Cross-Strait Policy Must Comply with the ROC Constitution

Cross-Strait Policy Must Comply with the ROC Constitution
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2011

When the Ma administration enunciated its cross-Strait policy, it stressed that "Taiwan's future must be determined by 23 million people." This sounds eerily reminiscent of the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It could be considered plagiarism, and may well be unconstitutional.

Green Camp rhetoric has undergone a four stage evolution. Stage One. During the 1950s, it championed "democratic self-determination," demanded a "public referendum," and proclaimed that "Taiwan's future should be decided collectively by the Taiwanese people." Stage Two. The 1991 "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" demanded "an independent nation and the authoring of a new constitution." Stage Three. The 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" argued that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. According to the current constitution, it is referred to as the Republic of China." It argued that "any changes to the status quo regarding independence, must be determined by the Taiwanese people via referendum." Stage Four. In 2007, it trotted out its "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and called for the "swift rectification of names."

Amidst these four stages, "democratic self-determination" has remained a consistent theme. The "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" called for the founding of a "Republic of Taiwan." The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" adopted a "backdoor listing" strategy. It called for a "unified referendum." The Resolution on Taiwan's Future stipulated that any declaration of "independent status" would require a referendum. The "Resolution for a Normal Nation" again called for the "rectification of names." These four different stages of Green Camp rhetoric have been merged into DPP policy positions. This has resulted in a strange phenomenon, namely "four simultaneous stages, with chickens and rabbits in the same cage." What's more, a Fifth Stage will be soon be added -- the "Platform for the Coming Decade." But "democratic determinism" has remained its consistent theme, namely, "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by the Taiwanese people."

The Ma administration appears to be copying the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." But if we look closely. we realize the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" is moving closer to "Republic of China" reasoning. In 1999, for the sake of Chen Shui-bian's presidential campaign, the DPP is began promoting its "New Centrist Path." Hence the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." In 1998 this newspaper proposed a "referendum on unification." We departed from the notion that only a declaration of independence required a referendum. The DPP meanwhile, is still calling for "four simultaneous stages, with chickens and rabbits in the same cage." Therefore, its main thrust remains "Taiwan independence" and "backdoor listing."

When the Ma administration and the DPP simultaneously proclaim that "Taiwan's future must be decided by 23 million people," people will naturally demand that certain distinctions be made. For the Democratic Progressive Party, 23 million people is all it takes to overthrow the Republic of China and found a separate "Nation of Taiwan." But for the KMT and the Ma administration, this is not the case. Freedom of expression is protected by the constitution. Therefore private individuals may advocate independence. But the Ma administration clearly does not consider Taiwan independence an option. If it did, the KMT and the Ma administration would be no different from the DPP on such issues as "Taiwan independence," an "independent Taiwan," the "two-states theory," "one country on each side," and "backdoor listing." The negative press the KMT received recently was clearly self-generated.

When the Ma administration addresses cross-Strait policy, it often proclaims its allegiance to the "framework of the ROC Constitution." But can one proclaim that "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by 23 million people," while simultaneously proclaiming that "cross-Strait policy must comply with the ROC Constitution?" The KMT and the Ma administration must reaffirm their allegiance to the "Republic of China." They must also uphold the spirit of "democratic self-determination." They must distinguish themselves from the DPP. They must go beyond the DPP. Only then can they avoid charges that they are "violatiing the constitution."

As mentioned earlier, Green Camp assertions that "Taiwan's future must be determined by 23 million people" has its origins in the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," in Taiwan independence ideology, and "backdoor listing." By contrast, "the future of cross-Strait relations must comply with the ROC Constitution," is predicated upon the Republic of China and "One China, Different Interpretations." The emphasis is on "future cross-Strait relations," complying with "the Republic of China Constitution, democratic processes, and the rule of law."

The term "complying with the Republic of China Constitution" has two meanings. One. The cross-Strait status quo. All processes must of course comply with the ROC Constitution. Whoever is in office must rise to office in accordance with constitutional processes. Opposition parties must provide checks and balances, in accordance with constitutional processes. In other words, cross-Strait policy is the result of constitutional processes, including elections, majority rule, ruling party changes, democracy, and the rule of law. In 2000, the DPP won the right to rule by just such means. So did the KMT In 2008. Two. Amendments in the preamble of the Constitution stipulate that "in order to meet the needs of the nation prior to reunification," the constitution will allows for "one China, different interpretations" and "divided rule." If one day this "prior to reunification" constitution is amended, it must of course be amended in accordance with constitutional processes.

The argument that "cross-Strait policy must comply with ROC constitutional processes," is more compelling than the argument that "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by 23 million people." The "One China Constitution," the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," "No [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force," "Putting Taiwan first, and benefitting the people," are all mutually reinforcing policies. These are the basis for Taipei's cross-Strait policy. They are guidelines for cross-Strait relations that Beijing should accept and cannot refuse to accept.

