Diaoyutai Island and South China Sea Fishing Rights Impact Cross-Strait Sovereignty

Diaoyutai Island and South China Sea Fishing Rights Impact Cross-Strait Sovereignty
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2013

Summary: Taipei and Beijing may have disputes over sovereignty. But they do not affect the two sides' joint assertions of sovereignty relative to Tokyo and Manila. The two sides must attend to the people's concerns about their livelihood. The issue of sovereignty between the two sides is something that should be tackled in order, easy things first, difficult things last. The Diaoyutai Island and South China Sea sovereignty issues impact cross-Strait sovereignty. All the more reason to use the Big Roof Concept of China to combine and unify cross-Strait sovereignty.

Full Text below:

On May 10, every newspaper headline on Taiwan was about the Philippines ocean surveillance ship shooting and killing Taiwanese fishermen Hong Shi-cheng. But before the presses started rolling, over 50 Taiwanese fishing vessels were already waiting outside Diaoyutai Island waters. They were waiting for the stroke of midnight, when the "Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement" would go into effect for the very first time. They were anchored outside these fishing grounds, which the Japanese only recently termed off-limits.

It is currently the fishing season. Had the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement not gone into effect, clashes around the island would be inevitable. Finally, a problem in the East China Sea has been resolved. Sadly, blood has simultaneously been shed in the South China Sea. Fishing rights disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea are linked. Taipei and Beijing are also linked as a result of these disputes. For the two sides of the Strait, the South China Sea issue may develop along similar lines as the Diaoyutai Islands issue.

Consider the interests of the Japanese. Last summer Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara was the trouble-maker. He raised money to "purchase" the Diaoyutai Islands. He pressured the Yoshihiko Noda Cabinet to "nationalize" the Diaoyutai Islands. This resulted in Mainland Chinese aircraft and ships routinely cruising the territorial waters and airspace of the Diaoyutai Islands, and reaffirming that the islands belong to China. This shattered Japan's alleged "effective control." Therefore, the immediate perception in Japan, was that Tokyo must act decisively to allow Taiwanese fishing vessels to enter the so-called "exclusive economic zone." Otherwise, Mainland ships escorting Taiwanese fishing vessels would become the norm. The situation would then be even harder to deal with. As a result, Taipei seized the opportunity to sign the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.

The Philippines openly shot and killed someone. This brought the two sides together once more. In fact, the South China Sea conflict between Beijing and Manila, is a hundred times more serious than the fisheries dispute between Taipei and Manila. Aircraft and ships from the two sides have clashed repeatedly and exchanged fire. In 2003, during a "naval battle" of sorts, the Mainland side sank six Philippine ships, and the Philippines hit five Mainland ships. Beijing's official media outlet, the Global Times, interpreted the Philippine killings as "The Philippines taking out their anger on Taiwan." It wrote that the Philippines showed their will and determination by strafing the Taiwanese fishing vessel, in an effort to strengthen its bargaining position in talks with the Mainland." The newspaper suggested that Beijing should "act alone" to demonstrate solidarity with Taiwan.

In fact, Beijing's actions in response to the "Kuang Ta Hsing 28 Incident" were unavoidable. Given Mainland China's definition of sovereignty, Beijing must interpret the Philippines atrocites against Taiwanese fishing vessels as if they were directed at itself. One. Classifying the Taiwanese fishing vessel murder as an offense against itself provides Beijing with an extra bargaining chip with the Philippines in the South China Sea. Two. Showing solidarity with Taiwanese fishing vessels, increases goodwill from the people of Taiwan. Beijing's intervention and expression of solidarity inspires a sense of shared interests and destiny. Three. Widening the conflict between Beijing and Manila in the South China Sea forces Manila to deal with more variables.

The Philippines killed a man, drawing Beijing into the dispute. Is Washington willing to see Beijing and Taipei join forces against Manila in this dispute? If not, it should encourage Taipei and Manila to reach a fisheries agreement. The Taipei vs. Manila fisheries dispute could then be resolved according to the Diaoyutai Islands model. This could become a trend. Manila can reduce the number of variables if faces and narrow the scope of the conflict. It can prevent the two sides from joining hands. It can reach a special fisheries agreement with Taipei.

Some people say that by signing the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, Taiwan undermined its sovereignty over the islands and shattered the implicit cross-Strait defense of sovereignty. Some on Taiwan are excoriating the Ma administration. Mainland netizens are claling Ma Ying-jeou a "traitor." But this is clearly not Beijing's view. When the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement was signed, the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office said, "Both sides share responsibility for maintaining the fishing rights and interests of fishermen regarding traditional fishing grounds."

What is "sovereignty?" Japan claims it has "nationalized" the Diaoyutai Islands. But it does not dare station government officials on the island. Beijing regularly patrols Diaoyutai Islands with ships and aircraft. But it has yet to occupy it. Taipei claims that the Diaoyutai Islands are its "long established territory." But it watches meekly from the sidelines as ships dispatched by Beijing and Tokyo venture into its "territorial waters." Must Taiwan fishermen wait until Taipei, Beijing, or Tokyo actually seize the Diaoyutai Islands before asserting their fishing rights? Isn't that an outrageous argument? The outcome of the tripartite sovereignty dispute is uncertain. But the two sides can jointly safeguard the interests of fishermen. The two sides can make a meaningful humanitarian and economic contribution. The government of the Republic of China must uphold its sovereignty claims without losing its sense of proportion.

