Major Defeat for Frank Hsieh, Major Setback for DPP Reform

Major Defeat for Frank Hsieh, Major Setback for DPP Reform
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 22, 2012

Summary: The DPP has decided. It will refer to its new body as the "China Affairs Committee." Its Chief Convener will be Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang. Frank Hsieh will be pushed off the stage. A "one nation on each side" framework will make the "one China constitution" impossible. Recall Frank Hsieh's "bartending trip." He spoke of a "constitutional one China." He spoke of a "one China constitution." But in the end the only drink he could mix was a glass of bitter wine. He remained a solitary figure, drinking alone in the shadows. This is Frank Hsieh's bitter fruit. It is also the sorry fate of the Democratic Progressive Party.

Full Text below:

The DPP has decided. It will refer to its new body as the "China Affairs Committee." Its Chief Convener will be Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang. This constitutes a major defeat for Frank Hsieh. It also shrouds DPP reform amidst dark clouds. This editorial attempts to trace the evolution of Frank Hsieh's reasoning. It investigates why the DPP has been unable to undergo reform.

In July 2000 Frank Hsieh declared that "Kaohsiung and Xiamen are two cities within the same country." This amounted to "one China, different interpretations," "one country, two regions," or a "constitutional one China." This amounted to "opposition to Taiwan independence," or at least "A commitment to something other than Taiwan independence." These two points can be regarded as the prototype for Frank Hsieh's cross-Strait framework. It was the broadest and most balanced framework he has ever elucidated. The prototype and a "constitutional one China" naturally lead to "one China, different interpretations." . Therefore one need no longer oppose the 1992 consensus.

Alas, Taiwan independence elements would not allow Frank Hsieh to recognize one China. Their backlash was intense. The 1992 consensus implies "one China, different interpretations." Therefore they would not allow him to recognize the 1992 consensus either. As a result Frank Hsieh cast about for alternatives. He argued that the term "1992 consensus" was never actually used back then. Therefore he did not recognize the "1992 consensus." But he recognized the "spirit of the 1992 talks." He said that the "spirit" was not the same as the "1992 consensus." This was his own "constitutional consensus," which he invented two decades after the 1992 talks. This was of course an anachronism. It was akin to Yue Fei returning to the Three Kingdoms era to fight Zhang Fei. Frank Hsieh was surrounded and "gang-banged" by Taiwan independence hardliners, to the point where he lost his composure.

Frank Hsieh used "constitutional consensus" as a stepping stone. But he was evasive about the "one China constitution." He clearly advocated a "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutions, different interpretations." But he denied advocating the "one China Constitution" or a "constitutional one China." He even denied advocating "one China, different interpretatios." He avoided the taboo "one China" framework altogether. But how can one depart from the Republic of China Constitution's "one China" framework? That would mean departing from the aforementioned prototype. When Frank Hsieh invokes the "constitution," just exactly which constitution is he referring to? When Frank Hsieh invokes the "Republic of China," just exactly what Republic of China is he referring to?

The Taiwan independence hardliners' bullying obliterated Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus." Some of them flatly repudiated the Constitution of the Republic of China. They wanted the DPP to promote the "rectification of names." Others asserted that the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" merely championed "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence as a nation. It says we can use the Republic of China name. Nothing more. It did not imply "one China, different interpretations." In other words, the DPP's bottom line was the repudiation of any "one China framework." It was a denial of the "one China constitution." It was a denial of "one China, different interpretations." It was even a denial that "one China is the Republic of China." This compelled Frank Hsieh to distance himself from the prototype he himself proposed in July 2000. But suppose he distances himself from his "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations" prototype? What difference if any would remain between Frank Hsieh's rhetoric and the "backdoor listing" rhetoric of Taiwan independence hardliners?

The two sides are currently commemorating the "20th Anniversary of the 1992 consensus." The 1992 consensus is already part of the CCP's 18th National Congress Official Report. Frank Hsieh knows he is in a quandary. He says the DPP should engage in talks based on "the spirit of 1992." He wants to accept the 1992 consensus indirectly.

