Three Little Pigs Cannot Elbow Aside 1992 Consensus

Three Little Pigs Cannot Elbow Aside 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 11, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has made clear that if she is elected president, she will refuse to recognize the 1992 consensus. This will immediately precipitate a showdown with Beijing. When that happens, who will be forced to back down? Who will be forced to eat crow? Will it be Beijing? Or will it be Tsai Ing-wen?

Full Text Below:

Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi is currently in Hawaii attending an APEC meeting. Wang said that the basis of the Chiang-Chen meeting is the 1992 consensus. Will next year's Chiang-Chen meeting be held as usual? That depends on how the situation unfolds after the ROC presidential election on Taiwan. Wang said that the foundation for cross-Strait consultations is the 1992 consensus. "This is beyond dispute."

A reporter asked Wang Yi whether the cross-Strait insurance agreement might be signed during next spring's Chiang-Chen meeting. Wang replied, "If the Chiang-Chen meeting can be held, then the agreement can be signed." The implication was that "If the meeting cannot be held, then the agreement cannot be signed."

Beijing has reiterated that "If the foundation crumbles, then the building must fall." Wang even said "The 16 agreements signed by the two sides are the building erected upon the consensus." This means ECFA is included.

The main point of contention in the ongoing Blue vs. Green tug of war has been whether to recognize the 1992 consensus. It has suddenly been sidelined by such issues as "The Three Little Pigs." But the key to the general election is still the 1992 consensus. This is not something anyone can wish away. The Three Little Pigs cannot wish away the 1992 consensus.

For Taipei, the 1992 consensus is the basis for national identity and cross-Strait interaction, as laid out in the Constitution of the Republic of China. For Taipei it means "one China, different interpretations," and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use force." For Beijing it means "seeking common ground while acknowledging differences." In short, the 1992 consensus has become the premise and foundation for cross-Strait peaceful development.

So far Tsai Ing-wen has refused to recognize the 1992 consensus, But her cross-Strait rhetoric is clearly subject to powerful constraints imposed upon her by the 1992 consensus. For example, she once opposed ECFA because she opposed the 1992 consensus. Now she approves of ECFA. But she cannot do without the support of the 1992 consensus. She once alleged that "The Republic of China is a government in exile," again because she opposed the 1992 consensus. But now she has changed her tune. She now says "The Republic of China is not a foreign regime." She cannot do without the support of "one China, different interpretations." She once opposed President Ma's peace agreement. But now she champions her "three principles of peace." She cannot do without the support of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force."

Tsai has vocally opposed the 1992 consensus. But every policy she has ever advanced on constitutional allegiance ir cross-Strait interaction, cannot do without the support of the 1992 consensus. Without the support of the 1992 consensus, her policies are simply infeasible. She wants to maintain ECFA. But can she do so without the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations? She wants to equate the Republic of China with Taiwan, and Taiwan with the Republic of China, But can she do so without the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations?" She wants to sell voters on her "three principles of peace." But can she do so without the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations?"

Tsai Ing-wen has long refused to recognize the 1992 consensus. Her refusal underwent three stages. First she alleged that the 1992 consensus did not exist. Then she alleged that the 1992 consensus was synonymous with "one China." In other words, the 1992 consensus existed, but it meant "one China," and not "one China, different interpretations." Finally, she boasted that even if she refused to recognize the 1992 consensus after becoming president, Beijing would not dare shun her. She boasted that Beijing would blink, that it would let the matter of the 1992 consensus slide. In other words, the 1992 consensus would remain, but Beijing would back down.

In sum, Tsai Ing-wen's assumptions are absurd and dangerous. She clearly realizes that cross-Strait peaceful development depends upon the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpetations." But she repeatedly flip-flops. First the denies that the 1992 consensus exists. Then she equates the 1992 consensus with Beijing's interpretation of "one China." She is even paranoid enough to imagine that she can repudiate the 1992 consensus and maintain ECFA, rule over the Republic of China, and implementation her "three principles of peace."

Tsai Ing-wen has made clear that if she is elected president, she will refuse to recognize the 1992 consensus. This will immediately precipitate a showdown with Beijing. When that happens, who will be forced to back down? Who will be forced to eat crow? Will it be Beijing? Or will it be Tsai Ing-wen?

Tsai and the DPP may think they can simply wait until they have won. They may think they can then invoke weasel words such as "the spirit of the 1992 talks" and deftly turn the situation around. But if Tsai Ing-wen does this, she will be surrendering to Beijing, Listen to what Wang Yi said. Listen to the tone in which he said it. When the time comes, Beijing will insist on hearing Tsai Ing-wen say the words: "1992 consensus." Nothing more, and nothing less. Beijing will not tolerate the slightest deviation. That is because the 1992 consensus is the policy position that Beijing officials charged with Taiwan affairs have relentlessly hammered upon since 2005. The Mainland cannot take it back, and Tsai Ing-wen cannot force the Mainland to take it back.

This is the bizarre paradox in this election. In the event Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will immediately collide head on with Beijing. She has no qualms about inflicting political and economic disaster upon Taiwan, merely to further her election campaign. Public attention has been led astray. It is now focused on jokes about "Three Little Pigs." The DPP is exploiting populist sentiment over the "Three Little Pigs." It hopes to elect a Republic of China president who will repudiate the 1992 consensus and clash head on with Beijing. Tsai Ing-wen is clearly even more paranoid, radical, and foolish than Chen Shui-bian.

