Giving In Order to Get: Fair and Reasonable Cross-Strait Arrangements

Giving In Order to Get: Fair and Reasonable Cross-Strait Arrangements
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 30, 2013

Summary: Recently Liu Guosheng, President of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, issued some "Suggestions for Peaceful Development and Fair and Reasonable Arrangements." This should be considered a breakthrough on the Mainland side. Liu's suggestions are worth affirming. The two sides need not remain mired in empty rhetoric and vain babblings. Liu's suggestions offer a rough draft. The two sides should see them as food for thought.

Full text below:

The CCP 18th National Congress Political Report spoke of "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation is not yet reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." Recently Liu Guosheng, President of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, issued some "Suggestions for Peaceful Development and Fair and Reasonable Arrangements." This should be considered a breakthrough on the Mainland side. Nevertheless, Liu's suggestions include some serious blind spots.

During the Cross-Strait Peace Forum Liu Guosheng said, "Current cross-Strait political relations are relations within the same nation's sovereign territory. They are relations between two opposing regimes of differing strength." He added, "Do not lightly equate one China with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." These two passages made two breakthroughs.

One. Liu publicly referred to the two sides as "two opposing regimes." Two. Liu added that "One China should not be lightly equated with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." But Liu's suggestions also included a blind spot. Since "one China" should not be equated with either the PRC or the ROC, just what is the "one China" he is referring to? As we can see, Liu Guosheng's suggestions may contain breakthroughs. But they also contain blind spots.

A. Liu offered six suggestions. Liu apparently wanted to make breakthroughs in order to improve the situation. But his six suggestions call for an "end to hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement" as a precondition. They do not see these breakthroughs and improvements as paving the way for the signing of the peace agreement.

For example, Liu suggests that the "Taiwan side first formally approve the two sides, one nation position." He suggested that with the exception of the Olympic Games and other high-visibility international events, the ROC national title, national flag, and national anthem could be displayed at ordinary international events, and that the PRC need not directly intervene whenever the ROC publicly displays its political symbols.

Liu's suggestions recognize that the ROC has a national title, a national flag, and a national anthem. But these breakthroughs and improvements should be viewed as a means of enhancing friendship and mutual trust before the signing of a peace agreement. They should not be used as bargaining chips in exchange for a peace agreement. In recent years, Beijing has changed its stand on the display of ROC flags at international sports events. It no longer advocates public and direct interference. It knows that if it reacts too harshly, the public on Taiwan will be even more opposed to a peace agreement. Liu spoke of "two sides, one country." He spoke of "after the Taiwan side officially recognizes that the two sides are one country." He said "Do not lightly equate one China with either the Peoples Republic of China or the Republic of China." What did Liu mean by "one country" in his suggestions? That has yet to be made clear. His premise has yet to be defined. Therefore it cannot serve as an instrument of theoretical interpretation or political implementation.

B. Liu's suggestions also say that "with the end of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement, the Mainland may gradually relax restrictions on the Taiwan side's central government, with the exception of agencies involved in national defense and foreign diplomacy. It may gradually relax restrictions on the terminology for Taiwan side agencies. Scare quotes would no longer be used. Officials would be addressed by their official titles. Under these preconditions the two sides could increase mutual trust. Even the Taiwan authorities official titles are negotiable.

Such remarks show that Beijing is aware of what cross-Strait improvements and breakthroughs must be made. But if we already know that cross-Strait relations are "relations between two regimes," why characterize them as "relations between two hostile regimes?" Why not characterize them as "coopetition between two friendly regimes?" If we can do this, then the changes in official titles can lay the groundwork for a peace agreement, instead of presenting an obstacle to a peace agreement.

C. The chief blind spot in Liu's suggestions is the sovereignty issue. Liu supports "mutual non-recognition of sovereignty claims" and  opposes "two Chinas with different names but the same substance." This is Beijing's proposal. The Ma government refers to it as "non-recognition of each other's sovereignty." But according to this logic, the two sides "do not recognize each other's sovereignty." According to this logic, the PRC and the ROC are "two opposing regimes" that constitute "two governments." But neither the PRC nor the ROC can be "lightly equated with one China." We must work together to create a "Third Concept of China," or a "Big Roof Concept of China" that transcends both the PRC and the ROC. Otherwise how can we establish what Liu spoke of, "two regimes within one China?"

Liu's suggestions show that Beijing realizes the current arrangement includes many senseless and unreasonable conditions. These senseless and unreasonable conditions should not exist. Therefore a peace agreement is all the more urgent. We must try to improve these conditions. We must create the conditions necessary for a peace agreement. Two conditions are essential. One. Do not equate one China with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China. Instead, create a "Third Concept of China" or "Big Roof Concept of China." Two. Before the two sides sign a peace agreement or reach a final solution, they should see each other as "two regimes enagaged in friendly coopetition." They should see each other as "hostile regimes." After all, the two sides are no longer fighting a civil war.

