Unfortunately the DPP has become a Taiwan independence party. Every election and every legislative battle becomes all about reunification vs. independence. No time remains to delve into the details of public livelihood. Worse still, national identity issues often hinder the implementation of policies relating to public livelihood. Cross-Strait relations are increasingly volatile as a result of the sudden and perplexing ups and downs of Taiwan independence. Taiwan is currently in a recession. The wealth gap is widening. If we could set aside the issue of reunification vs. independence, the KMT and DPP could advance different policies on public livelihood. They could make full use of cross-Strait economic synergies. They could lead Taiwan out of its current predicament.
The Democratic Progressive Party's middle name is "progressive." This implies concern for the socially disadvantaged. Unfortunately, over the years, the DPP has been preoccupied with Taiwan independence. No debate or compromise is possible between left and right. There is only internecine warfare over reunification vs. independence. The DPP should replace its "China Affairs Department" with a "Mainland Affairs Department." It should accept the 1992 consensus. This would benefit not just cross-Strait interaction, but also the DPP during the next general election. It would help Taiwan return to constitutional rule. It would improve the people's livelihood.
Phasing out Taiwan independence is the DPP's lifeline. Democracy and progress are more pragmatic and ambitious goals than Taiwan independence. The shore is not far. The DPP need only turn its head.
民主進步：比台獨更務實遠大的目標
2012-11-21
中國時報
二次政黨輪替之後，民進黨歷經陳水扁下獄、蔡英文二○一二敗選，氣勢大挫。雖然馬政府近來政績不佳，但並不代表二○一六大選必是綠營的天下。綠營的最大敵人，還是自己。如果民進黨拿不出讓人民放心的兩岸政策，選票可能還是流向國民黨。
中國崛起已是不爭的事實。台灣與大陸近在咫尺，經貿及民間往來如此緊密，但是政治上卻與彼岸如此扞格，這是古今中外絕無僅有的特例。任何台灣的執政者，首要任務都得處理好兩岸關係。任何有意角逐大位者，也都不能敷衍、避談他的兩岸政策。
事實擺在眼前，民進黨對大陸的敵意使其既無法了解對岸，也無從理順兩岸關係。該黨的大陸政策如不改弦更張，恐怕使它淪為永遠的在野黨。國民黨除非犯下比「笨拙」更嚴重的錯誤，將很難被民進黨取代。這不但是綠營支持者，也是關心台灣民主政治者不願看到的局面。
民進黨今天的中常會將討論是否設立「中國事務部」，我們想趁此機會表達對該黨的最深期許。
民進黨設立處理兩岸事務的專職機構，似乎已是箭在弦上，但下列三個關卡必須打通：第一是機構名稱，第二是主事者人選，第三是該黨大陸政策是否將有實質改變。有關人選問題，外人無須置喙，不屬本文討論範圍。
現有的三個名稱「大陸事務部」、「兩岸事務部」、「中國事務部」，我們建議在前兩者擇一，不要採用「中國事務部」。因為「中國事務部」隱含「一邊一國」，這是強北京所難，但又無力逼其吞下。民進黨設此機構的目的如果是要與對岸繼續對抗，那麼另當別論。如果民進黨覺今是而昨非，那就沒有理由自己搬個大石頭，擋在面前。綠營前輩黃信介且曾說「台獨只能做不能說」，今日大陸的發展，與兩岸的差距，已迥異於黃信介當年所見者，民進黨今天的領導人，理應較其前人採取更有智慧的行徑才是。
即便新設機構稱為「大陸事務部」，民進黨仍需務實面對「九二共識」。中共十八大正式文件已列入「九二共識」，將其作為開展協商、建立互信、推動兩岸關係和平發展的重要政治基礎。民進黨必須對此有所回應。該黨即使設了「大陸事務部」，若不承認九二共識，民共兩黨的交流仍舊無法展開。二○一六大選時，它仍是綠營的罩門。換言之，如果不根本改變對大陸態度，新設「大陸事務部」將缺少實質意義。
民進黨人或許認為接受「九二共識」、放棄台獨目標似乎是使該黨喪失它的存在價值，其實不然。
民進黨創黨之初，是以對抗威權體制、追求民主進步為號召，不是台獨反中。這使得許多希望見到台灣走向民主憲政的人士對其寄予厚望。
但是，自從一九九一年台獨黨綱通過後，這個黨不但失去了與對岸和平互動的機會，也斷送了與憲政同步發展的可能。陳水扁八年任內在兩岸關係和憲政運作上掀起的驚濤駭浪，朝野記憶猶新。如果民進黨不改弦更張，那麼這個黨除了滿足對國民黨不滿的選民之情緒需求外，對台灣的健全發展終將是一負面因素。
此外，國人羨慕歐美的兩黨政治而不可得。因為這些先進國家沒有國家認同問題，兩黨可以分據民生問題左右兩端，政治舞台長期都以民生議題為主軸。民主品質自然逐步提升，民生也可得到左右之間的妥協。然而，民進黨成為台獨黨後，台灣所有選舉以及國會對抗，都以統獨為主，不但無暇細論民生，更常因國家認同有異而阻礙民生政策推行。兩岸關係也因島內台獨勢力的起伏而陰晴不定、波譎雲詭。目前台灣社會經濟蕭條，貧富差距擴大，國內政治如果能放下統獨爭議，國民兩黨大可以提出不同的民生政策，充分運用兩岸經濟互補之處，帶領台灣脫離目前困境。
民主進步黨黨名當中所謂「進步」，隱含關懷弱勢族群的理想。可惜多年來，在民進黨的台獨掛帥之下，台灣都沒有左右的辯論與協調，只有統獨的內耗與空轉。民進黨若能以「大陸事務部」取代「中國事務部」，並能進而接受「九二共識」，不但有利兩岸互動，有利民進黨下次大選，更有利於台灣的憲政走回正軌、民生處境得到改善。
淡化台獨色彩是民進黨的生路。民主、進步更是比台獨更務實、更遠大的目標。彼岸不遠，回頭便是。
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
Evaluating the Historical Legacies of Our Political Leaders
Evaluating the Historical Legacies of Our Political Leaders
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 20, 2012
Summary: With a single word, The Economist touched off more controversy about President Ma Ying-jeou's legacy. The Economist referred to Ma as a "bumbler." Is President Ma a bumbler? Is he incompetent? Is he "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" Is he another King Zhou of Shang? We need not seek premature conclusions. History will render its verdict, one that is reasonable, that does not exaggerate, that does not defame. When the time comes, his critics too will see how they rank.
Full Text below:
With a single word, The Economist touched off more controversy about President Ma Ying-jeou's legacy. The Economist referred to Ma as a "bumbler." This article asks how we should evaluate the legacies of our political leaders. We have no desire to draw any firm conclusions about President Ma's legacy at the moment. We merely cite him as an example.
We can evaluate the legacy of a political leader from two perspectives. The first is according to his standing in history. The second is according to his standing during his own lifetime. From an historical perspective, he can be compared to his predecessors and his successors. Therefore we can evaluate Ma Ying-jeou by comparing him to Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. We can also compare him to future generations. From an historical perspective, Ma Ying-jeou compares rather favorably. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian tore Taiwan apart. They stood on the wrong side of history. They led Taiwan down the garden path. Ma Ying-jeou undid the mistakes of his predecessors. He set future generations irreversibly back on the right path. The DPP is currently debating whether to undertake reforms. That is evidence of Ma's impact.
Let us consider a political leader's status during his own lifetime. We can compare him to his contemporaries, both at home and abroad. We can compare Ma Ying-jeou to Frank Hsieh in 2008, and to Tsai Ing-wen in 2012. Frank Hsieh is currently promoting DPP reform. He even says "There is nothing wrong with the DPP learning from the KMT's cross-Strait policy." This is the difference between Ma and Hsieh. Had Tsai Ing-wen prevailed over Ma Ying-jeou in 2012 and become president, her record would surely be inferior to Ma Ying-jeou's. She would surely have been incapable of making cross-Strait relations work, let alone other matters. This is the difference between Ma and Tsai.
Compare Ma to his contemporaries abroad. Leaders of the major powers are presiding over their nations' economic decline. Few leaders of nations with freedom of the press, competition between political parties, democracy, and a free economy, are in good odor or enjoy popular support. One look at Europe proves that. Cabinets in Japan are overturned regularly. South Korea's Lee Myung-bak enjoys better press abroad than he does at home. President Barack Obama, leader of the United States, the most powerful nation on earth, has the same label attached to him: bumbler. Look at the cover story in the same issue of The Economist. See how it criticized France. Clearly Ma Ying-jeou is not the one in lowest repute. No wonder President Francois Hollande was hopping mad.
Any evaluation of a political leader's worth should take into account the difficulty of the task he faces. He must be able to manage the resources of the nation. Chiang Ching-kuo's administration was tainted by martial law and the Chiang Nan Incident. But the nation was in dire straits. He wrestled with social constraints. He eventually implemented democracy and cross-Strait exchanges. This secured his legacy, both historically and contemporarily. Taiwan was in crisis. Chiang Ching-kuo achieved much with little, making his accomplishments all the more impressive.
Taiwan faces problems, domestic and international, that are extraordinary and daunting. It must cope with demands from without, and demands from within. It must cope with the "one China framework" from the CCP, and the "rectification of names" from the DPP. It must promote liberal democracy. It must tackle the challenges of globalization despite its lack of resources. It must meet public expectations of economic growth and distributive justice. As Jerome Cohen noted, the presidency of the Republic of China is the toughest job in the world. Ma's predecessors Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian tore Taiwan apart. Taiwan became a "troublemaker," detested by both Washington and Beijing. This is why it is not easy to be President of the Republic of China. This is why Lee and Chen wanted to repudiate the Republic of China altogether, and divest themselves of the burden its governance. By contrast, Frank Hsieh wants to reclaim the ROC.
