Does Taiwan Independence Still Have a Market?

Does Taiwan Independence Still Have a Market? 
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
May 7, 2013

Summary: Consider Taiwan independence from an ideological perspective. One can understand its emotional appeal. One may even sympathize those who yearn for it. But decades of hard reality have shown that Taiwan independence is infeasible as a survival strategy. Therefore Taiwan independence ideology is now merely for Green Camp "domestic consumption." This is hardly surprising. The political usefulness of Taiwan independence ideology has steadily declined. This much is evident. Given the degree of decline, one can conclude that Taiwan independence ideology, at the international, cross-Strait, and domestic level, is expired goods. It should be taken off the shelves and returned to the manufacturer.

Full Text below:

Does Taiwan independence still have a market? That depends on one's interpretation.

Frank Hsieh says, "The DPP's cross-Strait policy has been a failure." Yao Jen-to says, "The time when the majority of the public can be persuaded that Taiwan independence is possible is over." This suggests that "Taiwan independence no longer has a market." But Yao Chia-wen, Yu Shyi-kun, Annette Lu and others have established an "Anti-One China Uphold Sovereignty Connection." They specifically cite Frank Hsieh's "Different Constitutional Interpretations" as the thing they oppose. This suggests that for some, "Taiwan independence does indeed have a market."

The political marketplace is dynamic. It experiences ups and downs. It undergoes growth and decline. The market for Taiwan independence has not completely dried up. In 1991, over 20 years ago, the DPP enacted its "Taiwan independence Party Platform." Since then the market for Taiwan independence has undergone major changes. The market has sharply declined. This much is obvious. Taiwan independence can be viewed from two perspectives. One, the content of Taiwan independence ideology, and two, its political usefulness.

First consider the content of Taiwan independence ideology, and the changes it has undergone as it has declined. One. The DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" called for the "establishment of a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan." This has vanished from the political marketplace. The Chen Shui-bian administration ruled for eight years. During that time it pandered to Taiwan independence sentiments with such gimmicks as the "rectification of names" and "normalization." But these were phony issues, which have since become dead issues. One by one, such demands have vanished from the political marketplace. Two. The content of Taiwan independence ideology has changed. It has declined. It has changed to "support for Taiwan's primacy." It has changed to "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. Its current name is the Republic of China" This formulation is known as "backdoor listing." Frank Hsieh advocates "different Constitutional interpretations." Yao Jen-to advocates changing "the founding of a nation" to "the establishment of diplomatic relations." In fact, both are forms of "backdoor listing." Both can be regarded as a "variant of Taiwan independence." This shows that the content of Taiwan independence ideology has changed. It has declined.

Now take the political usefulness of Taiwan independence ideology. Its political usefulness has changed as it declined. The political usefulness of Taiwan independence ideology can be divided into three types, or three stages. One. Taiwan independence ideology was useful as a means of opposing the Republic of China. For instance, the DPP used to refuse to publicly swear allegiance in front of the portrait of Sun Yat-sen. They characterized the Republic of China as a "foreign regime." Taiwan independence is no longer as politically useful as it once was in this way. During the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen conceded that the "Republic of China was not a foreign regime." Two. Taiwan independence was useful in opposing the People's Republic of China or in supporting "de-Sinicization." But it is rapidly becoming less useful in this matter. For example, during the 2012 general election the DPP unconditionally accepted ECFA, which it had previously denounced as "pandering to [Mainland] China, selling out Taiwan, forfeiting sovereignty and humiliating the nation." Nevertheless it lost the election over the 1992 Consensus and "one China, different interpretations." Today Yao Jen-to has pointed out the DPP's cross-Strait dilemma. It is unable to offer a viable alternative to the 1992 Consensus. Also, Taiwan independence opposes the People's Republic of China. During the Cold War, there may have been a few buyers in the international political marketplace. But this is currently undergoing rapid change. Three. Taiwan independence ideology is politically useful in a third way, as an instrument for infighting within the DPP. As we can see, The political usefulness of Taiwan independence ideology has sharply declined. It is now nothing more than a justification for Yu Hsi-kun's "Anti-one China, Defend Sovereignty Connection." It is nothing more than fodder by which Yu Hsi-kun can blast Frank Hsieh's "different constitutional interpretations." It has become a political football tossed back and forth between Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang in the run-up to the 2016 general election. It has become a pretext by which Green Camp Taiwan independence advocates can accuse Yao Jen-to of being "pro-unification" and a "traitor to Taiwan." It has even become fodder within the Green Camp for infighting between "pro-Chen" and "anti-Chen" factions.

Consider the changes in the content of Taiwan independence ideology. Consider its decline. The content has changed, from "Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation" to "backdoor listing." Examples include Frank Hsieh, Yao Jen-to and other "Taiwan independence advocates." They wish to maintain "Taiwan's primacy," They realize they must invoke the Constitution of the Republic of China, and champion "different constitutional interpretations." They realize they must build upon the political framework of the Republic of China. They realize they must advocate something akin to the "Free Person's Declaration." They realize they have no alternative. But "backdoor listing" does not get to the root of the problem. The real solution in what this newspaper advocates, the "Glass Theory." Taiwan is the water. The Republic of China is the glass. As long as the glass remains, the water is contained within it. Once the glass is shattered, the water spills out and is lost.

