Tsai Ing-wen in 2016: Four Uncertainties

Tsai Ing-wen in 2016: Four Uncertainties
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 13, 2015

Executive Summary: Eric Chu may offer a breakthrough in cross-Strait policy, Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, continues to hem and haw. Can the KMT consolidate support behind a single candidate, even if Eric Chu decides not to run? If it can, its election prospects may not remain in the pits. In the coming ten months, leaders of both parties will face an endless string of political and policy challenges. Tsai Ing-wen faces no fewer than the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen's smug complacency is more than a little premature.

Full Text Below:

As soon as the results of the nine in one elections were announced, DPP momentum surged. It now appears as if victory in next year's presidential election is assured. First of all, the DPP presidential candidate has already been decided. The KMT, by contrast, is stuck. Several potential candidates have prior political commitments, or are dogged by controversy. They are unable to rally Kuomintang supporters behind them, never mind win public support. Tsai Ing-wen only has to play a waiting game.

Secondly, the political winds greatly favor the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. Political pundits and ordinary voters alike have concluded that Tsai Ing-wen will unquestionably be the winner in next year's presidential election. Voters on Taiwan have long been "bandwagon jumpers" contemptuous of “born losers”. Therefore the political winds definitely favor Tsai Ing-wen.

Indeed, Tsai Ing-wen has already become smugly complacent. Recently, Tsai Ing-wen said that her presidential campaign strategy “would not spend large sums for advertising, would not resort to traditional organization and mobilization." Instead it would rely on the "cyber army" to "organize and mobilize the biggest defeat ever of the Kuomintang". This is very much how Lai Ching-teh won reelection as mayor. But this strategy overestimates Tsai Ing-wen's online support. It also underestimates the KMT's campaign ability.

Tsai Ing-wen told reporters that "Dealing with interpersonal relationships is important for politicians." She said that she was "quite capable of handling interpersonal relationships, which is why despite many people's pessimism about me, I am still here." Actually, there is a huge gap between Tsai Ing-wen's self-image and her image in political and media circles. This shows just how complacent and self-satisfied she has become. That does not bode well for Tsai Ing-wen.

Should Tsai Ing-wen be optimistic about her election prospects? To answer that question, many objective and subjective factors must be considered. First, there is the Chen Shui-bian factor. Chen and Tsai have unresolved grievances. Their paths differ. Chen's influence is difficult to estimate, and he will be difficult to control. Second, according to various polls, support for the DPP is unquestionably higher than support for the KMT. The gap is also widening. That said, Tsai Ing-wen is not a shoo-in given all possible candidates. Some polls even show her slightly trailing Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng. One pundit says "The presumption is that Tsai Ing-wen is a shoo in. Yet Tsai's poll numbers have never exceeded 50%. They have fluctuated between 42 and 49%."

Former DPP Legislator Julian Kuo noted three major difficulties. He said "During the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen faced three major obstacles. Cross-Strait issues undermined support in Taipei and New Taipei. Support in southern Taiwan was lukewarm. Grassroots campaigns in Taoyuan, Xinchu, and Miaoli were inadequate. Today there still remains much room for improvement." Despite six years of Kuomintang ineptitude, support and enthusiasm for Tsai Ing-wen is actually far less than support for Ma Ying-jeou in 2008.

Third, Tsai Ing-wen's "Final Mile" is not as easy to negotiate as expected. It is much farther away than previously imagined. People know that Tsai Ing-wen's "Final Mile" is all about cross-Strait relations, or more precisely, trilateral relations between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. Early this year, it was rumored that Tsai Ing-wen would visit the US. But so far there has been much thunder and little rain. The word is "conditions have not been set." In other words, Washington is still worried about Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy.

Meanwhile, the Mainland is not merely "listening to Tsai Ing-wen says and watching what she does.” It is already deeply suspicious of her. It has repeatedly expressed concerns regarding positions held by the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. Recently Xi Jinping reiterated, "The 1992 consensus has an irreplaceable role in cross-Strait political trust, dialogue, consultation, and improved relations. If this cross-Strait political foundation is destroyed, cross-Strait trust will be lost. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos." This was the Mainland making its position clear to Tsai Ing-wen and other Taiwan political leaders, ahead of any changes resulting from the upcoming presidential election. 

The DPP has not responded vehemently to the Mainland's declaration. It has not posted anything online. But the DPP's "three benefits" and "three constants" failed to answer any of the substantive questions on everyone's mind. Questions such as how a ruling Democratic Progressive Party would maintain, consolidate, and develop the cross-Strait political trust. Washington and Beijing both harbour doubts about Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen is neither willing nor able to reverse the situation. That means her "Final Mile" will be a long one indeed.

Fourth, the KMT is not standing still. Eric Chu has taken over as party chairman. Step by step, he is going his own way. He is reforming party personnel appointments, restructuring and transforming think tanks, establishing an examination system, resolving the Ma Wang controversy, abolishing honorary chairmanships, and gradually revealing his own political style. Recently, Eric Chu visited Hong Kong and Singapore, raising his international profile. More importantly, he is clear about his support for the 1992 consensus. KMT and CCP  leaders have expressed strong support. He has met Beijing's expectations and allayed Beijing's concerns. This has greatly enhanced his reputation and image. His father in law Kao Yu-jen has advanced a  "Beyond the 1992 Consensus" thesis, leading to public speculation about Eric Chu's cross-Strait stance.

