Political Dialogue Will Enable Win/Win

Political Dialogue Will Enable Win/Win
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 29, 2013

Summary: Today the two sides must set aside their prejudices. They must refrain from further self-righteousness. They must plant their feet firmly on solid ground. They must proceed from low-level political dialogue to high-level political negotiation. We hope the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will be guided by their wisdom. We hope they will find a win-win situation, and achieve the best possible result.

Full text below:

In early October, scholars from private sector Red, Blue, and Green camp think tanks participated in a Cross-Strait Peace Forum held in Shanghai. The forum focused on cross-Strait political dialogue. It addressed such issues as a peace agreement, military confidence building measures, and Taipei's international space. The two sides also discussed the complex issue of sovereignty and jurisdiction. On the 18th, President Ma Ying-jeou met for the first time with Foreign Policy Committee members from the US. He told them that the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices was political, not economic in nature. On the 26th, Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung attended a cross-Strait trade and cultural forum on the Chinese mainland. He said that the two sides encountered political problems while discussing economics. There is a reason for this. The time for cross-Strait political dialogue has arrived.

Here, we would like to emphasize that political dialogue is not something to be dreaded. Political negotiations are not synonymous with reunification. The picture for Taiwan is worsening. Military conflict is a lose/lose proposition. It is the worst case scenario. Only cross-Strait political negotiation can resolve these problems. As long as conditions are right, and we are well-prepared, there is no reason why political dialogue between the two sides cannot become political negotiations. Cross-Strait relations are of course not relations between separate nations. Cross-Strait issues are not international issues. The United States and the CCP held talks in Geneva and Warsaw from the mid-1950s until the late 1960s. The two sides talked for ten years. Nothing concrete came of the talks. But continuing to interact with each other increased understanding. It served a purpose, and provides us with a precedent.

During this very first peace forum in Shanghai, many scholars from Taiwan spoke of "mutual non-recognition of sovereignty, mutual non-repudiation of jurisdiction." This to a considerable extent, reflects the Ma administration's thinking. Many even suggested that Mainland Affairs Council Director Chang Chi-jun and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yuqi have already addressed each other by their official titles. Therefore Beijing may wish to consider the possibility of the two sides recognizing each others' jurisdiction. This argument has something to be said for it. The CCP never directly addresses the cross-Strait diplomatic truce. Beijing is concerned. If it agrees that the two sides do not recognize each others' sovereignty, that means that another sovereign entity besides Beijing exists. The mutual recognition of jurisdiction could lead to the erosion of Beijing's sovereignty. Beijing's concerns are not entirely baseless.

During the Peace Forum in Shanghai, some compared current cross-Strait relations to a wedding engagement. Taipei is not ready, but Beijing wants to deceive Taipei or force Taipei to marry, and even abduct her. Academics emerging from their ivory towers and making themselves understood by the general public by discussing cross-Strait relations in everyday vernacular is not a bad thing. But we have a different analogy. The Mainland is a big lug pursuing Taiwan, a delicate beauty. He constantly seeks intimacy. He wants to hold her tiny hand. Taiwan initally sought wealth and objected to his poverty. But when the Mainland became immensely wealthy, Taiwan complained that he was not civilized enough. When the Mainland obtained advanced degrees, and a level of sophistication, Taiwan complained that he could not speak any foreign languages. When the Mainland finally meets all of Taiwan's demands, Taiwan will object that the Mainland is too old, and refuse any further advances. Where there is no will, there is no way.

Another, even more vivid metaphor is that Taiwan merely wants to cohabitate. Taiwan does not want to get married. Taiwan merely wants to enjoy the relationship. Taiwan wants all the benefits of a relationship, but one of the legal obligations of marriage. In cross-Strait relations, it means that as long as Taiwan can benefit, it will want all the benefits, but will refuse to commit to marriage, i.e.,  reunification. Instead, Taiwan is merely playing the Mainland for a fool. Some may ask whether Taiwan the male or the female? Perhaps it is the male or the female as conditions demand. Time drags on, but the two sides remain incapable of establishing their legal status. What if one day Taiwan finds itself playing the role of "the other woman?" Is time really on Taiwan's side? This is a question worth pondering.

Objectively speaking, if a Ma Xi meeting can be arranged, the two sides' leaders can issue a joint declaration or joint communique expressing their proposals and positions. They can progress from cross-Strait peaceful dialogue to political negotiations to the signing of a peace agreement. The language need not include any explicit rejection of Taiwan independence secession or support for national reunification. But we are pursuing cross-Strait coexistence, cooperation, and a renaissance of Chinese civilization. If even such implications and declarations of intent are ruled out, why would Beijing bother to sign such an agreement? Negotiation means compromise. Taking without giving, or giving without taking, while expecting completely open negotiatons could backfire. One could paint oneself into a corner, and find oneself forced to solve the problem some other way. The possibility of success under such circumstances would be slight.

Recall the past. The two sides may consider their own official policies flawless. But that is hardly the case. Beijing once harbored doubts about Taipei's National Unification Council and Guidelines for National Unification. It harbored the same doubts about the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the percentage of people on Taiwan who consider themselves Chinese continues to decline. Reunification has become a desirable but unachievable luxury. As for Taiwan, in 1989 Chen Lifu proposed a US$10 billion dollar cooperative venture with Beijing. It would promote Sun Yatsen's Industrial Plan, cross-Strait mutual trust, and help achieve the goal of national reunification. Today, 10 billion, 100 billion, even a trillion would not help. The relative strength of the two sides is already clear. Time, as it turns out, was not on our side. Obviously both sides have much soul-searching to do.

