Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan's Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman

Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan's Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 30, 2008

Lai Hsing-yuan will definitely head up the Mainland Affairs Council. Leave aside what political considerations were behind Ma Ying-jeou's move. Leave aside the controversy and backlash this appointment has elicited within the Blue camp. To focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan herself is pointless. After all, MAC and SEF personnel have already been officially appointed. Future cross-strait policy will be handled by this group. The question now ought to be how to make this rag tag group into a well-organized team.

In other words, the next cause for concern, is not relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung, or relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and the rest of the Ma administration. The next cause for concern is relations between the MAC and the SEF, the future of cross-strait policy, the division of labor, and the modus operanda. More broadly speaking, this includes the modus operanda for the presidential palace, the National Security Council, the Executive Yuan, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transportation, and other relevant ministries. How will they coordinate their efforts to promote cross-strait policy? From this point of view, to focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan or to deliberately overestimate her role is unnecessary.

Frankly, the MAC and the SEF's two-track system design was a product of the special "cross-strait" situation. One set policy, the other carried it out. In cross-strait interactions they played the roles of "good cop" and "bad cop." This inevitably led to conflicts between the two. But in the end, they did enable cross-strait dialogue to take place, including the Koo-Wang during the early 90s. It was only the controversy over the Two States Theory and the subsequent ruling party change that mothballed this cross-straits mechanism for nearly 10 years. Ten years is a long time. People have passed away. Expertise has been lost and cross-strait mutual trust has been undermined. When we say we now want to "restart" cross-strait exchanges, we are not exaggerating.

But today's cross-strait situation is completely different from the way it was 10 years ago. MAC and SEF personnel have all been replaced. It would be impossible to replicate the decision-making process in place a decade ago. It makes no difference if we are comparing Chiang Pin-kung today to Koo Chen-fu yesterday, or even Lai Hsing-yuan today to Huang Kun-hui yesterday. Everything is different. Since it is so different, what should the cross-strait policy-making and implementation process be? That is the question Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung will have to answer.

Some people are worried that having Lai Hsing-yuan at the head of the Mainland Affairs Council may affect the timetable for direct flights and mainland tourism, or even destroy the ongoing process of cross-strait reconciliation. The Taiwan stock exchange (TAIEX) plummeted for an entire day. Many political observers worry that Lai Hsing-yuan's EQ is too low. They worry that her pro-green stance will drag the entire Ma administration down. But is Lai Hsing-yuan that powerful? Based on interviews with the media, Lai Hsing-yuan is already on the same page as the Ma Hsiao team. She said she now agrees with Ma's "One China, Different Interpretations" premise. She said she approved of opening Taiwan to mainland tourism, to weekend charter flights, and to allowing the free exchange of NTD with RMB. These provisions are ready for implementation. They are already in full swing. She is confident they can be achieved.

As for raising the ceiling on mainland investments beyond the current 40 percent, recognizing mainland diplomas, she said she had reservations about them unless comprehensive plans were first drawn up. As we look at these policy statements, we can't see any big differences between Lai and Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform.

The KMT's real cross-strait policy challenge is not that Lai Hsing-yuan will hijack the Ma Hsiao team's policy, but that the Blue camp can pull together and avoid having a carriage with too many horses pulling in too many directions. For example, the outgoing administration has yet to hand over power to the incoming administration. The new cross-strait exchange mechanism has yet to be established. Chiang Pin-kung, who has yet to be inaugurated as chairman of the SEF, went to the mainland to thank Taiwan businesspeople for their support. Former Party Chairman Lien Chan also led a delegation to Beijing to attend a Lien-Hu Summit. Current Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung lead a delegation that took part in a KMT-CCP Forum, If cross-strait relations can allow these Blue camp elders to fight over the spotlight, while the decision makers who must assume political responsibility are caught in a dilemma, then hasn't all hell broken loose? Frankly Lai Hsing-yuan is not the only person who must face the music. So must soon to be inaugurated President Ma.

