The New Administration's Diplomatic Challenges

The New Administration's Diplomatic Challenges
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2008

Although Washington is not allowing Ma Ying-jeou to visit the United States, it is sending a higher-ranking envoy than usual to his inauguration. On the one hand this defers to international realpolitik. One the other hand it expresses goodwill towards the new administration. The international community also welcomes the imminent return to rational and pragmatic diplomacy. The new administration's first challenge will be to revamp the ROC's diplomatic strategy. It must defend the nation's sovereignty, uphold its dignity, ensure its survival, and provide for its future development.

When the outcome of the presidential election was announced, the international community breathed a collective sigh of relief, and focused its attention on cross-strait reconciliation. Long ago planned but long delayed exchanges may soon take place. A new dawn is breaking on once troubled cross-strait relations. The atmosphere of growing optimism has even led to hopes for a diplomatic truce.

Such expectations are unrealistic and must not form the basis for diplomatic strategy. Beijing may display unprecedentes flexibility by allowing Vice President-elect Vincent Siew participate in the Boao Forum and an historic Hu Siew Summit. But such flexibility will probably not extend to the diplomatic arena. The CCP has long maintained distinct internal and external policies. It may treat compatriots on Taiwan more gently, but it is unrealisic to expect the CCP to accept the Republic of China's sovereignty in the international arena. The mainland China Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long maintained a hardline position regarding Taiwan. The mainland is currently experiencing a surge of nationalist sentiment reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion. Under such circumstances the mainland authorities will be under pressure not to give way.

Moreover, given the mainland's economic rise, international developments have benefited the mainland authorities. They believe time is on their side. They want to avoid driving the public on Taiwan toward independence. Nevertheless they must provide incentives for the comparatively moderate Kuomintang government. Only then can the KMT influence the public on Taiwan. But how far Beijing is prepared to relax its attitude toward Taiwan, in what areas, and in what manner, remains unclear. Whatever it gives, it can take away. Therefore it is not something one can depend upon. We must not harbor any illusions. Otherwise we may harm the ROC's interests.

The ROC's diplomatic plight is the result of the disparity between its strength and the mainland's, and the CCP's insistence on playing a zero-sum game. Being weaker, we must make increase our strength and accumulate bargaining chips. Only then can we defend our sovereignty and ensure a modicum of breathing space in the international arena. Unfortunately the outgoing DPP's diplomatic efforts have been a complete waste. They have provided Chen Shui-bian with photo-ops and opportunities for electioneering, but little else. The ruling DPP has frittered away precious diplomatic capital accumulated through long years of hard work. Its Taiwan independence provocations have depleted the reserves of sympathy the international community once felt for the ROC, and undermined Taipei's once close relationship with Washington. Ma Ying-jeou is inheriting a foreign policy debacle. He must rebuild foreign relations from scratch. Although Taipei/Washington relations can be quickly rebuilt, relations with other nations will need considerably more effort. The unprecedented appointment of Latin American expert Francisco Ou as Minister of Foreign Affairs will return professionalism to diplomacy. It will also help manage crises that have arisen in our relations with allies in Latin America, our diplomatic stronghold.

The mainland's foreign policies are not under our control. Therefore one cannot expect major breakthroughs merely because our ruling administration and foreign policies have changed. But at least our diplomacy can get back on track. At least we can do what we ought to do, and not do what we ought not to do. At least we can begin giving priority to our long-term interests, adopting the most advantageous strategies for safeguarding the ROC's sovereignty, ensuring our survival, and providing for future development. At least the new administration will restore the dignity of professional diplomats, and allow our foreign policy to reflect the aspirations of 23 million Chinese on Taiwan.

In fact, the Republic of China's greatest asset is its values. We have relations with fewer countries than the mainland. We have even fewer votes in the United Nations. But the ROC has undergone a second change in ruling parties. It has demonstrated to the world that the Chinese people are capable of establishing a free, democratic, open, and mature society. To the world's advanced democracies, the continued existence of these values is something precious and worth defending.

The ROC understands the harsh reality of international realpolitik. But we have ignored the intangible values of civilized human society. We have failed to properly market the ROC's virtues. More can be written about this in the future. Because the ROC needs to survive internationally. we need the support of the major powers. Domestic opinion has an influence on decision-making within these major powers. If the ROC's civilized values meet with the approval of international public opinion, their government's foreign policy will reflect that opinion. Many political leaders' decision not to participate in the Beijing Olympics torch relay or the opening ceremonies were based on public opinion and domestic pressure. The ROC government is far more powerful than the Tibetan protestors. If Tibet can gain international sympathy, so can the ROC.