Ma Ying-jeou is President of the Republic of China. The public does not want cross-Strait relations to collapse into chaos. It does not want a repeat of Chen Shui-bian's corruption. Chen's daughter summed up Chen's corruption well when she said, "Who hasn't taken money from my father?" Taiwan lacks the wherewithal to duplicate Lee-Myung-Bak's landing on Dokdo, or George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq. Some members of the public wanted Ma to sign ECFA. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted the capital gains tax. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted gasoline and electricity rate hikes. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted servicemen to pay taxes. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted second generation health care. Others did not. Have members of the public forgotten "market price real estate listing?" Former Vice President Vincent Siew and Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jing-pying both expressed opposition. Should "market price real estate listing" be implemented? How can Ma Ying-jeou convince opponents? He can't even convince Vincent Siew and Wang Jing-pyng.
The Economist's evaluation of Ma Ying-jeou is self-contradictory. It said, "Nothing suggests Mr Ma's main policies will change (or that they should)." This harsh editorial said President Ma "will not change" and "should not change." Ma's critics are apparently just as "bumbling" as President Ma. Take the U.S. beef imports controversy. It raged for six months. Some legislators camped out on the floor of the Legislative Yuan for five days. Recall what happened. The Economist leveled some harsh criticisms. But did it bother to evaluate the Ma administration's U.S. beef imports policy? Did it bother to ask itself why it "will not change" and "should not change?" Is the Ma administration really that incompetent? Or are its critics merely being unreasonable?
Consider a political leader's ability and achievements according to his standing in history and his standing during his own lifetime. They can be divided into four categories. One. A political leader may use evil means in the pursuit of evil ends. A major offender would be someone like Mao Zedong. A minor offender would be someone like Chen Shui-bian. Two. A political leader may use evil means in the understandable pursuit of lofty ends. Examples include Deng Xiaoping's draconian measures and Chiang Ching-kuo's martial law. Three. A political leader may use legitimate but clumsy means in pursuit of justifiable ends. Examples include ECFA, Market Price Real Estate Listings, and U.S. beef imports. This was the case with Ma Ying-jeou. Four. A political leader may use legitimate and sophisticated means in pursuit of justifiable ends. Perhaps once in the lifetime of every political leader an opportunity like this will arise. But no political leader is ever going encounter fair winds and following seas during his entire career.
On March 22, 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected to his first term as president. On March 25th, this newspaper published the third in a series of editorials, entitled, "Ma Ying-jeou's Challenge: A Good Person Must Become a Capable Person." As we can see, doubts about his ability have long haunted Ma Ying-jeou. This newspaper's editorials have criticized him relentlessly. This newspaper feels that a democracy must be critical of its political leaders. But simplistic judgments, including characterizations of Ma Ying-jeou as the tyrannical King Zhou of Shang are hardly fair. Under democracy those in power will do what they must do. Critics will say what they must say. But Ma Ying-jeou's legacy will not be determined by Wang Chien-hsuan's characterization of him as "incompetent," or by The Economist's characterization of him as a "bumbler." .
Is President Ma a bumbler? Is he incompetent? Is he "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" Is he another King Zhou of Shang? We need not seek premature conclusions. History will render its verdict, one that is reasonable, that does not exaggerate, that does not defame. When the time comes, his critics too will see how they rank.
煮酒論英雄：歷史縱軸與時代橫軸
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.20
《經濟學人》的一句bumbler，又掀起對馬英九總統評價的議論。本文主要想談如何評價一位政治人物，而不欲定論對馬總統的評價，只是以他為例。
對一位政治領袖的評價，可從歷史縱軸與時代橫軸等兩個面向觀察。從歷史縱軸看，可將這位領袖與前人比，也要與其後人比。因此，評價馬英九，可與李登輝與陳水扁比，也將與馬的未來幾代後任者比。在歷史縱軸上，馬英九有其優勢，因為李登輝與陳水扁撕裂了台灣社會，且誤導台灣走向了歷史的謬誤面；而馬英九扭轉了前人的錯誤，並為後人定下了無可逆轉的方向，民進黨正在爭議轉型，即可佐證。
再從時代的橫軸看，可將這位政治領袖與本國當代人物比，亦與世界當代領袖比。馬英九在二○○八年與謝長廷比，二○一二年與蔡英文比。謝長廷此時正在主導民進黨轉型，甚至稱「民進黨兩岸政策學國民黨也不錯」，這是馬謝對比；而倘若蔡英文在二○一二贏過馬英九，當了總統，其政績可以斷言絕對還不如馬英九今日的表現，因為她當時根本喬不定兩岸關係，遑論其他，這是馬蔡對比。
再與當代世界領袖比：當現今舉世國家領袖都站在世界經濟衰颯的共同立足點上，且倘若同是採行輿論自由、政黨競爭的民主政治與自由經濟，率皆難有高聲望及高民氣，舉目歐洲即可知，日本的內閣更翻覆如翻書，連韓國的李明博也是「外國評價比國內高」，而全球首強美國總統歐巴馬，輿論也曾送給他與馬英九一模一樣的封號：bumbler。這只要看同一期《經濟學人》的封面故事如何批評法國，即知馬英九恐怕尚不是最難堪的一位，難怪惹得歐蘭德總統跳腳。
再者，評價一名政治領袖的能力，應與其所面對之任務的難易程度相對比，亦須以其能夠操持的國家資源條件為參酌。蔣經國一生，雖有戒嚴統治及江南案等汙點，但他在國家那般艱困的情勢下，苦心陶鑄社會條件，終於完成「政治民主／兩岸開放」的巨大工程；這使他無論在歷史縱軸或時代橫軸上，皆有可以肯定的地位。因為，台灣的處境既危又衰，從而蔣經國以小搏大的成就即相對顯得難能可貴。
正因台灣的內外處境是異常又非常的艱難，既要面對彼岸的「一中框架」與內部的「正名制憲」，又要推行自由開放的民主政治，還要在資源窮絀下，迎對全球化的挑戰，且須維持可堪滿足人心的經濟發展與分配正義，使得孔傑榮稱，「台灣總統是全世界最難的工作之一」；亦正因如此，前任的李登輝、陳水扁二人將台灣撕裂得支離破碎，使台灣成為華府與北京皆表厭惡的「麻煩製造者」，這正可見擔任中華民國總統之不易，甚至使李扁二人想乾脆根本否定中華民國，丟掉中華民國這個包袱；但是，謝長廷一輩現在又想將之拾回。
馬英九正是台灣的總統，正是中華民國總統；國人不願他把兩岸關係搞得烏煙瘴氣，也不容他像陳水扁那樣用貪汙的錢去搞「誰沒有收過我爸爸的錢？」，且台灣又沒有如「李明博登獨島」、「小布希揮軍伊拉克」的國際操作空間，但人們又要他簽ＥＣＦＡ又反對，又要他徵證所稅又反對，又要他油電漲價又反對，又要他軍人納稅又反對，又要他二代健保又反對……。國人若不健忘，即以「實價登錄」而言，前副總統蕭萬長及立法院長王金平皆曾表示反對，但「實價登錄」應不應當做？馬英九豈有「能力」去說服所有的反對者，他連蕭萬長與王金平都說服不了。
《經濟學人》對馬英九的最後評語是一弔詭。它說：「沒有跡象顯示馬的主要政策會改變（或者應該改變）。」春秋之筆的寓意是：馬總統「不會改變」，也「不應該改變」。於是，在此又可得知，主政者的「能力」與批評者的「能力」，其實是相互對應的。例如美牛案，天翻地覆地吵了半年多，甚至有人在立院打了五天地鋪，但現在回想起來，除了那些火爆辛辣的「批評」以外，有沒有人認真想過當時美牛政策「不會改變／不應改變」的道理何在？這到底是主政者「無能」？還是批評者「無理」？
從歷史縱軸與時代橫軸看，政治領袖的「能力」與「政績」之對比，或許可概分為四種類型。一、以惡劣的手法追求惡劣之目的。大巫是毛澤東之類，小巫是陳水扁之屬。二、以惡劣之手法，追求可以理解並終付實現之高遠目的，如鄧小平的強硬操作，與蔣經國的戒嚴統治；三、以正當但笨拙的手法，追求正當合理之目的，如ＥＣＦＡ或實價登錄、美牛案等，這是馬英九；四、以正當又精巧之手法，完成正當合理之目的，則或許每一政治領袖的一生中偶爾能有此類個案之表現，但不可能找到一人終生事事如此的奇蹟。
在二○○八年三月二十二日，馬英九首次當選總統，本報在二十五日刊出系列社論第三篇，題目即是：〈馬英九課題：從「好人」到「能人」！〉可見，「有無能力」這個質疑，一直如影隨形地跟著馬英九，本報社論對其亦是批評不斷；本文認為，民主政治應當對政治領袖嚴格批評是天經地義，但過於簡化的評論，甚至公開在報紙上將馬英九喻為商紂王，卻也難謂公允。民主政治，本來就是主政者為所應為，批評者批所當批。然而，馬英九的評價，恐怕不是王建?一句「無能」，或《經濟學人》一句bumbler，可以一槌落定。
馬總統是否bumbler？是否無能？是否「傾中賣台」？是否商紂王？其實皆不必過早定論，日後在歷史縱軸與時代橫軸的座標上，終將會給馬英九一個不虛誇、不踐踏的合理定位，到時候今日的批評者也會看到自己的位置。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 20, 2012
Summary: With a single word, The Economist touched off more controversy about President Ma Ying-jeou's legacy. The Economist referred to Ma as a "bumbler." Is President Ma a bumbler? Is he incompetent? Is he "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" Is he another King Zhou of Shang? We need not seek premature conclusions. History will render its verdict, one that is reasonable, that does not exaggerate, that does not defame. When the time comes, his critics too will see how they rank.
