May 20 Speech and Cross-Strait Three Party Interaction

May 20 Speech and Cross-Strait Three Party Interaction
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2012

Summary: The two sides have fallen back on "existing systems and legal provisions," i.e., their constitutions, to define the cross-Strait relationship. But this does not resolve all problems pertaining to "one China." This is why President Ma has yet to utter the words, "both sides are part of one China." Instead, he says that people on both sides are part of the Chinese nation. That is because "one China" still requires "different interpretations." If the two sides wish to proceed, they should reach an "interim agreement" based on a "big roof."

Full Text below:

President Ma Ying-jeou's second term inaugural speech contained about 6000 words. The portion addressing cross-Strait issues was based on a "national security iron triangle" and contained over 2000 words. It was the most anticipated part of the speech. It was the portion on which he expended the most ink.

President Ma's position on cross-Strait issues remains largely unchanged from what it was in 2008, when he delivered his first term inaugural speech. As we can see, his framework is right and it works. But certain addenda have already resulted in fresh controversies.

For four years, one thing has been consistent. As Ma noted, "Ying-jeou solemnly points out that the Constitution of the Republic of China is the government's final arbiter vis a vis cross-Strait relations. Cross-strait policy must adhere to the framework of the ROC Constitution. It must maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, i.e., "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must be based on the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, It must promote cross-Strait peace and development." This framework has become a three-way understanding between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing. It withstood the acid test of the 2012 presidential election. It is right and it works.

The addenda states that "According to the constitution, the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of China includes both Taiwan and the Mainland. The government's current jurisdiction however, covers only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." In other words, for the past two decades the constitution's position vis a vis the cross-Strait situation is "one Republic of China, two regions." Over the past two months the portion pertaining to "one country, two regions" became a point of contention. The public also wondered whether President Ma would say "both sides are part of one China." Instead, President Ma said "People on both sides of the Strait are part of the Chinese nation." But this too became a point of contention.

The source of the controversy was the "Wu-Hu meeting" in March. Hu Jintao said, "We affirm that (the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China). This is consistent with existing legal provisions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is something both sides consider doable." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "The two sides' existing systems and legal provisions affirm that they are both "part of one China." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "Taiwan's existing legal provisions (i.e., the Statute Governing Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region) is the legal basis for "one country, two regions." The relationship between the two sides is not a state-to-state relation. It is a special type of relationship."

Did President Ma's inaugural speech have any connection to the Wu Hu Meeting? That remains unknown. It is possible Beijing saw the cross-Strait situation as volatile and unpredictable. It wanted a to characterize the cross-Strait relationship in a new way. it wanted to say, "Both two sides are part of one China." But the Ma administration may have been wary of the "one China" portion. It responded by "reaffirming the Constitution of the Republic of China," It reaffirmed that "one country, two regions" was part of the Constitution of the Republic of China.

The Ma administration's response was reasonable. Article 11 of the Amended Constitution "responds to the need for national unity." It refers to the "Free Region" and the "Mainland Region." It refers to the "Statute Governing Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region." It renames the regions the "Taiwan Region" and the "Mainland Region." Without such a legal basis, we could not have "Taiwan Compatriot Permits" and "Mainland Compatriot Permits." The two sides would have no basis by which to interact. President Ma said "For two decades the constitution has defined the cross-Strait situation as "one Republic of China, two regions," We have elected three presidents during that time. But that legal provision has never changed." This is absolutely correct.

But three political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are competing for power. This "new framework" could have either positive or negative consequences. Consider one negative consequence. Actually this "new framework" is part of the old legal framework. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is well established. It is a stable and workable framework. Adding "one country, two regions" to it is gilding the lily. It could lead to new disputes. The past two months confirm this.

Now consider a positive consequence. As mentioned above, the Wu Hu Meeting said both sides were part of "one China." The basis for this was the two sides' "existing systems and legal provisions." The "existing systems and legal provisions" are the two sides' ' constitutions. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "One country, two regions is the underlying legal basis for cross-Strait relations, one that both sides have long supported." Can Beijing support the Republic of China's "one China Constitution?" Can it lean this way? Can it modify its "one China, different interpretations" policy? If it can, we anticipate positive consequences.

