Unconditional Acceptance: Tsai Ing-wen Has No Alternative

Unconditional Acceptance: Tsai Ing-wen Has No Alternative
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2014

Summary: In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen forced Chen Shui-bian to repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing is now waiting for her to declare that she will adhere to 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. In 2013 Tsai Ing-wen "unconditionally accepted" ECFA. Now, however, she has ruined her chance to "unconditionally accept" the STA and Free Trade Zones. Globalization is here to stay. If the DPP hopes to return to power, it must "unconditionally accept" and "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen has no other alternative.

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Tsai Ing-wen was elected party chair by 93% of the vote. This underscores her standing within the DPP. The next day, a poll showed her public approval rating trailing Eric Chu's by a mere 1%. This underscores her political support among the general public.

Following her defeat in 2012, Tsai Ing-wen said that if it hopes to return to power, the DPP must focus on the "final mile." Having been elected party chair however, she has changed her tune. She now says that she wants the DPP to focus on the "first mile." She said "Let us change the DPP, and furthermore change Taiwan." But the media thinks Tsai Ing-wen had better change Tsai Ing-wen first.

Does the DPP hope to return to power? If it does, it makes no difference whether it focuses on the "last mile" or the "first mile." The only change that will make a difference is changing its cross-Strait policy. It must put people at ease. But what did Tsai Ing-wen do? She demanded a constitutional amendment to promote the the "first mile." Clearly her words are at odds with her actions. They may well be a smokescreen to confuse the public.

Tsai Ing-wen argues that a constitutional amendment is required because the "votes are not of equal value." She says this is the main reason the DPP cannot win in Kinmen, Lianjiang, Taitung, Hualien, and sparsely populated aboriginal legislative districts. She says this leads to discrepancies in the votes to seats ratio. But the problem is not with the electoral system. There is no reason Kinmen and Matsu cannot be a single district. The DPP loses because of its image and its policies. Tsai Ing-wen's real motives for demanding a constitutional amendment are threefold. One. She hopes to discredit the constitution. She hopes to falsely characterize it as unfair to the DPP. Two. She hopes to turn the constitutional amendment into a political football. She hopes to drag in all sorts of issues, including national identity and the presidential system vs. the cabinet system. She hopes to confuse the public. The constitutional amendment will not pass. But she will have succeeded in muddying the political waters. Three. She hopes to demagogue constitutional issues to draw attention away from her defective cross-Strait policies. She hopes to confuse the public. She hopes to avoid cross-Strait issues by seeking safety in constitutional issues.

This is known as "setting the agenda." Tsai Ing-wen knows that cross-Strait issues are the key to 2016. She knows she cannot escape this fact. Therefore she hopes to drag in constitutional issues to confuse the public. She hopes to reduce pressure on herself and the DPP on cross-Strait issues. Unfortunately this amounts to "covering one's ears while stealing a bell." This is an "ostrich with its head in the sand" strategy.

Chao Tian-ling was Tsai Ing-wen's Director of Chinese Affairs during her first term as party chair. Chao visited the US in February. According to Chao, U.S. officials said the DPP does not recognize the 1992 Consensus, therefore 2016 will probably be a replay of 2012. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen failed to complete the "final mile" because she refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen now insists on a replay the same script with her "first mile." If Tsai Ing-wen hopes for a different outcome, she must begin by reversing her position on the 1992 Consensus.

Frank Hsieh unsuccessfully attempted to substitute his "Constitutional Consensus" for the 1992 Consensus. As everyone could see, the Beijing authorities reiterated their bottom line. They demanded adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Beijing clearly has no intention of yielding on this point. The 1992 Consensus is a familiar proposition for both sides. Its meaning is clear. It needs no further elaboration. In other words, the agenda for the 2016 presidential election may still be adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. In which case, does Tsai Ing-wen intend to respond by saying "What 1992 Consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen may be able to get elected by refusing to respond altogether. But she cannot refuse to respond in the event she is elected.

If Tsai Ing-wen cannot escape even the bonds of the 1992 Consensus, she is likely to trip over the same rope again in 2016. Tsai Ing-wen must hitch a ride on the Ma administration bandwagon. She must help the STA, the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Bill, and Free Trade Zone Special Regulations pass.Yet she has openly declared her intention to "forcefully" obstruct them, then sit back and watch as these goldern opportunities are lost. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP return to power, they may refuse to "unconditionally accept" the Ma administration's policies. If so, how will the nation survive?

Tsai Ing-wen should help the DPP and herself by unconditionally accepting those conditions necessary to maintain cross-Strait relations. Globalization and cross-Strait relations leave her no alternative. Besides ECFA. TPP, and RCEP, Taiwan has nowhere else to go. This is where the Ma administration can immediately make a difference. If the DPP refuses to cooperate, Tsai Ing-wen will be helpless in the event she is elected. Even if she is not helpless, she will have missed a golden opportunity. The DPP may be able to "forcefully" obstruct the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. But Tsai Ing-wen must promote the early adoption of these bills. Otherwise she will destroy the very policies she will need to "unconditionally accept." That will amount to political suicide.

