Beijing's Response to President Ma's May 20 Speech

Beijing's Response to President Ma's May 20 Speech
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 31, 2012

Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou delivered his inaugural speech ten days ago. Yesterday Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office finally made a formal response. Spokesman Yang Yi was asked about President Ma's "One Republic of China, Two Regions" comment. Yang said that this was Mr. Ma's long held policy position regarding the Mainland. We are not the least bit surprised. Yang was asked whether President Ma's speech would affect follow-up consultations between the two sides. Yang Yi replied bluntly, "It will not."

Full Text below:

President Ma Ying-jeou delivered his inaugural speech ten days ago. Yesterday Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office finally made a formal response. Spokesman Yang Yi was asked about President Ma's "One Republic of China, Two Regions" comment. Yang said that this was Mr. Ma's long held policy position regarding the Mainland. We are not the least bit surprised. Yang was asked whether President Ma's speech would affect follow-up consultations between the two sides. Yang Yi replied bluntly, "It will not."

Yang Yi's remarks were comparatively piecemeal. But a comparison between them and the language of the Wu/Hu Meeting in Beijing, back in March, may give us a clearer picture. One. Beijing opposes Taiwan independence. It recognizes the 1992 consensus. Two. The Ma administration handles cross-Strait relations according to the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Beijing has not responded to this fact directly. But it has acknowledged that it is the Ma administration's "long held policy regarding the Mainland." It has acknowledged that it "has never voiced any objections in the past." Beijing is clearly "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements."

During the March Wu/Hu Meeting Hu Jintao said, "We affirm that (both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of one China). This is consistent with the two sides' legal provisions. It is something the two sides can agree upon." The "two sides' legal provisions" refers of course to the two sides' constitutions. In fact Hu Jintao told the Taiwan side, "Actually this is what your Republic of China Constitution stipulates. This is what you should abide by."

Meanwhile, Wu Poh-hsiung said, "According to the two sides' current systems and relevant legal provisions, the two sides maintain that they are both part of one China." Wu Poh-hsiung then proposed a "one country, two regions" perspective. He qualified his remarks by adding that under the Republic of China Constitution. "one China" has "different interpetations."

This is the first time the two sides have attempted to build political trust at the constitutional level, by referring to their current systems and legal provisions. The Beijing authorities have clearly acknowledged this. Something akin to a peace agreement may be difficult to achieve. Until then the sole basis for stable cross-Strait relations is the Republic of China Constitution, e.g. the "one China Constitution."

Consider President Ma's cross-Strait policy, including his "one Republic of China, two regions" phrasing. Its premise is the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is similarly rooted in the constitutional framework of the Republic of China.

Beijing's response to Taipei's May 20 policy statement can be summed up in two ways. One. Its guiding principle is opposition to Taiwan independence. Opposing Taiwan independence takes precedence over promoting Chinese reunification. As the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office often says, "As long as everyone recognizes one China, all other issues are negotiable." Two. Beijng considers Taipei's cross-Strait policy acceptable. The bottom line is adherence to the Republic of China Constitution, since "this is what Taiwan ought to abide by."

The above analysis is somewhat loose. After all, Beijing did not state its position in quite so explicit terms. But it catches Beijing's drift. It offers new meaning for the three parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. One. Beijing now acknowledges that the Republic of China Constitution stabilizes cross-Strait relations. This is a huge step. Two. The Ma administration included the phrases "one China means the Republic of China," and "one Republic of China, two regions" in Ma's inaugural speech. In short, Ma expressed support for one China, different interpetations "under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China." Beijing does not consider his an obstacle to cross-Strait peaceful development. This represents significant progress in cross-Strait interaction. Three. Yesterday Yang Yi repudiated the DPP's "one country on each side" rhetoric. The DPP can choose to return to its "rectification of names" policy. It can choose to have a showdown with Beijing. Or it can do the smart thing and choose to reaffirm the Republic of China Constitution.

The UDN News uses the "glass theory" to describe the situation. The Republic of China Constitution is the glass. Taiwan is the water. As long as the glass remains, the water is contained within. But once the glass is broken, the water is lost.

Therefore, absent further breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations, the Republic of China Constitution remains the bottom line for the three-parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, the DPP's "rectification of names" is impossible. It cannot ignore the Republic of China Constitution. It must contend with the Republic of China Constitution, as well as objections from Beijing. It must defend Taiwan by defending the Republic of China Constitution. Conversely, Taiwan approaches cross-Strait relations from the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Beijing must accept this. It must accept that for Taiwan "one China, different interpretations" is rooted in the Republic of China Constitution. This too is a line that cannot be easily crossed.

