Is One China, Different Interpretations a Panacea?

Is One China, Different Interpretations a Panacea?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2008

During yesterday's meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian, the focus of the debate was the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. Each side had its own position. Just exactly what does the so-called 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations entail? Will the unpleasant cross-strait problems we have endured over the past eight years vanish because Ma Ying-jeou has been elected and agrees to One China, Different Interpretations? Will cross-strait interactions and exchanges return to normal?

Following Ma's election, many cross-strait problems have apparently been solved. One China, Different Interpretations is something Washington, Beijing, and Taipei all find acceptable. Generally speaking, with Ma Ying-jeou's election, one can expect that Washington, Beijing, Taipei relations will become more relaxed. For the past eight years the Chen Shui-bian administration has forced Washington and Beijing to draw lines in the sand, and seek a modus vivendi in the space in between. Whatever Chen's motives might have been, his real world impact was to bring Washington, Beijing, and Taipei relations to a new low. Therefore, as long as Ma Ying-jeou does not repeat Chen Shui-bian's mistakes upon assuming office, Ma's inauguration will allow Washington, Beijing, Taipei relations to enter a new phase. On this basis, it is reasonable to expect an improvement in cross-strait relations.

But is the situation really so rosy? Can all cross-strait disputes be resolved within the framework of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations?

Let's take a look at the historical record. In 1992, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan met in Hong Kong. The two sides reached a non-controversial agreement to "shelve the dispute over sovereignty" and attend to "business matters." Based on the 1992 Consensus, Koo and Wang met again in 1993, this time in Singapore. They reached an agreement on cross-strait certification of academic credentials, cross-strait registered letter enquiries, and a mechanism for liason and talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). These channels could be opened because the two sides were able to shelve the dispute over sovereignty.

In fact, "shelving the dispute over sovereignty" is another way of saying "One China, Different Interpretations." One China, Different Interpretations means that each side has a different interpretation of One China. One China, Different Interpretations allows the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China to express their own views on the sovereignty issue. It allows the two sides to find a consensus amid their differences.

In all fairness, the words "1992 Consensus" did not actually appear during the 1992 Hong Kong talks. But the two sides did in fact reach a consensus on a wide range of issues. Therefore the result has come to be known as the "1992 consensus." For the past eight years, Chen Shui-bian, based on the flimsy pretext that the words "1992 Consensus" did not appear, has refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. When Chen repudiated Koo's commitment, he undermined all the time and effort Koo and Wang invested and brought cross-strait relations to a new low.

Ma Ying-jeou now says he is willing to return to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. He is willing to consult with the mainland regarding such issues as direct cross-strait flights and allowing mainland tourists to come to Taiwan. Although Washington, Beijing, and Taipei can all accept the premise of One China, Different Interpretations, problems remain.

First, the two sides' interpretations of One China, Different Interpretations vary. According to mainland scholars, Beijing stresses One China while Taipei stresses Different Interpretations. Although the two sides' understanding of the consensus overlaps, the degree of overlap depends upon the prevailing atmosphere and the issues at hand.

In terms of atmosphere, once Chen Shui-bian steps down and Ma Ying-jeou steps up, Beijing may harbor illusions about opposition to independence and promotion of reunification. It may conclude that the outcome of the presidential election shows that the public on Taiwan opposes independence and supports reunification. If Beijing believes this, then it has not studied the presidential election closely enough. Reunification vs. independence was not the core issue. Economic issues were the core issue. If Beijing indulges in wishful thinking before coming to the negotiating table, then it has misjudged the situation.

In terms of issues, a consensus was reached in 1992 and 1993 over "business matters." But the issues that Ma Ying-jeou must deal with include freedom of navigation. Any international negotiations over freedom of navigation invariably involve sovereignty.

Can the two sides really shelve the cross-strait sovereignty issue and talk about freedom of navigation issues? Are Hongqiao to Sungshan flights, or Pudong to Taoyuan flights "domestic" or "international" flights. How should any disputes be resolved?

Furthermore, navigational rights and allowing mainland tourists to come to Taiwan are all policies Taipei is willing to implement. On these Beijing must be in step and demonstrate goodwill. These are not things that can be achieved unilaterally. If the atmosphere is unfavorable, if common ground cannot be found, if the other side is unwilling, then it is entirely possible the door to consultations could again close.