Beijing's Global Times editorials are worthy of attention. The newspaper repeatedly said that "The Mainland need not rush to pursue cross-strait cooperation over the issue of sovereignty, as doing so could backfire." Taipei and Beijing may have disputes over sovereignty. But they do not affect the two sides' joint assertions of sovereignty relative to Tokyo and Manila. The two sides must attend to the people's concerns about their livelihood. The issue of sovereignty between the two sides is something that should be tackled in order, easy things first, difficult things last.

In short, the Diaoyutai Island and South China Sea sovereignty issues impact cross-Strait sovereignty. All the more reason to use the Big Roof Concept of China to combine and unify cross-Strait sovereignty.

從釣島南海漁權衝突談兩岸主權立場
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.14 02:16 am

五月十日，台灣所有日報的頭條新聞是菲律賓海監船槍殺台灣漁民洪石成事件；然而，就在各家印報機器尚未啟動前，五十餘艘台灣漁船已守候在釣魚台周邊海域外圍，正等待著午夜零時《台日漁業協定》生效的第一時間到來，一同起錨進入前此被日本視為禁區的釣島漁場作業。

時序已經進入漁季。如果不是《台日漁業協定》生效，釣島周邊不免爆發漁作糾紛；如今好不容易東海的難題解決了，南海周邊卻又發生流血事件。跡象顯示，東海與南海的漁作糾紛已經連成一氣，台灣與大陸也已經綁在一起；對於台海兩岸來說，南海問題不無可能在某種程度上比照「釣島模式」發展下去。

就日本的利益言，去年夏天的東京都知事石原慎太郎是敗家子。他募款購買釣魚台的動作，迫生了野田佳彥內閣的「國有化」，因而引致中國大陸的飛機船艦以「巡弋中國釣島領海領空」為常態，日本的「實效管理」遂告破功。因此，日本立即感知，倘若不果斷開放台灣漁船進入其所謂的「專屬經濟海域」，未來一旦形成中國大陸船艦護衛台灣漁船的態勢，局面將難以收拾。於是，台北方面把握了借力使力的良機，《台日漁業協定》遂應運而生。

如今，菲律賓公然開槍殺人，儼然又將兩岸連在一起。其實，北京與菲律賓之間的南海衝突，較諸台菲漁業糾紛嚴重百倍；兩方幾度出現飛機艦艇對峙或交火的場面，甚至在二○○三的「海戰」中，中方曾擊沉菲艦六艘，菲亦重創中艦五艘。因此，北京官媒《環球時報》在第一時間，即將菲律賓殺人事件延伸解釋為「（菲）把憋的氣撒到台灣頭上」，「通過掃射台灣漁船顯示其意志和決心，強化針對中國大陸的談判地位」；因而該報建議，中方應採「單獨行動」，聲援台灣。

其實，這些針對「廣大興二十八號事件」的反應，皆是北京「不得不」採取的動作。因為，根據中國大陸的「主權觀點」，北京「必須」視菲律賓對台灣漁船的暴行，等同對於北京的開釁。第一，將台灣漁船血案一併計入，可以增加北京對菲律賓在南海算賬的籌碼。第二，聲援台灣漁船，引發台灣人民的好感，並對北京的介入與聲援逐漸產生一種「認命感」。第三，拉大北京與菲律賓在南海的衝突場域，使菲國面對更多的變數。

菲律賓殺了人，把北京引入這場糾紛；美國若不願見北京與台北在台菲衝突中「聯手」，即可能促使台菲達成漁業協議。於是，台菲漁業糾紛，就有了循「釣島模式」發展的可能性。勢若趨此，菲方不無可能為縮減衝突的變數與場域，並切斷兩岸聯手，與台灣達成特定條件的漁業談判。

有人指《台日漁業協定》是台灣未堅守主權原則而破壞了「兩岸聯手護主權」的默契；在台灣有人以此猛批馬政府，在大陸甚至有網民指馬英九為「漢奸」。但是，這卻顯然不是北京當局的觀點與境界；在《台日漁業協定》簽定時，國台辦的評論是：「維護兩岸漁民在這一傳統漁場的漁業權益，是兩岸雙方的責任所在。」

什麼叫做「主權」？至今日本雖將釣島「國有化」，也不敢「派公務員駐島」；北京三不五時出動飛機船艦巡弋釣島，亦未奪下釣魚台；台灣也宣稱釣魚台是「固有領土」，卻眼睜睜看著北京與日本的船艦在自己的「領海」上尬來尬去。如此，難道要台灣漁民等到台、陸、日的一方奪下了釣魚台，才能再論釣島海域的漁權？這是何等豈有此理的論調？如今，在三方主權爭議未定之際，兩岸但凡能「共同維護漁民權益」，即是兩岸共同實現了最大的人道與民生成就，中華民國政府只要持守一個「主權在我」的主張即不失分寸。

關於這一點，北京《環球時報》的幾篇評論值得重視。該報反覆主張：「大陸不應急於追求兩岸在維護主權問題上的合作，這樣可能會事與願違。」由此可知，台灣與大陸雖在「主權」上仍有爭議，但無礙兩岸各自及共同對日菲主張「主權」；此時此際，兩岸首要共同珍惜的是民生與民心，相對於此，「主權」在兩岸之間畢竟仍是一個「先易後難」的議題。

最後可附一筆：從釣島及南海情勢看兩岸主權立場，更有理由朝向「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個大屋頂中國」邁進。