Opportunities are Fleeting: Establish an Interim Political Structure

Opportunities are Fleeting:
Establish an Interim Political Structure
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2013

Summary: Ma Ying-jeou has only three years left in his second and final term. When it comes to the conduct of cross-strait policy, to its upgrading and innovation, Ma Ying-jeou must realize that time is fleeting. Beijing must also be aware of the fleeting historical opportunity. It must not complain only that Ma Ying-jeou is not sufficiently pro-reunification. It must realize that the two sides' "yet to be reunified" status is a more pressing issue than "reunification."

Full Text below:

Time flies. During the last three years of his second and final term, President Ma Ying-jeou faces an array of internal and external challenges. From time to time he may feel a sense of urgency. On the opposite side of the Strait, the Beijing government is probably increasingly concerned that the rosy historic scenario which began in 2008 may not last.

As everyone knows, this precious opportunity for improved cross-Strait relations presented itself in 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. Also, as everyone knows, this opportunity may vanish if the KMT loses the presidential election in 2016.

The KMT could lose in 2106. This is something we have mentioned before in this editorial series. If the KMT loses, it will be because it failed to improve the economy. It will constitute an unstoppable historical inevitability, akin to a landslide. During this period of history, Lien Chan, Ma Ying-jeou, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping created unprecedented opportunities for cross-Strait co-operation. Their achievements are before us, for all the world to see. Therefore even if the KMT loses in 2016, the defeat must not be interpreted as a defeat for cross-Strait policy. In other words, suppose the KMT loses in 2016. The two sides must not allow their cumulative achievements to be nullified. They must not descend into purgatory, as they did once before.

Therefore the authorities on both sides must work together. They must cherish the last three years of Ma Ying-jeou's second and final term. The two sides must use the opportunity to establish a more stable and durable cross-Strait framework, one that will not be swayed by any variables that might appear in 2016. Such a framework was mentioned in the 18th CCP Political Report. "Explore cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." This is similar in spirit to provisions in the amended ROC Constitution. This framework could be termed "a cross-strait political structure in response to the requirements of national unity prior to reunification." The above two could be termed an "interim political structure."

In recent years, the focus of policy for Beijing has shifted from "reunification" to "political relations under circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is a tremendous breakthrough. It is a paradigm shift. It has liberated cross-Strait relations from the dilemma of goal-orientated reunification, and embraced process-oriented peaceful development. Hu Jintao has long advocated a peace agreement. His advocacy reflected his awareness that reunification was no easy matter. He attempted to take advantage of a peace agreement to establish cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, He sought an interim solution. But Beijing has yet to establish a framework of "fair and reasonable arrangements." As a result, Ma Ying-jeou has remained fearful of a public backlash.

By now both sides know they must establish a "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise Beijing must bear the burden of reunification, while Taipei must live with the fear of "being reunified." Reunification has become an obstacle to improved cross-Strait political relations. The peace agreement meanwhile, has run aground. Therefore we should seek an alternative. We should establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This framework should be the representative offices the two sides are currently discussing and seeking to implement.

Zhang Nienshi heads up Shanghai's East Asian Institute. He thinks the two sides should establish representative offices consistent with a "one country, two governments" framework. If one does not recognize a "one country, two governments" framework, then one cannot possibly agree to the establishment of two representative offices, both with official authority. Zhang Nianshi does not speak for the Beijing government. But his logic is consistent with cross-Strait thinking in recent years. One may wrack one's brains. But probably nothing besides "one country, two governments" thinking can establish a "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This newspaper's "big roof concept of China" is just this sort of thinking. Either "one country, two governments" or a "big roof concept of China" can be regarded as a "reasonable interim political structure".

Lee Teng-hui advocated the "National Unification Guidelines." Chen Shui-bian advocated the "Five Noes." Beijing forced them back into the Taiwan independence fold. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is "one China, different interpretations." It is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It is "One China is the Republic of China." It is the rejection of "one China, one Taiwan," and the rejection of "Taiwan independence." This represents the current state of public opinion on Taiwan. Beijing must cherish this hard-won cross-strait consensus. It must take this success and apply "one country, two governments" or "big roof concept of China" thinking to it. In the coming "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified" this can be made explicit. This would protect this hard-won result. We must not end up with neither "reunification" nor "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."

