M503 Flight Route: Model for Cross-Strait Dispute Resolution

M503 Flight Route: Model for Cross-Strait Dispute Resolution
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2015

Executive Summary: The long dispute over the M503 flight route has finally been resolved. Neither side is completely happy with the result, but both sides find it acceptable, or at least tolerable. This shows that as long as the two sides remain rational and pragmatic, and are willing to communicate with each other, they can reach an understanding, enhance mutual trust, and settle their differences. In fact, there are no insoluble cross-Strait problems. Such mutually beneficial cooperation deserves recognition and encouragement. It proves that “where there is a will, there is a way”.

Full Text Below:

The long dispute over the M503 flight route has finally been resolved. Neither side is completely happy with the result, but both sides find it acceptable, or at least tolerable. This shows that as long as the two sides remain rational and pragmatic, and are willing to communicate with each other, they can reach an understanding, enhance mutual trust, and settle their differences. In fact, there are no insoluble cross-Strait problems. Such mutually beneficial cooperation deserves recognition and encouragement. It proves that “where there is a will, there is a way”.

During this year's Spring Festival, Wang Yu-chi, former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, and Zhang Zhijun, director of the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office, were supposed to meet for the third time in Kinmen. But the Mainland side unilaterally announced the establishment of Flight Route M503, near the midline of the Taiwan Strait. This provoked public criticism on Taiwan. Taipei felt it had been disrespected. National security was also a concern. As a result, our side postponed the high profile Wang Zhang meeting, which had attracted considerable public attention. Now that the furor has died down, the two sides must seize the opportunity to resume high-level official dialogue.

The M503 flight route controversy includes several facets. One. Position and attitude. Two. Process. Three. Practical consequences. As we all know, the two sides of the Strait are diametrically opposed on many matters. They differ in their positions. They differ in their methods. They differ in their substance. The former differences are primarily symbolic in nature. The latter involve real world consequences.

For example, Beijing refers to the cross-Strait meetings as the Zhang Wang meeting and the Wang Koo meeting. Taipei refers to them as the Wang Zhang meeting and the Koo Wang meeting. Beijing talks about a one China framework, Taipei talks about a one China architecture. Such differences in word order and terminology represent different political stances, laden with symbolic differences that both sides consider important.

The latter differences involve trade-offs between political and economic interests. Examples include cross-Strait air traffic rights negotiations, the content of the ECFA early harvest list, the ARATS and the SEF offices, and personal safety for Taiwan compatriots. Significant economic and even political interests are involved. As a result, both sides are extremely cautious. They cross every t and dot every i to protect their political and economic bottom lines, and avoid harming their political and economic interests. They take care to avoid broader repercussions that might cause unnecessary problems or unwanted associations down the line.

Take the Mainland's unilaterally drawn and announced M503 flight route. Ignore for the moment whether it would have much impact on Taiwan's security. Consider only the Mainland's position and attitude. ROC government agencies, including the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Transportation must first express clear opposition. Such expressions may not have much practical effect. Nevertheless they are necessary to clarify our bottom line and prepare our response. Adhering to our bottom line requires adhering to our position and answering to public opinion. It also requires negotiating in the best interests of the nation. Anything less amounts to a dereliction of duty.

According to media reports, the flight route issue was indeed the subject of repeated advance exchanges. But the two sides failed to reach an agreement. No consensus was reached. Yet Beijing unilaterally announced the establishment of the flight route. Taipei expressed its dissatisfaction and concerns. Understandably, it found this difficult to accept. Once Taipei expressed its objections however, Beijing did not dig in its heels. Instead, it urged Taiwan's media to visit Taiwan's air traffic control agency and witness for itself existing airspace congestion. Beijing agreed to delay implementation. It took the initiative to shift the flight route 6 nautical miles to the west of the midline, as a gesture of goodwill. Although Taipei expressed dissatisfaction, it accepted it. The two sides reconsidered their positions. They each took a step back. Their approach deserves affirmation.

Now take the matter of practical consequences, of military considerations, especially those of the Air Force. The M503 flight route over the midline of the Taiwan Strait understandably raises military concerns and provokes psychological insecurities. But Beijing submitted the case to the ICAO in advance. The international community expressed little opposition. Taipei represents a peaceful nation in the East Asian region. If the M503 flight route poses national security concerns, we should respond by enhancing our early warning capabilities, rather than by insisting on own one-sided interests.

