Xi Jinping's Cross-Strait Challenge: Upgrading the 1992 Consensus

Xi Jinping's Cross-Strait Challenge: Upgrading the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 29, 2012

Summary: CCP Central Committee & State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi spoke during the 20th anniversary celebration of the 1992 consensus. He summarized the Hu Jintao administration's 1992 consensus achievements. He also revealed the blueprint for the Xi Jinping administration's next step for the 1992 consensus. We suggest that the 1992 consensus be upgraded. It should be transformed into "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of China."

Full Text below:

CCP Central Committee & State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi spoke during the 20th anniversary celebration of the 1992 consensus. He summarized the Hu Jintao administration's 1992 consensus achievements. He also revealed the blueprint for the Xi Jinping administration's next step for the 1992 consensus.

For the sake of continuity, we suggest that the 1992 consensus be upgraded. It should be transformed into "one China, different interpretations under the big roof concept of China."

Wang Yi defined the 1992 consensus. He said "each side of the Taiwan Strait has verbally declared that both sides of the Strait adhere to the one China principle." This is historical fact. But it is only part of the story. It cites only Beijing's interpretation in 1992. Another part of the story revealed itself during in the March 26, 2008 hotline conversation between President Hu Jintao and President George W. Bush."The (1992 consensus) means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but agree that each side has its own definition of one China." This is also how the Taipei side interprets the 1992 consensus. Over the past four years, the 1992 consensus has gathered energy. The energy comes from the aforementioned endorsement of "one China, different interpretations" by Bush and Hu on the Beijing/Washington Hotline. Alas, the 1992 consensus contains a bottleneck. No one knows for certain what the "one China" in "one China principle" refers to.

Wang Yi mentioned both this "energy" and this "bottleneck" during his talk. Take the "energy" part. Wang said, "The key to the 1992 consensus is the one-China principle. The essence of the 1992 consensus is seeking common ground while shelving differences." In fact, he was referring to "seeking common ground while shelving differences under the one-China principle." He spoke of "seeking common ground in one China, while both sides shelve their political differences." He even spoke of "the ability to seek common ground while shelving minor differences. He even spoke of "the ability to seek common ground while shelving major differences." In fact, he was referring to "seeking common ground in one China, while shelving the differences in different expressions." One China is the greatest common ground. Whereas different interpretations is the greatest difference. The spirit of "one China, different interpretations" and "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is embodied in the 1992 consensus.

Now take the "bottleneck" part. Wang Yi said, "Seeking only common ground is unrealistic. It is also infeasible." Apply Wang's own logic to this dilemma. Wang's remark could be interpreted as, "Seeking only common ground in one China is unrealistic. Talking only about political differences is infeasible." Consider Beijing's perspective. "Talking only about political differences is infeasible." So far, so good. But why is is "Seeking only common ground in one China" unrealistic? Clearly Beijing's thinking about "seeking common ground while shelving differences" requires closer scrutiny.

The problem arises as a result of doubts over "one China." If Beijing sees "one China" as an abstraction transcending the cross-Strait status quo, then "one China" becomes "a third concept of China, a big roof concept of China." That enables the two sides to "shelve their political differences." But if Beijing sees "one China" as the "People's Republic of China," then it is being unrealistic. Then there is no room for "shelving differences." This conflict must be resolved. Otherwise the 1992 consensus will contain a bottleneck. To resolve this conflict, the 1992 consensus should be upgraded. Now is the time to remove the bottleneck. The opportunity must not be missed.

The opportunity revealed itself in the CCP 18th National Congress Political Report. It includes a call to "Investigate cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and make reasonable arrangements." The three keys were "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, and political relations." Given the three keys, "one China" cannot possibly be the "People's Republic of China." It has to be the "big roof concept of one China." This must the foundation for all "reasonable arrangements".

Wang Yi said that the term "reasonable" means not coercing others. Reasonable means abiding by existing legal provisions. The "legal provisions" referred to would be the "Hu Six Points," the provisions of the Wu-Hu Summit of March, and Wang Yi's statement, "in compliance with the legal provisions (constitutions) for both sides." Shelving differences between the constitutional provisions of the two sides, and seeking the common ground of one China, requires the big roof concept of one China. Without this big roof concept of one China, nothing can accomodate a nation that has "yet to be reunified," and maintain "political relations under special circumstances."

The Hu Jintao administration made a critical contribution to cross-Strait relations. It shifted the focus of policy to the signing of a peace agreement. It did this under special circumstances. Cross-Strait political relations were being conducted even though the nation has yet to be reunified. This policy was innovative because it established "yet to be reunified" as an official policy challenge. Without such thinking, cross-Strait peaceful development would be impossible.

Wang Yi said, "We must have a good grasp of the common ground and the differences in our relationship. We must be adept at seeking common ground while shelving minor differences. We must even be adept at seeking common ground while shelving major differences." The "major difference" is the thing we mentioned earlier. We must upgrade the 1992 consensus. Major common ground is the "big roof concept of one China." The major difference refers to the two sides' legal provisions, specifically the constitutions of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. When the big roof China principle becomes the one China principle, only then can we "seek common ground while shelving major differences." Under the big roof concept of one China, The Republic of China is a democratic China, the People's Republic of China is a socialist China.