Eric Chu may offer a breakthrough in cross-Strait policy, Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, continues to hem and haw. Can the KMT consolidate support behind a single candidate, even if Eric Chu decides not to run? If it can, its election prospects may not remain in the pits. In the coming ten months, leaders of both parties will face an endless string of political and policy challenges. Tsai Ing-wen faces no fewer than the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen's smug complacency is more than a little premature.

社論－蔡英文2016必勝的四個不一定
2015年03月13日 04:10
本報訊

九合一地方大選結果揭曉後，民進黨聲勢大漲，目前似乎完全掌握了明年總統大選的先機。首先，民進黨的總統候選人已經定於一尊，國民黨還深陷泥淖之中，幾個檯面上可能的候選人不是有政治承諾在前，就是帶有爭議，無法凝聚全體國民黨支持者的團結，甚或是社會接受度較差，蔡英文可以說是以逸待勞。

其次，政治風向大大有利於民進黨、有利於蔡英文，不管是政治觀察家，還是一般選民，對於明年總統大選的結局幾乎已經有了定論，就是「蔡英文穩贏」。台灣的選民素來有「西瓜偎大邊」、「扶起不扶倒」的政治性格，這樣的政治風向，對於蔡英文絕對是一大利多。

事實上，蔡英文的自滿感、驕傲感已經浮現。日前，蔡英文公開表示，總統大選的策略是「不花大錢作廣告、不走傳統組織動員」，要靠「婉君」、「以有史以來最大組織動員打敗國民黨」，很像賴清德連任市長選戰的風格。但蔡英文這個策略首先是高估自己在網路中的支持度，其次是輕忽國民黨的選舉能量。

在之前，蔡英文接受媒體專訪時還表示：「處理人際關係是政治人物重要的元素」，她自己則「滿會處理人際關係，這也是為什麼以前很多人不看好我，但我到現在還可以在這裡。」蔡英文的自我認定，其實和政治圈、媒體圈的看法有很大差距，這完全流露她的自我感覺良好。凡此種種跡象，實非蔡英文之福。

然而，客觀評估蔡英文的選情是否樂觀，還有更重要的主客觀因素需要掌握。首先是陳水扁因素，扁蔡過去心結已深，未來路線更是有別，陳的能量難以估計更難控制。第二，是民調數據，根據各家民調，民進黨的支持度毫無疑問高過國民黨，差距還有拉大的趨勢，但與此同時，蔡英文並沒有在可能人選間居於遙遙領先的地位，某些民調甚至顯示她的聲望還略遜於朱立倫、王金平。有政治觀察家已經指出，「在一面倒預期蔡英文必將當選總統的氣氛下，蔡民調始終沒過半，只在42%～49%間擺盪」。

民進黨前立委郭正亮也指出，「2012年總統大選蔡英文所面臨的三大困境，不管是兩岸因素衝擊雙北、南部熱情激發不足、桃竹苗基層經營不足，如今看來仍有不少改善空間」。歷經國民黨6年多的失政，目前民眾對蔡英文的支持度與熱情，其實遠不及2008年馬英九所獲得的支持度。

第三，蔡英文的「最後一哩路」比預期中、想像中更漫長、遙遠。人們都清楚蔡英文「最後一哩路」是「兩岸關係」、或者嚴格說來是「台灣、大陸、美國三邊關係」。年初時曾傳出蔡英文預定訪美，但目前為止是雷聲大、雨點小，政壇盛傳是「條件沒談妥」，也就是美國依舊對蔡英文的兩岸政策沒有譜、不放心。

另一方面，大陸對蔡英文已不只是「聽其言、觀其行」，而是高度警惕，也多次表達大陸對民進黨與蔡英文兩岸立場的關注。日前，習近平就再度指出：「九二共識對兩岸建立政治互信、開展對話協商、改善和發展兩岸關係，發揮了不可替代的重要作用。如果兩岸雙方的共同政治基礎遭到破壞，兩岸互信將不復存在，兩岸關係就會重新回到動蕩不安的老路上去」。這是大陸預先對總統大選後台灣與兩岸新政局形勢變化「有言在先」，更是對蔡英文等台灣政黨領袖的提醒。

面對大陸方面的表態，民進黨雖然沒有強力駁斥、上綱上線，但是該黨表達的「三個有利」、「三個堅持」，完全沒回答實質問題，也就是民進黨執政後如何維護、鞏固、發展兩岸的「政治互信」。從華盛頓到北京，都對蔡英文抱持疑慮，蔡英文又不願也無力扭轉局面，這條「最後一哩路」確實是十分漫長。

第四，國民黨並沒有坐以待斃。朱立倫接任黨主席後，一步步走自己的路，黨務人事革新、重整改造智庫、建立考紀制度、處理馬王爭議，加上卸除榮譽主席等，慢慢展現了自己的政治風格。近日朱立倫訪星訪港，除了拉高了國際格局，更重要的是明確對九二共識以及國共雙方領導人會面表達了積極正面的立場與態度，可說是一掃北京的觀望與疑慮，大大提高了朱立倫的聲望與形象，加上其岳父高育仁一番「超越九二共識」的談話，更讓人對朱立倫的兩岸立場有更多想像空間。

朱立倫在兩岸政策上可能出現新的突破，對比蔡英文的裹足不前，如果國民黨能進一步在「團結」、「整合」上有具體、積極的進展，國民黨無論是否由朱立倫代表參選，選情未必始終低盪。未來十個月兩黨領袖都要不斷面對各種政治與政策的考驗，蔡英文面前的難關並不比國民黨少，蔡英文的自我感覺良好與自滿，恐怕來的太早了一些。