Ma Ying-jeou and Eric Chu: The Big Picture

Ma Ying-jeou and Eric Chu: The Big Picture
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2015

Executive Summary: The KMT faces an uphill battle in 2016. A united KMT may not win. But a disunited KMT will surely lose. Peace most precious may not be enough. Only cohesion, ideas, and vision can win popular support. When all is said and done, the blue camp has a distinctly different stand on Chinese cultural identity and cross-Strait peace than the green camp. The pan-blue forces must unite and consolidate a pan-blue consensus. This will not be easy. It all depends on whether Ma, Chu, and the KMT leadership have the necessary wisdom and tolerance.

Full Text Below:

Should the KMT take on the Wang Jin-pyng litigation case? The KMT says no, on the basis of "peace most precious" and "familial harmony, assured prosperity". This has resulted in a peculiar interaction between Ma, Wang, and Chu. The three shook hands during the KMT executive and legislative seminar.  It means the battle over Wang Jin-pyng's continued party membership is over. Ma did not release any sky lanterns. Chu will not attend the party affairs meeting. These actions suggest that while these two party chairmen may have forsaken confrontation for cooperation, they still need to exercise greater wisdom and tolerance.

We have several suggestions for Ma and Chu. First, Ma and Chu must maximize what they share in common, namely, how to turn the tide and win the 2016 presidential and legislative elections. This means they must reduce not increase the distance between themselves. The KMT may lose both the presidential and legislative elections in 2016. Ma must understand that even though he is no longer party chairman, he was nevertheless in office for eight years. Therefore he will bear substantial responsibility for any party defeat. This will affect the issue that most concerns him -- his legacy. Chu must realize that the situation in 2016 is highly unfavorable to the Kuomintang. He need not assume as much substantive responsibility for the defeat as Ma. But as party chairman, he cannot totally escape responsibility. A defeat would still impact Chu's political prestige and political momentum. If he loses in 2016, any talk of winning in 2020 would be moot, and involve far too many variables.

More importantly, the election is not just about Ma and Chu's personal prestige. It is not just about a KMT party victory. It is about the KMT's cross-strait policy. If this policy is not maintained, Taiwan will suffer significant harm and be placed in grave danger. The DPP is confident it will emerge victorious. It believes it can persuade the United States to change, and compel the Mainland to follow suit. Therefore it no longer talks about how to complete the final mile to the presidency. Cross-Strait relations may once again be shrouded in uncertainty. How can the KMT win and maintain its cross-Strait policy? That is the Big Picture that Ma and Chu must keep in mind.

Second, Chu is now party chairman. Peace most precious may be necessary for victory, but it is not sufficient. Familial harmony may be necessary as well, but neither is it sufficient. Chu chose “familial harmony” when dealing with the Wang Jin-pyng party membership battle. But “assured prosperity” may require a more aggressive approach. Peace most precious is a means, not an end. Voters will not vote for the KMT because it values “peace most precious”. Political realities may require giving Wang Jin-pyng a free pass in the influence peddling case. Personal enmities may be bygones. Current laws contain legal loopholes. Even if Wang Jin-pyng was guilty of influence peddling, he cannot be prosecuted. Chu cannot be blamed for that. But as ruling party leader, Chu must fight corruption and champion reform. Public expectations are high. Legislation pertaining to the obstruction of justice will make influence peddling actionable, ending judicial influence peddling and the absurdity of immunity from prosecution.

In September the year before, during the influence peddling scandal, President Ma was viewed as a disputant. As a result his push for legislation forbidding the “obstruction of justice" lacked legitimacy. Chu is in a different position. He had no part in the September controversy. He is in a better position than President Ma to demand reforms. If Chu can make influence peddling illegal, he will have seized the moral high ground from President Ma. President Ma is constrained by political realities. All he can do is take a stand. Chu can implement reforms. This is the only way to let the people see that besides “peace most precious”, the KMT deserves its support.

This would constitute a positive response to President Ma's demands for justice. It would help mend relations between Ma and Chu. Of course, one must also consider Wang Jin-pyng's feelings. Chu can make clear to Wang that this is not about Wang personally, but rather reforms necessary to ensure the integrity of the government. Wang Jin-pyng has emerged victorious in the party struggle. He should display magnanimity and let the matter slide. Besides, familial harmony must not apply only to Wang, it must also apply to Ma. President Ma's popularity may be low. But the 8% to 15% who support him are KMT loyalists. If these supporters feel betrayed, a KMT victory is even less likely.

Third, President Ma should relinquish all control. He should allow Eric Chu to mastermind the 2016 election. He can do this in two ways. The first pertains to the Wang Jin-pyng party membership battle. President Ma has already gone on record and spoken his peace. He has demanded justice. He must now relinquish control and allow Eric Chu to deal with the matter, for better or worse. Second, he might as well dispense with the formality of the party political meetings and prove that he has relinquished control. He should concentrate on doing what a president should do. He should interact with the public more, enabling them to understand his policy prescriptions and years of hard work. He should avoid any further involvement in party and electoral affairs. Critics may question President Ma's tolerance. But that would be preferable to maintaining the pretense of a substantive meeting, only to have critics make an even greater fuss.

