The 1992 Consensus: One Consensus, Two Interpretations?

The 1992 Consensus: One Consensus, Two Interpretations?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2008

During the Hu/Siew Summit at the Boao Forum, Vincent Siew proposed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait "confront reality, create a better future, set aside differences, and seek a win/win scenario." Hu Jintao made no mention of the One China Principle. He didn't even mention his joint statement with George W. Bush regarding the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

On the following day, during the Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Round Table, the Beijing Ministry of Commerce issued a press release mentioning the One-China Principle. Two hours later, Xinhua deleted the term from its news coverage. The Ministry of Commerce also removed the term from its website. Such developments suggest that differences over the One China Principle have been set aside. During a press conference State Council Office for Taiwan Affairs spokesman Li Weiyi told reporters that cross-strait relations "rested on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus."

The situation is somewhat chaotic. Have the two sides set aside their differences or not? If they have, have even the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations been set aside as well? Hu Jintao made no mention of the 1992 Consensus during the Hu/Siew Summit. Does that mean it has been set aside too? A few days later, the State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs mentioned the 1992 Consensus. Does that mean the 1992 Consensus is synonymous with One China, Different Interpretations? Are the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Expressions synonymous with "setting aside differences?" Was the disappearance of the One-China Principle from the Boao press temporary? If it appears again, does that mean the One China Principle is equivalent to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations? Different Expressions does not negate One China. It merely notes that each side defines and understands "One China" differently.

The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations seems to be in a tug of war with "setting aside differences." Hu Jintao failed to mention the 1992 Consensus or One China, Different Interpretations during the Boao Forum. But the One-China Principle was added to a press release afterwards. If this is what "setting aside differences" means, it is disingenuous, and may lead to problems down the line. This is not setting aside differences. This is sweeping them under the rug.

By contrast, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations is a much better way of setting aside differences. On the one hand, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations can be considered synonymous with "setting aside differences." On the other hand, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations does not sweep differences under the rug. Instead, it incorporates both views. If the two sides have gone from affirming the 1992 Consensus to setting aside the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, then that is sweeping differences under the rug, then that is a step back, not a step forward.

The Ma administration must be alert to the risks involved. It must not engage in self-deception. A better approach is to stick to the 1992 Consensus, to reinforce the 1992 Consensus and to stress Different Interpretations. The Ma administration must equate the One-China Principle with the 1992 Consensus and Different Interpretations. Only then can it set aside and resolve differences rather than cover them up. Only then can it avoid the risk of self-deception and eventual catastrophe.

The Ma administration and the Beijing authorities are attempting to reaffirm the legitimacy of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. They must also consolidate public support for the 1992 Consensus and for One China, Different Interpretations. A decade ago Lee Teng-hui was wallowing in "black gold" corruption and wilfully destroying the ROC Constitution. The DPP followed suit by forcing everyone into a simplistic "Loving Taiwan vs. Betraying Taiwan" dichotomy. The term "Republic of China" nearly became a dirty word. Candidates at KMT rallies dared not emphasize the formal name of the country or wave the national flag. The DPP had arrogated to itself the right to define the ethnic and national identity of the Chinese people on Taiwan. The DPP's Rectification of Names campaign, Anti-Chiang Purges, insults to Chiang's memory, demolition of Chiang's plaques, Join the UN Plebiscites, selective 228-oriented reading of history, and attempts to stuff the Republic of China down an Orwellian "Memory Hole" have left the nation prostrate and bleeding.

The Ma administration must make a commitment. It must identify with the Republic of China and heal the artificially-concocted "ethnic" and "national" divisions created by the Taiwan independence movement. Only by rehabilitating the Republic of China, can it properly defend One China, Different Interpretations and deal with its ramifications. The One-China Principle must include the Different Interpretations clause. The Ma administration must not treat the Republic of China as it has in the past, as Original Sin. It must not bob and weave. It must not attempt to muddle through. It must find the courage to reaffirm the moral and political legitimacy of the Republic of China. If it fails to do so, the public will not support the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. In that case, how can the Ma administration possibly expect Beijing to respect and abide by its terms?

