Taipei and Beijing: Problems Must Be Named Before They Can Be Solved

Taipei and Beijing: Problems Must Be Named Before They Can Be Solved
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 23, 2013

Summary: During the first Cross-Strait Peace Forum, the Blue, Green, and Red camps all openly referred to the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma." This gave us an insight into the meaning of the "deep end of the pool." In the past, neither Taiwan nor the Mainland could talk openly about such matters. Dialogue was impossible. Now the two sides can venture into the deep end of the pool. They can use controversial terminology. They can ask the hard questions. Only this will enable them to solve the difficult problems.

Full text below:

During the first Cross-Strait Peace Forum, the Blue, Green, and Red camps all openly referred to the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma." This gave us an insight into the meaning of the "deep end of the pool."

On similar occasions in the past, terms such as the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma" were taboo. They were unmentionable. One could not even say them aloud. How then, could anyone address the problems associated with them? No agreement has ever been reached on terms such as "one China," or the "one China framework." Even Beijing, which formulated the concepts, cannot not tell you precisely what they mean. Nor has anyone ever asked Beijing, "Just what is is the one China framework you refer to?" The recent Cross-Strait Peace Forum at least asked the question, "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" These are hard questions. They require wading into the deep end of the pool. Asking and answering such questions requires courage.

In other words, before one can ask hard questions, one must first be willing to use controversial terminology. One must be willing to use such controversial terms as the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and " President Ma." Only then can one ask the hard questions, including the question, "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" If we dare not use these controversial terms, how can we enter the deep end of the pool? In this respect, the forum offered two bright spots.

One. This forum earnestly and frankly addressed the issue of the two sides' sovereignty and jurisdiction. Kao Yu-jen argued for "mutual recognition of overlapping sovereignty, and mutual respect for separate jurisdiction." This would establish a consensus on some of the controversial terminology. During the forum, Mainland and other conference participants were impressive in their frankness. First, Mainland participants showed no reservations about using terms such as the "Republic of China" and the " Constitution of the Republic of China." Secondly, Mainland participants tended to agree with other participants' references to "mutual recognition of each others' jurisdiction" or " one country, two governments." For example, Xiamen University scholar Liu Xuesheng said, "The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China are two hostile regimes inside the territory of one country." He said, "One China should not be equated with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." Peking University scholar Li Yihu said, "Linkages should be actively sought between the two sides. The one China Constitution is worth considering." Renmin University scholar Huang Jiashu said, "The Mainland must face the fact that on Taiwan there is a system of government that is not part of the People's Republic of China system of government." Finally, the "Minutes of the General Assembly" pointed out that "problems involving interactions between public officials from the two sides must be properly dealt with." The term "public officials" attracted the most attention.

Such acknowledgements point to the hard question "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" Kao Yu-jen argued for "mutual recognition of overlapping sovereignty." He even hinted at the possibility of a "third concept" transcending the ROC and the PRC, a "generic concept of China" or "Big Roof Concept of China." In short, this was one of the bright spots of the forum. It introduced controversial terminology into the debate. It waded into the deep end of the pool.

Two. The forum affirmed the understanding reached during the Ma Xi meeting. The forum noted that, "Leaders from both sides of the Strait made an important contribution to regional and world peace. They recommended and actively created the requisite conditions. The form and content of the forum helped bring about mutually acceptable solutions." The forum reached a consensus on the term "leaders from the two sides." They agreed that Ma and Xi should address each other as "leader of the Taiwan authorities" and "leader of the Mainland authorities." This would facilitate a Ma Xi meeting. If the two sides can refer to each other as "leaders," then the question of sovereignty and jurisdiction has been sorted out to some degree.

Peace forum members differed over the Ma Xi meeting. Mainland think tanks wanted a peace agreement first, and a Ma Xi meeting next. Taiwan scholars thought that a peace agreement might be difficult to achieve. If a peace agreement was made a precondition to a Ma Xi meeting, that might be a deal breaker. They suggested substituting a "Peace Declaration." Actually the two sides differed on the peace agreement itself. Mainland think tanks said a peace agreement would not be a "reunification agreement," but it would not preclude a move toward reunification. Taiwan scholars thought that an "agreement" should not be a "legal commitment." It should not amount to "kidnapping" or even a "wedding engagement." These are the controversial terms. These are the hard questions that require wading into the deep end of the pool.

The recent Cross-Strait Peace Forum amounted to "private sector trail blazing." On the Taiwan side, Kao Yu-jen shrugged off government and partisan strictures. He said things the Ma government could not say. He said things the KMT and the DPP dare not say. On the Mainland side, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun fulfilled his pledge to "shatter taboos" upon taking office. He opened the floodgates. He gave Mainland and other forum participants additional room to maneuver. They could now speak openly about the "Republic of China" and the "Constitution of the Republic of China." This was all possible because the forum was a private sector initiative. The two sides confonted reality. This contributed to the success of the forum.