Full Text below:
With a single word, The Economist touched off more controversy about President Ma Ying-jeou's legacy. The Economist referred to Ma as a "bumbler." This article asks how we should evaluate the legacies of our political leaders. We have no desire to draw any firm conclusions about President Ma's legacy at the moment. We merely cite him as an example.
We can evaluate the legacy of a political leader from two perspectives. The first is according to his standing in history. The second is according to his standing during his own lifetime. From an historical perspective, he can be compared to his predecessors and his successors. Therefore we can evaluate Ma Ying-jeou by comparing him to Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. We can also compare him to future generations. From an historical perspective, Ma Ying-jeou compares rather favorably. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian tore Taiwan apart. They stood on the wrong side of history. They led Taiwan down the garden path. Ma Ying-jeou undid the mistakes of his predecessors. He set future generations irreversibly back on the right path. The DPP is currently debating whether to undertake reforms. That is evidence of Ma's impact.
Let us consider a political leader's status during his own lifetime. We can compare him to his contemporaries, both at home and abroad. We can compare Ma Ying-jeou to Frank Hsieh in 2008, and to Tsai Ing-wen in 2012. Frank Hsieh is currently promoting DPP reform. He even says "There is nothing wrong with the DPP learning from the KMT's cross-Strait policy." This is the difference between Ma and Hsieh. Had Tsai Ing-wen prevailed over Ma Ying-jeou in 2012 and become president, her record would surely be inferior to Ma Ying-jeou's. She would surely have been incapable of making cross-Strait relations work, let alone other matters. This is the difference between Ma and Tsai.
Compare Ma to his contemporaries abroad. Leaders of the major powers are presiding over their nations' economic decline. Few leaders of nations with freedom of the press, competition between political parties, democracy, and a free economy, are in good odor or enjoy popular support. One look at Europe proves that. Cabinets in Japan are overturned regularly. South Korea's Lee Myung-bak enjoys better press abroad than he does at home. President Barack Obama, leader of the United States, the most powerful nation on earth, has the same label attached to him: bumbler. Look at the cover story in the same issue of The Economist. See how it criticized France. Clearly Ma Ying-jeou is not the one in lowest repute. No wonder President Francois Hollande was hopping mad.
Any evaluation of a political leader's worth should take into account the difficulty of the task he faces. He must be able to manage the resources of the nation. Chiang Ching-kuo's administration was tainted by martial law and the Chiang Nan Incident. But the nation was in dire straits. He wrestled with social constraints. He eventually implemented democracy and cross-Strait exchanges. This secured his legacy, both historically and contemporarily. Taiwan was in crisis. Chiang Ching-kuo achieved much with little, making his accomplishments all the more impressive.
Taiwan faces problems, domestic and international, that are extraordinary and daunting. It must cope with demands from without, and demands from within. It must cope with the "one China framework" from the CCP, and the "rectification of names" from the DPP. It must promote liberal democracy. It must tackle the challenges of globalization despite its lack of resources. It must meet public expectations of economic growth and distributive justice. As Jerome Cohen noted, the presidency of the Republic of China is the toughest job in the world. Ma's predecessors Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian tore Taiwan apart. Taiwan became a "troublemaker," detested by both Washington and Beijing. This is why it is not easy to be President of the Republic of China. This is why Lee and Chen wanted to repudiate the Republic of China altogether, and divest themselves of the burden its governance. By contrast, Frank Hsieh wants to reclaim the ROC.
Ma Ying-jeou is President of the Republic of China. The public does not want cross-Strait relations to collapse into chaos. It does not want a repeat of Chen Shui-bian's corruption. Chen's daughter summed up Chen's corruption well when she said, "Who hasn't taken money from my father?" Taiwan lacks the wherewithal to duplicate Lee-Myung-Bak's landing on Dokdo, or George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq. Some members of the public wanted Ma to sign ECFA. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted the capital gains tax. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted gasoline and electricity rate hikes. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted servicemen to pay taxes. Others did not. Some members of the public wanted second generation health care. Others did not. Have members of the public forgotten "market price real estate listing?" Former Vice President Vincent Siew and Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jing-pying both expressed opposition. Should "market price real estate listing" be implemented? How can Ma Ying-jeou convince opponents? He can't even convince Vincent Siew and Wang Jing-pyng.
The Economist's evaluation of Ma Ying-jeou is self-contradictory. It said, "Nothing suggests Mr Ma's main policies will change (or that they should)." This harsh editorial said President Ma "will not change" and "should not change." Ma's critics are apparently just as "bumbling" as President Ma. Take the U.S. beef imports controversy. It raged for six months. Some legislators camped out on the floor of the Legislative Yuan for five days. Recall what happened. The Economist leveled some harsh criticisms. But did it bother to evaluate the Ma administration's U.S. beef imports policy? Did it bother to ask itself why it "will not change" and "should not change?" Is the Ma administration really that incompetent? Or are its critics merely being unreasonable?
Consider a political leader's ability and achievements according to his standing in history and his standing during his own lifetime. They can be divided into four categories. One. A political leader may use evil means in the pursuit of evil ends. A major offender would be someone like Mao Zedong. A minor offender would be someone like Chen Shui-bian. Two. A political leader may use evil means in the understandable pursuit of lofty ends. Examples include Deng Xiaoping's draconian measures and Chiang Ching-kuo's martial law. Three. A political leader may use legitimate but clumsy means in pursuit of justifiable ends. Examples include ECFA, Market Price Real Estate Listings, and U.S. beef imports. This was the case with Ma Ying-jeou. Four. A political leader may use legitimate and sophisticated means in pursuit of justifiable ends. Perhaps once in the lifetime of every political leader an opportunity like this will arise. But no political leader is ever going encounter fair winds and following seas during his entire career.
On March 22, 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected to his first term as president. On March 25th, this newspaper published the third in a series of editorials, entitled, "Ma Ying-jeou's Challenge: A Good Person Must Become a Capable Person." As we can see, doubts about his ability have long haunted Ma Ying-jeou. This newspaper's editorials have criticized him relentlessly. This newspaper feels that a democracy must be critical of its political leaders. But simplistic judgments, including characterizations of Ma Ying-jeou as the tyrannical King Zhou of Shang are hardly fair. Under democracy those in power will do what they must do. Critics will say what they must say. But Ma Ying-jeou's legacy will not be determined by Wang Chien-hsuan's characterization of him as "incompetent," or by The Economist's characterization of him as a "bumbler." .
Is President Ma a bumbler? Is he incompetent? Is he "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" Is he another King Zhou of Shang? We need not seek premature conclusions. History will render its verdict, one that is reasonable, that does not exaggerate, that does not defame. When the time comes, his critics too will see how they rank.
煮酒論英雄：歷史縱軸與時代橫軸
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.20
《經濟學人》的一句bumbler，又掀起對馬英九總統評價的議論。本文主要想談如何評價一位政治人物，而不欲定論對馬總統的評價，只是以他為例。
對一位政治領袖的評價，可從歷史縱軸與時代橫軸等兩個面向觀察。從歷史縱軸看，可將這位領袖與前人比，也要與其後人比。因此，評價馬英九，可與李登輝與陳水扁比，也將與馬的未來幾代後任者比。在歷史縱軸上，馬英九有其優勢，因為李登輝與陳水扁撕裂了台灣社會，且誤導台灣走向了歷史的謬誤面；而馬英九扭轉了前人的錯誤，並為後人定下了無可逆轉的方向，民進黨正在爭議轉型，即可佐證。
再從時代的橫軸看，可將這位政治領袖與本國當代人物比，亦與世界當代領袖比。馬英九在二○○八年與謝長廷比，二○一二年與蔡英文比。謝長廷此時正在主導民進黨轉型，甚至稱「民進黨兩岸政策學國民黨也不錯」，這是馬謝對比；而倘若蔡英文在二○一二贏過馬英九，當了總統，其政績可以斷言絕對還不如馬英九今日的表現，因為她當時根本喬不定兩岸關係，遑論其他，這是馬蔡對比。
再與當代世界領袖比：當現今舉世國家領袖都站在世界經濟衰颯的共同立足點上，且倘若同是採行輿論自由、政黨競爭的民主政治與自由經濟，率皆難有高聲望及高民氣，舉目歐洲即可知，日本的內閣更翻覆如翻書，連韓國的李明博也是「外國評價比國內高」，而全球首強美國總統歐巴馬，輿論也曾送給他與馬英九一模一樣的封號：bumbler。這只要看同一期《經濟學人》的封面故事如何批評法國，即知馬英九恐怕尚不是最難堪的一位，難怪惹得歐蘭德總統跳腳。