Today the two sides must set aside their prejudices. They must refrain from further self-righteousness. They must plant their feet firmly on solid ground. They must proceed from low-level political dialogue to high-level political negotiation. We hope the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will be guided by their wisdom. We hope they will find a win-win situation, and achieve the best possible result.

社論－從政治對話創造兩岸雙贏
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年10月29日 04:10

10月上旬，兩岸民間智庫廣邀紅、藍、綠三方學者在上海舉行和平論壇，討論重點在於兩岸政治對話，其中除了觸及和平協議、軍事安全互信、台灣的國際活動空間等議題之外，也討論了複雜的兩岸主權和治權的問題；18日，馬英九總統在接見美國外交政策全國委員會訪問團時首度表示，兩岸互設辦事處的協議不是經濟性質，而是屬於政治性質；26日，在中國大陸出席兩岸經貿文化論壇的國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄也表示，兩岸終究會碰到經中有政的問題。事出有因，看來兩岸政治對話已經逐漸提到日程表上來了。

於此，我們要強調的是，政治對話並不是洪水猛獸，政治談判並不等於統一談判，既然現況對台灣逐漸不利，而軍事衝突又是雙輸的最壞結果，兩岸未來只有透過政治談判解決問題，所以只要在條件成熟，準備周詳的情況下，雙方循序漸進的由政治對話進入政治談判並非絕不可為。當然，兩岸關係並非國與國關係，兩岸問題也非國際問題，但當年美國與中共的會談，從日內瓦會談到華沙會談，由1950年代中期一直到1960年代末期，雙方談了十幾年雖無具體成就，但對維持彼此互動及增加了解，還是起了一定程度的作用，可為借鏡。

在上海首屆和平論壇中，許多台灣學者提及兩岸主權互不承認、治權互不否認一事，這在相當程度上確實反應了馬英九政府的政策思維。不少人甚至主張，既然國台辦主任張志軍和陸委會主委王郁琦已經以官銜相互稱呼，大陸不妨進一步思考兩岸治權相互承認的可能。此說，表面上有其合理之處，但就像中共從來不曾正面回應兩岸外交休兵一樣，北京所擔心的是，只要一回應主權互不承認就意味著除了北京之外還有一個主權存在，而治權的相互承認則又有可能對主權造成侵蝕性的效果，大陸的顧忌並非全然無的放矢。

在上海和平論壇中，有人提及兩岸關係目前像是訂婚，台灣還沒準備好中共就想要騙婚、逼婚，甚至搶婚。學者願意走出象牙塔，用一般民眾可以理解的辭彙來討論兩岸關係當然不是件壞事，但是我們想到的另一個比喻是，大陸這個粗壯大漢正在追求台灣這位美女，總想一親芳澤、牽牽小手，台灣先是嫌貧愛富，等到大陸財富倍增又嫌對方不夠文明，直到大陸也得了高級學位，文明程度精進，此時台灣又嫌北京不懂外語，等到北京一切滿足了台北的需要，台灣此時卻嫌北京已經太老，仍然拒絕往來，沒有意願一切白搭。

另外一個更形象的比喻是，台灣現在只要同居，不要結婚，只想享受兩人世界，美好關係的一切好處，但就是不要承擔任何因為婚姻關係而來的法律義務。在兩岸關係上，這就意味著台灣只要好處，所有的好處都要，但就是不肯做出對統一（婚姻）的承諾，直把中國大陸當個傻大個耍得暈頭轉向。不過這裡有些人不禁要問的是，到底台灣是男是女，還是既可男又是女，角色居然能夠相互轉換？久拖不決，雙方不能有個合法名份，萬一台灣有一天把自己玩成所謂的剩女，時間到底站不站在台灣的一方，還真值得深思。

客觀的來看，未來的馬習會若能成局，雙方領導人可以用共同宣言、聯合公報的方式來表達各自或共同的主張和立場。而未來兩岸從和平對話、政治談判走向簽署和平協議時，其中或許可以沒有直接反對台獨分裂主義、支持國家統一的明確字眼，但若連追求兩岸共存共榮、合作振興中華這些具有特定意涵，隱晦、指向性的表述也被完全排除，北京能否簽下類此協議實在讓人懷疑？談判是一個妥協的過程，只要不給或只給不要，期望一個完全開放式的協議，最後反而成了局限自己以其他方式解決問題的政策選項，這種可能性委實不大。

回顧過去，兩岸官方或許認為自己的政策一貫正確，但事實並非如此。北京當年對台灣的國統會、國統綱領曾有疑慮，對於九二共識一度也有看法，結果今日台灣自認自己也是中國人的比例仍在持續下滑，統一如果不是奢望也成了個可欲而不可得的盼望；至於台灣方面，八九年之後陳立夫曾經主張以100億美元與中共合作，推動國父的實業計畫，促進兩岸互信，希望有助實現國家統一的目標，如今莫說百億，千億、萬億也已於事無補，兩岸強弱已然易勢，時不我予已成事實。雙方顯然都有值得檢討之處。

於今之計，放下成見，切莫再自以為是，雙方都要腳踏實地的在已有的基礎上，先由低階的政治對話往前發展，再往高階的政治談判方面進行規畫，我們熱切期望，用兩岸中國人的智慧，早日找到一條雙贏、多贏的出路和最佳結果。