For Taipei, the 1992 consensus or "spirit of the 1992 talks" is the same as "one China, different interpretations in accordance with the one China constitution" for Beijing, It is the same as the verbal declaration made during the March, 2008 Hotline conversation between Hu Jintao and George W. Bush: "The two sides (of the Taiwan Strait) acknowledge that there is only one China, but agree that each side has its own definition of one China." Therefore if Frank Hsieh repudiates the "one China constitution," he is also repudiating the 1992 consensus. Conversely, if he affirms the "one China constitution," he has no reason to repudiate the 1992 consensus. That is because the "one China constitution" inevitably implies "one China, different interpretations." Alas, Frank Hsieh caught himself in a contradiction. He affirmed a "constitutional consensus." But he simultaneously repudiated a "constitutional one China." What was this but a case of his left hand fighting his right?

Frank Hsieh wants DPP reform. His first step should be to return to his own prototype, to the "constitutional one China" of July 2000. He may choose not to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But he must accept the "spirit of the 1992 talks." The talks included a consensus regarding "one China, different interpretations" or "different interpretations of one China." This is Taiwan's "one China, different interpretations, according to the one China constitution." Otherwise, one cannot talk about reform. Otherwise, one cannot sever the DPP's cross-Strait policy Gordian Knot. What should be done about the term "1992 consensus?" Frank Hsieh can say he did not recognize the term, because it was never used back then. He can say that if someone wants to refer to its as the "1992 consensus" after the fact, he can won't object too strongly. He could compare it to ECFA. It was initially denounced as "forfeiting our sovereignty and humiliating our nation." But eventually it was "accepted unconditionally."

Frank Hsieh added that the DPP must resolve the contradictions betweeen its "three resolutions." Actually it must do more than that. It must also resolve the contradictions between its party platform and the three resolutions. Only then will its reform be complete.

In short, if the DPP persists in disavowing the "one China constitution," its transformation will be stillborn. It will become yet another form of "backdoor listing." Without the "one China constitution" there can be no "constitutional consensus," let alone "different constitutions, different interpretations." Conversely, if one recognizes the "one China constitution," then the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations" follow, as a matter of course. In which case one need not and ought not refuse to recognize the 1992 consensus. As an alternative, the DPP can refuse to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But it must recognize "one China, different interpretations according to the one China constitution." That remains Taiwan's best cross-Strait policy. It must recognize the "spirit of the 1992 talks."

But this is all water under the bridge. The DPP has decided to use the name "China Affairs Committee." Frank Hsieh will be pushed off the stage. A "one nation on each side" framework will make the "one China constitution" impossible. Recall Frank Hsieh's "bartending trip." He spoke of a "constitutional one China." He spoke of a "one China constitution." But in the end the only drink he could mix was a glass of bitter wine. He remained a solitary figure, drinking alone in the shadows. This is Frank Hsieh's bitter fruit. It is also the sorry fate of the Democratic Progressive Party.

謝長廷重大挫敗 民進黨轉型困境
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.22

民進黨決定採用「中國事務委員會」的名稱，並由黨主席蘇貞昌自兼召集人。這不僅是謝長廷的重大挫敗，也使民進黨的轉型憧憬佈滿烏雲。本文試回溯謝長廷論述理路的演變，來探討民進黨轉型工程的困境。

二○○○年七月，謝長廷一方面主張「高雄與廈門是一個國家的兩個城市」（這其實是「一中各表」與「一國兩區」），另一方面又稱「憲法一中」（可解讀為「反台獨」或「非台獨」）；這兩點可視為謝長廷現持兩岸論述的「原型」，也是他迄今施展得最開闊與均衡的架構。倘若以此一「原型」為準據，在「憲法一中」之下，「一中各表」即為理所當然的演繹，亦無反對「九二共識」之理。

但是，獨派不容謝長廷承認「一中」，反撲力道甚大；又由於「九二共識」涉及「一中（各表）」，因而亦不容他承認「九二共識」。於是，謝長廷開始東挖西補：他說，一九九二年沒有「九二共識」這「四個字」，所以他不承認「九二共識」；但他又承認有「九二年會談精神」，卻稱這個「精神」不是「九二共識」，而竟然是他在會談二十年後所發明的「憲法共識」。這簡直是讓岳飛跑到三國時代去打張飛，謝長廷被獨派圍剿，堪謂已至慌不擇路的地步。

