Tsai Ing-wen's Declaration of War

Tsai Ing-wen's Declaration of War
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2014

Summary: Cross-Strait relations have become mired in quicksand. But some leverage is still available. The authorities on both sides can keep Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan simple. They can refrain from overly politicizing it. They can refrain from making too many petty calculations. They can cooperate with each other in order to establish a positive atmosphere. They can create the conditions needed to make it happen. This may be a case of "Mission Impossible." But it is worth a try.

Full Text below:

Life is unpredictable. Late last year discussions concerning cross-Strait relations focused on the likelihood of a Ma Xi meeting at this year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. They focused on whether the STA and MTA would help Taiwan's economy. They focused on whether the establishment of cross-strait representative offices would strengthen political relations. Shortly after the Spring Festival, Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Wang Yu-chi and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun met successfully in Nanjing. This raised expectations for cross-Strait peaceful development. No one foresaw the mass protests against the STA in March of this year. Since then, all progress in cross-Strait relations has remained stalled. This was followed by James Soong's trip to the Mainland. Xi Jinping used the opportunity to send an important message to Taiwan. This was followed by the "broad one China declaration" transcending blue vs. green partisanship. Tsai Ing-wen suddenly declared her willingness to meet with Zhang Zhijun at DPP Headquarters when he came to Taiwan, providing there were no preconditions. And finally, Lai Ching-teh, Mayor of Tainan City and a Taiwan independence advocate, visited Shanghai. Events have occurred faster than the eye can follow. Peoples' plans can no longer keep up with the changes.

Among these swift changes however, some things remain as immovable as mountains. For example, the Mainland's Taiwan policy. The central theme of Mainland Taiwan policy is peaceful development. The basis for Xi Jinping era Taiwan policy is that "The two sides of the Strait are one family." No matter how much Taiwan has changed, the Mainland's Taiwan policy has not budged. Time is on the Mainland's side. As long as Taiwan does not cross the line, Beijing will not jump to any conclusions, or change its approach to winning over the public on Taiwan. It will not be affected by momentary frustrations or some random politician's rantings. Objective evidence suggests that public opinion on Taiwan is increasingly alienated from the Mainland. Some even interpret Mainland goodwill as a sign of weakness. The public sees CCP concessions to Taiwan as reunification ploys. The DPP rejects both the carrot and the stick. The rhetoric may change. But the substance remains the same. Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen ordered the DPP to block Ma administration cross-Strait policy at all costs. That much is clear.

Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen expressed a willingness to meet with Director Zhang Zhijun. This is one link in the DPP's 2016 strategy chain. First disrupt Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait relations. Prevent a Xi Ma meeting from taking place. Wait until Ma Ying-jeou has become a lame duck. Then promote reconciliation, including reconciliation with the Mainland. Establish DPP/CCP dialogue. Finally, freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. This is what DPP legislative caucus chief convener Ker Chien-ming told outsiders.

The DPP is indulging in wishful thinking. On the one hand, it is making a show of goodwill toward Mainland China. On the other hand, it is lashing out at the Kuomintang. It wants the public on Taiwan to conclude that the DPP is capable of managing cross-Strait relations, and that the KMT does have an exclusive franchise on cross-Strait affairs. It wants reassure the international community that the DPP is capable of changing with the times, that it is not reactionary, and that it does not oppose change out of sheer obstinacy. The DPP of course believes that this strategy will succeed.

But consider this. The DPP may be willing to reconcile with the Mainland. Tsai Ing-wen may welcome a visit by Zhang Zhijun. But have the DPP and Tsai actually changed their policy path? Or have they merely changed their public relations strategy? Tsai Ing-wen said she was willing to meet with Zhang Zhijun -- without preconditions. But what was her stipulation, other than a precondition? Zhang Zhijun visiting the Democratic Progressive Party is tantamount to party to party exchanges with the Chinese Communist Party. Unless the DPP forsakes Taiwan independence, such an exchange is impossible. Anyone with any shred of common sense knows this.

The Taipei Declaration, initiated by Shih Ming-teh, addressed sovereignty, jurisdiction, and even national identity. It was unavoidable. It was similar to the interim agreement advocated by Kenneth Lieberthal and Harry Harding. First the two sides proposed a closed interim agreement with the ultimate goal of reunification. Taipei was the first to reject this. The Mainland refused to respond. Later they offered an improved, open interim agreement without reunification as a goal. Chen Shui-bian was probably willing to accept it. But Beijing naturally rejected it. In the end it all came to nothing. Within the "broad one China framework," the "one China" is virtual, the "two countries" is real. As a result the authorities on both sides have reverted to long held official positions. Beijing reaffirms that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. Taipei reaffirms the 1992 Consensus.

For the time being, the STA has no hope of passage. The MTA and other trade negotiations have also been suspended. Polls conducted on Taiwan indicate declining Identification with China. The Chinese mainland is deeply frustated with the cross-Strait status quo. The key obstacle to improved cross-Strait relations is internal politics on Taiwan. The DPP has made clear that it will not allow the STA to pass. Tsai Ing-wen has said she will wage full scale war in the Legislative Yuan over the STA, the cross-strait oversight regulations, and free trade zones. The Ma administration will probably find it difficult to improve cross-Strait relations.