As far as position and attitude are concerned, Taipei must of course express opposition. But as far as practical consequences are concerned, assuming the flight route does not pose a danger, a compromise would be timely and appropriate. Beijing was motivated by practical concerns. It wanted the M503 flight route. It followed applicable procedures. It notified international organizations. Once it understood Taipei's concerns, it modified its position appropriately. This led to a win-win outcome. We hope the two sides will maintain such attitudes and practices in the future. Bilateral relations can be improved. We hope future disputes will be settled through rational communications. This will benefit all the people.

社評－M503航路創兩岸爭議解決典範
2015年03月09日 04:10
本報訊

擾嚷多時的M503航路爭議終於在兩岸雙方雖不全然滿意，但都還能小接受，或至少是願意容忍情況下達成共識，稍得到緩解。此事說明，只要雙方本著理性、務實的態度，願意透過溝通、對話，以相互理解，增加互信的方式討論彼此之間的問題與歧見，兩岸其實沒有不能解決的問題。這種合作、互利、包容的作法值得肯定與鼓勵，也證明一切事在人為。

今年春節前夕，陸委會前主委王郁琦與大陸國台辦主任張志軍本來要在金門舉行第3次會談，但是由於大陸片面宣布要在緊鄰海峽中線處開通新的M503航路，引起台灣輿論批評，我方一來覺得未受尊重，二來還有國安疑慮，所以主動推遲眾所矚目的王張會，自然引起各方關注。如今問題得到緩解，兩岸似乎都應把握機遇，早日重啟制度性的雙方高層互動與對話。

回頭檢討M503航路事件，可由幾個不同的面向切入。首先是立場和態度的考量，其次是操作處理的方式，最後才是實質影響的問題。一如所知，兩岸雙方對於很多事情都有南轅北轍，截然不同的立場，其中有形式的不同，也有實質的差異，前者帶有象徵的意義，後者則有實際利害考量。

比如說中共慣稱張王會、汪辜會，台灣方面一定堅持王張會與辜汪會，北京主張一中框架，台北就提出一中架構。這種不同的順序排列和文字表述都代表政治上的立場問題，有政治上的象徵意涵，雙方都相當在意。

後者則牽涉實際政治和經濟利益的取捨和分配問題，比如說兩岸對於航權的談判，關於ECFA早收清單的內容，兩岸兩會辦事機構，台商台胞的人身保護問題等等。由於事涉巨大的經濟、甚或政治利益，雙方都是步步為營，字斟句酌的務求守住政治及經濟底線，輕要避免有損自己的政、經利益，重要避免造成擴散效應，引發不必要的問題或聯想，免得日後造成更大的困擾及後遺症。

就陸方單方畫設、宣布、開通M503航路而言，先不管其是否真的會對台灣的安全造成多大的實質影響，光從立場和態度而言，中華民國政府的有關單位，從國安會到國防部到交通部，首先就要拿出明確的態度，表達台灣方面反對的立場。即使這樣的抗議與反對不會發生實際效果，但還是要把態度講清楚，並畫定底線，準備各種因應劇本，堅守底線，既要堅持立場，能對民意有所交待，更要做好談判準備，爭取國家最大利益，否則就有虧職守。

檢討此次操作處理的方式，至少就媒體披露的消息來看，兩岸雙方確實曾就本案於事前進行多次溝通。但在雙方未能達成協議，還沒有共識的情況下，北京片面宣布此事，台北方面表達不滿、疑慮、難以接受的立場事屬合理。北京在台北表達反對之後，並未堅持己見，卻主動邀請台灣媒體參觀航管機構，實地證明現行空域擁塞的實際情況，並且同意延後實施，同時又主動再往中線以西偏移6浬，釋出善意。台北隨即表達雖不滿意，但勉予接受的立場，雙方這種易位思考、各退一步、莫為己甚的作法應予肯定。

再談實質影響問題，從國軍，尤其是空軍的角度來看，M503航路過度接近海峽中線，加深軍方的疑慮和心理上的不安全感，言之成理；但中共曾將本案先行照會國際民航組織，國際社會對此並無太大反對聲浪，我方作為一個東亞區域和平主義國家，如果M503航路確實對國家安全造成疑慮，應該以充實國防力量、強化預警能力因應，而非堅持自己片面利益。

從立場上，台灣必須表明反對的態度，但在實務上，台灣又能在不損及原則和安全的前提下，適時、適度的妥協；同樣的，北京出於現實的需要，一方面要實施M503航路，也按照相關程序，照會國際組織及公告周知，但在理解台灣的疑慮後，又能從善如流，適度的加以調整。這就是一種雙贏、多贏的結果，我們樂見兩岸當局今後秉持這樣的心態與作法，讓雙邊關係進一步往良性的方向發展，更希望未來所有爭議都能理性溝通，這才是全民之福。