Thursday, May 23, 2013

Necessity and Feasibility: Relations with the Philippines

Necessity and Feasibility:
Relations with the Philippines
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 24, 2013


Summary: Have people on Taiwan had any dreams while hung over? We do not know. But we do know we cannot depend upon the goodwill of others to protect our fishing rights, We must depend upon our own military strength. Otherwise, Taipei-Manila Dispute Resolution will remain a nightmare.

Full Text below:

After many days of emotional protests against the Philippines, it is finally the morning after. People are gradually emerging from their intoxication. They must now face reality. Our government, along with the Philippines government, must begin an investigation and agree on compensation. We imbibed high proof liquor. Given an arrogant and capricious Philippines, the Ma administration's headaches will persist.

In dealing with the Taipei-Manila dispute, President Ma has repeatedly demanded a formal apology, damages, a thorough investigation of the facts with punishment for the murderers. and a restart of Taipei-Manila fishing rights negotiations. These are four bottom line conditions that must be met in the Kuang Ta Hsing 28 murder case. These four demands have never changed.

But the Philippines is not Japan. From a practical perspective, getting the Philippines government to make concessions, and honor these four principles above the "one China principle," is not going to be easy. The Philippines government has repeatedly played games. It has put different government agencies in charge. It has used "public contributions" to downgrade the status of the damages. This is all too clear. In particular, Taipei and Manila define "fact-finding" very differently. The material evidence (the firearm used, the fishing vessel attacked) and witness testimony (the shooter) are geographically separated. Some are on Taiwan. Some are in the Philippines. The Philippines have already declared their unwillingness to take part in a joint investigation on Taiwan. Waiting for the two sides' legal systems to interact, and for the two sides' investigative reports to be released, is certain to waste time. There is no guarantee we will not repeat the experience of three years ago, when a Hong Kong tour group was kidnapped. In the end, nothing was resolved, and the case was left hanging.

Under pressure from international opinion, the Philippine government's attitude softened. But this does not mean the Philippines has changed its policy. Philippines President Aquino said it is willing to negotiate fisheries agreements with Taipei and other neighboring governments. But on Taiwan, when the Philippines participated in criminal investigations, whenever the Philippine government came across sensitive material evidence, they adopted an uncooperative and evasive stance. For example, our government identified eight articles of evidence to be analyzed. The Philippine government only agreed to two of them. It agreed to examine the fishing vessel and perform ballistic tests on the firearm that fired the fatal rounds. The Philippines resorted to passive resistance. This means the diplomatic dispute will not end. Fishing rights negotiations between the two governments will remain elusive.

The government may be willing to wait. But the public is not. The murder investigation and fishing rights negotiations will remain stalled for the foreseeable future. President Ma's prestige is sure to tumble. Therefore, we should keep a close eye on the government, to see whether it follows up. We must evaluate its performance based on both necessity and feasibility,

President Ma issued four demands. Our government is looking forward the most to officially restarting fisheries negotiations with the Philippines. It wants to delineate the boundary between the two sides' overlapping economic zones. This would provide long-term stability for our fishermen operating in the Bashi Channel. This is a matter of absolute necessity. Secondly, it demanded a formal apology, damages and prosecution of the criminals involved in the homicide case. This does not conflict with Taipei-Manila fisheries negotiations. Therefore, our government can adopt a twin-pronged fact-finding and fishing rights negotiations approach. It can use investigating the facts as a basis for strengthening our bargaining position on fishing rights. This is a matter of feasibility.

When establishing what is a necessity and what is feasibile, can the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement adopted just months ago serve as a model for Taipei-Manila fisheries talks?

The Japanese are adept at manipulating "one China, one Taiwan." Leave that issue aside for the moment. The Philippines adhere to the "one China principle." Leave that difference aside for the moment alsowell. Taipei was able to sign a fisheries agreement with Tokyo, mainly because Taipei and Beijing launched a coordinated attack on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. The United States' passivity and non-intervention contributed as well. These two external factors resulted in a qualitative change. This qualitative change is sure to affect Taipei-Manila fisheries talks.

Firstly, coordination between Taipei and Beijing appeared to have weakened. Obama was re-elected. US rebalancing in Asia is gradually increasing in intensity. This is sure to make Beijing feel beseiged along its borders. Myanmar President Thein Sein visited the United States. North Korea arbitrarily detained Mainland fishing vessels. This forced Beijing to busy itself shoring up its foundations, and concentrate on protecting Diaoyutai. This left it unable to take care of the situation in the South China Sea. Xi Jinping visited the U.S. on June 7. Beijing would never have provoked a South China Sea dispute just before that. An incident would have undermined the atmosphere necesary for successful negotiations with the US. This is the main reason Beijing paid only lip service to helping Taipei in its conflict with Manila.

Secondly, U.S. intervention is expanding. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is heating up. Beijing will then be able to use the Diaoyutai Islands as leverage to breakthrough the US's Western Pacific island containment chain. The United States has lost the initiative in the East China Sea. It will gradually find itself defending the South China Sea full force. The Philippines is the US's most important pawn in the South China Sea. Therefore at this stage the Taipei-Manila dispute, the U.S. will be paying particular attention to any signs of cross-Strait coordination. It will do its utmost to avoid giving Beijing a justification to use military force in the South China Sea. This is the main reason Taipei has been so cautious about using military deterrence against the Philippines.

