Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin's "Tsai Ing-wen Consensus"

Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin's "Tsai Ing-wen Consensus"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 22, 2011

The DPP held a plenary meeting today. It will arrive at a resolution on the nomination of presidential candidates and the conduct of the party primaries. It may adopt any number of nomination procedures. But Tsai Ing-wen will probably be the party's nominee. The key will be how to implement her cross-Strait policy proposals.

Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy position includes two major points. One. It opposes the 1992 Consensus. Two. It declares that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. But these two points have already been refuted by Chen Shui-bian and ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin. Tsai Ing-wen finds herself attacked both front and rear.

Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin both made the same point. One the one hand Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. On the other hand she has declared that she intends to continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. This is self-contradictory, and makes no sense. As Chen Yunlin put it, "if" one opposes the 1992 Consensus, one cannot continue conducting cross-Strait economic exchanges. As Chen Shui-bian put it, "since" one opposes the 1992 Consensus, one cannot continue conducting cross-Strait economic exchanges. Comparing the two shines a spotlight on Tsai Ing-wen's logical contradiction. One might say that Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin have reached a "Tsai Ing-wen Consensus."

Frank Hsieh proposed "One Constitution, Two Interpretations." He was blasted by others in his party. The main reason the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus is that the Taiwan independence movement cannot bring itself to recognize the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China. If they recognize the Republic of China, they must recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. If they recognize the ROC Constitution, they must recognize the One China Constitution. If they recognize the One China Constitution, they must recognize One China, Different Interpretations. If they recognize One China, Different Interpretations, they must recognize the 1992 Consensus. Therefore if one wants to ascertain whether the DPP really recognizes the Republic of China, and is not merely engaging in "backdoor listing," merely ask whether they recognize the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations.

The logic of Taiwan independence is incompatible with the Republic of China. Frank Hsieh was blasted by Taiwan independence elements. "The DPP demands the rectification of names. How can it support One Constitution, Different Interpretations?" Frank Hsieh inadvertently touched the Taiwan independence movement's third rail. Refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus and refusing to recognize the Republic of China, suddenly became two sides of the same coin. This suddenly made the 1992 Consensus an even more insoluble dilemma within the Democratic Progressive Party.

When Frank Hsieh made his proposal, he tested the Taiwan independence movement's bottom line. Not only does the movement oppose the 1992 Consensus, it also opposes One China, Different Interpretations. It categorically opposes the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. Of course, that does not mean it will become the DPP's campaign platform for the coming 2012 presidential election. Interestingly enough, the political climate in the DPP is more Taiwan independence oriented than it has ever been during past presidential campaigns.

Compare the plight of Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP, in support of Chen Shui-bian's first campaign in 2000, issued its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." They supported his advocacy of the "New Centrist Path." They allowed him to declare "Five Noes." They made every effort to soften the "Taiwan independence party platform." Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen stopped Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus and restarting the National Unification Council. Only then did Ah-Bian apply the brakes. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen has yet to take her first step. But Taiwan independence elements have already forbidden her to recognize the 1992 Consensus. They have reminded her that she herself refused to recognize it. To intimidate her, they have made an example of Frank Hsieh. They forbade her from playing word games or engaging in "backdoor listing." They even forbade her from explicitly recognizing the Republic of China. They reminded her that she herself referred to the ROC as an "alien regime."

If this is the case, Tsai Ing-wen faces two problems. One. Whether to continue publicly expressing opposition to the 1992 Consensus. If she wants to change course, how can she continue playing word games? Two. If she wishes to express her views on the Republic of China, and return to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," that still does not solve the problem. The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" states that "according to the Constitution, [Taiwan] shall be known as the "Republic of China." But if one recognizes the "ROC Constitution" and the "Republic of China," how can one refuse to accept the "One China Constitution," "One China, Different Interpretations" and the "1992 Consensus?" Frank Hsieh learned a lesson. Do not play word games with "One Constitution, Different Interpretations."

As Taiwan independence elements recapitulate the vicissitudes of the past eight years, they have clearly concluded that Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" were a form of self incarceration, and a betrayal of Taiwan independence. They also consider the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" and "backdoor listing" opportunistic behavior. Hence the massive backlash against Frank Hsieh's "One Constitution, Different Interpretations" and "word games." As for Chen Shui-bian, he has become the spiritual leader of "One nation on each side." He is doing his utmost to ensure his historical legacy. He is giving himself a makeover, from "corrupt president" to "Taiwan independence standard-bearer." Years ago, Tsai Ing-wen forbade Chen from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Years later, Chen is not about to let Tsai Ing-wen off the hook.

If Tsai Ing-wen fails to clarify her stand on the 1992 Consensus, how can she respond to Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin? If Tsai Ing-wen fails to clarify her stand on the "Republic of China," how can she respond to Frank Hsieh, who asked, "Without it, [the ROC] how can we even hold a presidential election?"

