The Ways of Heaven are Hard to Decipher: The DPP made the Hu Siew Summit Possible

The Ways of Heaven are Hard to Decipher: The DPP made the Hu Siew Summit Possible
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2008

The DPP made the Hu Hsiao Summit possible. That is not an exaggeration.

In 2000, the Lien/Siew ticket was cheated out of its election victory. Lien and Siew each went their own way. In 2001, Siew organized the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation. He served one term as Chen Shui-bian's Chief Economic Adviser. In 2005, Lien Chan, as Chairman of the Kuomintang, visited the mainland and established a KMT/CCP dialog mechanism. For several years, Lien and Siew went their own way, and shared little ground in common.

Who could have predicted that in 2008 Ma Ying-jeou would seek out Vincent Siew as his running mate? That the Ma/Siew ticket would score a resounding victory? That the mutual trust created between the KMT and CCP by Lien Chan's dialogue mechanism, in conjunction with Vincent Siew's cross-strait foundation, would enable the attention-grabbing Hu/Siew Summit to take shape, virtually overnight? Lien Chan's dialog mechanism, Vincent Siew's cross-strait foundation, and Ma's impending presidency were three separate paths. Yet they converged almost instantly. They became a "one-two punch." They played out a chapter of history that took the world by surprise.

The course of history is tortuous. Had the KMT not been out of power for eight years, would Lien Chan have been able to visit the mainland? Had the DPP not resorted to political trickery to remain in power in 2004, would Lien Chan's visit the mainland have acquired so much legitimacy with the public on Taiwan? Had the KMT not been out of power, would Vincent Siew have been "reduced" to lobbyist for a cross-strait common market? Could the KMT and the CCP have established such a well-oiled dialogue mechanism? Would party officials at the highest levels have enjoyed the opportunity for face-to-face interaction? Had the DPP not lost the hearts and minds of the people, would Ma Ying-jeou and his new cross-strait policy have met with the approval of so many voters? Without all these precedents, how could the Hu Siew Summit have taken place? How could the "Four Hopes" and "Four Constants" have made their debut?

The price paid, eight years in the political wilderness, was high. But the rewards have been commensurate. First. Events have confirmed that the path of Taiwan independence and the DPP's Closed Door Policy is a dead end. Maintaining the status quo and advocating cross-strait exchange can no longer be falsely equated with "betraying Taiwan." The Ma/Siew ticket's election victory has confirmed the legitimacy of cross-strait links. Second. The KMT and CCP party hierarchies have made good use of this eight year window of opportunity. After rare personal contacts and heartfelt exchanges, they have established a considerable degree of mutual trust. Third. The KMT was able to establish close contacts with the CCP only because it was out of power. Now that the KMT is again the ruling party, bilateral contacts can immediately and seamlessly be raised to the level of "ruling party to ruling party" contacts.

Without eight years of accumulated experience, today's scenario would have been impossible. Eight years of opposition KMT interaction with the CCP will enable the ruling KMT to interact smoothly and constructively with the CCP. Conversely, eight years of Democratic Progressive Party misrule has thoroughly discredited Taiwan independence and the DPP's Closed Door Policy. Eight years of DPP misrule has transformed the DPP into a reluctant but persuasive witness on behalf of the KMT's new cross-strait policy. For cross-strait relations, the past eight years have been a blessing in disguise.

As Beijing sees it, Taiwan independence momentum has been building over the past eight years. The Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution campaigns, the Plebiscite to Join the UN, and efforts to stuff the Republic of China down the Memory Hole, have forced Beijing to look more favorably on "maintaining the status quo." A Bush/Hu hotline exchange affirmed the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, and that "opposing independence had higher priority than promoting reunification." Meanwhile on Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian's misrule and malfeasance, his campaigns to purge Chiang's legacy, insult Chiang's memory, demolish Chiang's name plaques, demagogue the 228 Incident, Rectify Names and Author of a New Constitution, hold Plebiscites to Join the UN, have infuriated the public, undermined the legitimacy of Taiwan independence, and provoked doubts about the DPP's Closed Door policy.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have taken note of two entirely opposite trends. The mainland authorities have noted the Taiwan independence movement's increased momentum. The public on Taiwan has noted the Taiwan independence movement's diminished credibility. Amidst these opposing trends, the KMT and the CCP have won over public opinion. The public has endorsed the KMT's policy of open exchanges. Ma Ying-jeou, as spokesman for a new cross-strait policy, emerged victorious in the presidential election. Who created this situation? Who but the DPP? Who but Chen Shui-bian?

