Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen: Tit for Tat

Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen: Tit for Tat
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2015

Executive Summary: Ambiguous political language may temporarily fool some of people on Taiwan. But in the end, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen must come clean. She must explain just exactly what she means by “affirmation of our national sovereignty”. She must tell us how far the sovereignty of the Republic of China extends. She must tell us what relationship the Republic of China has to Taiwan? People on Taiwan must decide how to deal with the new cross-Strait relationship. They must not allow themselves to be manipulated by a handful of politicians and political parties. They must remain cool and choose wisely.

Full Text Below:

On March 4th, Mainland President Xi Jinping took part in the 12th Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He met with the National Revolutionary Committee, the Taiwan League, and the Taiwan Union. The topic was the current state of cross-Strait relations. The outcome was four affirmations. One. Affirm the path of peaceful development. Two. Adhere to the 1992 consensus and oppose Taiwan independence as the political basis for cross-Strait relations. Three. Work for the well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. Four. Work together to achieve national rejuvenation.

Taiwan is about to begin its quadrennial elections. The DPP, favored to win in 2016, still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. Xi Jinping's four affirmations clearly called for a response. How should we on Taiwan interpret them, and how should we respond?

Over the years, Mainland policy toward Taiwan has changed in some respects, but remained the same in others. It remains the same in its pursuit of national unity and its unwavering opposition to Taiwan independence. It has changed in response to changing times, changing points of emphasis, and changing strategies.

For example, the Mainland sometimes emphasizes preventing Taiwan indepencence more than promoting Chinese reunification. Sometimes it emphasizes both equally. Sometimes it resorts to verbal or military threats. Sometimes it emphasizes PRC-USA “joint mangagement” of Taiwan independence “troublemakers”. Sometimes it emphasizes legal constraints against independence. Sometimes it uses both the carrot and the stick. Sometimes the carrot is bigger. At other times the stick is bigger.

A variety of methods are used. In short, CCP policy toward Taiwan is firm on principles, but flexibile on strategy, and changes with the times.

Where and what Xi Jinping said were carefully calculated. Clearly the target of his remarks was not merely those in attendance. The NPC and CPPCC are the CCP's most important annual events. For Xi to address the Taiwan issue before the National Revolutionary Committee, the Taiwan League, and the Taiwan Union, was entirely appropos, and calculated not raise any red flags with the outside world.

The upcoming ROC presidential election is still sometime away. The mobilization of political passions has yet to begin. Beijing is appealing to both emotions and reason. It is saying what needs to be said up front, clearly and comprehensively. This is not a bad thing.

When Xi Jinping said the things he did, he had certain considerations. He began at the strategic level. He implied that despite repeated twists and turns, Beijing would continue down the path toward peaceful development. Peaceful development safeguards cross-Strait peace. It is the correct path, one that promotes shared development and benefits compatriots on both sides of the Strait.

Xi then spoke about the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. This is the basis for cross-Strait peace, political dialogue, and mutual trust. He said “If the foundation is not sound, the ground will shake." He then returned to the well-being of Taiwan compatriots. He said compatriots on both sides should join hands in the pursuit of national revival, to realize the Chinese dream.

Clearly, the Mainland has learned from the mistakes of the past, and respects the wishes of the people on Taiwan to be their own masters. That includes having their own politics and lifestyles.

Xi Jinping spoke dispassionately. He eschwed intimidation. He wanted to avoid provoking any backlash. His words were not directed exclusively at the DPP, but also at the KMT and the public on Taiwan. If  cross-strait trust is lost, then the basis for dialogue will be as well. Without the skin, how can there be any hair?

Beijing hopes that everyone on Taiwan will understand where the CCP stands, and what its policies are. It does not want anyone to harbor any illusions. It wants to avoid any misunderstandings or miscalculations about the CCP's bottom line.

For Beijing, adherence to the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence are two sides of the same coin. Therefore the public on Taiwan does not need to about whether the 1992 consensus means “one China, no interpretations”, “one China, two interpretations”, or a “shared interpretation of one China”. It does however include the "one China concept". That is beyond dispute. Opposition to Taiwan independence is the inevitable result of the one China concept. No person or political party can accept the one China concept, yet insist on Taiwan independence.

Beijing is clearly telling everyone on Taiwan, especially the DPP and its supporters, that departing from the 1992 consensus, and advocating and implementing Taiwan independence, will inevitably undermine cross-Strait relations

The Democratic Progressive Party, which may return to power in 2016, is using “three advantages” and “three affirmations” to promote cross-Strait relations. Superficially they sound reasonable. But the DPP has long insisted on Taiwan independence. It does more than repudiate the 1992 consensus. It demonizes it. Political reality has forced the DPP to face this problem and seek ways to work around it.  Hence, the “spirit of 1992”, the “one five consensus”, the “Taiwan consensus”, and the “ROC constitutional consensus”.

