How Should the DPP Respond to Earth-Shaking Cross-Strait Changes?

How Should the DPP Respond to Earth-Shaking Cross-Strait Changes?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2015

Executive Summary: Xi Jinping says that if the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for cross-Strait relations, is destroyed, then cross-Strait trust will cease to exist. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos. He said, "Without a solid foundation, the earth will shake." If the DPP rejects the 1992 consensus to the bitter end, it will eventually have to face the consequences. The earth will shake. Therefore it should help the 1992 Consensus to evolve. That is the way to go with the flow and the way to ensure the best outcome.

Full Text Below:

Xi Jinping says that if the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for cross-Strait relations, is destroyed, then cross-Strait trust will cease to exist. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos. He said, "Without a solid foundation, the earth will shake."

Taiwan may well experience a third change in ruling parties in 2016. Xi Jinping laid his cards on the table for the Democratic Progressive Party, which may well return to power. He did this relatively early. On the one hand, he wanted to preempt the DPP's “wait and see” mentality. On the other hand, he wanted to give the DPP more time and more space to maneuver.

In fact, the DPP's understanding of the 1992 consensus and its response to it, has changed. In 2008, Tsai Ing-wen denounced ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan”, and as “undermining sovereignty and humiliating the nation". She opposed the legalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. On the very eve of the 2012 election, Tsai Ing-wen was still advocating "globalization without China." Back then, she blocked cross-Strait exchanges. She insisted that "There is no 1992 consensus. So how can we accept any alleged 1992 consensus?” But after Xi Jinping said "the earth will shake", Tsai Ing-wen changed her tune. She said cross-Strait relations should not be “labeled” as the 1992 consensus. In other words, she finally acknowledged its existence. Tsai Ing-wen spoke of "three constants". She said "The process of cross-Strait exchanges must ensure equal opportunity and diverse participation. Cross-strait exchanges must ensure public welfare and social benefits." This showed that on cross-Strait policy, her bark was worse than her bite. Seven years of changes have revealed major contradictions in the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Back then, the DPP obstructed exchanges. It insisted that "The 1992 consensus does not exist". Today Tsai Ing-wen talks of “equal opportunity and diverse participation” and “public welfare and social benefits". Can she still maintain that the 1992 consensus does not exist?

Tsai Ing-wen recently proposed "three benefits, three constants". These can be summed up as “peace” and "exchanges". But Xi Jinping said peace and cross-Strait exchanges are based on the 1992 consensus, the two sides' "shared political foundation". If the 1992 consensus is destroyed, then "the earth will shake”. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen's call for cross-Straits peace and exchanges without the 1992 consensus, is nothing more than hollow rhetoric.

Tsai Ing-wen can no longer say "Basically there is no 1992 consensus". Wen-Je Ko can no longer say, "I do not know what the contents of the 1992 consensus are". They can no longer feign deafness. In fact, the 1992 consensus is a cross-Strait policy framework that still has room for improvement. On the one hand, DPP acceptance of the 1992 consensus would stabilize cross-Strait peace. On the other hand, the DPP can demand that the 1992 consensus be improved. As Ma Ying-jeou noted, "If the 1992 consensus refers to one China, different interpretations, then I support it". The DPP can say, "If the 1992 consensus ensures equal opportunity and diverse participation, public welfare and social benefits, then we support it." In short, the DPP cannot refuse to accept the 1992 consensus. Instead, it must make every effort to improve the 1992 consensus.

Why does the Democratic Progressive Party oppose the 1992 consensus? Put bluntly, because it cannot cast off Taiwan independence. It feels compelled to pander to its supporters, many of whom persist in advocating Taiwan independence. Because the DPP cannot cast off Taiwan independence, it cannot recognize a "constitutional one China". Because it cannot recognize a “constitutional one China", it is reluctant to accept any "one China, different interpretations” style argument. That is why it opposes the 1992 consensus. That is why Beijing regards the DPP's assertion that that "There is no 1992 consensus" as synonymous with advocacy of Taiwan independence. But the global situation has changed. Does the DPP still dare to advocate Taiwan independence? Will the DPP persist in its calls for Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation? If it does, it will continue its opposition to the 1992 consensus. But if cannot and dare not advocate the founding of a Republic of Taiwan, what point is there in rejecting the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations?

Rejecting the 1992 consensus amounts to rejecting the "one China Constitution". It amounts to "backdoor listing" Taiwan independence thinking. Rejecting the "one China Constitution" while upholding "one China, different interpretations", "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence and no use of force” will not fly. The earth will shake. Tsai Ing-wen's “equal opportunity and diverse participation” and “public welfare and social benefits" will remain a pipe dream. 

Taiwan independence is no longer possible. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it cannot evade the matter of the 1992 consensus. It can only work within the framework of the ROC Constitution. It can only attempt to improve the 1992 consensus. This involves three main points. First, the Republic of China is not a means of achieving Taiwan independence. The Republic of China "one China framework" must be honored. Second, “one China” is currently in the "different interpretations" stage. But it may be possible for the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China to exist side by side, and define that as "one China". Third, if "one China" can be defined as a "big roof China", then the two warring sides can become two separately administered sides. This would enable the DPP to switch from the defensive to the offensive, and the passive to the active, vis a vis  the 1992 consensus quagmire, and enable it to undergo transformation. 