再者，評價一名政治領袖的能力，應與其所面對之任務的難易程度相對比，亦須以其能夠操持的國家資源條件為參酌。蔣經國一生，雖有戒嚴統治及江南案等汙點，但他在國家那般艱困的情勢下，苦心陶鑄社會條件，終於完成「政治民主／兩岸開放」的巨大工程；這使他無論在歷史縱軸或時代橫軸上，皆有可以肯定的地位。因為，台灣的處境既危又衰，從而蔣經國以小搏大的成就即相對顯得難能可貴。
正因台灣的內外處境是異常又非常的艱難，既要面對彼岸的「一中框架」與內部的「正名制憲」，又要推行自由開放的民主政治，還要在資源窮絀下，迎對全球化的挑戰，且須維持可堪滿足人心的經濟發展與分配正義，使得孔傑榮稱，「台灣總統是全世界最難的工作之一」；亦正因如此，前任的李登輝、陳水扁二人將台灣撕裂得支離破碎，使台灣成為華府與北京皆表厭惡的「麻煩製造者」，這正可見擔任中華民國總統之不易，甚至使李扁二人想乾脆根本否定中華民國，丟掉中華民國這個包袱；但是，謝長廷一輩現在又想將之拾回。
馬英九正是台灣的總統，正是中華民國總統；國人不願他把兩岸關係搞得烏煙瘴氣，也不容他像陳水扁那樣用貪汙的錢去搞「誰沒有收過我爸爸的錢？」，且台灣又沒有如「李明博登獨島」、「小布希揮軍伊拉克」的國際操作空間，但人們又要他簽ＥＣＦＡ又反對，又要他徵證所稅又反對，又要他油電漲價又反對，又要他軍人納稅又反對，又要他二代健保又反對……。國人若不健忘，即以「實價登錄」而言，前副總統蕭萬長及立法院長王金平皆曾表示反對，但「實價登錄」應不應當做？馬英九豈有「能力」去說服所有的反對者，他連蕭萬長與王金平都說服不了。
《經濟學人》對馬英九的最後評語是一弔詭。它說：「沒有跡象顯示馬的主要政策會改變（或者應該改變）。」春秋之筆的寓意是：馬總統「不會改變」，也「不應該改變」。於是，在此又可得知，主政者的「能力」與批評者的「能力」，其實是相互對應的。例如美牛案，天翻地覆地吵了半年多，甚至有人在立院打了五天地鋪，但現在回想起來，除了那些火爆辛辣的「批評」以外，有沒有人認真想過當時美牛政策「不會改變／不應改變」的道理何在？這到底是主政者「無能」？還是批評者「無理」？
從歷史縱軸與時代橫軸看，政治領袖的「能力」與「政績」之對比，或許可概分為四種類型。一、以惡劣的手法追求惡劣之目的。大巫是毛澤東之類，小巫是陳水扁之屬。二、以惡劣之手法，追求可以理解並終付實現之高遠目的，如鄧小平的強硬操作，與蔣經國的戒嚴統治；三、以正當但笨拙的手法，追求正當合理之目的，如ＥＣＦＡ或實價登錄、美牛案等，這是馬英九；四、以正當又精巧之手法，完成正當合理之目的，則或許每一政治領袖的一生中偶爾能有此類個案之表現，但不可能找到一人終生事事如此的奇蹟。
在二○○八年三月二十二日，馬英九首次當選總統，本報在二十五日刊出系列社論第三篇，題目即是：〈馬英九課題：從「好人」到「能人」！〉可見，「有無能力」這個質疑，一直如影隨形地跟著馬英九，本報社論對其亦是批評不斷；本文認為，民主政治應當對政治領袖嚴格批評是天經地義，但過於簡化的評論，甚至公開在報紙上將馬英九喻為商紂王，卻也難謂公允。民主政治，本來就是主政者為所應為，批評者批所當批。然而，馬英九的評價，恐怕不是王建?一句「無能」，或《經濟學人》一句bumbler，可以一槌落定。
馬總統是否bumbler？是否無能？是否「傾中賣台」？是否商紂王？其實皆不必過早定論，日後在歷史縱軸與時代橫軸的座標上，終將會給馬英九一個不虛誇、不踐踏的合理定位，到時候今日的批評者也會看到自己的位置。
Monday, November 19, 2012
Posturing on a National Policy Conference: Enough is Enough
Posturing on a National Policy Conference: Enough is Enough
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 18, 2012
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang have called on the Ma administration to convene a "National Policy Conference on the Retirement Annuity." Tsai and Su should forget about their phony call for a national policy conference. They should return to the problem of reforming the DPP's cross-Strait policy. If they invite President Ma to a national policy conference on cross-Strait policy, the public will surely approve and applaud.
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang have called on the Ma administration to convene a "National Policy Conference on the Retirement Annuity." President Ma shot down their proposal. Instead, President Ma invited Tsai and Su to the Presidential Palace to participate in a "National Policy Advisory Meeting." The three would discuss, face-to-face, issues such as the retirement annuities. They would even talk about whether to hold a national policy conference. Two hours later, Tsai and Su rejected this proposal.
Enough is enough. Ring down the curtain on this sorry farce. As Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jing-pyn put it, the Pension Annuities issue is a matter of law. It must be handled with caution. He said "Matters of law are the Legislative Yuan's responsibility." He said other issues could be raised in a national policy conference. That would be a different matter. But the Pension Annuity issue is the responsibility of the Legislative Yuan. Wang Jinping's insights underscore a simple fact. The so-called "National Policy Conference on the Retirement Annuity" is a phony issue:
One. Can one address the Retirement Annuity issue without convening a national policy conference? Answer: Of course one can. As Wang Jinpyng noted, Retirement Pension and Annuity Reform is a highly specialized legislative matter. It requires debate by the legislature and by the political parties. They must bear responsibility. They must listen to differing views. A public hearing is perfectly adequate. Whence the need to convene a national policy conference?
When Tsai Ing-wen was DPP chairman, policies such as ECFA had powerful political overtones. Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly refused dialogue with President Ma. Did anyone ever hear her call for a national policy conference on ECFA? Instead Tsai Ing-wen led the DPP onto the streets, and engaged in bloody clashes. ECFA was eventually signed. It was a great achievement. Yet it did not require the convening of a national policy conference. Under DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang, the DPP legislative caucus held overnight sit-ins. The matter was eventually resolved. Did that require the convening of a national policy conference?
Two. Will failure to convene a national policy conference make "blue-green reconciliation" impossible? Answer: Of course not. If the blue and green camps can reconcile, then anything can be reconciled. Over the past two decades, a dozen or so large and small "national policy conferences" have been convened. What, if anything, was "reconciled?" Take the pension fund or end of year condolence fund. Blue-green reconciliation requires nothing more than bipartisan agreement within the legislature. That is enough to ensure the legislative responsibility Wang Jin-pyng spoke of. In this connection, we hope DPP Taipei City Council Members will cease their baseless and unfounded allegations that Mayor Hau Lung-bin's wife accepted a diamond ring as a bribe. Does that too require the convening of a national policy conference? The notion that "national policy conferences contribute to blue-green reconciliation" is a delusion. Two decades of political experience has confirmed that. Anyone who maintains otherwise is either ignorant or disingenuous. Based on these reasons, there is no need to convene a national policy conference.
Do not whitewash Tsai Ing-wen's dismal record. Do not turn a blind eye to her political deceit. She did not call for a national policy conference on ECFA, on the Three Laws pertaining to Mainland Students, on US beef imports. She did not call for a national policy conference when Frank Hsieh provoked a storm of controversy over cross-Strait issues. She did not even call for a "party policy conference." Tsai Ing-wen is wearing the "emperors' new clothes." They are transparent ploys. Calling a national policy conference is mere show. It is "selective indignation." Should large sums of public monies be squandered on one? Should social resources be wasted to underwrite her national policy conference publicity stunt? Isn't she underestimating the intelligence of the public on Taiwan?
Three. The third reason one need not convene a national policy conference is that one must not allow insincere and opportunistic politicians to play times mind games on the public. If she wants to take to the streets, then let her take to the streets. If she wants reconciliation, then she can have her reconciliation. The president asked her to dialogue. She refused. She expects others to defer to her every whim. She expects the president "to take the lead in the public dialogue." When she was party chairman, she stubbornly refused to dialogue. Now that she is no longer party chairman, she demands dialogue. She did not call for a national policy conference on ECFA. Instead she took to the streets. She did not call for a national policy conference on the Three Laws pertaining to Mainland Students. Instead DPP legislators squirted superglue into the locks on the doors of the legislature. She did not call for a national policy conference on the U.S. beef imports issue. Instead DPP legislators conducted a sit-in on the legislature floor. She is calling for a national conference only on the retirement annuity issue. Her political deceit has sunk to this level. Whither her credibility?
We are deeply concerned about retirement annuities. But the solution is not another national policy conference. We look forward to blue-green reconciliation. But national policy conferences are hardly the sole means of reconciliation. Over the past two decades we have convened no less than a dozen "National Policy Conferences." The 1996 National Development Conference is considered the most successful one. But in fact the greatest achievement of that conference was bipartisan collusion in an outrageous and disastrous undermining of the constitution. Other national policy conferences were merely rubber stamps. The retirement annuity is an issue that has no utterly no need for a national policy conference. The matter would be far better handled by political parties inside the Legislative Yuan. Whence the need for a national conference?
Politicians should demonstrate good faith and seek reconciliation, always and everywhere. They should not put on a show by calling for a "national policy conference."
Finally, there is the infighting between Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang. Do not take this infighting onto the national stage. Suppose the two decide to meet with President Ma. Which of the two should meet with Ma first? Should they meet with him at the same time? This will probably be impossible to decide. As we can see, Tsai and Su should forget about their phony call for a national policy conference. They should return to the problem of reforming the DPP's cross-Strait policy. If they invite President Ma to a national policy conference on cross-Strait policy, the public will surely approve and applaud.