As long as Ma Ying-jeou avoids crossing the red line after he assumes office, cross-strait relations can return to normal. But to assume that One China, Different Interpretations will automatically lead to cross-strait harmony is too optimistic.

中時電子報
今日晚報 　2008.04.02
「一中各表」是萬靈丹？
【中時電子報／賴正翔】

在昨天的扁馬會中，「九二共識」、「一中各表」成為扁馬交鋒的焦點，雙方各有立場；不過，所謂「九二共識」、「一中各表」到底是指什麼？在馬英九當選後，只要祭出「一中各表」，過去八年來，兩岸之間所有不悅與不滿，都一筆勾消嗎？兩岸互動與交流就可以趨於正常嗎？

在馬當選後，兩岸之間的不快似乎迎刃而解，「一中各表」成為美、中、台三方都可以接受的共識。整體來說，馬英九當選後，美中台三方關係可望趨於緩和，主要原因是，扁主政八年，不斷進逼美、中設下的紅線，企圖在美中夾縫中生存。姑且不論扁背後的動機為何，但實際上效果有限，並讓美、中、台三方關係陷入低潮。因此，在馬英九上任後，馬英九只要不重蹈扁的覆轍，基本上，馬可讓美中台三方關係，走入新的局面；在這個基礎上，兩岸關係也可望明朗。

但，事實真的這麼樂觀嗎？兩岸所有爭議，在「九二共識」、「一中各表」都可以解決嗎？

回顧歷史，在一九九二年，辜振甫與汪道涵在香港進行會談，雙方當時達成「擱置主權爭議」，就沒有爭議的「事務性」的議題進行協商；在一九九二年這樣的共識下，在九三年辜汪二人，在新加坡分別就「兩岸文書認證」、「兩岸掛號函件查詢事宜」、「兩會聯繫與會談制度」達成協議。而當時的進展，開啟兩岸之間接觸管道，主要就是因為「擱置主權爭議」的共識。

而「擱置主權爭議」也就是一中各表，所謂一中各表，指的是，兩岸雙方對於一個中國，各有不同認知，各自表述為「中華人民共和國」與「中華民國」，也就在「主權」問題上，採取模糊空間，「異中求同」擱置爭議，才能達成共識。

平心而論，在九二年香港會談時，的確沒有所謂的「九二共識」字眼，但當時在「擱置爭議」的前提下，達成多項共識；而後來為了方便說明，才有「九二共識」。陳水扁執政八年，一直不承認九二共識與一中各表，也是基於此，但扁不承認這樣的共識，也使得辜汪二位老先生擱置爭議的努力，化為烏有，而兩岸關係也陷入冰點。

而現在馬英九表示，願意回到「九二共識」，在「一中各表」的前提下和對岸協商，就兩岸直航，開放大陸觀光客來台等議題進行商談；雖然美中台三方都可以接受「一中各表」，不過，端出「一中各表」後，仍是問題重重。

首先，對岸和我方對「一中各表」的定義，內涵不盡相同；根據之前的報導，對岸學者曾分析，中國強調「一中」而台灣重視「各表」，兩岸各取所需，這也顯示，兩岸的認知雖然有交集，但交集的多寡全視「氣氛」與「議題」而定。

在氣氛上，扁下馬上後，對岸對台灣有著「反獨促統」的幻想，認為這次總統大選的結果，顯示台灣的人民反對獨立，接受統一；但對岸並沒有仔細思考，這次總統大選的主軸，獨統問題不是核心，經濟議題才是重點，對岸一廂情願的思維，若帶到談判桌上，恐怕會誤判情勢。

在議題上，九二年達成共識後，九三年談的都是「事務性」的議題，不過，這次馬英九擘劃的議題，例如航權議題，國際上任何航權的談判，都牽涉主權，

兩岸真的能擱置主權直接談航權嗎？而虹橋飛松山或是浦東飛桃園，到底該定位為國內線還是國際性，爭議又該如何化解？

再者，不論是航權、開放大陸觀光客來台，都不是我方願意就可以做的，必須對方同步釋出善意，也就是「非操之在我」；在這樣的況狀下，如果氣氛不融洽，議題交集有限，對岸一個不願意，關閉協商大門，也是有可能的。

因此，馬英九上任後，只要馬不踩紅線，兩岸關係由谷底回升的可能性，是相當大的；但若一昧的相信，只要拿出「一中各表」兩岸之間就立刻水乳交融，恐怕也是太過樂觀。