How Beijing views Lai Hsing-yuan's appointment will also be worth noting. We await the consequences of Ma Ying-jeou's decision to appoint Green camp fighter Lai Hsing-yuan as cross-strait decision-maker. It is clear that Ma Ying-jeou is interested in uniting the Blue and Green camps behind his cross-strait policy. He represents the will of over 7 million Blue camp voters. But he does not want to ignore the concerns of 5 million voters. If Beijing cannot see this, if it cools cross-strait relations, then it is not seeing the bigger picture.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.30
如何看待賴幸媛掌陸委會後的兩岸關係
中時社論

　賴幸媛確定出掌陸委會之後，姑不論馬英九這步棋背後的政治考量是什麼，也不論這項人事任命引發藍軍內部多少議論與反彈，持續將焦點鎖定在賴幸媛一個人身上，其實意義已經不大。畢竟陸委會與海基會的人事既然已經正式底定，未來處理兩岸政策的核心，就是這組搭配了。現在的問題焦點應該是：如何讓這個混雜編組的隊伍，變身成一支行動一致的團隊，才是未來真正需要面對的挑戰。

　換言之，接下來最值得關注的，絕對不是賴幸媛與江丙坤之間，或是賴幸媛跟整個馬團隊之間將怎麼磨合，而是陸委會與海基會未來在兩岸政策上的角色分工、乃至運作機制會是什麼？或者更大範圍的說，這個運作機制在未來將與總統府國安會、行政院所屬的外交部、經濟部、內政部與交通部等相關部會間，怎麼步伐一致的推動兩岸政策？從這個角度看，刻意放大或高估賴幸媛一個人的角色，其實是不必要的。

　不諱言說，當初陸委會與海基會這種雙軌的制度設計，本來就是為因應「兩岸」特殊情境的產物。它們一掌政策、一掌執行，在兩岸互動上各自扮演黑白臉，固然免不了鬧出過多次的「海陸大戰」，但畢竟還是在一九九○年代完成包括辜汪會談在內的多次兩岸對話。只不過歷經「兩國論」風波以及後來的政黨輪替，使得這套運作機制有近十年的歲月幾近完全停擺，十年可不是短暫的歲月，人事全非不說，經驗傳承乃至兩岸互信的建立也全部中斷。如今重新啟動相關機制，說是「重新出發」亦不為過。

　只不過，如今的兩岸情勢，與十年前對比已經完全不一樣，重新人事布局的陸委會與海基會，也不可能再複製十年前的決策與運作模式，不論是江丙坤相較於當年辜振甫，亦或是賴幸媛相較於當年的黃昆輝，所面對課題其實是完全都不同了。既然不一樣，那麼新兩岸決策與執行模式又該是什麼？這個問題正就是賴幸媛與江丙坤在接下來所要回答的問題。

　沒錯，有人擔憂賴幸媛出掌陸委會之後，可能會影響直航與陸客來台觀光的時程，甚至還會把已經融冰的兩岸關係再度摧毀掉，連台北股市都還為此慘跌了一天，也有不少政界人士擔心賴幸媛的ＥＱ太差，怕她親綠的立場會拖累整個馬團隊，問題是賴幸媛真有那麼大的能耐嗎？至少從賴幸媛接受記者訪談內容看來，她其實已經是站在馬蕭執政團隊的立場在思考了！她說她現在已經可以認同馬的「一中各表」概念，她也說開放觀光客來台、周末包機與開放人民幣兌換等政策，都是已經準備差不多的開放措施，也進入緊鑼密鼓階段，她有信心可以達成。至於調整對大陸投資四十％上限、開放大陸學歷等，則除非有完整配套，否則她依舊持保留態度。檢視這些立場表述，與馬英九在競選期間的主張，看得出有太大的差異嗎？

　目前國民黨在兩岸政策上的真正挑戰，絕不是賴幸媛會不會以個人立場凌駕整個馬蕭團隊的政策，而是藍軍內部未來要怎麼齊一步伐，避免走上多頭馬車，一人一把號的困境。譬如說，僅僅只是目前，新舊政府都還未交接，新的兩岸互動機制也還未確定，尚未就職海基會董事長的江丙坤就已風塵樸樸的登陸謝票，已經卸下黨主席的連戰也率團赴北京進行「連胡會」，接下來還有現任黨主席吳伯雄要率團參與國共論壇，兩岸關係若是一再任由這些絡繹於兩岸的藍營大老在前面搶業績，讓真正必須負政治責任的決策者反而左支右絀、進退兩難，豈不是全都亂了套？坦言之，必須面對這個課題不只是賴幸媛，還有即將就職的馬總統。

　至於北京當局方面，未來將會用怎樣的高度看待賴幸媛的這項人事任命，也非常值得觀察。馬英九爭取賴幸媛這位昔日綠營戰將主掌兩岸決策，會有怎樣的效應與後果，大家都在拭目以待。但顯然馬英九確有意將兩岸政策的操作，試著與藍綠民意板塊的和解串聯在一起，他當然代表著七百多萬選民的意志，但他也不想完全置另外五百多萬選民的憂慮於不顧，北京若是看不透這一點，就急著將兩岸關係降溫，也就喪失應有高度了。