國是會議鬧夠 勿再歹戲拖棚
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.18
蔡英文領著蘇貞昌，主張馬政府出面召集「退休年金國是會議」，被馬總統否決；而馬總統開口邀請蔡蘇二人入府進行「國政諮詢會談」，面商包括退休年金等議題，甚至可談是否召開國是會議，亦在兩個小時後遭到拒絕。
好了，這就夠了，別再歹戲拖棚。立法院長王金平說：退撫年金議題是法律層次問題，應慎重其事，「法律層面的事，應由立法院負起責任。」他說，國是會議若有其他議題，或可另當別論；但退撫年金是立法院的責任。王金平的見解，點出了所謂「退休年金國是會議」只是一個假議題：
一、不開國是會議就不能處理「退休年金」的課題嗎？答案：絕對不是。如王金平言，退撫年金的興革，是一高度專業的立法事件，透過立法機構的政黨辯論，已可承擔責任；至於若要聽取意見，精緻細密的公聽會必可勝任。何勞召開國是會議？
相對而言，在蔡英文民進黨主席任內，如ＥＣＦＡ等政策，政治意涵極為濃重，蔡英文卻曾三番兩次拒絕馬總統相邀進行會談，遑論聽她主張過為ＥＣＦＡ召開國是會議？但是，在蔡英文率領民進黨血染街頭之下，ＥＣＦＡ也已簽成；倘若ＥＣＦＡ是一項巨大成就，卻非成自於「國是會議」。同樣的，在蘇貞昌主席麾下，美牛案鬧到民進黨夜宿議場，而最後亦終獲解決，又難道是成自於「國是會議」？
二、不開國是會議，就不能「藍綠和解」嗎？答案：絕對不是。藍綠若要和解，無事不能和解，無處不可和解；過去近二十年，開了不下十次大大小小、形形色色的「國是會議」，請問「和解」了什麼？即以退休基金或退休人員年終慰問金言，只要兩黨的立院黨團能夠「藍綠和解」，即可承擔起王金平所說「立法院的責任」；何況，倘是希望民進黨議員勿在無憑無據下誣指郝龍斌市長之妻收受鑽戒賄賂，難道也需召開國是會議？二十年來的政治經驗證實，「國是會議可促成藍綠和解」之說，倘非無知，即是故作天真。基於以上兩種理由，即知未必要召開國是會議。
不必為蔡英文塗脂抹粉，假裝看不懂她的政治權術。ＥＣＦＡ她未主張「國是會議」，「陸生三法」她未主張「國是會議」，「美牛案」她未主張「國是會議」；在謝長廷掀起的兩岸議題風暴中，她不僅未主張「國是會議」，連「黨是會議」都沒聽她提起。若能看穿蔡英文的這件「新衣」，即知她主張召開國是會議只是「插花」、「沾醬油」，更是高度「選擇性」的議題操作；然則，倘仍要動用大筆公帑、耗費社會資源去為她打造一個「國是會議超大醬油碟」，豈不低估汙辱了台灣人民的智慧？
因而，不需召開國是會議的第三個理由正是：不能讓不真誠的投機政客次次玩弄國家社會，而竟次次得逞。她要上街頭就上街頭，她要和解就和解。總統請她對話時，她拒絕對話；等她心血來潮，又要總統「引導社會對話」。任黨主席時，堅拒對話；不任黨主席，反而起鬨要對話。於是，ＥＣＦＡ不開國是會議要上街頭，陸生三法不開國是會議要三秒膠，美牛案不開國是會議要夜宿議場，唯獨退休年金要開國是會議。操弄至此，真誠何在？
我們萬分關切退休年金問題，但解決之道並非非國是會議不可；我們更期待藍綠和解，但和解之方亦非只有國是會議。二十年來不下十次的「國是會議」，被認為最成功者是民國八十五年的「國家發展會議」，但那次會議最大的成就，卻是兩黨勾結修出一部完全離譜、貽禍至今的憲法；其他的國是會議，則皆是「大拜拜」。其實，「退休年金」正是最無必要召開國是會議的題目，立法院的政黨互動已優為之。那麼，還要開國是會議嗎？
此時，政治人物應當示範與追求的，應是時時處處皆在的真誠「和解」與「對話」，而絕不在只是一場充滿表演意味的「國是會議」。
最後要指出的是：蔡英文與蘇貞昌的明爭暗鬥，不要搬到國是會議這個舞台來演出，二人若與馬總統見面，連誰先第一個赴會或是共同赴會也可能喬不定，可見一斑。蔡蘇應擱下國是會議這個假議題，回過頭去共同面對民進黨兩岸政策的轉型難題，若能以兩岸政策邀請馬總統召開國是會議，國人必全力喝采，大力贊成！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 18, 2012
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang have called on the Ma administration to convene a "National Policy Conference on the Retirement Annuity." Tsai and Su should forget about their phony call for a national policy conference. They should return to the problem of reforming the DPP's cross-Strait policy. If they invite President Ma to a national policy conference on cross-Strait policy, the public will surely approve and applaud.
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang have called on the Ma administration to convene a "National Policy Conference on the Retirement Annuity." President Ma shot down their proposal. Instead, President Ma invited Tsai and Su to the Presidential Palace to participate in a "National Policy Advisory Meeting." The three would discuss, face-to-face, issues such as the retirement annuities. They would even talk about whether to hold a national policy conference. Two hours later, Tsai and Su rejected this proposal.
Enough is enough. Ring down the curtain on this sorry farce. As Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jing-pyn put it, the Pension Annuities issue is a matter of law. It must be handled with caution. He said "Matters of law are the Legislative Yuan's responsibility." He said other issues could be raised in a national policy conference. That would be a different matter. But the Pension Annuity issue is the responsibility of the Legislative Yuan. Wang Jinping's insights underscore a simple fact. The so-called "National Policy Conference on the Retirement Annuity" is a phony issue:
One. Can one address the Retirement Annuity issue without convening a national policy conference? Answer: Of course one can. As Wang Jinpyng noted, Retirement Pension and Annuity Reform is a highly specialized legislative matter. It requires debate by the legislature and by the political parties. They must bear responsibility. They must listen to differing views. A public hearing is perfectly adequate. Whence the need to convene a national policy conference?
When Tsai Ing-wen was DPP chairman, policies such as ECFA had powerful political overtones. Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly refused dialogue with President Ma. Did anyone ever hear her call for a national policy conference on ECFA? Instead Tsai Ing-wen led the DPP onto the streets, and engaged in bloody clashes. ECFA was eventually signed. It was a great achievement. Yet it did not require the convening of a national policy conference. Under DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang, the DPP legislative caucus held overnight sit-ins. The matter was eventually resolved. Did that require the convening of a national policy conference?
Two. Will failure to convene a national policy conference make "blue-green reconciliation" impossible? Answer: Of course not. If the blue and green camps can reconcile, then anything can be reconciled. Over the past two decades, a dozen or so large and small "national policy conferences" have been convened. What, if anything, was "reconciled?" Take the pension fund or end of year condolence fund. Blue-green reconciliation requires nothing more than bipartisan agreement within the legislature. That is enough to ensure the legislative responsibility Wang Jin-pyng spoke of. In this connection, we hope DPP Taipei City Council Members will cease their baseless and unfounded allegations that Mayor Hau Lung-bin's wife accepted a diamond ring as a bribe. Does that too require the convening of a national policy conference? The notion that "national policy conferences contribute to blue-green reconciliation" is a delusion. Two decades of political experience has confirmed that. Anyone who maintains otherwise is either ignorant or disingenuous. Based on these reasons, there is no need to convene a national policy conference.
Do not whitewash Tsai Ing-wen's dismal record. Do not turn a blind eye to her political deceit. She did not call for a national policy conference on ECFA, on the Three Laws pertaining to Mainland Students, on US beef imports. She did not call for a national policy conference when Frank Hsieh provoked a storm of controversy over cross-Strait issues. She did not even call for a "party policy conference." Tsai Ing-wen is wearing the "emperors' new clothes." They are transparent ploys. Calling a national policy conference is mere show. It is "selective indignation." Should large sums of public monies be squandered on one? Should social resources be wasted to underwrite her national policy conference publicity stunt? Isn't she underestimating the intelligence of the public on Taiwan?
Three. The third reason one need not convene a national policy conference is that one must not allow insincere and opportunistic politicians to play times mind games on the public. If she wants to take to the streets, then let her take to the streets. If she wants reconciliation, then she can have her reconciliation. The president asked her to dialogue. She refused. She expects others to defer to her every whim. She expects the president "to take the lead in the public dialogue." When she was party chairman, she stubbornly refused to dialogue. Now that she is no longer party chairman, she demands dialogue. She did not call for a national policy conference on ECFA. Instead she took to the streets. She did not call for a national policy conference on the Three Laws pertaining to Mainland Students. Instead DPP legislators squirted superglue into the locks on the doors of the legislature. She did not call for a national policy conference on the U.S. beef imports issue. Instead DPP legislators conducted a sit-in on the legislature floor. She is calling for a national conference only on the retirement annuity issue. Her political deceit has sunk to this level. Whither her credibility?
We are deeply concerned about retirement annuities. But the solution is not another national policy conference. We look forward to blue-green reconciliation. But national policy conferences are hardly the sole means of reconciliation. Over the past two decades we have convened no less than a dozen "National Policy Conferences." The 1996 National Development Conference is considered the most successful one. But in fact the greatest achievement of that conference was bipartisan collusion in an outrageous and disastrous undermining of the constitution. Other national policy conferences were merely rubber stamps. The retirement annuity is an issue that has no utterly no need for a national policy conference. The matter would be far better handled by political parties inside the Legislative Yuan. Whence the need for a national conference?
Politicians should demonstrate good faith and seek reconciliation, always and everywhere. They should not put on a show by calling for a "national policy conference."
Finally, there is the infighting between Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang. Do not take this infighting onto the national stage. Suppose the two decide to meet with President Ma. Which of the two should meet with Ma first? Should they meet with him at the same time? This will probably be impossible to decide. As we can see, Tsai and Su should forget about their phony call for a national policy conference. They should return to the problem of reforming the DPP's cross-Strait policy. If they invite President Ma to a national policy conference on cross-Strait policy, the public will surely approve and applaud.