Tsai Ing-wen was originally considered the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate most able to reconcile cross-Strait relations with national identity. But the situation has evolved. She may be the person in the greatest peril, with the least room to maneuver. That is because she once forced Chen Shui-bian to say "I oppose the 1992 Consensus!" and because she herself says it today.

陳水扁與陳雲林的「蔡英文共識」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.22


民進黨今日舉行臨全會，將議決總統候選人初選提名辦法。但不論以何種辦法提名，蔡英文出線的機率皆高，關鍵問題仍在她的兩岸論述將如何呈現。

蔡英文迄今的兩岸論述可歸納作兩點。一、反對九二共識；二、民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策。但這兩點卻被陳水扁及大陸海協會長陳雲林相繼批駁。蔡英文儼然腹背受敵。

陳水扁與陳雲林皆指出了一個共同點，那就是：蔡英文一方面要「反對九二共識」，一方面又要「延續前朝兩岸政策」，這是矛盾不通的。簡略而言，陳雲林的說法是：「如果」反對九二共識，那就「不能」延續兩岸經濟交流現狀。陳水扁的說法則是：「既然」反對九二共識，那就「不可」延續兩岸經濟交流現狀。兩相對照，皆聚焦於蔡英文的邏輯矛盾，這可謂是陳水扁與陳雲林的「蔡英文共識」。

謝長廷發表「憲法各表」而遭黨內狂轟猛批，揭示了一個事實，那就是：民進黨不能承認「九二共識」的主要原因，是在台獨的邏輯上根本不能承認「中華民國」與「中華民國憲法」。因為，若承認中華民國，即應承認中華民國憲法；若承認中華民國憲法，即應承認憲法一中；若承認憲法一中，即應承認一中各表；若承認一中各表，即可承認九二共識。所以，若欲檢視民進黨是否真正承認中華民國（而非「借殼上市」），就看是否承認「九二共識／一中各表」。

但是，台獨的邏輯基礎卻是根本不承認中華民國，正如謝長廷所受來自獨派的批評：「民進黨要正名制憲，豈能憲法各表？」謝長廷貿然撕開了台獨邏輯的底蘊，使得「不承認九二共識」與「不承認中華民國」頓時成為一體的兩面，遂使「九二共識」在民進黨內的不可解決性陡然升高。

謝長廷的提法測出了獨派的底線，那就是：不但反對九二共識，反對一中各表，而且根本反對中華民國與中華民國憲法。當然，這未必即成為民進黨未來在2012大選中的論述體系；但值得玩味的是，這樣的政治氛圍卻是民進黨在歷屆總統大選中最「獨」的一次。

以陳水扁與蔡英文的處境相比。2000年，陳水扁首次參選，民進黨為他發表《台灣前途決議文》，支撐他主張「新中間路線」，又維護他宣示「四不一沒有」，一切努力皆指向架空及軟化《台獨黨綱》；一直到陸委會主委蔡英文阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」及重啟「國統會」，扁才被迫煞車轉向。相較而言，蔡英文如今尚未起步，獨派就禁止她承認「九二共識」（當年妳自己不也不承認嗎？），甚至以謝長廷對她殺雞嚇猴，將她逼到不可再玩「文字遊戲」，不可「借殼上市」，甚至不可正面承認中華民國（妳不說是「外來政權」嗎？）的地步。

勢若趨此，蔡英文至少面臨了兩個難題：一、是否繼續公開表示「反對九二共識」？若要轉彎，又如何玩「文字遊戲」？二、如何表達其「中華民國論述」？若仍回到《台灣前途決議文》，恐仍解決不了問題；因為《決議文》稱「依憲法稱為中華民國」，則若承認了「憲法」與「中華民國」，又如何不接受「憲法一中」、「一中各表」及「九二共識」？謝長廷得到的教訓是不可玩「憲法各表」之類的「文字遊戲」。

此時的獨派回憶起過去八年執政的滄桑，他們顯然認為陳水扁的「四不一沒有」是作繭自縛，且背叛了台獨，也認為《台灣前途決議文》的「借殼上市」是投機行為，因此才會對謝長廷「憲法各表」的「文字遊戲」大反彈。至於陳水扁，現在成了「一邊一國」的精神領袖，他全力要將自己的歷史定位，從「貪汙總統」的形象轉成「台獨旗手」角色，當然也不會輕易放過當年阻禁他承認「九二共識」的蔡英文。

蔡英文若對「九二共識」說不清楚，如何回應陳水扁及陳雲林？而若對「中華民國」說不清楚，又如何回應謝長廷所問：「不然我們怎麼選總統？」

蔡英文原被認為是最能化解兩岸關係及國家認同爭議的民進黨總統候選人，如今情勢的演化則顯示，她卻可能是一個最無轉圜迴旋餘地的危險人物。因為她曾教陳水扁說且現在自己仍說：「我反對九二共識！」