If the DPP rejects the 1992 consensus to the bitter end, it will eventually have to face the consequences. The earth will shake. Therefore it should help the 1992 Consensus to evolve. That is the way to go with the flow and the way to ensure the best outcome.

聯合／民進黨如何因應「地動山搖」兩岸變局
2015-03-12 01:32:39 聯合報 聯合報社論

習近平說，如果兩岸共同的政治基礎九二共識遭到破壞，兩岸互信不復存在，兩岸關係將重回動盪不安的老路。他說：「基礎不牢，地動山搖。」

台灣政局可能在二○一六年出現政黨輪替，習近平的談話不啻是對可能重返執政的民進黨攤牌。這個攤牌動作較預期出現得早，一方面是在提前抵制民進黨猶豫觀望的心態，另一方面也形同給民進黨預留了較長且較平緩的轉圜空間。

民進黨對「九二共識」的認知與立場，其實已有改變。在二○○八年，蔡英文指ＥＣＦＡ為「傾中賣台／喪權辱國」，反對兩岸經貿交流法制化；甚至在二○一二年大選前夕，蔡英文尚主張「沒有中國的全球化」。在當年那種「抗阻兩岸交流」的論述架構下，蔡英文的主張是，「根本沒有九二共識／如何接受九二共識」？但是，到了此次習近平提出「地動山搖論」後，蔡英文已改口稱，不宜以「九二共識」將兩岸關係「標籤化」，也就是她終究承認了「九二共識」之存在。蔡英文甚至在其「三個堅持」中強調，「兩岸交流的過程必須多元參與機會平等／兩岸交流的成果必須維護公益與社會共享」，暴露了她在兩岸政策上的色厲內荏。七年的變化顯現了民進黨兩岸政策的重大矛盾：當年民進黨抗阻交流，猶可說「九二共識根本不存在」；如今蔡英文已至主張「多元平等交流／交流利益共享」之地步，則豈能再視「九二共識」為無物？

蔡英文最近所提「三個有利／三個堅持」，可以總結為「和平」與「交流」兩大目標。但習近平則指出，兩岸的和平與交流皆以九二共識為「共同政治基礎」；若九二共識遭到破壞，即是「基礎不牢／地動山搖」。因此，蔡英文僅主張兩岸和平交流，卻迴避九二共識，自然被指為仍是一棵「空心菜」。

蔡英文不能再說「根本沒有九二共識」，柯文哲也不能再說「不知九二共識是何內容」，此皆掩耳盜鈴。其實，「九二共識」迄今仍是一個尚在發展及存有改善空間的兩岸政策架構。為今之計，民進黨應一方面接納「九二共識」在穩定兩岸和平發展上的既有績效，另一方面亦可嘗試對「九二共識」的內涵及運作加以發展與改善。也就是說，正如馬英九說的「九二共識若指一中各表／我支持」；民進黨也可提出「九二共識若指向一種存有發展性及改善空間的方向／我可接受」之類的主張。亦即，民進黨既不可能否定九二共識，即應將心力用於發展及改善九二共識。

民進黨因何反對「九二共識」？直白地說，正是因甩不掉台獨，或必須對其支持者作出主張台獨的姿態。民進黨因甩不掉台獨，所以不能承認「憲法一中」；又因不承認「憲法一中」，所以不願接受「一中各表」之類的論述；再由於不願主張「一中各表」，所以反對「九二共識」。正因如此，北京即將民進黨的「否定九二共識」與「台獨」視為同義詞。然而，世局國情發展至今日地步，民進黨還敢或還能主張台獨嗎？若民進黨仍然堅持獨立建國，其反對九二共識尚猶可說；但若不能亦不敢再主張「建立台灣共和國」，則「否定九二共識」與「否定憲法一中」之意義何在？

否定九二共識，即是否定「一中憲法」，亦是「借殼上市」的台獨思維；但若否定「一中憲法」，則連與大陸維持「一中各表」「不統／不獨／不武」的和平發展亦無以為繼，在「地動山搖」中，更如何實現蔡英文「多元平等交流／交流利益共享」的夢想？

台獨已無可能，民進黨若欲重返執政，即無可能迴避九二共識；而只能設法在中華民國憲法的一中架構下，試圖找出「九二共識」的發展及改善空間。其主要張本有三：一、中華民國不是台獨，因此必須尊重中華民國在「一中架構」中的地位；二、一個中國的內涵目前在「各自表述」階段，但應有可能在中華民國及中華人民共和國並立共生的現實下，來定義「一個中國」；三、若「一個中國」能有「大屋頂中國」的定義，則兩岸交戰政府即有轉向分治政府的可能性。這將是民進黨在「九二共識」的困局中反守為攻、化被動為主動的槓桿，並可借力使力為轉型契機。

民進黨若否定九二共識到底，勢將面臨「地動山搖」的後果；因此，努力爭取九二共識內涵與運作的發展及改善，始是因勢利導、趨吉避凶之計。