Beijing is the Key to the 1992 Consensus

Beijing is the Key to the 1992 Consensus
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2008

The protagonists were the same. The setting was the same. When Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou met yesterday, it was virtually a scene by scene reenactment of their meeting two years ago. Especially in terms of the total lack of consensus between them over the 1992 Consensus. The result of this closely watched "Chen Ma Meeting" was a "Chen Ma Debate" that resulted in "One 1992 Consensus, Two Different Interpretations."

The only difference is that two years ago, Chen Shui-bian was a sitting president who wielded full power. Now he is a lame duck with less than two months left in his term. Only two years ago, Ma Ying-jeou was a humble opposition party chairman. Now he is president elect. President Chen again insisted "There is no so-called 1992 consensus," and in any event it was "a thing of the past." Ma Ying-jeou on the other hand, maintains that "There was a 1992 Consensus" and that it may become "a thing of the future."

This total lack of consensus between the Blue and Green camps over cross-strait policy has been the norm for years. The KMT has repeatedly cited a series of messages between the two sides, proving there was a verbal consensus concerning "One China, Different Interpretations," and confirming that the two sides subsequently conducted a number of cross-strait talks predicated on this consensus. The DPP maintains that there is no written record showing that the two sides signed a 1992 Consensus. The Blue and Green camps have never reached a consensus in this eight year long dispute. Instead their exchanges have been an endless round of "Says you? says me!" This situation, in which each side expresses its own view, is itself a case of "Different Interpretations."

The Democratic Progressive Party would like to reduce the 1992 Consensus to a matter of textual research. There was no formal document with the two words "1992 Consensus" on the cover. Therefore, they argue, "The 1992 Consensus doesn't exist." For the Kuomintang the 1992 Consensus is an issue of hermeneutics. Although the communiques between the two sides may be scattered, ultimately they add up to a tacit understanding. This allows different perceptions on each side, and allows each side to set aside its differences. Hence "Different Interpretations." This mutual tolerance, this rhetorical expediency is a solution to the insoluble dispute over sovereignty. After all, if we don't proceed on this basis, then talks will remain stalled on issues of reunification vs. independence. Of course, if one wishes to engage in legal sophistry, one can simply claim that the consensus does not exist. This of course is what President Chen is doing, with an air of righteousness.

If each side refuses to yields to the other, then whose view is adopted depends entirely upon who is in office. The DPP has been in office for nearly eight years. Cross-strait relations have been conducted on the basis that "There is no 1992 Consensus." The outcome of this approach is clear to see -- an eight year cross-strait stalemate. The SEF and ARATS have ceased interacting. Direct flights, mainland tourism, currency exchanges have all remain stalled. Besides satisfying the requirements of their fundamentalist ideology, the DPP has never offered any alternative.

The KMT is back in office. Ma Ying-jeou has reintroduced the 1992 Consensus which the DPP kept stuffed in the bottom of a chest for eight years. He has announced that the SEF and ARATS will soon resume their dialogue. The Bush/Hu Meeting reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus. The world has been paying close attention, hoping that the cross-strait freeze can be further melted.

Frankly, whether there was in fact any 1992 Consensus is no longer the point. The point is whether both sides felt they had arrived at an mutally acceptable understanding. Chen Shui-bian pointed out a problem. Since Beijing recognizes the 1992 Consensus, that means it recognizes the "Different Expressions" clause. During their Chen/Ma Meeting Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian declared that if Beijing refuses to recognize "Different Expressions," then all bets are off. In other words, the ball is now in Beijing's court. If Beijing wishes to underscore only "One China" to the exclusion of "Different Interpretations," then Ma Ying-jeou will face tough resistance from the Green Camp when it comes to cross-strait policy. Beijing must be clear on this point.

Similarly, if the two sides can interact on the basis of the "One China, Different Interpretations" consensus reached in 1992, then the DPP will have to get past its resistance to "One China." At the very least the DPP must adopt Chen Shui-bian's "Return to the Spirit of 1992" approach. The DPP must stop seeing its struggle with the KMT over cross-strait policy as a zero sum game. It must see it as a win/win game. If the DPP remains mired in its ideological fundamentalism, if it refuses to emerge from its self-imposed isolation, if it refuses to walk into the light, then Taiwan will continue to spin its wheels for years to come.

