1992 Consensus Means Different Interpretations

1992 Consensus Means Different Interpretations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 28, 2012

Summary: Everyone on Taiwan has heard the term "1992 consensus." Many people refer to it, but few have an accurate undestanding of it. Few are able to explain what it really means. Some would deny its existence altogether. For the sake of Taiwan's future, we would like to take some time to explain what it means. The 1992 consensus appears complex. In fact, it is quite simple, All that is required is good faith.

Full Text below:

Everyone on Taiwan has heard the term "1992 consensus." Many people refer to it, but few have an accurate undestanding of it. Few are able to explain what it really means. Some would deny its existence altogether. For the sake of Taiwan's future, we would like to take some time to explain what it means.

In 1993, the Koo-Wang Meetings threw open the doors to official cross-Strait negotiations. The two sides took their first steps towards mutually beneficial exchanges. But all of the negotiations that took place had a mutually agreed upon premise. Without this premise, the two sides would not have been able to sit down at the same table. The premise of the Koo-Wang Meetings was summed up by former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi, who referred to it as the "1992 consensus." As long as both parties accepted this premise, a consensus existed. Whether the premise was written into the official results of the negotiations, whether it was explicitly referred to as the "1992 consensus," the "Spirit of '92," or any other name, makes no difference. None of these undermine the fact that such a consensus exists.

Taiwan independence elements always say the 1992 consensus does not exist. They even insinuate that Su fabricated it. They are merely seizing on the fact that when the two sides exchanged documents, the words "1992" and "consensus" never appeared. But none of this changes the fact that a meeting was held in 1992, and a consensus emerged from this meeting. Therefore it is perfectly reasonable to abide by convention and refer to this consensus as the 1992 consensus.

Consider the contents of the 1992 consensus. Beijing has seized upon the "one China" principle and neglected other aspects. Taipei meanwhile, refers to it as "one China, different interpretations." Consider Taipei's perspective for the moment. Taipei's take on "one China" can be seen in the language used in the National Unification Council proceedings of 1992. It read: 'Concerning the meaning of "one China," the two sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one China principle. But both sides ascribe different meanings to the term. The Chinese Communist authorities understands "one China" to mean the "People's Republic of China." They think that after reunification, Taiwan will be a "Special Administrative Region." We think that "one China" means the Republic of China, founded in 1912. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. But its current jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China. But the Chinese mainland is also a part of China.'

We subscribe to the resolutions of the National Unification Council. Therefore the two sides have no disagreement over the territorial sovereignty of "one China." Both say that "China" includes the Mainland and Taiwan. They disagree only over how sovereignty and jurisdiction should be exercised. That is the only part over which they disagree. That is the only part over which there is no consensus. That is the only part over which they are compelled to have "different interpretations." There is no disagreement over the "one China" part of the 1992 consensus. There is only disagreement over the "different interpretations" part. This part pertains to jurisdiction, and includes the national title and the structure of the government. This is why Beijing says that the 1992 consensus means "one China," but that each side has its own interpretation about "the part about which no consensus has been reached." For this part, "different interpretations" persist, and of course, no consensus exists.

As we can see, China under the 1992 consensus is a nation with unified sovereignty but divided jurisdiction. The ROC Constitution's "Articles on Relations between People Across the Strait" clearly specifies "one country, two regions." Both Mainland China and Taiwan are included in ROC sovereignty claims. That is why over the years, the Mainland has never complained that Taiwan is taking advantage of it, or that Taiwan has demeaned the Mainland by classifying it as a region.

President Ma said the two sides "do not recognize each others' sovereignty, but do not deny each others' jurisdiction." This remark is particularly significant. The term "sovereignty" implies exclusivity. The two cannot coexist in the same territory. If the two sides recognize each others' sovereignty, then China would immediately be split into two sovereign states. Therefore having the two sides "not recognize each others' sovereignty" is essential. But within "one China" there are two regimes. Each regime must face the fact that the other exists. Only then can they have peaceful contacts. Therefore they must not deny each others' jurisdiction. The former, "one China," is legal consensus. The latter, "different interpretations," is realpolitik.

The 1992 consensus must be clarified and honored. Only then can cross-Strait conflicts be resolved. For example, the Mainland's new passports include scenes of Taiwan. The Mainland authorities' jurisdiction may not be as compelling as the Taiwan authorities'. But that does not negate its sovereignty over Taiwan. This is the Mainland's "one China, different interpretations." The Mainland Affairs Council has complained about the Mainland's new passport. It has called upon the Mainland to "shelve disputes and face reality." But the MAC is confused. Is the MAC saying that the Republic of China cannot include the Yangtze River and the Yellow River in official Republic of China documents? The MAC has apparently confused sovereignty with jurisdiction. The two sides have no dispute over territorial sovereignty, Therefore what is there to shelve? Beijing did not ask the public on Taiwan to apply for Mainland passports. Clearly Beijing recognizes the reality of divided jurisdiction.