In this respect the big roof concept of one China may be the link connecting Wang Yi's one China. This link may be, as he said, an "effort to seek common ground, and properly handle the points of disagreement." To "increase common ground, and increase mutual tolerance" is the way to "seek common ground while shelving major differences."

The Xi Jinping administration has inherited the 1992 consensus. If it wishes to transcend it, it must upgrade it, to different interpretations under the big roof concept of one China, and seeking common ground while shelving differences.

習近平的兩岸課題：九二共識的升級版
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.29

中共中央台辦暨國務院台辦主任王毅日前在「九二共識廿周年座談會」中的談話，一方面總結了胡錦濤團隊對九二共識的經營成果，另一方面也揭示了習近平團隊對九二共識的開發藍圖。

我們提出的相對主張是：為承先啟後，繼往開來，九二共識應當有一個升級版，亦即：「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」。

王毅將「九二共識」定義為「（兩岸）各自以口頭方式表述『海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則』的共識」。這是歷史事實，卻只是一部分的事實，僅引據了北京在一九九二當年的「表述」。另一部分的事實，則呈現在二○○八年三月廿六日胡錦濤主席在熱線電話對小布希總統所言：「（九二共識）意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義不同。」這也正是台灣方面在一九九二當年的「表述」。四年多來，九二共識真正的動能，即是來自前述「布胡熱線」也贊同的「一中各表」；九二共識的瓶頸，則在「一個中國原則」所稱的「一個中國」不知究何所指？

王毅的談話數度提及這種「動能」與「瓶頸」的對比關係。關於「動能」部分，王毅說，「九二共識的核心是一個中國原則，九二共識的精髓是求同存異」，其實就是指「在一個中國原則下的求同存異」；他又進一步指出，「求一個中國之同，存雙方政治分歧之異」，甚至說「善於求大同、存小異，乃至求大同，存大異」，其實就是「求一中之同，存各表之異」，因為「一中是最大之同，各表是最大之異」。此種「一中各表／求同存異」的精神，正是「九二共識」的最大動能所在。

關於「瓶頸」部分，王毅說，「只求同，是不現實的；只講異，更是不可行的」，如果以此套入王毅自己的邏輯，或可解釋為：「只求一個中國之同，是不現實的；只講雙方政治分歧之異，是不可行的。」固然，站在北京立場，只講「雙方政治分歧之異」是不可行的，但為何「只求一個中國之同」也是不現實的？可見，北京「求同存異」的思維仍有可以推敲之處。

一切均因「一個中國」的疑義而起。主要的問題是：當北京若將「一個中國」視為超越兩岸現狀的抽象原則之時，亦即將「一個中國」定位為「第三概念的大屋頂中國」之時，就能「存雙方政治分歧之異」；但是，當北京倘將「一個中國」視為「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」之時，卻是「不現實的」，因為這就完全失去了「存異」的空間。若不解決這個矛盾，「九二共識」就有「瓶頸」；倘要解決這個矛盾，「九二共識」就應有「升級版」。當下，突破「瓶頸」的契機已現，不可錯過。

契機即在中共十八大政治報告所揭「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，並對此作出合情合理的安排」。其中的三個關鍵字是：「尚未統一／特殊情況／政治關係」；在這三個關鍵字下，所謂的「一個中國」，即絕無可能是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而當然應是一個「大屋頂中國」，這也始是一切「合情合理的安排」的基礎。

王毅說：合情，就是不搞強加於人；合理，就是恪守法理基礎。而所謂的「法理基礎」，應是指胡六點、今年三月「吳胡會」及王毅此次談話中所稱的「符合雙方各自（憲法）規定」；而倘若要「存雙方憲法規定之異，以求一個中國之同」，則這個「一個中國」，除了「大屋頂中國」之外，豈有可能一方面「尚未統一」，另一方面又維持「特殊情況下的政治關係」？

我們認為，歸結胡錦濤團隊在兩岸關係上最關鍵的「政策創新」，就是將政策焦點轉移至「尚未統一前的特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，而以議簽《和平協議》為目標；此一政策的創新處在於，將「尚未統一」確立為正式的政策課題，並認為應當發展出「尚未統一的政治關係」，若無此種思維，兩岸的「和平發展」即無可能。

王毅說：「必須把握好同與異的關係，善於求大同，存小異；乃至求大同，存大異。」其中，「大異」是首見的說法。若就「九二共識」的升級版而言：大同，即是「大屋頂中國」，「大異」即是「依各自規定（憲法）運行的中華民國與中華人民共和國」。當「大屋頂中國原則」成了「一個中國原則」，始有可能「求大同，存大異」。在大屋頂中國之下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國。

準此以論，「大屋頂中國」，或許即是王毅正在「尋求」的「一個中國」的「連接點」；在此「連接點」上，始可能如他所言，「努力尋求認知的共同點，妥善處理好分歧點」、「擴大彼此的共同點，增強相互的包容性」，如此方是「求大同，存大異」。

習近平團隊若要承繼並超越「九二共識」，應當推動升級版：在大屋頂中國下一中各表，求同存異。