「九二共識」落實與否的關鍵在北京
中國時報
2008.04.02　

同樣的主角，近似的場景，陳水扁與馬英九昨日的會面，簡直形同拿著兩年前雙方會面的劇本，重新再對了一遍詞。特別是針對當初到底有沒有九二共識這回事，雙方的對話完全未見交集，結果讓這場眾所矚目的「扁馬會」，結結實實的演成了「扁馬辯」，成為「一個九二共識，各自表述」的局面。

唯一不同的是，兩年前陳水扁還是權傾一時的總統，如今則是剩沒兩個月就要卸任，而馬英九兩年前只是個在野的陽春黨主席，如今則是即將接棒的準總統，陳總統再怎麼堅持「根本沒有所謂九二共識」，也即將會是「過去完成式」，而馬英九所堅持的「確有九二共識這回事」，則可能成為「未來進行式」。

這場沒有交集的對話，其實就是過去幾年藍綠陣營在兩岸政策上，劃開彼此分歧的最大焦點。國民黨一再舉出一連串兩岸往來函電的文件，證明雙方確曾有過「各自表述一中」的口頭共識，也根據這個共識進行過多次兩岸兩會的商談；而民進黨則是強調根據所有的書面文獻，根本沒有任何正式紀錄，顯示雙方有白紙黑字簽下宣稱為「九二共識」的文件。這項爭議在過去八年藍綠陣營從來沒有達成過「共識」，一直就是你說你的「有九二共識」，我說我的「沒有九二共識」，這種各說各話的狀態，呈現的其實就是「各自表述」的狀態。

在民進黨看來，九二共識是個文獻考據學的問題，既然沒有一份正式文書協議找得到有「九二共識」這四個字，當然就可振振有詞的宣稱九二共識根本不存在。但對國民黨而言，九二共識是個詮釋學的問題，儘管許多文字散見雙方往來的函電中，但最終它其實是一種不直接形諸文字的「默契」，這當然涉及雙方主觀認知可能有所不同，但也預留了彼此「求同存異」的曖昧空間，所以才說是「各自表述」。這種彼此容忍對方「各執一詞」的操作，是在雙方主權爭議根本無解的狀態下，所設想出的一種修辭學上的權宜，畢竟不這麼做，什麼問題就全卡在這統統不必談了。當然若是依「律師性格」的角度思考，當然可以主張其根本不存在，這也就是陳總統到現在都理直氣壯的原因。

如果誰也說服不了誰，結論就變成由誰執政，就採取誰的立場，再看看究竟是誰的觀點較為管用了。如今民進黨執政即將滿八年，在兩岸問題上這八年一路堅持的就是「沒有九二共識」，結局倒是也很清楚，兩岸就是這麼僵持了八年，海基海協兩會的互動完全凍結，什麼直航、觀光、通匯等統統都在原地踏步，而民進黨也從未證明，他們的堅持除了能滿足意識形態上的需求，還能有其它的出路。

如今換做國民黨再度執政了，馬英九將八年前已經被塵封在箱底的「九二共識」論述再度提出來，而且表明要很快啟動海基海協的對話平台，再加上「布胡會」的對話也提及了九二共識，因而也等於說全球都在睜大眼睛看，已經形同被鎖緊的兩岸關係，能不能在這種論述的復活上，重新再見到鬆綁。

不諱言說，如今到底有沒有九二共識早已不是重點，重點在於各方究竟有無認可這個共識？陳水扁確實點出了一個問題，即北京當局所認知的「九二共識」，是否已包含了認可「各表」在內？馬英九也在扁馬會中表明，如果北京未來根本不承認「各表」，那他也談不下去了！這也等於說，這個球已經踢到北京那裡了，如果北京方面未來只願意強調「一中」，卻對「各表」不願表態，那麼講實在話，馬英九未來在推動兩岸政策上，走勢將面臨來自綠營強硬的抵制。這一點，北京真的不能再模糊了。

同樣的，如果兩岸未來真能在「一中各表」的九二共識基礎上展開互動，那麼民進黨也就該選擇超越了，至少民進黨完全可以依據陳水扁當年所提出的「回歸九二精神」原則，對國民黨未來的兩岸政策進行非零和的制衡，這也是我們所樂見的良性循環。畢竟如果民進黨永遠只讓自己停留在意識形態的糾纏上，不願意積極走出來，那麼台灣未來恐怕也將持續在同樣的爭議中原地踏步下去。