Is There a 1992 Consensus?

Is There a 1992 Consensus?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 4, 2010

The KMT and the DPP are crossing swords over whether there is a "1992 Consensus," and whether to recognize the 1992 Consensus. These are really two questions. If there is no 1992 Consensus, what's the point of recognizing it? If there is a 1992 Consensus, what would be the consequences of repudiating it?

First, suppose there is no 1992 Consensus. Then what? The answer is, even assuming there was no 1992 Consensus before, there is a 1992 Consensus now. In 1992, during negotiations in Hong Kong, no one actually used the term, "1992 Consensus." But since then, Taipei has characterized the negotiations as "one China, different interpretations," while Beijing has characterized the negotiations as "different interpretations of one China." The two sides clearly arrived at a consensus. They agreed to emphasize areas they shared in common, and to set aside areas they did not. Since then, this consensus has become known as the "1992 Consensus." It has become a keyword in cross-Strait interaction. That is an even clearer fact. That is why even though the term "1992 Consensus" may not have existed before, it exists now. As for "one China, different interpretations," and "different interpretations of one China," these existed long ago. This sums up the KMT position.

Tsai Ing-wen said: "Asking me to recognize something that does not exist is very difficult." In other words, she insists there is no 1992 Consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen is merely asserting that no one used the term "1992 Consensus" back in 1992, then she is merely indulging in meaningless sophistry. She must confront reality. The fact is that today, when the two sides wish to state their position, they refer to the "1992 Consensus." Imagine a baby born in 1992. He is later given a name -- "1992 Consensus." Tsai Ing-wen cannot insist that merely because the baby was not given a name in 1992, therefore it does not exist. The fundamental question is not whether the baby exists, but whether to recognize that it exists. Nineteen years have elapsed. Yet the baby is still struggling to survive. It was belatedly given a name -- "1992 Consensus," merely for convenience.

The Democratic Progressive Party and Tsai Ing-wen have two reasons for repudiating the 1992 Consensus. Reason One, as this newspaper recently noted, is that In 2000, then Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Tsai Ing-wen, stopped President Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. If she reneges by recognizing the 1992 Consensus today, she will be stoned to death by Taiwan independence advocates. Reason Two is that from Taipei's perspective, the "1992 Consensus" is "one China, different interpretations." The "one China" aspect is already part of our own "One China Constitution." But the DPP cannot free itself of its attachment to Taiwan independence. If it recognizes the 1992 Consensus, it must also recognize the One China Constitution, which is diametrically opposed to Taiwan independence. This, for the DPP, is an insurmountable internal obstacle. In other words, the primary reason the DPP feels compelled to repudiate the 1992 Consensus, is the One China Constitution. If the DPP recognizes the One China Constitution, it has no reason to repudiate "one China, different interpretations." Conversely, if it recognizes "one China, different interpretations," how can it repudiate the 1992 Consensus?

Therefore, the two parties have a fundamental difference. The KMT upholds the Republic of China, the "One China Constitution," "one China, different interpretations," and champions the 1992 Consensus. The DPP repudiates the Republic of China and the "One China Constitution." It insists that "one China, different interpretations" is infeasible, and repudates the 1992 Consensus. The fundamental difference between the two parties lies in the way they think. One thinks in terms of the "Republic of China." The other thinks in terms of a "Nation of Taiwan."

The DPP has offered one somewhat more persuasive argument. It asks, "Can one China, different interpretations really work?" Will the CCP really recognize the Republic of China? Unfortunately this merely reflects the DPP's long-standing policy of repudiating and humiliating the Republic of China. The DPP ignores the Republic of China's struggle to survive. It ignores the Republic of China's achievements. It attempts to replace the Republic of China with a "Nation of Taiwan." It is true that Beijing does not publicly recognize "one China, different interpretations." But Hu Jintao recognized it once, while speaking on the Bush/Hu hotline. This recognition was one of great significance. But the progress made in "mutual non-repudiation" in any number of areas, has been obvious. The Republic of China should make a greater effort on behalf of "one China, different interpretations." Beijing has yet to publicly recognize "one China, different interpretations." But for the past two years, it has never publicly repudiated "one China, different interpretations." As an editorial published by this newspaper on New Year's day noted, this has moved cross-Strait relations out of the era of "confrontation," into the era of "avoidance," and finally into the era of "coopetition." This is a major achievement, based on the "1992 Consensus." To the Republic of China, the situation is hardly satisfactory. But at least it holds the possibility of improvement. After all, the 1992 Consensus is a concept that allows growth and development.