Ma Ying-jeou has only three years left in his second and final term. When it comes to the conduct of cross-strait policy, to its upgrading and innovation, Ma Ying-jeou must realize that time is fleeting. Beijing must also be aware of the fleeting historical opportunity. It must not complain only that Ma Ying-jeou is not sufficiently pro-reunification. It must realize that the two sides' "yet to be reunified" status is a more pressing issue than "reunification."

機遇稍縱即逝 兩岸思酌建立中程政治架構
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.20 02:14 am

歲月如馳，馬英九總統在未來三年任期中，面對千頭萬緒的內外難題，或許已有時不我與的緊迫感；其實，對岸的北京政府，面對這段自二○○八年出現的兩岸歷史機遇之漸趨消磨，恐怕亦生好景不常的警惕。

眾所皆知，兩岸這段珍貴機遇是自馬英九二○○八年當選總統而確立；同樣亦有目共睹的是，這段機緣不無可能在二○一六年因國民黨的敗選而畫下句點。

國民黨若在二○一六敗選，如本系列社論前文所述，主要可能是因經濟未能改善及儼如土石流一般的歷史擠兌未能解決使然。但是，這一段經連戰、馬英九及胡錦濤、習近平所共同經營的兩岸機遇，其成就卻是舉世共見的；國民黨即使在二○一六年敗選，應亦不能解釋為敗於兩岸政策；換句話說，國民黨即使在二○一六敗選，兩岸亦不可使雙方所累積的成就即此化作烏有，而令兩岸再又墜入另一次的煉獄輪迴。

因此，兩岸當局應當共同珍惜馬英九的最後三年任期，務期趁此在兩岸關係上建立一個更加穩固且可長可久的架構，要穩固到不會受二○一六的任何變數所動搖的地步。此一架構即是中共十八大政治報告所說：「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排。」相對於中華民國憲法增修條文的精神意涵，此一架構亦可稱作：「為因應國家統一前之需要的兩岸政治架構。」以上二者，皆可說是一個「中程政治架構」。

北京近年來的政策焦點能從「統一」轉移至「尚未統一的政治關係」，這是極大的突破與超越；也使兩岸得以從「目的論」的困局中，走向「和平發展」的「過程論」。胡錦濤始終主張《和平協議》，應當即是反映出已然認知「統一不易」，而欲藉《和平協議》，來建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」，此即一種「中程思考」；但是由於北京方面始終未提出一個「合情合理的安排」之架構，致使馬英九方面在顧忌民意反彈之下不願迎對。

兩岸其實均確知，事到如今，必須建立一「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，否則北京扛著「統一」的包袱，台灣懷著「統一」的憂懼，「統一」反而成了兩岸穩固與提升政治關係的障礙。而《和平協議》既已擱淺，即應設法找到一個可以替代《和平協議》的機制，用以建構「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，而此一機制應當就是兩岸正在議商的互設辦事處。

上海東亞研究所所長章念馳最近表示，兩岸互設辦事處即是按照「一國兩府」的架構進行；如果不承認「一國兩府」就不會同意互設代表雙方公權力的辦事處。章念馳所述雖非官方說法，卻是對於近年來兩岸思維演化的一個符合邏輯且能證諸事實的論證。而窮盡思考，恐怕也想不出除了「一國兩府」之類的思維，還有什麼機制能夠體現「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」之架構，本報所倡「大屋頂中國」亦可歸屬此類。亦即，「一國兩府」或「大屋頂中國」之屬，皆可視作一種「合情合理的中程政治架構」。

北京曾將主張《國統綱領》的李登輝，及主張「四不一沒有」的陳水扁，逼回到台獨的牆角。如今，馬英九已將兩岸政策帶到「一個中國／各自表述」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「一個中國就是中華民國」、「不推兩個中國、一中一台、台灣獨立」的位置，這已是現階段台灣民意的極致；如果北京尚知珍惜此一得來不易的兩岸共同成果，即應努力將此一成果，透過「一國兩府」或「大屋頂中國」之類的思維，進階內建於「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的政治關係架構」之上，而在未來的《兩岸互設辦事處協議》作出明文體現，以保全此一辛苦果實；不要最後落得不但沒有「統一」，也沒有了「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。

馬英九僅剩三年任期，在兩岸政策的開展、升級與創新上，馬英九應知珍惜光陰，北京也要有歷史機遇一去即不再有的警惕。不要只嫌馬英九不夠「統」，應知「尚未統一」是一個比「統一」更應妥適處理的課題。