In the past, neither Taiwan nor the Mainland could talk openly about such matters. Dialogue was impossible. Now the two sides can venture into the deep end of the pool. They can use controversial terminology. They can ask the hard questions. Only this will enable them to solve the difficult problems.

兩岸先蓄水，才有深水區
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.23 02:37 am

在首屆兩岸和平論壇上，藍綠紅三方與會者嘴上「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」不絕於口，這才令人見識到什麼叫做「深水區」。

在過去的類似場合，「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」之類語彙幾皆屬禁忌，可說根本「無水」，形同在旱地游泳，如何進入「深水區」？另如，「一個中國」或「一中框架」，過去從來皆未有一共認的定義，連作此主張的北京亦說不出個所以然來，卻也沒有人追問北京「你說的一中框架究竟是什麼？」；但此次兩岸和平論壇上，至少提出了「如何釐清一個中國框架和兩岸各自現行規定之間的法理關係？」這類問題。這才是「深水區」的問題，能夠提出並解答此類問題才能叫做進入「深水區」。

也就是說，要進入深水區，先得蓄水。先要使用深水區的語言，包括「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」等；再要面對深水區的問題，包括「如何釐清一個中國框架和中華民國憲法與中華人民共和國憲法之間的法理關係」。倘若不肯注水，如何進入深水區？簡略而言，此會有兩大亮點：

第一、此會真正進入兩岸主權與治權關係的公開探討。高育仁在揭幕式提出「互相承認重疊的主權，互相尊重分立的治權」之主張，確立了此會「深水區」的格局。會中，大陸與會者在這方面的發言令人印象深刻。首先，大陸與會者完全不忌諱使用「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」等語彙。其次，大陸與會者透露出傾向同意「相互承認治權」或「一國兩府」的意向。例如，廈門大學劉學深說，「中華人民共和國與中華民國是一個中國境內兩個敵對政權的關係」，又說，「一個中國不要輕易等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」；北京大學李義虎說，「應積極尋找能實現兩岸雙方對接的紐帶，『憲法一中』可作參考」；人民大學黃嘉樹說，「大陸首先面對一個事實，即在台灣存在著一個不隸屬於中華人民共和國的政府體系」。最後，在《大會紀要》中，又指出「妥善處理兩岸公務機關人員互動之相關問題」；其中，「公務機關人員」六字最受矚目。

這類發言與認知，均指向了「如何釐清一個中國框架和中華民國憲法與中華人民共和國憲法之間的法理關係」的深水區問題，而高育仁所倡「相互承認重疊的主權」，更不啻指出中華民國與中華人民共和國二者之上，有無可能出現一個「第三概念」或「上位概念」的「屋頂中國」？總之，此會最亮麗的成果即在：要進入深水區，先得使用深水區的語彙，更要提出深水區的問題。

第二，此會表達了兩岸為馬習會催生的「共同認知」。大會指出：「兩岸領導人會晤的實現……是對地區及世界和平的重要貢獻。建議……積極創造條件，就會晤之形式和內容等安排，努力促成雙方均可接受的方案」。其實，若能採納此會所達成共同認知的「兩岸領導人」五字，引導馬習互稱「台灣當局領導人」及「大陸當局領導人」，則馬習會即有實現之可能。因為，雙方若互稱「領導人」，即顯示已經在某種程度上階段性地理順了兩岸治權與主權的「法理關係」。

關於馬習會，和平論壇中有一爭議。大陸智囊主張，先有《和平協議》，再有馬習會；台灣學者則認為《和平協議》有難度，若主張以《和平協議》為前提，馬習會必破局，可代以《和平宣言》。其實，關於《和平協議》，兩岸亦有歧見。大陸有智囊主張，雖非「統一協議」，但「不排除統一的政治指向」；台灣有學者則認為，《協議》不是「綁約」，並非「綁架」，也不是「雙方婚約」。這些，才是紮紮實實的深水區語言，也才是結結棍棍的深水區問題。

此次兩岸和平論壇，可謂建立了「民間先行」的典範。在台灣方面，高育仁擺脫了政府與政黨的牽絆，言馬政府所不能言，亦言國民黨與民進黨所不敢言；大陸方面，在習李體制下的台辦主任張志軍，相當程度地履行了他就任時「打破禁區」的承諾，開閘放水，使得大陸與會者較有自主發揮的空間，至少已可把「中華民國」與「中華民國憲法」掛在嘴上，因此較具「民間」色彩。雙方正視現實，促成了此會的成功。

過去，台灣之不敢談，與大陸之不准說，皆使深水區無水。現在，雙方要往池中注水，用深水區的語言，談深水區的問題，才有可能找到出入深水區的方案。