國是會議鬧夠 勿再歹戲拖棚
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.18
蔡英文領著蘇貞昌，主張馬政府出面召集「退休年金國是會議」，被馬總統否決；而馬總統開口邀請蔡蘇二人入府進行「國政諮詢會談」，面商包括退休年金等議題，甚至可談是否召開國是會議，亦在兩個小時後遭到拒絕。
好了，這就夠了，別再歹戲拖棚。立法院長王金平說：退撫年金議題是法律層次問題，應慎重其事，「法律層面的事，應由立法院負起責任。」他說，國是會議若有其他議題，或可另當別論；但退撫年金是立法院的責任。王金平的見解，點出了所謂「退休年金國是會議」只是一個假議題：
一、不開國是會議就不能處理「退休年金」的課題嗎？答案：絕對不是。如王金平言，退撫年金的興革，是一高度專業的立法事件，透過立法機構的政黨辯論，已可承擔責任；至於若要聽取意見，精緻細密的公聽會必可勝任。何勞召開國是會議？
相對而言，在蔡英文民進黨主席任內，如ＥＣＦＡ等政策，政治意涵極為濃重，蔡英文卻曾三番兩次拒絕馬總統相邀進行會談，遑論聽她主張過為ＥＣＦＡ召開國是會議？但是，在蔡英文率領民進黨血染街頭之下，ＥＣＦＡ也已簽成；倘若ＥＣＦＡ是一項巨大成就，卻非成自於「國是會議」。同樣的，在蘇貞昌主席麾下，美牛案鬧到民進黨夜宿議場，而最後亦終獲解決，又難道是成自於「國是會議」？
二、不開國是會議，就不能「藍綠和解」嗎？答案：絕對不是。藍綠若要和解，無事不能和解，無處不可和解；過去近二十年，開了不下十次大大小小、形形色色的「國是會議」，請問「和解」了什麼？即以退休基金或退休人員年終慰問金言，只要兩黨的立院黨團能夠「藍綠和解」，即可承擔起王金平所說「立法院的責任」；何況，倘是希望民進黨議員勿在無憑無據下誣指郝龍斌市長之妻收受鑽戒賄賂，難道也需召開國是會議？二十年來的政治經驗證實，「國是會議可促成藍綠和解」之說，倘非無知，即是故作天真。基於以上兩種理由，即知未必要召開國是會議。
不必為蔡英文塗脂抹粉，假裝看不懂她的政治權術。ＥＣＦＡ她未主張「國是會議」，「陸生三法」她未主張「國是會議」，「美牛案」她未主張「國是會議」；在謝長廷掀起的兩岸議題風暴中，她不僅未主張「國是會議」，連「黨是會議」都沒聽她提起。若能看穿蔡英文的這件「新衣」，即知她主張召開國是會議只是「插花」、「沾醬油」，更是高度「選擇性」的議題操作；然則，倘仍要動用大筆公帑、耗費社會資源去為她打造一個「國是會議超大醬油碟」，豈不低估汙辱了台灣人民的智慧？
因而，不需召開國是會議的第三個理由正是：不能讓不真誠的投機政客次次玩弄國家社會，而竟次次得逞。她要上街頭就上街頭，她要和解就和解。總統請她對話時，她拒絕對話；等她心血來潮，又要總統「引導社會對話」。任黨主席時，堅拒對話；不任黨主席，反而起鬨要對話。於是，ＥＣＦＡ不開國是會議要上街頭，陸生三法不開國是會議要三秒膠，美牛案不開國是會議要夜宿議場，唯獨退休年金要開國是會議。操弄至此，真誠何在？
我們萬分關切退休年金問題，但解決之道並非非國是會議不可；我們更期待藍綠和解，但和解之方亦非只有國是會議。二十年來不下十次的「國是會議」，被認為最成功者是民國八十五年的「國家發展會議」，但那次會議最大的成就，卻是兩黨勾結修出一部完全離譜、貽禍至今的憲法；其他的國是會議，則皆是「大拜拜」。其實，「退休年金」正是最無必要召開國是會議的題目，立法院的政黨互動已優為之。那麼，還要開國是會議嗎？
此時，政治人物應當示範與追求的，應是時時處處皆在的真誠「和解」與「對話」，而絕不在只是一場充滿表演意味的「國是會議」。
最後要指出的是：蔡英文與蘇貞昌的明爭暗鬥，不要搬到國是會議這個舞台來演出，二人若與馬總統見面，連誰先第一個赴會或是共同赴會也可能喬不定，可見一斑。蔡蘇應擱下國是會議這個假議題，回過頭去共同面對民進黨兩岸政策的轉型難題，若能以兩岸政策邀請馬總統召開國是會議，國人必全力喝采，大力贊成！
Thursday, November 15, 2012
CCP 18th National Congress Convenes: Challenge for Taiwan Begins
CCP 18th National Congress Convenes:
Challenge for Taiwan Begins
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 16, 2012
Summary: Strategic competition between Mainland China and the U.S. in the Asian-Pacific region continues to expand, especially surrounding Diaoytai in the East China Sea. Conflicts over the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the South China Sea islands continue to spread. Can Mainland China and the United States live together in peace? If they cannot, local Asian-Pacific conflicts will erupt, one after another. When the time comes, President Ma's strategy of "closeness with America, peace with the Mainland, and friendship with Japan" will no longer work. He will be unable to straddle the fence between Mainland China and the US. He will no longer be able to have it both ways. He will find himself on the horns of a dilemma.
Full Text below:
The Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress convened yesterday. Its emphasis has been "seeking truth from facts," and "scientific development" in keeping with the times. This was formally written into the Party Constitution as the party's guiding ideology. The CCP will be led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. It will use its economic achievements to consolidate its political power and public support. It will simultaneously will exercise its economic influence. This will be one of its chips in the international power game. It will be especially active as a leader in the Asian-Pacific region and international multilateral organizations and forums.
Xi Jinping stressed that the Pacific Ocean was big enough to accommodate both Mainland China and the US. During the coming decade Mainland China and the US will continue their coopetition in the international community. But US strategy is to contain Mainland China and prevent her from becoming the leading nation in the Asian-Pacific region. Mainland China will remain vigilant and prepared to respond.
Basically, Xi Jinping wants to consolidate the Chinese Communist regime, and achieve its national development goals. It wants to take positive measures to strengthen the Mainland's economic and military strength. It wants to adopt a multi-pronged diplomatic strategy. It wants to establish Mainland China as a responsible member of the international community. The United States is returning to the Asian-Pacific region. Xi Jinping is responding. He is applying a "military security and economic interests hand in hand strategy." He is using military confidence-building measures, a trade and economic win-win approach, and bilateral and multilateral interactions to gradually assert Mainland China's influence and leadership in the Asian-Pacific region.
In late 1978, Deng Xiaoping set forth his economic reform and liberalization measures. He said that for the time being a world war was unlikely. Mainland China should seize the opportunity to fully develop her economy. But Deng Xiaoping also stressed that by 2020 Mainland China and the United States would find themselves competing over strategic interests. Competition between the two countries in the Asian-Pacific region would increase. Therefore Mainland China had to prevent military conflict. Nobel laureate in economics, Robert W. Fogel thinks that Mainland China will undergo a transformation from a poor country in 2000 to an extremely wealthy country in 2040. Its per capita income will still be lower than the United States. But Mainland China's GDP will account for 40% of the world's wealth. This will far exceed the US's 14% share and the European Union's 5% share. The Wall Street Journal believes this economic battle is changing the world. It says Mainland China's "state capitalism" is clearly better than America's "liberal capitalism," and is clearly prevailing. The ranking of the world's superpowers is currenly undergoing a major re-shuffle.
Most analysts within Mainland Chinese, US, and Japanese strategic circles think the Asian-Pacific region has become the arena in which Mainland China and the US test their strength against each other. Both sides constantly stress the need to strengthen military exchanges and cooperation in order to deal with major regional and global issues. But in recent years the two sides have repeatedly clashed over economics and trade. The United States has refused to cancel export controls on high tech goods to Mainland China. Repeated military confrontations suggest increasing strategic competition between Mainland China and the United States. This shows that suspicions between the two remain high. Xi Jinping cancelled his September meeting with Hillary Clinton. This is more evidence that it suspects the U.S. strategic agenda.
Strategic mistrust between Mainland China and the US is increasing. Cross-Strait relations now face new and complex challenges. First, the United States is using "Air Sea Battle Strategy" to maintain a "strategic balance" in the Asian-Pacific region. It is actively strengthening military alliances among the United States, Japan, and Australia. Its target is clearly Mainland China. If Taiwan becomes part of this strategic array, can cross-Strait relations really continue to develop in a positive direction? Secondly, as Mainland China continues to progress, as its economic and military strength continue to grow, its international stature will grow accordingly, Taiwan must reduce the damage inflicted by internal squabbling. It must offer countermeasures in response to new challenges from the CCP and the international community. Otherwise, Taiwan is likely to be marginalized and be the loser. Thirdly, the conflict over the sovereignty of islands in the South China Sea will continue to escalate. Vietnam already has plans to seize Taiping Island, which is currently under the jurisdiction of the ROC government on Taiwan. If Vietnam takes military action against Taiping Island Mainland China and Taiwan must offer a military response. A militarily superior PLA could emerge victorious over Vietnam. If Mainland China takes advantage of the opportunity to occupy Taiping Island, can cross-Strait relations continue to develop in a positive direction?
Finally, the ruling and opposition parties have not been able to arrive at a consensus on how to deal with the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP's 18th National Congress stressed that the Mainland would continue to improve cross-Strait relations. But Xi Jinping to is adopting a "combined soft and hard strategy" to deal with Taiwan. He is promoting cross-Strait economic integration measures to peacefully absorb Taiwan in the future. He is building a deeper underlying structure and having a direct impact on the power base of the ruling and opposition political elite. How will Taiwan politicians react?