Faced with the rise of mainland China, the ROC finds itself in a position of political weakness. We have also lost our economic advantage. But we must not lose our self-confidence and fighting spirit. The ROC is valuable not merely for its tangible economic achievements, but also for its intangible civilized values. We must reaffirm the value of our continued existence. We must find new ways to market this beautiful island of Taiwan to the international community.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.25
新政府面對的外交挑戰
中時社論

　美國華府最終雖沒讓馬英九訪美，但畢竟也提升了出席就職典禮的特使層次；一方面維持國際現實的框架，一方面對新政府表達出善意與期待。同樣的，國際社會也期待台灣外交回歸理性務實。如何重建外交策略，保護台灣的生存發展與主權尊嚴，將是新政府的重大課題。

　從總統大選揭曉以來，鬆了一口氣的國際社會，紛紛把關注焦點擺在兩岸將走向和解上。就近來的發展看來確是如此，多項延宕許久的交流措施解禁有望，兩岸之間從山雨欲來一夕變成春暖花開，緩和的大氣氛在想像中一再加碼，乃至衍生出「外交休兵」的期待。

　但是，這樣的期待其實是不切實際的，也不能作為外交策略的前提。雖然中共願意讓副總統當選人蕭萬長參加博鰲會議，並舉行歷史性的胡蕭會，立場上更展現出前所罕見的彈性，可這樣的彈性未必能見諸外交領域。因為中共一向內外有別，對台灣同胞講話可以軟一些，寬容度可以大一些，但在國際舞台上要接受台灣的主權國家地位，對中共當局來說還是非常困難的。不要說外交部門一向對台立場最為強硬，現在大陸近於義和團式的激烈民族情緒，也會對中共當局造成不能退讓的壓力。

　何況，中國經濟崛起後，國際局勢一直朝對中共有利的局面發展，因此中共相信時間站在自己那一邊。儘管為了不刺激台灣鋌而走險尋求獨立，北京必須對路線比較和緩的國民黨政府提供一些鼓勵，才能讓這樣的路線在台灣內部有說服力，但到底願意放鬆到什麼程度、在哪些領域、以什麼方式，目前都還不清楚，也因為收放由人，隨時可以收回，所以不足以依賴，更不能有過多樂觀幻想，否則將對台灣的利益造成危害。

　台灣的外交困境源自兩岸力量懸殊及中共堅持零和戰，居於弱勢的我們，必須盡一切努力壯大實力累積籌碼，才能在國際社會有起碼的生存空間與主權地位。遺憾的是這些年外交大搞虛功，為了供元首作秀或替政黨助選，把長年耕耘的外交資源無謂浪擲，還以挑釁的台獨操作耗損國際間對台灣的同情，破壞台美原本緊密的關係。如今馬英九接收的，是片滿目瘡痍的外交荒地，得從頭整地灌溉。雖然台美關係可以很快重建，但與其他國家的關係，卻需要投下更多心力。這次破天荒由拉美專家歐鴻鍊出任外交部長，除了回歸外交專業外，應該也是著眼於我國外交重鎮拉美已經烽火四起，必須緊急救火了。

　國際環境與中共政策都非操之在我，因此很難期待外交處境因為政權輪替而出現重大突破，但至少應該要回歸外交正軌，做該做的事，不做不該做的事，以國家整體長遠利益為優先考量，選擇最有利的策略，來維護台灣的生存發展及主權地位。也期盼新政府能重建外交的專業尊嚴，讓外交政策能真正反映台灣二千三百萬人的心聲。

　其實，台灣最大的資產在於「價值」。比邦交國，我們當然比不過中共；算票數，離聯合國也還差得遠。但再度政黨輪替的台灣，卻示範了華人社會也可以有如此自由、民主、開放、成熟的文明狀態，這些價值的繼續存在，對世界民主先進國家來說，是非常珍貴而且必須保護的。

　台灣通常接觸到的是國際現實的苦澀面，忽略了無形的文明對人類社會的價值，也不懂得如何以此作為行銷台灣的賣點，未來在這方面其實可以多加著墨。因為台灣要維護國際生存，必定需要重要大國的支持，而這些大國的內部民意對決策頗具影響力，當台灣的文明價值得到民意認同時，政府的外交政策也必須作出回應。不少政治領袖決定不參與聖火傳遞或北京奧運開幕式，就是基於民意及輿論壓力，而西藏與中國力量之差距比台灣更大。西藏都可以得到國際同情，台灣當然不能妄自菲薄。

　面對崛起的中國，台灣本來政治地位就居弱勢，如今經濟優勢也迅速流失，但不必因此失去自信和鬥志，因為台灣的價值不只在有形的經濟成就，更在無形的文明發展。我們在確認自己存在價值的同時，也應該以嶄新的策略，重新向國際社會行銷台灣這個美麗島。