The political usefulness of Taiwan independence has changed. It has declined. The political usefulness of "Taiwan independence" in the market of international politics and domestic politics has changed. It has declined. Frank Hsieh says "Taiwan independence is directed against the KMT. It is not directed against the Chinese Communist Party." Today Yao Jen-to thinks "Taiwan independence" cannot replace the 1992 consensus. This means Taiwan independence ideology is no longer effective against the KMT. The political usefulness of Taiwan independence ideology has declined. It is now something that works only against Green Camp rivals inside the DPP. It has become nothing more than fodder for vicious infighting over ideological paths and political offices. Henceforth Taiwan independence ideology will merely be a pretext which DPP insiders invoke while battling each other, jockeying for position, and selling the public a bill of goods. Taiwan It provides the DPP with fodder for intraparty infighting. But does Taiwan independence ideology still have any market at the international, cross-Strait, and domestic levels?

Consider Taiwan independence from an ideological perspective. One can understand its emotional appeal. One may even sympathize those who yearn for it. But decades of hard reality have shown that Taiwan independence is infeasible as a survival strategy. Therefore Taiwan independence ideology is now merely for Green Camp "domestic consumption." This is hardly surprising. The political usefulness of Taiwan independence ideology has steadily declined. This much is evident. Given the degree of decline, one can conclude that Taiwan independence ideology, at the international, cross-Strait, and domestic level, is expired goods. It should be taken off the shelves and returned to the manufacturer.

台獨是否已無市場
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.07

台獨是否已無市場？這要看怎麼說。

一方面，謝長廷說「民進黨過去兩岸政策失敗」、姚人多稱「說服大多數人民相信可以獨立的時代已經過去了」，這似乎認為「台獨已無市場」；但是，姚嘉文、游錫堃、呂秀蓮等甫又成立「反一中顧主權連線」，並指名是針對謝長廷的「憲法各表」，這卻似又顯示對某些人而言「台獨仍有市場」。

政治市場是一個動態的概念，有榮枯消長；台獨市場不可能完全消失，但自一九九一年民進黨《台獨黨綱》頒行二十餘年以來，台獨市場在買賣雙方皆已出現重大的變化與退化，卻是有目共睹的事實。這可從台獨的內涵與功能兩方面來說：

先說台獨內涵的變化與退化。一、《台獨黨綱》所楬櫫的「建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國」之類的主張，可謂幾已在政治市場上消聲匿跡；在陳水扁執政八年中，改以「正名制憲」、「國家正常化」等訴求來操作台獨意識，但這些名目如今亦皆已從「假議題」變成了「死議題」，一個接一個從政治市場消失。二、變化及退化後的台獨內涵，改以「支持台灣的主體性」為號召，或以「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，現在的名字叫中華民國」為其「借殼上市」的操作，包括謝長廷主張的「憲法各表」與姚人多主張的「建國改為建交」，其實皆可謂是一種「借殼上市」的樣態，可視為一種「變異台獨」。由此可見台獨內涵之變化與退化，甚至異化。

再言台獨功能的變化與退化，可分三個類型或三個階段。第一類型的台獨功能是反中華民國，例如過去民進黨人不在國父遺像前宣示就任公職，或指中華民國是外來政權；現在，這類「功能」皆已退化或萎縮，蔡英文亦於二○一二總統大選改稱「中華民國不是外來政權」。第二類型的台獨功能是反中華人民共和國或「去中國化」，但這類「功能」亦在急遽退化及萎縮中，例如二○一二大選民進黨概括承受了它曾指為「傾中賣台／喪權辱國」的ＥＣＦＡ，但仍敗於「九二共識／一中各表」，以致今日姚人多指出「民進黨的兩岸困境，就是提不出能與『九二共識』等量齊觀的『替代物』」。此外，台獨的反中華人民共和國，在冷戰時代或有其國際政治市場上的功能，但此種功能現亦快速退化。第三類型的台獨功能，則是已退化至僅為民進黨內部的鬥爭題材而已；如眼前所見，台獨的「功能」已退化並異化成游錫堃的「反一中顧主權連線」與謝長廷的「憲法各表」之間的鬥爭題材，亦變化成蔡英文與蘇貞昌為二○一六大選互鬥的題材，或變化成綠營獨派將姚人多斥為「統派」、「台奸」的題材，甚至變化成綠營內部「挺扁／批扁」的內鬥題材。

從台獨內涵的變化與退化言，即是從「台獨建國」轉向「借殼上市」移動。如謝長廷、姚人多這類台獨人士愈來愈警覺，若要維護「台灣的主體性」，除了借重《中華民國憲法》（憲法各表），或借重「中華民國體制」（《自由人宣言》）之外，已無其他途徑可走。然而，「借殼上市」畢竟仍非正本清源之道，真正的出路應在本報倡議的「杯子理論」：台灣是水，中華民國是杯；杯在水在，杯破水覆。

再就台獨功能的變化與退化言，台獨在國際政治及國內政治市場上的「功能性」皆已退化，甚至異化。謝長廷說：「台獨是針對國民黨，不是針對共產黨。」唯如今姚人多既認為「台獨」不能取代「九二共識」，亦即不啻認為台獨已無力「針對國民黨」，於是台獨竟已淪落到只是「針對民進黨內部」的路線及權力惡鬥之題材而已。試問：今後台獨除了在民進黨內鬥來鬥去、卡來卡去、買空賣空，除了只是供應民進黨的內鬥與內需之外，台獨在國際、兩岸及台灣內部，還有什麼市場可言？

若將台獨當作一種意識形態來看，其在精神或感情上的內蘊是可以同情與理解的；但是，經過幾十年來的現實驗證，台獨卻絕無可能做為台灣的生存戰略（strategy of survival）。因此，台獨漸漸只剩下綠營的「內需市場」，也就不足為怪。今從台獨一路滑坡而明顯表現在內涵及功能上的變化、退化及異化來看，應可斷言：台獨在國際、兩岸及台灣內部皆已是理應退貨下市的過期商品。