The cross-Strait situation is like two brothers separated by a courtyard wall. They had no contact with each other. They even asked foreign powers to intervene. With the passage of time however, the two have let go of their resentments. They have begun talking to each other. They have realized that the wise course of action is to heal the rifts within the family.

The 1992 consensus appears complex. In fact, it is quite simple, All that is required is good faith.

「九二共識」的真義 在「一個各表」
2012-11-28
中國時報

在台灣，「九二共識」這個名詞大家都聽過，許多人都在引用，但是它的準確涵義卻少有人說得清楚，甚至還有人想否定它的存在。對於這個攸關台灣前途的概念與主張，我們不厭其煩願意詳加闡述如下。

一九九三年辜汪會談開啟了兩岸正式協商大門，踏出兩岸緊密來往與互利互惠的關鍵第一步。但所有談判都必有共同接受的前提。沒前提，雙方不可能坐上談判桌。辜汪會談的前提，就是後來被前陸委會主委蘇起概括為「九二共識」的原則。只要談判雙方共同接受會談的前提條件，共識就已存在。至於此一共識是否寫入談判結果的文件，或是否被稱為「九二共識」、「九二精神」，或其他名稱，都無礙於此一共識存在之事實。

獨派人物總說「九二共識」不存在，甚至暗示這是蘇起捏造的，其實都只抓住「當年兩岸往還文件中沒出現這四個字」而死纏爛打，並不能否定某種共識確已存在之事實。這裡我們依循慣例，將此共識稱為「九二共識」。

「九二共識」的內容，北京方面認定是「一個中國」原則而不追究其內涵，台北則稱是「一個中國，各自表述」。僅就台北這方而論，台灣方面對「一個中國」的表述方式可見於國統會在一九九二年通過《關於〈一個中國〉的涵義》：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同。中共當局認為『一個中國』即為『中華人民共和國』，將來統一以後，台灣將成為其轄下的一個『特別行政區』。我方則認為「一個中國」應指一九一二年成立迄今之中華民國，其主權及於整個中國，但目前之治權，則僅及於臺澎金馬。台灣固為中國之一部分，但大陸亦為中國之一部分。」

我們即使僅依國統會決議，也可看出兩岸對「一個中國」的主權範圍是沒爭議的，亦即都把「中國」視為包含大陸和台灣。雙方存在歧異而不得不「各自表述」的部分（亦即沒達成共識的部分），只是對這個「中國」的「主權」如何透過「治權」來實現，各自立場不同。所以，「九二共識」中的「一中」是指無爭議的主權範圍，「各表」則是雙方各自對治權立場（如國號、政體）進行表述。準此而論，北京自然會說「九二共識」是「一中」，而「對未達成共識的部分（不得不）各自表述」，既是「各自表述」，當然不存共識。

由此可見，「九二共識」下的中國，是主權統一、治權分裂的國家。我方的《兩岸人民關係條例》，就是基於憲法增修條文和此一共識而明定「一國兩區」，將大陸地區和台灣地區都納入我方主張的主權範圍內。因此多年來，大陸從未抗議台灣吃他們豆腐，或是台灣把大陸矮化為一個區。

至於馬總統所說兩岸「互不承認主權、互不否認治權」，此話尤有深意。「主權」具有排他性，在同一領土內無法並存兩個主權。若兩岸互相承認主權，則中國立即分裂成兩個主權國家，故「互不承認主權」本屬應然。但在「一個中國」內，現有兩個政權，彼此必須正視事實，雙方才能和平交往，因此又需「互不否認治權」。前者是「一中」之法理共識，後者仍是「各表」之面對事實。

釐清、遵守「九二共識」之後，兩岸間的紛紛擾擾都可化解。以大陸護照印有台灣風景為例，大陸的治權雖不及於台灣，但無礙其法理主權及於台灣，這正是大陸的「一中各表」。如今陸委會針對大陸新護照，要求大陸「擱置爭議、正視現實」，那麼中華民國是不是也不能把長江、黃河列入我國官文書呢？這似乎把主權、治權混為一談。因為兩岸對主權範圍本無爭議，如何擱置？北京並未要求台灣人民申請大陸護照，可見他們也沒有漠視治權分裂之現實。

兩岸局勢如兄弟鬩牆。早年不但互不往來，甚至援引外力與對方對抗。時過境遷後，兩人放下仇恨，深覺互動往來、恢復家人關係才屬明智。

「九二共識」看似複雜，其實也很簡單，誠意而已矣。