Hu Jintao's core thinking in dealing with the Taiwan issue was to proceed slowly but surely. It was predicated upon the notion that when the time is ripe, the fruit will fall. As long as the Mainland economy is doing well, it argued, the Taiwan issue be resolved naturally. But a power transfer took place during the CCP 18th National Congress. Healthy cross-Strait relations will require changes in the ongoing coopetition between Mainland China and the United States. Xi Jinping says the Taiwan problem is unlikely to be resolved as a result of improved cross-Strait relations. If the problem is dragged out and not resolved, it will create new uncertainties for the Mainland's perimeter security. Also the Taiwan issue will continue to be a pretext by which foreign powers attempt to contain Mainland China and to promote their China Threat theories. The United States and Japan will use Taiwan as an excuse to expand the scope of their security treaty. Their plan to establish an Asia-Pacific missile defense system can also cite Taiwan as a pretext. Finally, the persistence of the Taiwan problem runs the risk that Taiwan may split off. This will be a chronic drain on the energy and resources of the Mainland government.
Cross-strait relations have progressed from divided rule to positive interaction. This has not come easily. The two sides must treasure this. But strategic competition between Mainland China and the U.S. in the Asian-Pacific region continues to expand, especially surrounding Diaoytai in the East China Sea. Conflicts over the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the South China Sea islands continue to spread. Differences between the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have increased, not decreased. Asian-Pacific strategic circles sense an atmosphere of tension. Can Mainland China and the United States live together in peace? Can they work together for the common prosperity of the Asian-Pacific region? Can they exercise restraint and overcome undue influences? If they cannot, local Asian-Pacific conflicts will erupt, one after another. When the time comes, President Ma's strategy of "closeness with America, peace with the Mainland, and friendship with Japan" will no longer work. He will be unable to straddle the fence between Mainland China and the US. He will no longer be able to have it both ways. He will find himself on the horns of a dilemma.
中共十八大閉幕 台灣真挑戰開始
2012-11-16
中國時報
中共十八大一中全會昨日登場，強調實事求是、與時俱進的「科學發展觀」，正式寫入中共黨章列為指導思想。以習近平總書記為首的中共領導當局，將運用經濟發 展績效，強化鞏固政治社會基礎，同時，積極發揮其經濟資源影響力，做為布局國際戰略籌碼，尤其是在亞太地區和國際多邊組織與論壇中，主動發揮領導角色與功 能。
此外，習近平公開強調寬廣的太平洋，足夠容納中美兩國，未來十年間，中國與美國在國際社會上，將繼續維持「競合關係」，但是，對於美國方面意圖牽制，或延緩中國取得亞太領導地位的相關策略措施，也將保持高度警覺並準備應對能量。
基本上，習近平為鞏固中共政權，達成其國家發展目標，一方面採取強化大陸內部經濟軍事實力的積極作為；同時，也在外交策略上，運用「多管齊下」的方式，建 立中國在國際社會上負責任大國的地位；此外，習近平應對美國重返亞太的措施，是運用「軍事安全與經貿利益並進」的策略，透過軍事安全合作、經貿雙贏格局的 安排，採取雙邊和多邊互動架構，逐步展現中國在亞太地區的影響力與主導地位。
一九七八年底鄧小平提出經濟改革開放 時表示，目前世界大戰打不起來，中國應把握戰略機遇期，全力發展經濟；不過，鄧小平也同時強調到二○二○年時，中美將出現戰略利益競逐的矛盾，兩國在亞太 地區的競爭將升高，必須提防引爆軍事衝突。諾貝爾經濟學獎得主福格爾（Robert W. Fogel）認為，中國從二○○○年時的窮國，正蛻變為二○四○年的超級富國，雖然屆時人均財富仍低於美國，但中國的ＧＤＰ將占世界的百分之四十，遠超過 美國所占的百分之十四和歐盟的百分之五；《華爾街日報》更進一步指出，這場正在改變世界的經濟戰，中國「國家資本主義」顯然要比美國「自由資本主義」更占 上風，而世界超級大國地位正重新洗牌。
根據中美日戰略圈的主流意見認為，亞太地區已經成為中美戰略競逐的場域；雖 然雙方都不斷強調要加強軍事交流合作，以共同處理重大的區域性與全球性議題，但是，從近期以來的經貿糾紛、美國拒絕取消對大陸高科技出口管制，以及各項軍 事演習對峙跡象顯示，中美之間的戰略競逐矛盾有升溫趨勢，而這也反映出雙方持續互疑。習近平在九月間取消會見希拉蕊，即是一種對美國戰略猜疑的表態。
兩岸關係在中美戰略猜疑升溫的格局下，已面臨變數複雜化的新挑戰。首先，美國在亞太地區祭出「戰略再平衡」的「空海一體戰」構想，並積極強化美、日、澳軍 事同盟能量，挑明針對中國，而台灣若明確決定納入美國的規畫布局，則兩岸關係是否能夠繼續維持良性互動局面？其次，當中國大陸持續進步，經濟軍事能量增 強，國際地位愈來愈高的同時，台灣除了要減少內鬥內耗傷害，還要提出因應來自中共與國際新挑戰的對策，否則台灣將可能被邊緣化成為輸家；其三，南海地區的 島嶼主權爭議將持續延燒，越南針對台灣管轄的太平島，已經擬定奪島計畫，一旦越南對太平島採取軍事行動，大陸和台灣都將會有軍事反應；倘若共軍以優勢軍力 打敗越南，並順勢占領太平島，屆時，兩岸關係還能維持良性互動嗎？
最後，台灣朝野政黨一直無法凝聚應對中共的共 識，同時，中共十八大政治報告雖強調，要確保兩岸關係發展的連續性和穩定性，但是習近平將對台採取「懷柔與強硬手段交織運用」的策略，並進一步推動兩岸經 濟一體化措施，為未來和平消化台灣，構築深廣的下層結構，並直接衝擊台灣朝野政治精英的權力基礎，試問台灣政治人物將如何接招？
整體而言，胡錦濤處理台灣問題的核心思維是，事緩則圜、水到渠成、瓜熟蒂落，只要大陸把經濟搞好，台灣問題自然解決。但是，隨著中共十八大權力換屆交班， 兩岸關係若要良性發展，首先必須面對中美競合關係變化。習近平的核心策士指出，台灣問題雖因兩岸關係良性互動緩和，但如果久拖不決，將給大陸周邊安全增加 新的不確定因素；同時，台灣問題將繼續是國際勢力對中國防範、牽制的藉口和手段，中國威脅論、美日擴大安保條約適用範圍，計畫建立亞太飛彈防禦體系，都以 台灣做為支持理由；此外，台灣問題的存在，就意味著台灣有被分裂出去的危險，此始終牽扯著中國政府的精力和資源。
兩岸關係的發展從過去的壁壘分治，到現在的和緩良性互動，確實得來不易，殊值雙方善自珍惜。只是，隨著中美兩國在亞太地區的戰略競逐升溫，而且東海釣魚 台、南海諸島領土主權爭議繼續延燒，以及台灣朝野政黨路線分歧不減反增等情況湧現，讓亞太各國戰略圈人士聞到一股令人不安的氛圍。倘若中美兩國不能發揮和 平相處、共榮亞太的大智慧，並運用影響力有效克制躁動因素，亞太局部衝突的發火點恐將會相繼引爆，屆時，馬總統「親美、和陸、友日」的平衡策略，不無可能 從美中左右逢源高招，淪入進退兩難困境。
Challenge for Taiwan Begins
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 16, 2012
Summary: Strategic competition between Mainland China and the U.S. in the Asian-Pacific region continues to expand, especially surrounding Diaoytai in the East China Sea. Conflicts over the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the South China Sea islands continue to spread. Can Mainland China and the United States live together in peace? If they cannot, local Asian-Pacific conflicts will erupt, one after another. When the time comes, President Ma's strategy of "closeness with America, peace with the Mainland, and friendship with Japan" will no longer work. He will be unable to straddle the fence between Mainland China and the US. He will no longer be able to have it both ways. He will find himself on the horns of a dilemma.
Full Text below:
The Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress convened yesterday. Its emphasis has been "seeking truth from facts," and "scientific development" in keeping with the times. This was formally written into the Party Constitution as the party's guiding ideology. The CCP will be led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. It will use its economic achievements to consolidate its political power and public support. It will simultaneously will exercise its economic influence. This will be one of its chips in the international power game. It will be especially active as a leader in the Asian-Pacific region and international multilateral organizations and forums.
Xi Jinping stressed that the Pacific Ocean was big enough to accommodate both Mainland China and the US. During the coming decade Mainland China and the US will continue their coopetition in the international community. But US strategy is to contain Mainland China and prevent her from becoming the leading nation in the Asian-Pacific region. Mainland China will remain vigilant and prepared to respond.
Basically, Xi Jinping wants to consolidate the Chinese Communist regime, and achieve its national development goals. It wants to take positive measures to strengthen the Mainland's economic and military strength. It wants to adopt a multi-pronged diplomatic strategy. It wants to establish Mainland China as a responsible member of the international community. The United States is returning to the Asian-Pacific region. Xi Jinping is responding. He is applying a "military security and economic interests hand in hand strategy." He is using military confidence-building measures, a trade and economic win-win approach, and bilateral and multilateral interactions to gradually assert Mainland China's influence and leadership in the Asian-Pacific region.
In late 1978, Deng Xiaoping set forth his economic reform and liberalization measures. He said that for the time being a world war was unlikely. Mainland China should seize the opportunity to fully develop her economy. But Deng Xiaoping also stressed that by 2020 Mainland China and the United States would find themselves competing over strategic interests. Competition between the two countries in the Asian-Pacific region would increase. Therefore Mainland China had to prevent military conflict. Nobel laureate in economics, Robert W. Fogel thinks that Mainland China will undergo a transformation from a poor country in 2000 to an extremely wealthy country in 2040. Its per capita income will still be lower than the United States. But Mainland China's GDP will account for 40% of the world's wealth. This will far exceed the US's 14% share and the European Union's 5% share. The Wall Street Journal believes this economic battle is changing the world. It says Mainland China's "state capitalism" is clearly better than America's "liberal capitalism," and is clearly prevailing. The ranking of the world's superpowers is currenly undergoing a major re-shuffle.
