The Withering Away of the State vs. the Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait

The Withering Away of the State vs. the Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2013

Summary: The Beijing authorities have asked the DPP whether it dares to forswear calls for de jure Taiwan independence. Actually, it should ask the DPP whether it dares to reaffirm the Republic of China. Does the DPP really wish to use "cross-Strait civil society exchanges" as its counter-argument? Does it really wish to offer a fantastical response to a real question? Isn't it being just a tad unrealistic?

Full Text below:

The DPP is attempting to establish a new rhetorical framework for cross-Strait political relations. Apparently it favors the "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait," proposed by Pan Green academics from "Taiwan Democracy Watch." The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" has made reference to "Taiwan's China Agenda." During its recent All Peoples Conference it made reference to a Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait. These documents complement each other.

These three documents have certain key phrases in common. The first is "human rights.' The second is "civil society." Their primary purpose is to persuade fundamentalists within the party to agree to open communications with the Mainland. It is to reduce political resistance from within the party. These documents argue that exchanges promote democracy and human rights on the Mainland. They argue that "civil society" is the participant in these exchanges. The Democratic Progressive Party purports to be throwing open the doors of communication. Yet it resorts to these sorts of mealy-mouthed obfuscations. They merely reveal the deep-seated contradictions within the party.

The Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait, was originally entitled the Resolution on Human Rights in China. It originally contained the passage, "If our government intends to reach any political agreements with China [sic], then the people in China must first implement universal suffrage and democratic government." But this passage is missing in the "Taiwan Strait" version. Why the change? The question is intriguing. The "Free Person's Declaration" should be examined on the basis of its original wording.

The Declaration argues that "Until the regime in China [sic] has democratized, the two parties should not conduct any consultations with political implications." It even argued that "China is a one party state. Therefore it has no real "people's sovereignty." Therefore it is not a "fully independent nation." This is a fantastical variant on "withering away of the state" rhetoric. It is a pretext to deny that China is an independent state and to reject political consultations with the opposite shore. The Declaration purports to be an argument championing communication. But it has determined that "China is not a fully independent state." So how does the Declaration intend to interpret the 18 agreements the two sides have signed and implemented, including ECFA? Were these agreements with the opposite shore not signed with a government not established by means of universal suffrage? Were these agreements signed instead by the two sides' civil societies?

These three documents no longer call for "Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation." The China Agenda and Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait do not mention the "Republic of China." The Declaration mentions the "Republic of China." But it asserts that the ROC is not a fully independent state. This is surprising. The Declaration argues that the "constitutional government implemented by the public on Taiwan" and the constitutional framework of the" ROC " allow for confrontation, compromise, and divisions." If that is the case, then how did the Republic of China, allegedly not a fully independent state magically become "Taiwan, a sovereign and independent state?" The Republic of China is allegedly not a fully independent state. Yet Taiwan somehow qualifies as a sovereign and independent state. Is this political reality, or political dogma?

The "withering away of the state" rhetoric originated with the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Yet today, in the 21st century, it has found a home in the thinking of the Democratic Progressive Party. Is this not surprising? These three documents denigrate or flat out repudidate both the PRC and the ROC. Yet they purport to champion cross-Strait exchanges. They argue that the framework for such exchanges is civil society. This "withering away of the state" rhetoric amounts to talking to oneself. How can it possibly provide a framework for cross-Strait strategic relations?

The People's Republic of China is not a democracy. But its state and its government are real enough. Otherwise, consider nations such as North Korea. One need only argue that they are nations that fail to embody "popular sovereignty." One can then ignore the need for conflict resolution with them. The assertion that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country is essentially a phony proposition that can only be heard among citizens of the Republic of China, a truly sovereign and independent state.

The term "Republic of Taiwan" has vanished from the three documents. The DPP must turn back. It must come to grips with the fact that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China exist. How can the DPP deny that the two exist? How can it attempt to invoke civil society to argue that both states are dead, or to deconstruct the two sides' political systems? Beijing would ridicule such an argument. Such an argument would undermine the Republic of China's cross-Strait status. It would provide even less support for their pipe dream of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state. In fact, if one wishes to advocate human rights in the Taiwan Strait, one would be on firmer footing championing the Republic of China, which has in fact implemented them.

The DPP's Taiwan independence path was originally Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation. It called for opposition to the People's Republic of China, which claimed to represent all of China. It amounted to a confrontation between one state and another. Who knew the DPP would suddenly perform a total about face? It now no longer mentions the "Republic of Taiwan." It now argues that the People's Republic of China is not a sovereign state because it lacks universal suffrage and democracy. It even alleges that the Republic of China is not a fully independent nation. Yet, somehow it has concluded that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state. In one fell swoop, it has concluded that cross-Strait relations are "people to people," and "civil society to civil society" based. What does this underscore, if not the failure of the Taiwan independence movement's confrontation between states rhetoric? It is now attempting to substitute an ostrich head in the sand "withering away of the state" rhetoric in its place.