The Taiwan Affairs Office responded to President Ma's May 5 speech. Its response was both aggressive and passive. It was aggressive when it treated the Republic of China Constitution as the bottom line in cross-Strait relations. It was aggressive when it insisted it was "not the least bit surprised" that the Taiwan side predicated its "one China, different interpretations" argument on the Republic of China Constitution, It was aggressive when it adopted a pragmatic stance. It was passive when it avoided referring to the Republic of China Constitution. It was passivve when it avoided calling a spade a spade, and the constitution the constitution. It was not quite willing to say what it was thinking. This may be something we can anticipate in the future.

解讀北京對五二○演說的回應
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.31 01:54 am

馬英九總統發表就職演說後的第十天，北京國台辦昨日終於作出正式回應。發言人楊毅被問及對馬總統所說「一個中華民國，兩個地區」有何評論時表示：這是馬先生自己一貫的大陸政策，我們並不感到意外。又被問及，馬總統的演說會否影響兩岸後續協商？楊毅直截了當地答說：不會。

楊毅昨天的談話比較細碎，不過如將之與北京三月「吳胡會」以來的主要論述作綜合比對，或許能看出比較完整的輪廓。總體的印象是：一、北京仍以反對台獨及認同九二共識為政策主軸；二、對於馬政府「在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係」的立場，北京未直接表示態度；但既認知是馬政府「一貫的大陸政策」，而北京「一貫未表示異議」，可知這是在北京所說「求同存異」的範圍內。

在三月「吳胡會」中，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行現定，應該是雙方都可以做到的」。其中，所謂符合「兩岸現行規定」，即是指符合兩岸現行憲法；亦即，胡錦濤不啻是向台灣方面說：「這其實就是你們中華民國憲法的規定，應該是你們做得到的。」

相對而言，吳伯雄在「吳胡會」說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國」。吳伯雄並因而提出「一國兩區」的觀點，這是在強調：雖是「一個中國」，卻是「各自表述」，根據則在中華民國憲法。

這是兩岸之間首度嘗試以憲法層次（現行體制與規定）來建立政治信任。北京當局顯已認知，在《和平協議》之類的機制不易達成時，唯一可以確定兩岸關係者，即是中華民國憲法，亦即「一中憲法」。

至於馬總統的兩岸政策，包括「一個中華民國，兩個地區」的論述，其脊柱即是「在中華民國憲法架構下」；而「九二共識／一中各表」，也正是建立在「中華民國憲法架構下」。

因而，對五二○後北京的對台政策或許可以作出兩點總結：一、「反對台獨」為最高前提，反獨先於促統；也就是國台辦常說的，「只要認同一個中國，其他問題都可討論」。二、北京對台灣兩岸政策的接受範圍，將以「中華民國憲法」為底線，因為「這應該是台灣做得到的」。

以上的分析，或許略嫌寬鬆（因北京畢竟未明言），但應是勢之所趨，而對兩岸三黨皆有新的意義：一、對北京而言，認知到中華民國憲法是穩定兩岸走向的基本憑藉，這可視為邁出了一大步。二、對馬政府而言，能將「一中，即是中華民國」，及「一個中華民國，兩個地區」明白載入就職演說，亦即以「在中華民國憲法架構下」建立了「一中各表」，而北京認為此一論述無礙兩岸和平發展，這應是兩岸互動的重要進展。三、楊毅昨天否定了一切「一邊一國」的觀點，對民進黨而言，除非再回到「正名制憲」，決志與北京攤牌；否則，回到中華民國憲法的底線，恐是民進黨在兩岸關係上唯一的選擇。

或許可用本報所倡「杯子理論」來形容此一情勢，那就是：中華民國（憲法）是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。

於是：在兩岸關係未有進一步突破前，中華民國憲法，應在兩岸三黨「互為底線」：一方面，民進黨再無「正名制憲」的可能性，亦即絕無突破中華民國底線的機會；必須以中華民國憲法與北京抗衡，並以中華民國憲法來捍衛台灣；反過來說，北京也必須接受台灣方面「在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係」，亦即必須接受台灣以「一中憲法／一中各表」為兩岸政策的底線，不可輕易逾越。

解讀國台辦昨日對馬總統五二○演說的回應，可以見到有其積極的一面，亦可見其消極的一面。積極面是：將中華民國憲法視為維持兩岸關係的底線，也「不意外」台灣方面以中華民國憲法為「一中各表」的根據，此皆是朝務實方向移動。消極面則是：畢竟未能明白稱述中華民國憲法，亦即未能「把黑桃叫做黑桃，把憲法叫做憲法」，心有所指而言不能宣，這或許就要寄望下一階段的發展了。