Most analysts within Mainland Chinese, US, and Japanese strategic circles think the Asian-Pacific region has become the arena in which Mainland China and the US test their strength against each other. Both sides constantly stress the need to strengthen military exchanges and cooperation in order to deal with major regional and global issues. But in recent years the two sides have repeatedly clashed over economics and trade. The United States has refused to cancel export controls on high tech goods to Mainland China. Repeated military confrontations suggest increasing strategic competition between Mainland China and the United States. This shows that suspicions between the two remain high. Xi Jinping cancelled his September meeting with Hillary Clinton. This is more evidence that it suspects the U.S. strategic agenda.
Strategic mistrust between Mainland China and the US is increasing. Cross-Strait relations now face new and complex challenges. First, the United States is using "Air Sea Battle Strategy" to maintain a "strategic balance" in the Asian-Pacific region. It is actively strengthening military alliances among the United States, Japan, and Australia. Its target is clearly Mainland China. If Taiwan becomes part of this strategic array, can cross-Strait relations really continue to develop in a positive direction? Secondly, as Mainland China continues to progress, as its economic and military strength continue to grow, its international stature will grow accordingly, Taiwan must reduce the damage inflicted by internal squabbling. It must offer countermeasures in response to new challenges from the CCP and the international community. Otherwise, Taiwan is likely to be marginalized and be the loser. Thirdly, the conflict over the sovereignty of islands in the South China Sea will continue to escalate. Vietnam already has plans to seize Taiping Island, which is currently under the jurisdiction of the ROC government on Taiwan. If Vietnam takes military action against Taiping Island Mainland China and Taiwan must offer a military response. A militarily superior PLA could emerge victorious over Vietnam. If Mainland China takes advantage of the opportunity to occupy Taiping Island, can cross-Strait relations continue to develop in a positive direction?
Finally, the ruling and opposition parties have not been able to arrive at a consensus on how to deal with the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP's 18th National Congress stressed that the Mainland would continue to improve cross-Strait relations. But Xi Jinping to is adopting a "combined soft and hard strategy" to deal with Taiwan. He is promoting cross-Strait economic integration measures to peacefully absorb Taiwan in the future. He is building a deeper underlying structure and having a direct impact on the power base of the ruling and opposition political elite. How will Taiwan politicians react?
Hu Jintao's core thinking in dealing with the Taiwan issue was to proceed slowly but surely. It was predicated upon the notion that when the time is ripe, the fruit will fall. As long as the Mainland economy is doing well, it argued, the Taiwan issue be resolved naturally. But a power transfer took place during the CCP 18th National Congress. Healthy cross-Strait relations will require changes in the ongoing coopetition between Mainland China and the United States. Xi Jinping says the Taiwan problem is unlikely to be resolved as a result of improved cross-Strait relations. If the problem is dragged out and not resolved, it will create new uncertainties for the Mainland's perimeter security. Also the Taiwan issue will continue to be a pretext by which foreign powers attempt to contain Mainland China and to promote their China Threat theories. The United States and Japan will use Taiwan as an excuse to expand the scope of their security treaty. Their plan to establish an Asia-Pacific missile defense system can also cite Taiwan as a pretext. Finally, the persistence of the Taiwan problem runs the risk that Taiwan may split off. This will be a chronic drain on the energy and resources of the Mainland government.
Cross-strait relations have progressed from divided rule to positive interaction. This has not come easily. The two sides must treasure this. But strategic competition between Mainland China and the U.S. in the Asian-Pacific region continues to expand, especially surrounding Diaoytai in the East China Sea. Conflicts over the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the South China Sea islands continue to spread. Differences between the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have increased, not decreased. Asian-Pacific strategic circles sense an atmosphere of tension. Can Mainland China and the United States live together in peace? Can they work together for the common prosperity of the Asian-Pacific region? Can they exercise restraint and overcome undue influences? If they cannot, local Asian-Pacific conflicts will erupt, one after another. When the time comes, President Ma's strategy of "closeness with America, peace with the Mainland, and friendship with Japan" will no longer work. He will be unable to straddle the fence between Mainland China and the US. He will no longer be able to have it both ways. He will find himself on the horns of a dilemma.
中共十八大閉幕 台灣真挑戰開始
2012-11-16
中國時報
中共十八大一中全會昨日登場，強調實事求是、與時俱進的「科學發展觀」，正式寫入中共黨章列為指導思想。以習近平總書記為首的中共領導當局，將運用經濟發 展績效，強化鞏固政治社會基礎，同時，積極發揮其經濟資源影響力，做為布局國際戰略籌碼，尤其是在亞太地區和國際多邊組織與論壇中，主動發揮領導角色與功 能。
此外，習近平公開強調寬廣的太平洋，足夠容納中美兩國，未來十年間，中國與美國在國際社會上，將繼續維持「競合關係」，但是，對於美國方面意圖牽制，或延緩中國取得亞太領導地位的相關策略措施，也將保持高度警覺並準備應對能量。
基本上，習近平為鞏固中共政權，達成其國家發展目標，一方面採取強化大陸內部經濟軍事實力的積極作為；同時，也在外交策略上，運用「多管齊下」的方式，建 立中國在國際社會上負責任大國的地位；此外，習近平應對美國重返亞太的措施，是運用「軍事安全與經貿利益並進」的策略，透過軍事安全合作、經貿雙贏格局的 安排，採取雙邊和多邊互動架構，逐步展現中國在亞太地區的影響力與主導地位。
一九七八年底鄧小平提出經濟改革開放 時表示，目前世界大戰打不起來，中國應把握戰略機遇期，全力發展經濟；不過，鄧小平也同時強調到二○二○年時，中美將出現戰略利益競逐的矛盾，兩國在亞太 地區的競爭將升高，必須提防引爆軍事衝突。諾貝爾經濟學獎得主福格爾（Robert W. Fogel）認為，中國從二○○○年時的窮國，正蛻變為二○四○年的超級富國，雖然屆時人均財富仍低於美國，但中國的ＧＤＰ將占世界的百分之四十，遠超過 美國所占的百分之十四和歐盟的百分之五；《華爾街日報》更進一步指出，這場正在改變世界的經濟戰，中國「國家資本主義」顯然要比美國「自由資本主義」更占 上風，而世界超級大國地位正重新洗牌。
根據中美日戰略圈的主流意見認為，亞太地區已經成為中美戰略競逐的場域；雖 然雙方都不斷強調要加強軍事交流合作，以共同處理重大的區域性與全球性議題，但是，從近期以來的經貿糾紛、美國拒絕取消對大陸高科技出口管制，以及各項軍 事演習對峙跡象顯示，中美之間的戰略競逐矛盾有升溫趨勢，而這也反映出雙方持續互疑。習近平在九月間取消會見希拉蕊，即是一種對美國戰略猜疑的表態。
兩岸關係在中美戰略猜疑升溫的格局下，已面臨變數複雜化的新挑戰。首先，美國在亞太地區祭出「戰略再平衡」的「空海一體戰」構想，並積極強化美、日、澳軍 事同盟能量，挑明針對中國，而台灣若明確決定納入美國的規畫布局，則兩岸關係是否能夠繼續維持良性互動局面？其次，當中國大陸持續進步，經濟軍事能量增 強，國際地位愈來愈高的同時，台灣除了要減少內鬥內耗傷害，還要提出因應來自中共與國際新挑戰的對策，否則台灣將可能被邊緣化成為輸家；其三，南海地區的 島嶼主權爭議將持續延燒，越南針對台灣管轄的太平島，已經擬定奪島計畫，一旦越南對太平島採取軍事行動，大陸和台灣都將會有軍事反應；倘若共軍以優勢軍力 打敗越南，並順勢占領太平島，屆時，兩岸關係還能維持良性互動嗎？
最後，台灣朝野政黨一直無法凝聚應對中共的共 識，同時，中共十八大政治報告雖強調，要確保兩岸關係發展的連續性和穩定性，但是習近平將對台採取「懷柔與強硬手段交織運用」的策略，並進一步推動兩岸經 濟一體化措施，為未來和平消化台灣，構築深廣的下層結構，並直接衝擊台灣朝野政治精英的權力基礎，試問台灣政治人物將如何接招？
整體而言，胡錦濤處理台灣問題的核心思維是，事緩則圜、水到渠成、瓜熟蒂落，只要大陸把經濟搞好，台灣問題自然解決。但是，隨著中共十八大權力換屆交班， 兩岸關係若要良性發展，首先必須面對中美競合關係變化。習近平的核心策士指出，台灣問題雖因兩岸關係良性互動緩和，但如果久拖不決，將給大陸周邊安全增加 新的不確定因素；同時，台灣問題將繼續是國際勢力對中國防範、牽制的藉口和手段，中國威脅論、美日擴大安保條約適用範圍，計畫建立亞太飛彈防禦體系，都以 台灣做為支持理由；此外，台灣問題的存在，就意味著台灣有被分裂出去的危險，此始終牽扯著中國政府的精力和資源。
兩岸關係的發展從過去的壁壘分治，到現在的和緩良性互動，確實得來不易，殊值雙方善自珍惜。只是，隨著中美兩國在亞太地區的戰略競逐升溫，而且東海釣魚 台、南海諸島領土主權爭議繼續延燒，以及台灣朝野政黨路線分歧不減反增等情況湧現，讓亞太各國戰略圈人士聞到一股令人不安的氛圍。倘若中美兩國不能發揮和 平相處、共榮亞太的大智慧，並運用影響力有效克制躁動因素，亞太局部衝突的發火點恐將會相繼引爆，屆時，馬總統「親美、和陸、友日」的平衡策略，不無可能 從美中左右逢源高招，淪入進退兩難困境。
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