The Beijing authorities have asked the DPP whether it dares to forswear calls for de jure Taiwan independence. Actually, it should ask the DPP whether it dares to reaffirm the Republic of China. Does the DPP really wish to use "cross-Strait civil society exchanges" as its counter-argument? Does it really wish to offer a fantastical response to a real question? Isn't it being just a tad unrealistic?

「國家死滅論」與「台海人權決議文」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.27 01:48 am

民進黨正在嘗試建立兩岸新論述。跡象顯示，傾綠學者的「守護台灣民主平台」所提《自由人宣言》、民進黨「中國事務委員會」所提《台灣的中國議程》，及此次民進黨全代會所提《台海人權決議文》，皆是互為表裡的同一動作。

這三個文件（下稱三文件）有兩個共同的關鍵字：一、人權。二、公民社會。此一論述主要是用於說服黨內的基本教義派，欲取得開放民進黨與對岸交流的令狀，降低黨內阻力。其意是指：交流是為了促進大陸的民主人權，交流對象則以「公民社會」為主體。民進黨為了在黨內打開交流之門，竟至使出此種障眼法的地步，即可見黨內矛盾之深重。

《台海人權決議文》原名《中國人權決議文》。《中國版》原有一段文字是：我政府要與中國進行任何政治協議，應在中國人民以民主普選方式產生政府後為之；但是，到了《台海版》，這段文字卻好像不見了。為何有此變化，自是耐人尋味；這要從此一論述架構的原型，即《自由人宣言》論起。

《宣言》主張：「在中國體制尚未民主化之前，雙方不應進行任何具有政治意涵的協商。」甚至認為：「中國是一黨專政的國家，因此沒有真正的『人民主權』，也就不是完全獨立的國家。」這是一種奇幻的「國家死滅論」，以否定中國是一「獨立的國家」，來拒絕與對岸進行政治協商。然而《宣言》畢竟也是一種「交流論」；但既然認定「中國不是一個完全獨立的國家」，《宣言》將如何解釋兩岸已經簽成並實施的十八項協議（包括ＥＣＦＡ）？難道這些協議都不是與對岸「非普選產生之政府」所簽？而難道這些協議皆是兩岸「公民社會」所簽成？

三文件皆不再倡言「台獨建國」，而《中國議程》及《台海決議文》已揭示的部分亦未見「中華民國」。《宣言》雖提及「中華民國」，卻稱中華民國也不是一個「完全獨立的國家」；但奇怪的是，《宣言》既然認為「台灣人民的憲政實踐與『中華民國』體制與憲法，實際上有著對抗而又共存，妥協而又分裂的關係」，則如何從「中華民國這個不是完全獨立的國家」中，能夠得到「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的結論？中華民國不是一個「完全獨立的國家」，但台灣卻是一個「主權獨立的國家」，這是政治事實，或是政治宗教？

「國家死滅論」源出一八四八年的《共產黨宣言》，如今竟在二十一世紀又現於民進黨的思維中，能不令人拍案驚奇？三文件貶抑了或根本否定了中華人民共和國與中華民國，而欲將兩岸的交流，架構在所謂「公民社會」上，此種自說自話的「國家死滅論」如何能支撐起兩岸大局？

中華人民共和國並非民主政體，但其國家與政府皆為現實的存在；否則，如北韓這樣的國家，只要否定其為「人民主權」之國家即可，各國又何必與之折衝？而「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」，更根本是一寓居在「中華民國是一主權獨立國家」之中的假議題。

如今，「台灣國」既已從「三文件」上消失，民進黨即必須回過頭來認真面對中華民國與中華人民共和國的事實存在；豈能逕自否定二者，而欲以「公民社會」來「死滅」或解構兩岸的政治體制？那將被北京訕笑，亦傷及中華民國在兩岸間的地位，更不可能支撐「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的幻夢。其實，若要主張「台海人權」，站在中華民國的真正實踐之立場上，更加能說得義正詞嚴。

民進黨的台獨路線，原是以「台獨建國」對抗「代表一個中國的中華人民共和國」，這是國家與國家的對抗；不料，如今卻一退十萬八千里，除了不再提「台灣國」，又指中華人民共和國「不是人民主權國家」，更聲稱中華民國「不是完全獨立的國家」（但「台灣」卻是「一個主權獨立的國家」？），而一舉將兩岸關係化約為「人民對人民」、「公民社會對公民社會」的關係，這豈不正顯示了台獨「國家對抗論」的失敗，而欲以鴕鳥鑽沙的「國家死滅論」來取代？

北京問民進黨：敢不敢說「不搞法理台獨」？其實是問民進黨：要不要先回到中華民國再說？民進黨若竟以「兩岸公民社會交流」回應，實問虛答到了奇幻的地步，會不會太離譜了一些？