Cross-strait relations must not be reduced to empty lip service. Any differences to be set aside must be set aside under the terms of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

兩種不同的戰略：九二共識與擱置爭議
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.23 02:53 am

博鰲論壇胡蕭會，蕭萬長當著胡錦濤的面提出「十六字箴言」：「正視現實，開創未來，擱置爭議，追求雙贏。」胡錦濤則非但未提「一個中國原則」，亦未論及他在布胡熱線中說過的「九二共識」或「一中各表」。

但在次日的兩岸經貿圓桌會議後，北京商務部發表新聞稿，竟出現了「在一個中國的原則下」等語；兩小時後，新華社的報導又取消了這句話，商務部的網站也刪除此語。這麼一進一出之間，彷彿「一個中國原則」已成「被擱置的爭議」。然而，又隔幾天，國台辦發言人李維一在記者會中，卻又提及「在九二共識的基礎上」。

這是一個有點渾沌的情勢。兩岸當局是否已有「擱置爭議」的共識？若有，是否連「九二共識」及「一中各表」的「爭議」皆要「擱置」？胡錦濤在胡蕭會中未提「九二共識」，是否就是「擱置」的徵兆？不過，隔幾天國台辦何以又再提「九二共識」？那麼，「九二共識」是否已是「一中各表」的同位詞？而「九二共識」及「一中各表」，是否即是「擱置爭議」或「爭議已擱置」的同義表述？再者，「一個中國的原則」是否只是在博鰲新聞稿中暫時消失而已？倘若另日再出現，則未來的「一個中國原則」，是否也已包括了「九二共識／一中各表」？因為「各表」並未否定「一中」，只是對「一中」的認知與定義不同而已。

現在的情勢，彷彿是在「九二共識／一中各表」與「擱置爭議」之間出現拉鋸。我們認為：博鰲論壇未聞胡錦濤提起「九二共識」或「一中各表」，事後又更改了出現「一中原則」的新聞稿，這若就是所謂的「擱置爭議」，即未免太過權謀與矯情，將會為兩岸未來隱伏更多的危機。這不是「處理爭議」的正確方法，而只是以權謀手段「掩蓋爭議」而已。

相對而言，「九二共識／一中各表」，則較「擱置爭議」具建設性及發展性。一方面，如前所述，「九二共識／一中各表」原即可視為「擱置爭議」的同義表述；但另一方面，「九二共識／一中各表」卻未「掩蓋爭議」，而是一種「包容爭議」的表述方式。準此以論，兩岸當局若從「九二共識」轉入連「九二共識／一中各表」都被「擱置」或「掩蓋」的地步，這是倒退，而不是進步。

馬政府應當警覺「擱置爭議」的風險，不能因「擱置爭議」而自欺欺人。比較正確的做法是：固守「九二共識」的底線，並加強「九二共識」與其潛台詞「一中各表」的聯結，再努力建立「一中原則」與「九二共識／一中各表」的相容性。這樣才能在「擱置爭議」中，同時也「包容了爭議」、「處理了爭議」，庶不至於「掩蓋爭議」，而使台灣陷於「騙／養／套／殺」的風險。

此外，馬政府在與北京當局設法建立「九二共識／一中各表」的同時，亦須對內進行「九二共識／一中各表」的說服，以取得較穩固的社會支持。在十餘年前到大約四五年前，由於李登輝的黑金毀憲，及民進黨操作的「愛台／賣台」風潮，「中華民國」一度幾乎成為恥辱及不義的符號，連國民黨的集會與候選人也不敢標舉國號及國旗；又由於民進黨一度強勢主導了「國家及族群的詮釋權」，正名制憲、去蔣、鞭屍、拆匾、入聯公投、泛二二八史觀、去中華民國化，更使中華民國的國家認同創傷累累。

未來，馬政府應致力於中華民國的國家認同及族群關係的修補；唯有內部能將「中華民國認同」趨於穩固，始有操作「一中各表」甚至「一中原則」的主觀條件（「一中原則」應當亦不排斥「一中各表」）。馬政府倘若仍如過去那般簡直視「中華民國」為禁忌話題，能躲就躲，得過且過，未能在國民心理深處加強中華民國的合理性與正當性，則「九二共識／一中各表」將連台灣內部的基礎亦不穩固，遑論欲使北京當局尊重及遵守「九二共識／一中各表」？

兩岸情勢發展至今日地步，不宜倒退到一句更加虛無縹緲的「擱置爭議」；若要「擱置」，也應「擱置」在「九二共識／一中各表」之上。