DPP China Affairs Committee: Defective Organization, Defective Justification

DPP China Affairs Committee: Defective Organization, Defective Justification
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 10, 2013
Summary: Five years ago, in 2008, Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan for the first time, as ARATS chairman. The DPP launched no-holds barred street demonstrations. Today, by contrast, the two sides are about to establish representative offices. The DPP merely grumbles about "not undermining our sovereignty." By and large, it appears to have resigned itself to the situation.

Full Text below:

Outgoing ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin is visiting Taiwan. The two sides are in the process of establishing representative offices. Yesterday the DPP's "China Affairs Committee" held its first meeting.

Five years ago, in 2008, Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan for the first time, as ARATS chairman. The DPP launched no-holds barred street demonstrations. Today, by contrast, the two sides are about to establish representative offices. The DPP merely grumbles about "not undermining our sovereignty." By and large, it appears to have resigned itself to the situation.

It was in this sort of atmosphere that the DPP China Affairs Committee became operational.

Consider the committee's organizational structure. The committee consists of a convener and eight "party prince" level committee members. Consider the committee's rhetorical justification. During the meeting it announced a "Taiwan's Agenda for China." Both the organizational structure and rhetorical justifications outlined in the party's "agenda" suggest considerable room for improvement.

Consider the committee's organizational structure. Yu Shyi-kun and Frank Hsieh initially said they would not participate. Now Yu Shyi-kun has announced the establishment of an "Anti-One China, Defend Sovereignty Connection." Frank Hsieh has accepted the committee seat "reserved" for him. But he also announced that he would be chairing a cross-strait forum, to be held in Hong Kong in June. This means that these two factions within the China Affairs Committee are expanding their struggle, both inside and outside the committee. The committee's organizational structure means that the China Affairs Committee may develop in any one of three different directions. One. Taiwan independence hardliners and reformers may clash head on, tearing the DPP apart. Two. The two factions may settle into a "balance of terror." The DPP's cross-Strait policy may as a consequence, wind up chasing its tail. Three. The two factions may unite, and lead the DPP toward reform. We look forward to the third possibility.

Tsai Ing-wen wants to broaden China Affairs Committee participation. She wants to include Green Camp county and municipal leaders and younger generation leaders. She wants to introduce election considerations and younger generation thinking into the debate. Taiwan independence hardliners insist that "Taiwan independence is not about market appeal, but about responsibility." She is attempting to dilute their influence. Su Tseng-chang has endorsed Tsai Ing-wen's proposal. He intends to ask legislators, opinion leaders, and civic leaders to join the committee. This will dilute the influence of Taiwan independence hardliners on the China Affairs Committee via "intra-party democracy," thereby expediting reform. This also coincides with Su Tseng-chang's interests in 2016. Su is probably reluctant to draw fire from Taiwan independence hardliners by taking the lead in reform.

Consider the committee's rhetorical jusification. Its very name, "China Affairs Committee," speaks volumes. It practically shouts "Taiwan, China, one country on each side." But this path has proven to be a dead end. Is this what Su Tseng-chang meant when he spoke of a "new frame of reference?" The committee's "agenda" is still based on "Taiwan, China, one country on each side." It dictates a "Taiwan-centric agenda outside the framework of China."

The committee's "agenda" proclaims that "I am Taiwanese. My country is not the People's Republic of China." The word is it intentionally quoted Frank Hsieh. The implication was that "Even Frank Hsieh holds this position!" But the "Taiwan, China, one country on each side" framework has a problem. The problem is not "My country is not the People's Republic of China." The problem is what the DPP means by "my country?" Does it mean a "Nation of Taiwan," as in "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country?" Does it mean the "Republic of China," as in "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country?" Does it mean a "backdoor listed Taiwan," as in "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. It is currently referred to as the Republic of China?" Can the DPP even tell us what it means by "my country?" The committee's "agenda" flip flops between a "Nation of Taiwan," the "Republic of China," and a "backdoor listed Taiwan under the name of the Republic of China." The committee's "agenda" fails to make any of this clear. Therefore how can it even begin to talk about "Taiwan's Agenda for China?"

For example, the "agenda" mentions that "over 80% of the public has no desire to reunify." But what does that 80% advocate? Does it advocate "one China, different interpretations?" Does it advocate "maintaining the status quo" under the premise of "no [immediate] reunification and no independence?" Does it advocate "Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation," under the premise of "Taiwan, China, one country on each side?" The entire "agenda" invokes the rhetoric of a "Taiwan Dream" in a mealy-mouthed and evasive manner. How can it possibly live up to the name of something so ambitious and impractical as "Taiwan's Agenda for China?"

The "agenda" advocates "cross-Strait harmony and frictionless exchanges." Then it blames "stagnant wage growth" on the KMT-CCP 1992 Consensus. Stagnant wage growth is due to many complex internal and external factors. The DPP knows this. In recent years, cross-strait economic and trade exchanges have relied heavily on the 1992 Consensus. Without it, Taiwan's economic situation would be far worse. This is a watershed moment for DPP cross-Strait policy reform. Yet the "agenda" openly denounces the 1992 Consensus. This can only be described as bizarre. Is this what Su Tseng-chang meant when he spoke of "opening up new cross-Strait interactions?"