The DPP must handle this situation carefully. Four years ago it mindlessly opposed ECFA. Ultimately it merely painted itself into a corner. This is a matter of record. Today the DPP is apparently licking its chops over "one country, two regions." Apparently it thinks this provides an escape clause from the 1992 consensus. It has latched onto "one country, two regions" and refuses to let go. But "one country, two regions" merely revisits the debate over the constitution. Frank Hsieh is itching to pontificate about the "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." But if one repudiates "one country, two regions" how can one maintain the constitutional framework for the "Taiwan Compatriot Permits" and "Mainlander Compatriot Permits?" No wonder Su Tseng-chang ridiculed Frank Hsieh's theory, calling it a "Kuomintang knock-off." Su said they must conduct themselves as a "genuine Democratic Progressive Party." But how can the DPP hide behind the Constitution of the Republic of China? After all, they want to dismember the Constitution of the Republic of China. How can this possibly offer them a way out?

As we see it, "one country, two regions" is merely another way to reaffirm the constitutional basis for "one China, different interpretations." But the more one reaffirms this constitutional basis, the more one ratchets up social and psychological pressure, and the more likely one will have to confront the problem. One country, two regions means reaffirming the Constitution of the Republic of China. It means using it to define the cross-Strait relationship. This of course is much better that allowing Beijing to define it unilaterally. Hence the reaffirmation of the constitution and "one country, two regions." Agreement concerning the constitution may facilitate mutual trust. The DPP should capitalize on the trend, and not proceed down a blind alley.

The DPP hopes to repudiate "one country, two regions." This is nothing less than repudiating the constitution. Beijing calls it "mulish Taiwan independence." The DPP opposes US beef imports. Washington could choose to see this as a vendetta. The DPP should remember its painful experience with ECFA. It condemned it as "selling out Taiwan and pandering to [Mainland] China." But eventually it was compelled to "accept it in toto." The DPP should not seek short term advantage, only to find itself in a blind alley.

The two sides have fallen back on "existing systems and legal provisions," i.e., their constitutions. to define the cross-Strait relationship. But this does not resolve all problems pertaining to "one China." This is why President Ma has yet to utter the words, "both sides are part of one China." Instead, he says that people on both sides are part of the Chinese nation. That is because "one China" still requires "different interpretations." If the two sides wish to proceed, they should reach an "interim agreement" based on a "big roof."

從520演說看兩岸三黨互動
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.21

馬英九總統的連任就職演說，全文約六千字，其中涉及兩岸議題部分，以「國家安全鐵三角」為主框架，超過二千字；這是最受各界矚目的部分，也是演說著墨最重的部分。

馬總統對兩岸議題的論述，大體上仍維持其在二○○八年首任就職演說的架構，可證此一架構之正確與有效；但也有新的引申的部分，卻已形成了新的爭議。

四年來維持一貫的部分是：「英九要在此鄭重指出：中華民國憲法是政府處理兩岸關係的最高指導原則；兩岸政策必須在中華民國憲法架構下，維持臺海『不統、不獨、不武』的現狀，在『九二共識、一中各表』的基礎上，推動兩岸和平發展。」此一架構，如今已成台美中三方的共識或默契，並已經歷二○一二年總統大選的考驗，可謂正確與有效。

至於引申的部分則是：「依據憲法，中華民國領土主權涵蓋臺灣與大陸，目前政府的統治權僅及於臺、澎、金、馬。換言之，二十年來兩岸的憲法定位就是『一個中華民國，兩個地區』。」此段論述，即是所謂的「一國兩區」，已成近兩個月來政治爭議的焦點。另外，各界關注馬總統會不會說出「兩岸同屬一中」，則在演說中馬總統說了「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」，亦是一個爭議。