If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will be caught in a dilemma. She can repudiate the 1992 Consensus, or change her tune and recognize it. But either way, she will inflict political and economic disaster upon Taiwan. Furthermore, if she changes her tune and accepts the 1992 consensus, it will mean she is also accepting Beijing's interpretation of "one China." After all, that was her own understanding of the 1992 consensus. After all, she was the one who insisted that the 1992 consensus was the same as Beijing's interpretation of "one China." She was the one who insisted that the 1992 consensus was not the same as "one China, different interpretations."

「三隻小豬」吃不掉「九二共識」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.11

刻在夏威夷參加ＡＰＥＣ年會的北京國台辦主任王毅說：江陳會召開的基礎就是九二共識，明春江陳會是否能繼續召開，要看台灣大選後的情勢演變。他說，兩岸兩會協商的基礎就是九二共識，「這是不能被挑戰的」。

記者問王毅，明春江陳會有無可能簽署「兩岸投保協議」？王毅答：「江陳會若能開得成，就簽得成。」此話的潛台詞被認為是「若開不成，就簽不成」。

北京一再重申「基礎不保／樓層必倒」的論點。王毅日前甚至明指「兩會簽署的十六項協議就是在九二共識上新建的樓層」，即意謂ＥＣＦＡ亦包含其中。

藍綠攻防的主要議題「是否承認九二共識」彷彿突然消失，被「三隻小豬」等話題所取代。但此次大選的關鍵仍在「九二共識」，這不可能隨任何人的意志為轉移。「三隻小豬」也吃不掉「九二共識」。

「九二共識」，對台灣而言，就是以「中華民國憲法」為國家認同及兩岸運作的準據；對兩岸互動而言，則在台灣是「一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」，在北京則是「求同存異」。總而言之，「九二共識」已成為兩岸「和平發展」的前提與基礎。

蔡英文迄今否定九二共識，但她的兩岸論述卻顯受「九二共識」的強力制約。例如，她曾反ＥＣＦＡ，是緣於反九二共識；但如今她贊同ＥＣＦＡ，卻不能沒有「九二共識」的支撐。再如，她曾說「中華民國是流亡政府」，也是緣於反九二共識；但如今又改稱「中華民國不是外來政權」，亦不能沒有「一中各表」的支撐。又如，她反對馬總統的《和平協議》，卻又主張「和平三原則」，即不能沒有「不統／不獨／不武」的支撐。

可以這麼說，蔡英文口口聲聲反對「九二共識」，但是她所提出的國憲認同與兩岸運作的重大政策，每一件其實皆不能沒有「九二共識」支撐，否則就絕不可行。試問：要延續ＥＣＦＡ，無「九二共識／一中各表」行嗎？主張「中華民國就是台灣／台灣就是中華民國」，無「九二共識／一中各表」行嗎？主張「和平三原則」，無「九二共識／一中各表」行嗎？

蔡英文之「否定九二共識」，有三部曲：一、指九二共識根本不存在；二、指九二共識就是「一個中國」（「九二共識」存在了，但「一中各表」不見了）；三、揚言即使她否認九二共識而當選總統，北京也不敢與她翻臉，必會將「九二共識」吞回去。（九二共識存在了，但屆時北京會龜縮）。

綜上所論，蔡英文的荒謬及可怕在於，她明知兩岸的「和平發展」，繫於「九二共識／一中各表」；但她一下子根本否定「九二共識」的存在，一下子又將「九二共識」釘死在「一個中國」之上；而她又竟然妄想可以推翻「九二共識」卻仍延續ＥＣＦＡ、統治「中華民國」，及實現其「和平三原則」！

蔡英文如今的姿態，擺明了就是若當選後必會否定「九二共識」，立即與北京攤牌對撞。屆時，就看誰會龜縮？誰會把話吞回去？是北京？或蔡英文？

蔡英文與民進黨也許心中盤算，待若勝選後，再用「九二年會談精神」等修辭來轉彎；且莫說即使如此蔡英文亦形同向北京投降，何況聽王毅的口氣，北京屆時要從蔡英文口裡聽到的，應當是不折不扣、原原本本的「九二共識」四字，一個字也不能少，一個字也不能改。因為，「九二共識」是北京涉台人士自二○○五年以來強調過千百次的政策命題，大陸內部不容他們吞回去，蔡英文也不可能教他們吞回去。

這正是這場大選的奇詭弔詭。蔡英文其實是以當選後立即與北京攤牌對撞，且不惜為台灣掀起一場政經災難作為其競選的主要號召；但是，整個選情卻陷溺在「三隻小豬」的戲謔之中，欲用小豬的民粹熱情去拱出一位以「否定九二共識」與北京攤牌對撞的中華民國總統，這儼然比當年的陳水扁更偏執、激進、愚妄。

可以斷言，蔡英文若當選，必是「頭過，身不過。」屆時，她不論繼續否認或改口承認「九二共識」，皆將造成台灣的政經浩劫。何況，她若到時候接受了「九二共識」，即是表示她接受了「一個中國」，這正是她自己為「九二共識」釘死的定義，因為她不承認「一中各表」！