To Which "One China" do the Two Sides Belong?

To Which "One China" do the Two Sides Belong?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 16, 2012

Summary: On May 20, President Ma Ying-jeou will deliver his inaugural speech. What will he say about cross-Strait policy? The question has everyone on tenterhooks. Beijing has been dropping hints. Apparently it hopes to go beyond the 1992 consensus. It wants to emphasize that "the two sides are both part of one China." The 1992 consensus implies that "the two sides are both part of one China." But it does so with qualifications. Now is not the time for the two sides to deal with such a major issue. The issue should remain within the framework of the 1992 consensus. It is unnecessary to reframe the issue as "the two sides are part of one China."

Full Text below:

On May 20, President Ma Ying-jeou will deliver his inaugural speech. What will he say about cross-Strait policy? The question has everyone on tenterhooks.

Beijing has been dropping hints. Apparently it hopes to go beyond the 1992 consensus. It wants to emphasize that "the two sides are both part of one China." The 1992 consensus implies that "the two sides are both part of one China." But it does so with qualifications. Now is not the time for the two sides to deal with such a major issue. The issue should remain within the framework of the 1992 consensus. It is unnecessary to reframe the issue as "the two sides are part of one China."

During the 2012 presidential election, the chief topic of cross-Strait debate was the 1992 consensus. The DPP rejected the premise and went down in defeat. Now the DPP is looking ahead to the 2016 presidential election. But it remains reluctant to reverse itself. It remains unwilling to accept the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." It is attempting to arrive at its own framework for cross-Strait relations. One example is Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations."

Frank Hsieh is attempting to substitue "different constitutional interpretations" for "one China, different interpretations." But "one China, different interpretations" includes "different constitutional interpretations." Therefore advocating "different constitutional interpretations" does not supersede "one China, different interpretations." The KMT is not about to set aside the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations" during the run up to the 2016 election, merely to go along with the DPP's "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." Beijing is not about to let the DPP define the cross-Strait relationship. Therefore if the framework for cross-Strait relations does not change over the next four years, the question will still be: "Do you accept the 1992 consensus?" Why? Because this question impacts all three political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and their ability to set the agenda.

When referring to the 1992 consensus, Taipei emphasizes "one China, different interpretations." Beijing emphasizes "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." Alas, both positions still smack of "you are you and I am me" attitudes. That is why Beijing hopes to take one more step forward. It wants to stress that "the two sides are both part of one China." Its position is understandable. But the current positions involve the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," and "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." Changing that to "the two sides are both part of one China" would immediately touch off a controversy. If the two sides are both part of one China, just exactly which China are they a part of?

If one remains within the framework of the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements," these problems can be set aside and not discussed. But if one insists that "the two sides are both part of one China," the question immediately arises, which side are they a part of?

Beijing is unlikely to insist that both sides are part of one China, i.e. that both sides are part of the People's Republic of China. Such a statement would be too unrealistic, too far off the mark, and anger the public on Taiwan. Can someone turn Taiwan into part of the Peoples Republic of China merely by declaring it so? Since the "two sides are not part of the People's Republic of China," why not reaffirm the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," and "seeking agreement while shelving disagreements?" The 1992 consensus is also predicated upon one China. The only qualification is that the two sides hold "different interpretations" while seeking common ground and shelving disagreements."

In fact, the framework for cross-Strait relations can move toward "the two sides are both part of one China." We merely need to define "one China" as a "big roof" covering both sides. If "one China" is this "big roof," then the two sides are adjacent rooms under the "big roof." This would establish a new framework for cross-Strait relations.

On New Year's Eve 2008, Hu Jintao announced his "Hu Six Points." He said, "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified. the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China, This fact remains unchanged." The "one China" he referred to was the "big roof." Hu said that before the nation is reunified, the two sides can maintain "cross-Strait political relations under the special circumstances," and expand pragmatic dialogue. The special circumstances that Hu referred to is the special relationship between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. Here is where the "big roof" gives us more room to maneuver.

Over the next four years, under the "big roof," the two sides may be able to sign a peace agreement or cross-strait confidence building framework agreement (CBFA). This would transform the framework for cross-Strait relations. This would enable the two sides to declare that they are both part of one China. In the event this proves impossible, the two sides should adhere to the 1992 consensus, to "one China, different interpretations," and to "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." They should not overvalue rhetorical flourishes. The relationship between the three parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must not be upset and thrown into chaos.