Liu's suggestions are worth affirming. The two sides need not remain mired in empty rhetoric and vain babblings. Liu's suggestions offer a rough draft. The two sides should see them as food for thought.

拋玉引玉：兩岸共議合情合理的安排
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.30 02:34 am

中共十八大政治報告指出，「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」；最近，廈門大學台灣研究院院長劉國深提出「和平發展合情合理安排幾點建議」，可視為陸方首次推出的試探方案。劉案有若干突破，但仍有重大盲點。

劉國深在「兩岸和平論壇」中說：「當前兩岸政治關係是同一國家領土主權之內的兩個綜合實力懸殊的對立政權關係。」又說：「不要輕易將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國。」這兩段話的突破點是，將兩岸公開稱作「兩個對立的政權」，並稱「不宜將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」；其盲點則在，既不宜將「一個中國」等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國，則「一個中國」究何所指？劉國深的突破及盲點，延續存在於他的「幾點建議」中：

一、劉案提出六點「建議」，似有突破及改善現狀之意，但這六點建議皆以「在結束敵對狀態、簽署和平協議後」為前提，卻非主張用這些突破及改善，來作為「簽署和平協議之前」的氛圍及條件。

例如，劉案建議：「在兩岸一國的立場得到台方正式認可後，除了奧運會等少數高能見度的國際活動嚴格要求暫時不出現台灣方面的國號、國旗、國歌外，一般性國際活動不再公開直接干預台灣方面政治符號和政治象徵出現。」

劉案至少已承認台灣方面有國號、國旗及國歌。但此一突破及改善，似應用在「和平協議簽署之前」，作為創造友善及互信的方法，而非作為「簽署和平協議」的交換條件。實際上，近年來北京對國際運動會看台上的青天白日滿地紅國旗已「不再公開直接干涉」，自是已知倘再蠻橫禁阻，台灣民意就會更加反對簽署《和平協議》。至於「在兩岸一國的立場得到台方正式認可後」，其中的「兩岸一國」，倘是「不要輕易等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」，則究竟指的是什麼「一國」，劉案仍未釋明，而由於此一前提既無明確定義，即不能作為理論演繹及實政執行的工具。

二、劉案又稱：「在結束敵對狀態、簽署和平協議後，大陸在兩岸交往場合遇到台方的中央機構，除涉及國防、外交等少數機構外，可考慮逐步放寬稱謂限制……不必加引號；其主管官員頭銜可直接稱呼……在兩岸政治互信進一步深化的前提下，可以在兩岸之間直接稱呼台方所有官職，甚至包括台灣當局領導人的正式頭銜問題也可以進行有意義的討論。」

此段論述可見，北京其實完全知道兩岸的改善及突破口在何處；但如前文所引，如果已知應將兩岸視為「兩個政權的關係」，卻為何要將其定性為「兩個敵對的政權」，而不能將之定性為「兩個友善的競合政權」？倘能如此，一切稱謂的改善即可能成為簽署《和平協議》的前置工作，而非簽署的交易條件。

三、劉案主要的盲點仍在「主權」問題，因此主張「互不承認主權的主張……與反對兩個中國有異曲同工之處」。由於北京如此主張，馬政府亦稱「互不承認主權」。然而，若照此說，劉案即不啻指兩岸竟成「互不承認主權」的中華人民共和國與中華民國之間，存有「兩個對立的政權」，遂成「兩國兩府」。然而，既皆知中華人民共和國與中華民國皆「不能輕易等同於一個中國」，則若不能共同創造一個在中華人民共和國與中華民國之上的「第三概念的中國」或「大屋頂中國」，如何可能出現劉案所說「一個中國之內的兩個政權」？

劉案顯示，北京既明知現今的安排有諸多「不合情不合理」，即不應以這些「不合情不合理」作為催迫簽署《和平協議》的政治籌碼，而當盡力改善，用以創造「簽署和平協議」的條件與氛圍。關鍵有二：一、勿將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國，而應共創一個「第三概念或上位概念的大屋頂中國」；二、在簽署和平協議或在兩岸獲致終極解決方案之前，應將兩岸視為「大一中架構下的兩個友善的競合政權」，而不宜輕易將兩岸等同於「兩個敵對政權」，畢竟如今兩岸已絕非內戰情境。

劉案的提出十分值得肯定，今後雙方至少不必陷於無案可資論證的空言虛談。不妨即以劉案為底稿，在兩岸之間形成拋玉引玉的腦力激盪。