That was then, this is now. Organizationally, the DPP China Affairs Committee should broaden participation, making it a truly democratic entity. Rhetorically, the committee should reaffirm that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country. Its core values are democracy. Its core interests are on Taiwan. Its long-range challenge is to resolve the problems faced by Chinese people the world over."

Chen Yunlin is currently visiting Taiwan. Does the DPP still remember the "agenda" it carried out on the streets of Taipei five years ago? 

民進黨中國委員會在組織與論述上的缺陷
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.10 03:26 am

正當海協會卸任會長陳雲林在台遊訪、兩岸亦在進行互設辦事處的議商之際，民進黨「中國事務委員會」（下稱「中委會」）於昨日舉行首次會議。

五年前，二○○八年陳雲林以海協會長首次來台開會，民進黨發動近似焦土式的抗爭；但是，今逢兩岸互設辦事處在即，民進黨內除了吭幾聲「勿傷主權」的嘀咕，看來似乎已是概括承受。

就在這樣的氛圍下，民進黨中委會開始運作。從組織架構言，是由召集人與八名天王級委員組成；從論述架構言，則在會中宣布了《台灣的中國議程》。然而，不論從組織架構或論述架構看，此一委員會皆有很大的改善空間。

先談組織架構。游錫?與謝長廷原稱不參加，現游錫?在宣布成立「反一中顧主權連線」後加入，謝長廷也補實了委員會為他「保留」的最一個名額，但也預告將於六月在香港舉行兩岸論壇。這不啻預示，兩派將在中委會之內與之外展開角力。這樣的組織架構，使中委會的發展出現三種可能性：一、獨派與轉型派發生強烈衝突，撕裂了民進黨；二、兩派形成「恐怖平衡」，使民進黨的兩岸政策原地打轉；三、兩派形成整合，帶動民進黨轉型。我們期待，能朝第三種可能性發展。

蔡英文主張中委會應擴大參與，納入綠營縣市首長及青壯世代，這是要將「選舉思維」與「青壯思維」引入辯論平台，以對委員會中主張「台獨不是市場而是責任」的鐵桿獨派發生「稀釋」作用。對此，蘇貞昌已表示贊同蔡英文的主張，更將邀請立法委員、意見領袖與公民力量加入委員會的平台；因為，若能稀釋中委會而藉「黨內民主」來達成轉型之目的，其實也符合志在二○一六的蘇貞昌之利益；蘇或許只是不想領頭轉型而成為獨派的箭靶而已。

再談論述架構。《台灣的中國議程》這個標題，即是「一邊一國」的語言；但此路已證明走不通，難道這就是蘇貞昌所說的「全新的思考架構」？然而，此篇《議程》仍是建立在「一邊一國」的思考上，謂要「在中國的框架之外」，提出「以台灣為主題的議程」。

《議程》指出，「我是台灣人，我的國家不是中華人民共和國」；據說這是故意引據謝長廷的說辭，頗有「連謝長廷都這麼說」的意味。但是，「一邊一國」這個架構，問題其實不在「我的國家不是中華人民共和國」，而在民進黨所指的「我的國家」，究竟是「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」？或「中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家」？或「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，現在稱作中華民國」（借殼上市）？如果民進黨不能確定「我的國家是什麼」，而在「台灣國／中華民國／借殼上市」之間搖擺徬徨，那麼恐怕連「台灣的議程」都不知伊於胡底，遑論什麼《台灣的中國議程》？

例如，《議程》提到「超過八成民眾無意統一」；但這八成民眾究竟是主張在「一中各表」、「維持現狀」下的「不統／不獨」？或是主張「台獨建國」、「一邊一國」的拒統？然而，整個《議程》只是用「台灣夢」之類的詞彙對此吞吞吐吐、閃爍其詞，如何可能支撐得起《台灣的中國議程》這麼宏大又虛浮的架構？

《議程》一方面主張「兩岸和諧／暢順交流」，另一方面又將「台灣工資成長停滯」歸咎於「國共九二共識」；但「工資成長停滯」畢竟是複雜萬端的內外因素所致，而民進黨當然亦知，倘無近年兩岸基於「九二共識」的經貿交流，台灣的經濟情勢可能更加嚴峻。然而，在這個民進黨兩岸政策轉型的重大關口，《議程》竟仍公開反對「九二共識」，這可謂已是匪夷所思了，更如何實現蘇貞昌所說的「打開兩岸互動新局」？

迷途未遠，來者可追。民進黨中國事務委員會在組織上應擴大參與，使之成為一個真正的「民主平台」。至於在論述上，應當回到：「中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家，其核心價值是民主，其核心利益在台灣，其中長程的核心課題是與全球華人共同化解中國問題。」

陳雲林正在台灣趴趴走，民進黨應當還記得五年前在台北街頭演出的《議程》吧？