DPP: From the Good Fight to Dirty Pool

DPP: From the Good Fight to Dirty Pool
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 18, 2013

Summary: The DPP gained legitimacy through its calls for the lifting of martial law and for a "Taiwan independence consciousness." This historical background shaped the DPP's basic character. Today however, martial law is a fading memory. Taiwan independence is a pipe dream. Yet the DPP continues to live in the past. It continues to dwell on martial law and Taiwan independence. This reveals how anachronistic the DPP's thinking is.

Full text below:

The DPP gained legitimacy through its calls for the lifting of martial law and for a "Taiwan independence consciousness." This historical background shaped the DPP's basic character. Today however, martial law is a fading memory. Taiwan independence is a pipe dream. Yet the DPP continues to live in the past. It continues to dwell on martial law and Taiwan independence. This reveals how anachronistic the DPP's thinking is.

Today's DPP cannot distinguish between providing checks on the ruling administration and harming Taiwan's interests. It cannot distinguish between opposition to Ma and undermining the nation. By aiding and abetting Wang Jin-pyng and Ker Chien-ming, it hijacked and paralyzed the Legislative Yuan. TISA is considered the most generous cross-Strait trade concession to Taiwan ever offered by the Mainland authorities. Yet the DPP has obstinately opposed it to the bitter end. It once demanded a public referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Now however it has done an about faced and killed it. It has not hesitated to use the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant as a political tool to undermine the nation and society. Do such actions really "oppose Ma?" Or do they merely harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC?

Martial law was unjust. The "10,000 year Legislature," the prohibition against opposition political parties, the censorship of the press, and the lack of an independent criminal justice system provided the political opposition with moral legitimacy. As a result the DPP often resorted to physical violence in the streets or in the legislature. Society supported or tolerated it. That is why the then Kuomintang government implemented a policy of "non-retaliation in response to verbal or physical attacks." Its feelings of guilt over the "original sin" of martial law" reduced it to silence in the face of DPP insults and disruptions within the legislature. The DPP's "Taiwan independence consciousness" in particular was motivated by the desire to overthrow the Republic of China. As a result, it viewed the nation, the constitution, government officials, the military, and civil servants as the enemy of a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." All were to be demeaned and destroyed. Nothing and no one were to be spared. This attitude was reflected in the recent Hung Chung-chiu case. The DPP's actions in the Hung case were motivated not by a longing for justice. They were motivated by a desire to destroy the military, discredit its reputation, and undermine its fighting ability. This was a case of partisan battles harming Taiwan and undermining the ROC. If the DPP returns to power, can we still expect the military to defend the nation and the public?

The Taiwan independence movement no longer has issues such as the "10,000 year Legislature" to demagogue. As a result, its Taiwan independence appeals no longer carry the same force. DPP social issues no longer evince idealism, morality, and legitimacy. In recent years, DPP politlcal struggles have been waged over two issues. The first is cross-Strait relations. The second is public policy. On cross-Strait relations, the DPP has been wracked by internal power struggles over Taiwan independence, unable to extricate itself. It has redoubled its efforts on behalf of Taiwan independence in an effort to rally public sentiment. But it has also expressed support for cross-Strait policies such as ECFA. It went from street protests to "acceptance of ECFA in toto." Clearly the DPP finds itself in a dilemma on cross-Strait policy. On public policy, the DPP opposes virtually every one of the ruling party's public policies. U.S. beef imports are a classic example. The DPP demands the immediate shutdown of nuclear power plants. It can suggest no alternative energy solutions, yet simultaneously objects to electricty rate hikes. It demands membership in the TPP and RCEP, yet simultaneously opposes the "Free Trade Zone Pilot Program." It even opposes TISA, the most one-sidedly beneficial to Taiwan trade agreement the Mainland has ever offered. Under the circumstances, how can Taiwan possibly withstand the TPP's acid test? Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell recently addressed the matter of Taiwan's participation in the TPP. He said it would require political courage. He said it was not something any single political party on Taiwan could achieve on its own. His remark equated partisan partisan political struggle with undermining the nation. .

The DPP obstinately opposes almost all major ruling party public policies out of sheer spite. It adopts the same posture toward all major cross-Strait policies that it once adopted toward martial law and the "10,000 year Legislature." This includes ECFA and TISA. It brings the same Taiwan independence mindset to all national policy debates, leading inevitably to total paralysis. It risks harming Taiwan and undermining the ROC. The DPP is fully within its rights to oppose Ma and the KMT. But it has no right to harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC. That is an inexcusable crime. The Chen Shui-bian regime ruled for eight years. It left the Taipei/Washington/Beijing relationship in shambles. Does the DPP really intend to reenact this political farce again in 2016?

Today the president is directly elected. The legislature is completely "localized." DPP moral legitimacy must be based on the electoral system and majority rule. In recent years, Wang Jin-pyng and Ker Chien-ming have coauthored a script. The DPP is a minority party that toccupies only one third of all seats in the legislature. But by forcibly occupying the podium and other techniques, it has exercised an influence obviously at variance with the principle of proportional representation. This is not post-martial law era constitutional rule, and it has led to DPP vainglory. It has made political progress more difficult. It has forstalled systemic improvements.