事情的源頭來自三月間的「吳胡會」。當時，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行規定，應該是雙方都可以做到的。」吳伯雄說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國。」吳伯雄並說：「台灣現行的《兩岸人民關係條例》，即是以『一國兩區』為法理基礎的，兩岸並非國與國的關係，而是特殊的關係。」

馬總統在就職演說的相關表述，與吳胡會之間有何關連，尚不得而知。可能的情況是：北京鑒於兩岸情勢的變數莫測，希望提出兩岸論述新的主命題「兩岸同屬一中」；但馬政府對「一中」的定義有所疑忌，因而以「回歸中華民國憲法」作為回應，而「一國兩區」即是中華民國憲法的法理架構。

馬政府的此一應對，至目前看來，應屬合理。因為，依據「為因應國家統一前需要」而頒定的增修憲法第十一條，即稱「自由地區」與「大陸地區」，至《兩岸人民關係條例》，則改稱「台灣地區」及「大陸地區」；若無此一法理基礎，就根本不會有「台胞證」與「陸胞證」，則兩岸一切交流互動即失根據。因而，馬總統說：「二十年來兩岸的憲法定位即是『一個中華民國，兩個地區』，歷經三位總統，從未改變。」此說無錯，此理無誤。

然而，在兩岸三黨的競合架構中，這個新的論述架構（其實是原本即在法理體系中）卻可能引致正負兩向的發展。可能的負向發展是：「九二共識，一中各表」已是一個相當成熟、穩定且有效的架構，如今加上了畫蛇添足的「一國兩區」，即可能引發新的爭議與衝突；近兩個月來的擾攘，便是印證。

可能的正向發展則是：如前所述，吳胡會中，兩岸皆稱「一個中國」，是根據雙方現行之體制與規定；而所謂「現行體制與規定」即是指各自的憲法。國台辦主任王毅且說：「一國兩區是長期以來台灣在法律層面對兩岸關係所持的基本態度。」倘若北京對中華民國的「一中憲法」能持此見解，並朝此一方向調整「一中存異各表」的政策，應當可作正向期待。

民進黨處此情勢，必須謹慎因應。四年前魯莽反對ＥＣＦＡ，最後落至作繭自縛，可為殷鑑。目前所見，民進黨似對「一國兩區」見獵心喜，彷彿認為這是從「九二共識」脫困的出路，對著「一國兩區」狂追猛打。但是，「一國兩區」最後必將回到「憲法之辯（辨）」；如謝長廷等正擬以「憲法共識／憲法各表」為轉型槓桿，倘若否定「一國兩區」，將如何維持由「台胞證」與「陸胞證」所支撐的憲法架構？難怪謝長廷的理論被蘇貞昌暗譏為「山寨版的國民黨」，而謂應當作「正港的民進黨」。試問，民進黨若又想托庇於中華民國憲法，卻又要切割支解中華民國憲法，豈有生路可言？

我們認為，「一國兩區」其實是「一中各表」更加深入憲法法理的一種表達形態。當然，愈深入憲法法理，愈會形成社會的心理壓力，卻也是面對問題的契機。因為，如果「一國兩區」意味著回歸至中華民國憲法來界定兩岸關係的定位，當然比由北京片面去決定要好得多。因而，回歸憲法的「一國兩區」表述，潛藏著兩岸有可能在相互認知的憲法層次去建立互信的機制，民進黨應當因勢利導，不要自絕出路。

民進黨否定「一國兩區」，不啻自我否定憲法架構，已被北京指為「頑固台獨」；而其反美牛的姿態，亦極可能被美國視為「世仇」。民進黨應記取由「ＥＣＦＡ親中賣台」至「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」的慘痛經歷，不要逞一時之快，又將自己逼進一條無尾巷。

不過，兩岸各依「現行體制及規定」（即憲法）所界定的兩岸關係，並不能解決「一個中國」的疑義；這也應是馬總統未言「兩岸同屬一中」，而只說「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」的理由，因為，「一中」仍在「存異各表」狀態。我們的建議是：兩岸若要平穩走下去，仍應當有一「屋頂中國」的「中程方案」。