The KMT faces an uphill battle in 2016. A united KMT may not win. But a disunited KMT will surely lose. Peace most precious may not be enough. Only cohesion, ideas, and vision can win popular support. When all is said and done, the blue camp has a distinctly different stand on Chinese cultural identity and cross-Strait peace than the green camp. The pan-blue forces must unite and consolidate a pan-blue consensus. This will not be easy. It all depends on whether Ma, Chu, and the KMT leadership have the necessary wisdom and tolerance.

社論－馬英九與朱立倫的大是大非
2015年03月04日 04:10
本報訊

是否承接王金平訴訟案一事，國民黨在「以和為貴」、「家和萬事興」的思考下決定不承接，引發了馬、王、朱三人詭異的互動。三人最後在國民黨行政立法研討會中做出握手言和的表態，也意謂王金平黨籍案的落幕，但從馬不放天燈、朱不出席黨政會報的兩人過招看來，兩位先後任黨主席要化矛盾為合作，還需要更大的智慧與包容。

對馬朱二人我們有幾點建議。第一，馬朱應將求同放在存異之上，必須維繫的最大之「同」是：如何在逆勢中贏得2016年總統與立委選舉勝選，這就要讓彼此的關係向內縮近，而不是向外拉遠。馬應了解，如果2016年國民黨的總統、立委雙敗，即便馬已卸下黨主席，執政8年的馬仍必須承擔實質的敗選責任，這一點，將會影響他最在意的歷史定位；朱也要了解，2016年大形勢不利於國民黨，他必須承擔的敗選實質責任雖然可以少一些，但既任黨主席，形式責任仍跑不掉，敗選仍將重挫朱的政治聲望與政治能量，失掉2016再談2020顯然太沉重，變數也太多。

更重要的不只是馬朱個人聲望問題，也不只是國民黨一黨之勝負，而是國民黨兩岸政策若無法延續，對台灣將帶來的重大傷害與危險。民進黨勝券在握，相信自己可以說服美國、可以逼迫中國大陸改變，因而不再討論如何解決執政最後一哩路問題。在兩岸可能重返不確定關係陰影籠罩下，如何贏得勝選以延續國民黨的兩岸政策，才是馬朱應放在心上的最高位「大是大非」。

第二，朱立倫身為黨主席，「以和為貴」是勝選的必要條件，卻不是充要條件，家不和萬事必不興，但家和也不代表萬事一定興。在王金平黨籍案的處理上，朱立倫選擇了「家和」，但要做到「事興」，則須有更積極的做法。以和為貴是手段不是目的，選民不會因為「以和為貴」這4個字就把票投國民黨。就算為了「政治現實」而選擇「放下」王金平關說司法案，對「人」的紛紛擾擾讓他過去也罷，因為依我國目前的法律，就算王院長關說司法也無法可罰，這是法制漏洞，不能怪朱立倫。但是，身為執政黨領袖，朱立倫應在「事」的高度上進行「制度改革」，宣示推動社會期待甚高的「妨礙司法公正罪」立法，將關說司法入罪，為台灣斬斷關說司法，終結關說司法免負刑責的荒謬現象。

前年9月的關說風暴中，馬總統被視為爭議一方，推動「妨礙司法公正罪」制度改革缺乏正當性，朱立倫不同，他在九月風暴中的角色是中立的，比馬總統有更好的正當性與戰略位置去推制度改革。一旦朱立倫能成功讓關說司法入罪，必將擁有比馬總統更高的道德高度。馬總統的道德高度受政治現實所逼，只能「表態」，朱立倫的道德高度將是「落實改革」，唯有如此，才能讓人民看到除了「以和為貴」，國民黨有更值得支持的道理。

這將是對馬總統堅持大是大非的正面回應，也有助於修補馬朱關係，當然，王院長的感受也必須顧及，但朱可以向王說清楚，這不是針對王院長的個案，而是為了國家長治久安的必要改革，王院長既已在黨籍案獲得全勝，應有雅量在制度面放手。況且，家和不能只和王的那一面，也應和馬的另一面。否則馬總統的民調聲望雖低，但支持他的8%到15%的群眾，是國民黨的核心支持者。這些支持者若失望離開，國民黨更是勝選無望。

第三，馬總統應該徹底放權，讓朱立倫完全主導2016大選。這應表現於兩個層面，一是王金平的黨籍案，馬總統基於大是大非已做出歷史表態即為已足，其他的就放手給朱立倫，結果是好是壞，就讓朱立倫決定與承擔。二是，不妨取消流於形式的黨政會報，表達進一步放權的用意，把心力放在總統高位該做的事，多與民眾互動溝通，讓民眾有機會直接了解他的治國理念與苦心，就不要再對黨務與選務有任何的介入。也許又會引起外界質疑，認為馬總統器量太狹，但這總比繼續惺惺作態維持已不具實質功能的會議，徒給外界長期作文章要好。

面對2016年的劣勢，國民黨團結都不一定贏，不團結則必輸，「以和為貴」仍然不夠，這只有內聚的效果，還須兼顧理念、提出願景，才能外擴爭取認同、贏得支持。畢竟藍營對中華文化的認同與兩岸和平發展與綠營有明確的區隔，當務之急是整合泛藍力量，凝聚並鞏固泛藍大共識，這當然不容易，考驗的是馬朱二人及國民黨領導菁英的智慧與度量。