謝長廷以「憲法共識」為敲門磚，卻對「一中憲法」閃爍其詞。他明明主張「憲法共識」與「憲法各表」，卻竟諱言「一中憲法」或「憲法一中」，甚至否認「一中各表」，處處皆在避諱「一中」架構；但若違離了中華民國憲法的「一中」架構，亦即違離了前述的「原型」，請問謝長廷所說的「憲法」是哪一部「憲法」？而謝長廷所指的「中華民國」又是什麼「中華民國」？

獨派的氣焰壓倒謝長廷的「憲法共識」。有人根本否定「中華民國憲法」，而主張民進黨的目標是「正名制憲」；另有人說，《台灣前途決議文》只是主張「台灣這個主權獨立的國家，可以使用中華民國這個名字」而已，並無「一中各表」的意思。也就是說，這類的說法皆主張，民進黨的「底線」應當否認任何的「一中架構」，否認「一中憲法」，否認「一中各表」，亦否認「一個中國是中華民國」；這也就逼使謝長廷試圖跳離二○○○年七月他自己提出的「原型」，但倘若跳離「一中憲法／一中各表」的「原型」，謝長廷的論述與其他「借殼上市」的台獨論述有何差異？

兩岸正在「紀念九二共識二十周年」，且「九二共識」也已正式載入中共十八大政治報告；謝長廷自知陷入困境，於是他主張民進黨應對「九二年會談精神」給一個說法，亦即想要轉一個彎來接受「九二共識」。

「九二共識」或「九二年會談精神」，對台灣而言，就是「根據一中憲法的一中各表」；對北京而言，即是二○○八年三月胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中親口宣示的：「（兩岸）雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義不同。」所以，謝長廷如果否定「一中憲法」，當然即應否定「九二共識」；反之，倘若承認「一中憲法」，即無否定「九二共識」的道理，因為「一中憲法」的必然政策選擇即是「一中各表」。然而，謝長廷卻陷於自我矛盾之中，又要主張「憲法共識」，又要否定「憲法一中」，這難道是周伯通的左右互搏之術？

謝長廷若要引導民進黨轉型，第一步應當回到二○○○年七月他的「憲法一中」原型。他或許仍可不承認「九二共識」這「四個字」，但他必須接受「九二年會談精神」在兩岸存有「一中各表」或「各表一中」的「共識」，在台灣則是「根據一中憲法的一中各表」。非如此，不能言轉型；非如此，不能破解民進黨兩岸策的困境。至於「九二共識」這「四個字」怎麼辦？謝長廷或許可以說，我不承認當年有「這四個字」，但如果你們在後來要稱它「九二共識」，我雖不滿意，但也可以接受。不妨比照ＥＣＦＡ，由「喪權辱國」，轉到「概括承受」即可。

再者，謝長廷說，民進黨必須將「三個決議文」加以整合；其實不止如此，除了「三個決議文」以外，別忘了還有「台獨黨綱」。民進黨必須做到「一綱三文」的「整合」，轉型工程才算大功告成。

總之，若違離「一中憲法」的主軸，民進黨整個轉型工程即失去準據，而必將再淪為又一形態的「借殼上市」。因為，若無「一中憲法」，即不可能有「憲法共識」，遑論「憲法各表」；反之，若有「一中憲法」，則「九二共識」的「一中各表」即是應然與實然的歸趨，也就不必且不應否認「九二共識」。或者，民進黨可以不承認「九二共識」這「四個字」，但必須承認，「根據一中憲法的一中各表」，是台灣兩岸政策的最佳選擇，此即「九二年會談精神」的台灣觀點。

然而，俱往矣。民進黨決定採用「中國事務委員會」的名稱，且將謝長廷推下舞台，在「一邊一國」的思維架構下，自然難有「一中憲法」的空間；回頭看謝長廷的「調酒行」，一下子注入「憲法一中」，一下子倒出「一中憲法」，但最後仍是調出一杯苦酒，留給自己孤影獨酌。這是謝長廷的苦果，也是民進黨的宿命。