Over the next four years, we can expect the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpetations" to gradually improve relations. This will honor the two sides' desire for "different interpetations." This will enable the two sides to "seek common ground while shelving disagreement," thereby enabling both sides to proclaim that they are both part of one China. Concepts such as "one country, two regions" and "different constitutional interpetations" should be subsumed under the 1992 consensus. The definition of one China still requires "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." It is inadvisable to provoke controversy over "just exactly which China are we talking about?"

If the two sides can establish a "big roof" and an "interim agreement," that may enable the two sides to create an even more desirable cross-Strait framework.
               
兩岸同屬哪一個「中國」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.16 02:22 am

馬英九總統五二○就職演說將對兩岸政策作何宣示，極受矚目。

北 京方面不斷釋出的訊息顯示，似乎希望能超越「九二共識」的層次，將兩岸論述的落點置於「兩岸同屬一個中國」。然而，雖然「九二共識」其實已包涵了「兩岸同 屬一個中國」的潛台詞，但畢竟在邏輯上仍隔了一層；我們認為，現在並不是改換兩岸論述主命題的時機，仍應留在「九二共識」的層次，不必變換到「兩岸同屬一 個中國」。

二○一二總統大選的兩岸論述主命題是「九二共識」，民進黨因拒絕此項主命題而挫敗；現在，民進黨面對二○一六總統大選，似仍不肯回過頭來接受「九二共識／一中各表」，因而正嘗試另外建立兩岸論述的主命題，如謝長廷的「憲法共識／憲法各表」即是。

問 題是：謝長廷欲以「憲法各表」取代「一中各表」；但是，「一中各表」其實包含了「憲法各表」，則既主張「憲法各表」，何以否定「一中各表」？因此，至二○ 一六年大選，國民黨屆時似無可能擱下「九二共識／一中各表」，去跟隨「憲法共識／憲法各表」，北京亦不可能將兩岸主命題的定義權交給民進黨。因而，倘若未 來四年間，兩岸論述沒有更進一步的發展或定調，「接不接受九二共識」，應當仍是不變的主命題，因為這牽涉到兩岸三黨在話語權的主導權。

然 而，「九二共識」，台灣強調「一中各表」，大陸主張「求同存異」；這仍是一個「你是你，我是我」的態勢，因而，北京希望能夠向前邁一步，改換成「兩岸同屬 一個中國」的主命題，亦屬可以理解。但是，如果要從「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」的主命題，變換至「兩岸同屬一個中國」，立即觸發的爭議是：兩岸同屬 一個中國，究竟是指哪一個「中國」？

也就是說，如果停留在「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」的層次，此一問題或可置而不論，但若要進入「兩岸同屬一個中國」的層次，則立即浮現的問題將是：究竟是指哪一個中國？

北 京大概不會說：兩岸同屬一個中國，就是兩岸同屬中華人民共和國。因為，這種說法不實際，太離譜，且必會惹怒了台灣人；畢竟，誰能只憑一個說法，就把台灣說 成是中華人民共和國的？於是，既然不是「兩岸同屬中華人民共和國」，則何不回到「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」？因為，「九二共識」也是「一個中國」， 只是「各自表述／求同存異」罷了。

其實，兩岸主命題亦不無可能推至「兩岸同屬一個中國」，只要能界定這「一個中國」是「屋頂中國」即可。如果「一個中國」是「屋頂中國」，兩岸則是「同屬一個中國」的兩間「房間」，新的主命題即告建立。

胡 錦濤在二○○八年除夕發表的「胡六點」指出，「雖然兩岸尚未統一，但大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實並未改變」，此處所言「一個中國」，應當即是「屋頂中 國」；而胡錦濤又說，「兩岸可以就國家統一前的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實的探討」，此處所指「特殊情況下的特殊關係」，當然即是指「中華民國與中華人 民共和國的特殊情況下的政治關係」，此間亦有「屋頂中國」的想像空間。

我們認為，未來四年，兩岸倘能在「屋頂中國」 的概念下，簽定《和平協議》或《兩岸信任架構協議》（ＣＢＦＡ），即可變換採用「兩岸同屬一個中國」的主命題；倘若不能，則仍宜停留在「九二共識／一中各 表／求同存異」的階段，不要貪逞口舌之快，而使兩岸三黨的主命題再度陷於失衡失焦的亂局。

目前可以預期的是，「九二 共識／一中各表」在未來四年應可愈加友善化，「各表」的尊嚴得以維繫，「一中」則在求同存異中成為穩定默契；「一國兩區」、「憲法各表」等議論，皆應回歸 到「九二共識」尋求解答。在「一中」的定義尚在「存異各表」之際，不宜惹出「究竟是哪一個中國？」的爭議。

當然，若能建立「屋頂中國／中程方案」的架構，那將確是兩岸關係更加可欲的新的主命題。