Ambiguous political language may temporarily fool some of people on Taiwan. But in the end, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen must come clean. She must explain just exactly what she means by “affirmation of our national sovereignty”. She must tell us how far the sovereignty of the Republic of China extends. She must tell us what relationship the Republic of China has to Taiwan?

People on Taiwan must decide how to deal with the new cross-Strait relationship. They must not allow themselves to be manipulated by a handful of politicians and political parties. They must remain cool and choose wisely.

社評－習近平與蔡英文的針鋒相對
2015年03月06日 04:10
本報訊

大陸國家主席習近平4日參加今年全國政協12屆3次會議的民革、台盟、台聯小組聯組會，針對當前兩岸關係形勢，言簡意賅提出四個堅定：一、走和平發展道路，二、堅持九二共識與反台獨是兩岸關係政治基礎，三、為兩岸同胞謀福祉，四、攜手實現民族復興。

台灣即將進入4年一次的大選年，迄今依然否定九二共識的民進黨，似乎勝券在握，習近平最新提出的四個堅持，顯然有針鋒相對的意味，台灣應如何解讀並回應？

多年來，大陸的對台政策有所變，也有所不變：不變的是追求國家統一的目標，反對台獨的堅定立場，變的是不同時期有不同的訴求重點或鬥爭策略。

比如說，大陸有的時候是防獨重於促統，或兩者並重。有的時候又是文攻武嚇，強調中美共管台獨，或側重依法制獨，有時則是軟硬兼施，或是軟的更軟，硬的更硬。

各種方法不一而足。簡單的說，中共的對台政策是既有原則的堅定性，也有策略的靈活性，更有其與時俱進的一面。

習近平這次發表談話的時間、場合與內容顯然都經過精心的設計與評估，其談話的對象顯然也不是僅僅針對小組會上的出席成員而已。人大、政協兩會是中共的年度政治大事，習在政協的台聯、台盟與民革小組會上談論台灣問題名正言順，合情合理，不會讓外界覺得突兀。

而且此時距離台灣即將到來的總統大選還有一段時間，在台灣還未進入激情的政治動員旺季之前，北京先用動之以情，訴之以理的方式，把該講的話，完整、全面的表達一遍，其實不是一件壞事。

從習近平談話的具體內容來看，其鋪陳的方式有一定的考量，先是由戰略及大局的層面出發，間接表明儘管過去一段時間兩岸之間發生不少波折，但北京仍將堅持和平發展的道路，而兩岸關係和平發展是一條維護兩岸和平、促進共同發展、造福兩岸同胞的正確道路。

接著習才談到九二共識與反對台獨，而這是兩岸和平發展與政治對話和政治互信的基礎，如果「基礎不牢，地動山搖」，然後他才又回到為台灣同胞謀福祉，兩岸同胞攜手追求民族復興，共圓中國夢的訴求上來。

顯然，大陸已從過去的錯誤經驗中學到教訓，北京當然尊重台灣民眾當家作主的願望，包括政治活動在內的不同生活方式。

習近平的談話內容沒有任何一句激情或威嚇的用語，以避免產生負面的作用，但其內容不只是說給民進黨聽，也同時是講給國民黨和台灣民眾聽的，如果兩岸互信、對話的基礎受到傷害，皮之不存，毛將焉附。

北京希望台灣各界對於中共的立場和政策有個清晰而且明確的認知，不要再有任何不切實際的幻想，或誤解、誤判中共可能的作法。

應該強調的是，從北京的角度來看，堅持九二共識與反對台獨應該被視為一體的兩面。於此，台灣各界其實不必再去爭論九二共識到底是一中不表，一中各表或共表一中，但九二共識中確實包含「一中概念」則是不爭的事實，反對台獨則是一中概念下必然的結果，沒有任何人或政黨能夠接受一中，但又堅持台獨的道理。

北京的話是明確的告訴台灣民眾，尤其是民進黨及其支持者，只要悖離九二共識，堅持台獨的主張和行動，兩岸關係必然將會動盪起伏。

2016執政有望的民進黨主張用三個有利與三個堅持來推動兩岸關係，表面頗能言之成理，但它又向來以追求台灣獨立為職志，不但拒絕，而且妖魔化九二共識，雖然政治的現實迫使民進黨必須面對這個問題，嘗試提出種種不同的解套方案，從九二精神、一五共識、台灣共識、憲法共識到中華民國共識等等。

但這種模稜兩可的政治語言或許能夠一時唬弄部分台灣民眾，但民進黨主席蔡英文最後仍然必須進一步澄清，她所說的鞏固國家主權究竟意指為何，中華民國的主權範圍如何，中華民國與台灣的關係究竟如何？

台灣民眾應該要以什麼樣的態度和立場來面對、處理新局面下的兩岸關係，而不被少數的政客和政黨所操弄，確實是個大家必須冷靜思考、嚴肅的選擇問題。