Have people on Taiwan had any dreams while hung over? We do not know. But we do know we cannot depend upon the goodwill of others to protect our fishing rights, We must depend upon our own military strength. Otherwise, Taipei-Manila Dispute Resolution will remain a nightmare.

從必要性與操作性談對菲交涉
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.24 04:16 am

在歷經多日的抗菲激情過後,逐漸從宿醉中醒來的台灣,終究要面對現實,開始與菲律賓政府進行後續的事實調查與補償談判。這次我們喝的雖非劣酒,但面對傲慢、反覆無常的菲律賓,馬政府卻仍難免繼續頭痛。

馬總統對於處理台菲爭議,一再重申正式道歉、賠償損失、徹查事實嚴懲凶手,以及重啟台菲漁權談判,是我國政府處理這次廣大興二十八號喋血案的四大底線,這四項原則絲毫不容改變。

但是菲律賓並非日本!從現實層面來看,這四項原則想要全部取得高舉「一中原則」大旗的菲國政府讓步,顯然並非易事,這從菲律賓政府一再操弄「對口單位」與「人民捐款」等矮化我國的字眼,即可以清楚看出。尤其,台菲雙方在事實認定上的認知差距過大,事證(凶槍)、人證(凶嫌)與物證(漁船)又分處台菲兩地,在台菲已確定無法共組聯合調查團的情況下,若單要依賴雙方的司法互助,等待彼此的調查報告出爐,勢必曠日廢時。如此,難保不會重蹈三年前香港旅遊團劫持事件最後不了了之的覆轍。

在國際輿論壓力下,菲政府的態度雖似軟化,但這並不代表菲國的政策已經產生變化。菲國總統艾奎諾日前稱,在處理台菲外交糾紛後,願意與台灣等鄰國協商漁業協定;然而,在台菲協調進行司法調查時,卻可發現菲律賓政府一碰觸到關鍵性的證據便採取消極、不配合及躲避的政策。例如,在我國政府所提出的八項證據調查當中,菲國政府便只部分同意登船、驗槍比對彈道等兩項。依菲國這種「擠牙膏式」的做法,此一外交糾紛勢必遲遲無法落幕,兩國漁權談判更將遙遙無期。

對此,也許政府可以等,但人民卻無法等。血案司法調查的停滯與漁權談判的遙遙無期,勢將重挫馬總統的威信,因此,我們應須從必要性與操作性兩個面向,嚴肅看待政府的後續作為。

在馬總統所提的四原則中,我國政府最期待的當然是與菲國正式開啟漁業談判,劃定雙方重疊經濟海域的分界線,以確保今後我漁民在巴士海峽作業的長治久安,這是「必要性」。其次,正式道歉、賠償損失與嚴懲凶手則是涉及這次喋血案的事實認定調查,這與台菲漁業談判並不相背斥;因此,我國可以採取事實調查與漁權談判雙管並進的方式,並以調查的事實為基礎來強化我國在漁權談判上的有力籌碼,這是「操作性」。

在確立必要性的目標、並擬定操作性原則之後,月前剛通過的台日漁業協議是否可以作為今後台菲漁業會談的標準範本呢?

撇開日本善於操弄「一中一台」,以及菲律賓堅持「一中原則」的對台政策差異性不論,台日簽署漁業協議主要是來自於兩岸在釣魚台分進合擊的壓力,以及美國消極的不干預政策所促成的。而今,這兩項外在因素都逐漸產生質變,而此一質變勢將影響台菲漁業會談的力度與進度。

首先,是兩岸聯手的想像因形格勢禁而弱化:歐巴馬連任後,美國在亞洲再平衡的力度便逐漸加大,不免讓中國大陸出現「周邊有事」的狀況,例如緬甸總統登盛訪美,北韓恣意逮捕大陸的漁船,這迫使中國大陸忙於固樁,並集中力量保護釣魚台,而無力兼顧南海情勢。在六月七日習近平訪問美國之前,中國大陸不可能主動挑起南海爭端,破壞美中談判的氛圍,這是北京在台菲爭議當中口惠而實不至的主要原因。

其次,是美國干預力道的加大:在釣魚台爭議升高後,中國大陸以釣魚台為支點,找到突破西太平洋第一島鏈的缺口;而美國眼見在東海失去先機後,將逐漸全力防守南海,而菲律賓便是美國在南海最重要的馬前卒。於是,在這次台菲爭執中,美國便格外注意兩岸聯手的可能性,極力避免中國大陸藉由此次衝突取得軍事力量進入南海的正當性。這點,也是我對菲進行軍事嚇阻時前瞻後顧的主因。

我們不知道當台灣在宿醉時有沒有做夢?但我們知道如果護漁只處處在依賴別人的善意,而不靠自身的武力,台菲爭議的解決,恐將會是南柯一夢。

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