Cross-Strait relations have become mired in quicksand. But some leverage is still available. The authorities on both sides can keep Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan simple. They can refrain from overly politicizing it. They can refrain from making too many petty calculations. They can cooperate with each other in order to establish a positive atmosphere. They can create the conditions needed to make it happen. This may be a case of "Mission Impossible." But it is worth a try.

社論－解讀蔡英文的戰鬥宣言
2014年06月11日 04:10
本報訊

世事難料，去年底展望兩岸關係，討論最多的是今年亞太經合會期間馬習會的可能、兩岸服貿及貨貿協議對台灣經濟的幫助、兩岸互設兩會辦事機構對政治關係的強化等。春節過後，陸委會主委王郁琦與國台辦主任張志軍在南京成功會面，令人對兩岸和平發展大局大有期待。任何人大概想不到會有今年3月反服貿群眾運動，使得所有兩岸關係進展都受到波及、延宕；接著是宋楚瑜的大陸行，習近平藉機發表對台重要宣示，然後又有所謂跨藍綠大一中架構宣言；還有就是蔡英文突然表示，願在不設前提的情況下，與訪台的張志軍在民進黨中央黨部見面；最後就是台獨支持者台南市市長賴清德訪問上海。事態發展讓人目不暇給，誠所謂計畫趕不上變化。

但在種種快速變動中，卻有一些事顯得不動如山，譬如大陸對台政策。和平發展是大陸對台政策主軸、兩岸一家親則是習近平時代對台策略的總依據，不論台灣怎麼變，大陸對台政策卻未有任何搖擺移動。既然時間站在大陸的一方，只要台灣沒有出格的舉措，北京斷不會為了一時的挫折或某些政治人物一時的言論，而遽下定論，或改變其爭取台灣民心的作法。雖然一些客觀的事實顯示，台灣民意仍在往異化的方向發展，某些人更把大陸的善意視為軟弱，民眾把中共的對台讓利視為統戰陰謀，民進黨則是軟硬不吃，不斷變換說法，本質卻未變，這從蔡英文主席下達強硬抵制馬政府兩岸政策的命令，可以得到證實。

先說蔡英文主席表示願意與張志軍主任見面，其實是民進黨因應2016策略大布局的一環，先打斷馬英九的兩岸關係布局，阻擾習馬會實現，等馬英九徹底跛腳後，接著推動大和解，包括對大陸的和解，以建立民共對話關係，最後要凍結台獨黨綱，這是民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘對外的透露。

民進黨的如意算盤是，一方面對中國大陸表達善意，另一方面要打擊國民黨，希望讓台灣民眾相信，民進黨同樣有能力妥善處理兩岸關係，兩岸事務並非國民黨的專利，同時又可以讓國際社會放心，表明民進黨能夠與時俱進，不會食古不化的為反對而反對。對此，民進黨當然自以為得計。

但是，我們必須確認，民進黨願意與大陸和解、蔡英文歡迎張志軍來訪，究竟是策略的調整或路線的改變？細就蔡英文所謂願意在沒有前提下與張志軍見面，其實就是一個前提，要張志軍往訪民進黨中央黨部，形同與中共進行黨對黨交流，民進黨未放棄台獨情形下有無可能，只要用常識就能判斷。

施明德主導的台北宣言，同時涉及主權與治權，和國家認同更脫不了關係，其內涵相當程度上和當年李侃如、何漢理等人主張的中程協議相似。彼等首先提出的是封閉式，有終極統一目標的兩岸中程協議，台北拒絕在先，大陸也就沒有回應，後來再提改良式中程協議，採開放、沒有統一願景的模式，即使陳水扁政府有意接受，北京當然嚴詞拒絕，終告無疾而終。大一中架構中的一中其實是虛，兩國為實，因此兩岸官方仍然回到一貫立場，北京強調兩岸非國與國關係，台北政府也重申九二共識。

《兩岸服貿協議》暫時生效無望，貨貿協議及其他經貿議題協商均已暫停，台灣民意調查的中國認同持續降低，中國大陸對兩岸現狀應有很大的挫折感。當前兩岸問題的關鍵是在台灣內政，民進黨已經表明不會讓《服貿協議》短期內過關，蔡英文放話要在立法院為反《服貿協議》、反兩岸監督條例、反經濟示範區條例激烈戰鬥，看來馬英九政府已經很難再強力推動兩岸關係的進一步發展。

兩岸關係陷入泥淖，但仍有改變的槓桿支點。如果兩岸當局願意將張志軍訪台單純化，不對其訪台賦與太多政治意涵，不要在枝節上有太多算計或小動作，彼此配合營造氣氛、創造條件，積極促成，或許是一個化不可能為可能的作法，機會不大卻值得一試。