During the battle over martial law, the DPP "fought the good fight." Chen Shui-bian's "rectification of names" on the other hand, was both self-deception and deception of others. During the recent legislative turmoil the DPP Chairman became Ker Chien-ming's puppet. The DPP became Ker Chien-ming's political tool. The DPP's good fight has become dirty pool. Its sole purpose is to oppose Ma out of spite, and to harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC. The DPP has lost its badge of honor. It has lost track of time. it no longer knows what era it is living in. It has exceeded all bounds of reason.

民進黨從美好的一仗沉淪至打爛仗
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.18 04:11 am

民進黨以「推翻戒嚴體制」與「台獨意識」起家，此一歷史背景塑造了民進黨的根本氣質；然而，如今已經解嚴，台獨也已渺無希望，民進黨卻仍以「戒嚴時代」的「台獨思維」來問政。這是今日所見民進黨種種表現經常顯得時空錯亂的主要原因之一。

今日所見，民進黨似乎搞不清楚政黨制衡與傷害台灣的界際何在，也搞不清楚反馬與毀滅國家的界際何在。例如，將「挺王保柯」鬧到挾持癱瘓立法院的地步；再如，揚言對被稱為「全世界最讓利的FTA─兩岸服貿協議」將採焦土杯葛；又如，自毀「核四公投」的承諾，不惜以核四議題為其凌遲國家社會的政治工具。這些，究竟是在反馬？抑或傷台毀國？

由於戒嚴體制所存在的不正義，如萬年國會、黨禁報禁、司法不獨立等，使民進黨當年的反對運動具有道德性、正當性；於是，民進黨在街頭或議會常以暴力作強勢抗爭，但仍能獲得社會的支持或容忍。也因此，當年的國民黨政府在街頭「罵不還口／打不還手」，在議會則因「戒嚴原罪感」聽任民進黨羞辱官員、破壞議事。尤其，民進黨的台獨意識，心中原本以顛覆中華民國為宗旨，於是不論國家、憲法、政府、官員、國軍、公務員均視為「台灣國」的敵人，從而對之加以羞辱、毀傷，皆無所顧惜；此種心態也反映在最近的洪仲丘案上。民進黨對洪案的操作其實不在為個案伸張正義，而在趁勢摧毀整個國軍的榮譽與戰力，這已是將「黨爭」導向了「傷台毀國」。但另日民進黨若再上台執政時，難道可以不依靠國軍保國衛民？

由於如今已無「萬年國會」之類的大題目，台獨訴求亦渺無希望，民進黨遂在引領社會議題的理想性、道德性及正當性上失所寄託。於是，近年的政爭集中在兩類議題上。一、兩岸議題：一方面，民進黨內部的權力鬥爭已陷於台獨漩渦不能自拔，遑論再以台獨之主張來號召社會；另一方面，在兩岸政策上，如ECF

A，又自街頭全面抗爭轉至「概括承受」，俱見民進黨在兩岸政策上已是進退失據。二、公共政策：民進黨幾乎反對執政黨所有的公共政策，美牛案即是其經典作。再如，完全拿不出替代能源方案，又反對電價上漲，卻主張立即停建核四；又如，主張參加TPP、RCEP，卻一度反對「自由經濟示範區」，如今又反《服貿協議》，但連對岸片面大讓利的《服貿協議》也反；如此，台灣將如何禁得起TPP的考驗？美國前亞太助卿坎貝爾最近論及台灣參與TPP時說，「這需要政治雄心，不是（台灣）單一政黨的事」；此言不啻亦在標示「黨爭」與「毀國」的界際。

民進黨如果刻意反對執政黨所提一切重大公共政策，皆以「反戒嚴體制」及「反萬年國會」的高度及手法來操作；並反對一切重大的兩岸政策，如反ECFA及反服貿協議，且皆以「台獨思維」來操作反對，最後必定會造成國政癱瘓，甚至有傷台毀國之虞。民進黨當然可以反馬及反國民黨，但如因此不惜傷台毀國，那是不可原諒的罪行。陳水扁執政八年，留下了一個台美中三邊皆受重傷的政治廢墟；難道民進黨又要再製造一個政治廢墟，讓自己在二○一六年接手？

如今已是總統直選與國會全面本土化的時代，民進黨的道德性及正當性必須建立在選舉體制所標示的「多數原則」上。近年來，在王金平與柯建銘二人編導的劇本下，民進黨以僅占立院約三分之一餘席次的少數黨，用「霸占主席台」等手法，造成了一種「非如其分的」及「嚴重違反比例原則的」聲勢，此絕非「後解嚴時代」的憲政正義，且會造成民進黨的虛榮與虛胖，使其更不知轉型上進，對改善其體質絕無裨益。

在「戒嚴時代」的重大抗爭中，民進黨可謂「那美好的一仗已經打過」；至於陳水扁的「正名制憲」，則已是「自欺欺人」；再至最近這場立院風暴，民進黨主席儼然已成柯建銘的傀儡，民進黨全黨亦已成柯建銘之工具，不啻已成一場「逢馬必反／傷台毀國」的「爛仗」。榮辱殊途，時空錯亂，豈非莫此為甚？