The direction and content of existing cross-Strait policy for the 23 million people on Taiwan, was formulated in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, democracy, and the rule of law. The same rules must of course apply to future cross-Strait policy.

兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.01.12 02:49 am

馬政府在宣示兩岸政策時，屢屢表達「台灣的前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」之類的論述；此說被認為是抄襲民進黨的《台灣前途決議文》，且有違憲之虞。

綠營相關論述的演化，略可分作四個階段。一、五○年代起即倡議「民主自決論」及「公民投票論」，主張「台灣的前途應由台灣全體住民共同決定」。二、一九九一年的《台獨黨綱》，主張「獨立建國，制定新憲」。三、至一九九九年《台灣前途決議文》則主張「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家……依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，「任何有關獨立現狀的更動，必須經由台灣全體住民以公民投票方式決定」。四、二○○七年《正常國家決議文》，又回頭主張「及早正名制憲」。

在這四階段中，「民主自決論」是始終一貫的理論主軸。《台獨黨綱》主張另建台灣共和國；至《台灣前途決議文》，則見「借殼上市」的策略，甚至透露出「統一公投」的思維（決議文稱，若改變「獨立現狀」，必須公投）；到了《正常國家決議文》，又回到「正名制憲」。這雖是綠營四階段的不同論述，如今卻同時存在於民進黨的政策論述中，形成「四個階段／雞兔共籠」的奇異現象（不久後更將加入《十年政綱》的第五階段）；然而，「民主決定論」則是貫通其間的主軸訴求，亦即：「台灣的前途應由台灣全體住民共同決定。」

由前述析論可知，如今似乎是馬政府抄襲了《台灣前途決議文》，但究其根源，則是民進黨的《台灣前途決議文》先向「中華民國論述」靠攏。一九九九年，民進黨為推倡「新中間路線」的陳水扁參選總統進行部署，遂有《台灣前途決議文》的宣示；在其中略可見到本報在一九九八年所提「統一公投」的概念（改變「獨立現狀」才要公投）。不過，由於民進黨的相關論述迄今仍是「四個階段／雞兔共籠」，所以整個論述的主軸仍是「台獨取向」、「借殼上市」。

因而，當馬政府與民進黨皆宣示「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」之類的論述時，自然有人認為應當有所區隔。因為，民進黨持此說法時，是指只要兩千三百萬人決定，便可推翻中華民國，也可另建台灣國；但就國民黨與馬政府的立場言，基於憲法所保障的言論自由，雖不可禁止民間存有台獨論述，但馬政府顯然不能以「台獨選項」作為中華民國的國家政策。否則，國民黨及馬政府如何與台獨、獨台、兩國論、一邊一國或借殼上市有所區隔？有了這一層的思考，即可知最近引發的相關爭議可謂其來有自，不無道理。

其實，馬政府在宣示兩岸政策時，經常標舉「在中華民國憲法架構下」這個前提；若能將「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人共同決定」，置於此一前提之下，而稱「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法的程序決定」，即可一方面鞏固了「中華民國」的立場，兼也維持了「民主自決」的精神。可與民進黨區隔，並超越民進黨，也不會再有「違憲」的爭議。

如前所述，「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」，源自綠營對「台灣前途」的思維，係台獨取向，是借殼上市；但「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定」，則是以中華民國及一中各表為前提，而強調將「兩岸關係的未來」置於「中華民國憲法民主法治程序」的節制之下。

所謂「中華民國憲法的程序」，有兩層意義。一、就兩岸現狀的運作言，當然應當遵照中華民國憲法的程序；執政者應經憲法程序取得執政地位，在野黨應依憲法程序進行監督制衡。亦即，兩岸政策是在憲法程序中，經選舉、多數決及政黨輪替的民主法治之憲法規制所產生並據以運作。民進黨在二○○○年如此取得執政權，二 ○○八年國民黨亦是如此。二、現行憲法增修條文的前言標示「為因應國家統一前的需要」，所以這部憲法可以稱作「一中各表」的「分治憲法」；若他日要改變「統一前」的憲法狀態時，自然也應經由憲法程序來處理。

「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定」，可以成為大於並高於「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」的論述架構；而與「憲法一中」、「九二共識／一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「以台灣為主／對人民有利」等政策概念相輔相成。這應是台灣人民對兩岸政策的最大公約數，也是北京當局應當接納及不能不接納的兩岸互動準則。

因為，台灣兩千三百萬人對兩岸關係的方向及內容，過去及現在皆是通過中華民國憲法的民主法治之程序在加以節制，未來當然亦將如此。