After an eight-year War of Resistance against the DPP, the opposition KMT is again the ruling party. The KMT knows what it means to lose power. The CCP should take the KMT's experience to heart. It should remember that the people are the masters and government authority originates with them. After eight years of interaction, the leadership on both sides of the strait must behave not like rivals jockeying for advantage, but like stakeholders promoting mutual advantage. After all, the two sides have a common cause -- the welfare of the people. They may be opponents, but they are also allies. This precious eight year legacy is something that both sides should cherish and maintain.

As for the DPP, its eight years in power created the conditions that made the Hu Hsiao Summit a possibility and a reality. It makes no difference that it was the farthest thing from the DPP's intention. The indisputable fact is the DPP made it all possible.

天機莫測：民進黨促成了胡蕭會？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.17 02:43 am

民進黨促成了胡蕭會，此話怎講？

從二○○○年說起。「連蕭配」在總統大選慘敗，連蕭二人竟告分道揚鑣。二○○一年，蕭萬長自組「兩岸共同市場基金會」，一度並成為陳水扁的「總統首席經濟顧問」；連戰則在二○○五年以國民黨主席的身分訪問大陸，並成立「國共平台」。數年之間，連蕭各走各的路，看不出交集。

誰料，二○○八年馬英九竟然找上蕭萬長做競選搭檔，而「馬蕭配」又大勝，且以連戰的「國共平台」提供的互信基礎，及蕭萬長的「基金會」提供的題材，居然在一夕之間即湊成了舉世矚目的「胡蕭博鰲會」；至此，「連平台／蕭基金會／馬選總統」，原本三路「分進」，立即匯流而成「合擊」的交集場面，演出了令世人意外又驚嘆的一頁！

歷史的大道莫非是曲折的？如果不是因國民黨下野八年，連戰豈有可能訪問大陸？又如果不是民進黨的倒行逆施，連戰訪問大陸在台灣民間又豈有正當性？而若不是國民黨下野，蕭萬長又豈會「淪落」成「共同市場」鍥而不捨的兩岸說客？且國共兩黨之間又豈有可能搭起「平台」？兩黨最高階層又豈有機會面對面地頻密互動？而若非民進黨失盡人心，馬英九及其兩岸政策的變革又豈能獲得多數選民的背書？如果沒有了這一切，怎會有「胡蕭會」？又豈會有「四個希望」與「四個繼續」？

據此以論，八年的代價雖大，卻儼然已產生重大的報償：一、終於證實台獨鎖國的路行不通，使「維持現狀／開放交流」的兩岸政策不再被誣為「賣台」，且經馬蕭勝選建立了此一政策的民主正當性。二、國共高層人物利用這八年的「空窗期」，經歷了難得的親身交往，交換了「設身處地」的思維，並建立了一定程度的互信。三、國民黨因為下野才有與中共頻密接觸的機會，如今國民黨從在野黨又轉為執政黨，雙邊接觸層次亦告水漲船高，立即變成「執政黨對執政黨」，可謂是渾然天成的「無縫接軌」。

若無八年的點滴累積，不可能有今日局面。國民黨在野與中共互動了八年，累積了未來執政與中共互動的珍貴資產；而民進黨執政八年使台獨鎖國的政策宣告破產，無形中成為國民黨未來開創兩岸新局的最佳背書人。對兩岸來說，過去這八年可謂是因禍得福。

過去八年，從北京的角度看，台獨聲勢不斷升高，正名制憲，公投入聯，去中華民國化；這使得北京必須正視「維持現狀」，甚至在布胡熱線中出現「九二共識／一中各表」，政策主軸轉為「反獨先於促統」。從台灣內部的角度看，則由於陳水扁失政敗德，又將去蔣、鞭屍、拆匾、二二八、去中華民國、正名制憲，及入聯公投等，操作得民怨沸騰，致使台獨的道德性及正當性急劇耗弱，其鎖國的兩岸政策亦引發社會質疑。

於是，兩岸出現了兩條走向相對的動線：一條是中共認為台獨氣焰上升，一條是台灣民眾對台獨的評價下降；一長一消之間，國共平台在民意的支持中搭起，國民黨開放交流的政策獲得民主背書，馬英九亦以兩岸新局代言人的角色贏得總統大選。冥冥之中，請問誰是造成此一形勢的最主要推手？難道不正是民進黨？難道不正是陳水扁！

八年抗戰，國民黨從在野黨回復成執政黨，國民黨固然點滴在心頭，中共也應從國民黨「失去政權／重新執政」的鏡鑑中，體認民主與民本的真諦。經過八年互動，兩岸高層如今不應只是鉤心鬥角的鬥爭對手，而應當多少變成一種相互砥礪與相互提升的「利害關係人」（stakeholder），畢竟雙方的共同使命皆在造福人民。這種亦敵亦友的關係，可謂是八年形成的最珍貴資產，應當共同珍惜維護。

至於民進黨，執政八年累積了促成胡蕭會的一切條件，這究竟是有心栽花，還是無心插柳？