In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen forced Chen Shui-bian to repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing is now waiting for her to declare that she will adhere to 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. In 2013 Tsai Ing-wen "unconditionally accepted" ECFA. Now, however, she has ruined her chance to "unconditionally accept" the STA and Free Trade Zones. Globalization is here to stay. If the DPP hopes to return to power, it must "unconditionally accept" and "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen has no other alternative.

概括承受 蔡英文別無他途
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.06.04 04:44 am

蔡英文以九十三‧七％的得票率當選黨主席，這呈現了她在民進黨內的聲望；她在次日發表的民調支持率則僅差朱立倫一個百分點，這顯示了她在社會上的政治行情。

二○一二年落選，蔡英文說民進黨應走向重返執政的「最後一哩」；如今回鍋掌舵，她則改口說要帶民進黨走上重返執政的「第一哩路」。她說：「讓我們從改變民進黨，進一步改變台灣。」媒體則說，蔡英文應先改變蔡英文。

民進黨若欲重返執政，無論是「最後一哩」或「第一哩路」，皆必須改變其兩岸政策，以使國人安心。但蔡英文竟宣示以推動修憲作為其重新出發的「第一哩路」，則顯然文不對題，甚至是亂人耳目的煙幕彈。

蔡 英文主張的修憲主題是「票票不等值」，這主要是因民進黨常無法贏得金門、連江及台東、花蓮，及原住民等人口較少選區的幾席立委，致使總得票數與總席次的比 例出現落差。但這個問題與其說是選制的問題（金馬沒有理由不劃為單一選區），不如說民進黨的政策及形象才是敗選的原因。蔡英文以修憲為謀略的主因是：一、 攻擊憲法，偽稱民進黨因體制而處於不公。二、炒作修憲，引出種種包括國家認同及總統制、內閣制之類的爭議，以擾亂社會視聽；最後修憲未必成局，但已攪渾政 局。三、以炒作修憲來掩蔽兩岸議題，亂人耳目，在修憲的颱風眼中找到迴避兩岸議題的避風港。

這就叫做「議題設定」。蔡英文明知兩岸議題仍是二○一六的核心議題，她絕無可能逃避；但是，她卻想以修憲議題來亂人耳目，以減低兩岸議題給她自己及民進黨所帶來的無可逃逭的壓力。這是掩耳盜鈴，也是鴕鳥策略。

蔡英文首任的中國事務部主任趙天麟說，二月訪美，美方官員說，民進黨不承認九二共識，「恐怕二○一二年的作為，會再看到一次」。二○一二年，蔡英文的「最後一哩」摔倒在「否定九二共識」上；如今蔡英文重作馮婦的「第一哩路」，恐怕得從「重拾九二共識」做起。

自 謝長廷以「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」的嘗試失敗後，眾所共見，北京當局又重新強調「堅持九二共識／反對台獨」的政治底線。北京顯然不會輕易放棄此一主場 議題，因為「九二共識」已是兩岸皆已熟悉的命題，操作起來簡易明確，不必再多費唇舌解說。也就是說，二○一六總統大選的「議題設定」可能仍是「堅持九二共 識／反對台獨」，那麼，蔡英文是否仍然要用二○一二「哪裡有九二共識」的答案回應？蔡英文即使有可能在二○一六年不予回應而當選，但絕無可能若在二○一六 當選後仍不回應。

蔡英文如果連「九二共識」的捆綁都不能跳脫，她在二○一六年就可能被同一條繩子絆倒第二次。尤其，蔡英文若不借用馬政府 之力，將《服貿協議》、《兩岸協議監督條例》及《自由經濟示範區特別條例》等通過，卻聲稱要「採取比較有『力』的方法加以阻擋」，則一旦坐視時機流失，蔡 英文及民進黨未來倘重返執政將連「概括承受」的可能性亦告喪失，則何以維繫國脈民命？

因此，蔡英文應以替民進黨及自己在兩岸關係上籌措 「概括承受」的條件為計。因為，面對無可閃躲的全球化及兩岸關係，除了「ＥＣＦＡ加上ＴＰＰ、ＲＣＥＰ」外，台灣已無路可走；而這正是馬政府當下努力以赴 之事，民進黨若拆了這個台，不但他日蔡英文若執政將沒有補救能力，且即使有補救之心也已錯失了契機。因此，民進黨現在儘管可做些「比較有『力』」的姿態加 以阻擋，但蔡英文仍應設法促使這些法案早日通過，否則即不啻自毀了可以「概括承受」的本錢，無異政治自殺。

蔡英文在二○○○年迫使陳水扁 否定「九二共識」，但如今北京卻等待她對「堅持九二共識／反對台獨」作出回應。蔡英文在二○一二年「概括承受」了ＥＣＦＡ，但如今她卻可能毀了她也可以 「概括承受」的服貿協議及自由經濟示範區。試問：面對全球化的大勢，若想重返執政，除了準備做好「概括承受」，及「延續前朝兩岸政策」之外，蔡英文豈有他 途可走？