By contrast, the DPP repudiates the "1992 Consensus," the "One China Constitution," "one China, different interpretations," and the "1992 Consensus." This is tantamount to a total negation of our existing constitution and the foundation of cross-Strait "peaceful development."

In fact, the question the DPP faces is not "whether there is a 1992 Consensus." The question is how can Taipei possibly cope with cross-Strait relations if it abandons the currently accepted 1992 Consensus,

有沒有「九二共識」？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.04


國民黨與民進黨正為「有沒有九二共識」及「承不承認九二共識」激烈交火。其實，這是不同層次的兩個問題：如果根本「沒有」，談何「承認」？如果「有」，則「不承認」將有何後果？

先談「有沒有」。答案是：即使本來沒有，現在也有了。這意思是說，在九二當年的香港會談中，確實未有「九二共識」四個字；但是，若將當年的會談要義歸納成「一中各表」（台灣所強調）及「各表一中」（大陸所強調），則絕無疑義；而兩岸此種「求同存異」的立場，後來被製作成「九二共識」的「語彙膠囊」，且如今已通行使用，成為兩岸互動的關鍵字，則更是有目共睹的事實。所以說，「九二共識」這四個字，即使原本沒有，現在也有了；至於「一中各表」及「各表一中」的「求同存異」的立場，更是早已有之。以上大抵可簡要說明國民黨的立場。

蔡英文則說：「要我承認不存在的東西很困難。」也就是說，她主張沒有「九二共識」。如果蔡英文只是說，九二當年沒有「九二共識」這四個字，這種說法只是遁詞，已無意義；她必須對現在已經通行使用的「九二共識」表達立場。這好比九二誕生了一個嬰兒，後來取名「九二共識」；蔡英文不能只說當年沒這個名字，因為現在根本的問題是在承不承認這個經歷十九年折磨而至今仍在奮鬥求生的九二之子，至於它在事後才被命名為「九二共識」，則不過是為了便於指稱而已。

民進黨及蔡英文否定「九二共識」，有兩層原因。原因之一是如本報日前社論所說，蔡英文在二○○○年任陸委會主委時，曾阻擋陳水扁總統承認九二共識；如今她若回頭承認「九二共識」，必遭獨派矢石交加。另一層原因是，對台灣而言，「九二共識」即是「一個中國／各自表述」，而「一個中國」的根本是在「一中憲法」；但民進黨無法擺脫台獨的立場，以致若承認「九二共識」，即須承認「一中憲法」（反對台獨），這卻是民進黨無法超越的「內鍵障礙」。也就是說，對民進黨而言，不承認「九二共識」的主因是在不能承認「一中憲法」；因為，如果承認了「一中憲法」，即沒有理由否定「一中各表」；而若承認了「一中各表」，又豈須否認「九二共識」？

所以，兩黨的根本差異是在：國民黨擁護中華民國，維持「一中憲法」，推動「一中各表」，因而主張「九二共識」；民進黨則否定中華民國，否定「一中憲法」，不認為「一中各表」有可行性，因而不承認「九二共識」。二者根本的差異，是在於「中華民國」與「台灣國」的不同思維。

民進黨較有說服性的說法是：「一中各表」可行嗎？中共承認中華民國嗎？然而，這其實是民進黨的一貫態度：只是不斷地否定及羞辱中華民國，無視中華民國奮鬥求生的努力及成就，而又拿不出「取代中華民國」的方案來（成立台灣國嗎？）。北京確未公開承認「一中各表」（布胡熱線有過一次，且是極重要的一次），但在各領域中「互不否認」的進度十分明顯，而中華民國在「一中各表」上亦非沒有努力的空間。總括來看，北京雖未公開承認「一中各表」，但兩年多來亦未公開否認「一中各表」；正如本報元旦社論所說，這使得台灣的兩岸關係，由「對抗期」、「迴避期」進入了「競合期」。這是何其重大的成就，而這樣的成就全是建立在「九二共識」上的。對中華民國而言，當然絕不滿意，但仍大有努力的空間；畢竟，「九二共識」仍是一個成長發展中的概念。

相對而言，民進黨否定了「九二共識」，亦即對內否定「一中憲法」，對外否定「一中各表」；而否定了「九二共識」，也就形同對內與對外皆全盤否定了現行憲法及兩岸「和平發展」的前提與基礎。

其實，民進黨現在面對的問題已不是「有沒有九二共識」，而是若否棄了如今已經通行使用的「九二共識」，台灣將如何面對兩岸關係？將如何走下去？