The 1992 Consensus: Uphold and Go Beyond

The 1992 Consensus: Uphold and Go Beyond
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 29, 2015

Executive Summary: Beijing is reluctant to declare that "one China is the People's Republic of China". It realizes that harping on this point too vehemently will kill the 1992 consensus, and there will be nothing left to uphold. Taipei may argue that "One China is the Republic of China". But agreement about this is lacking on Taiwan, and so is trust across the Strait. The 1992 consensus may be defective, but it is nevertheless effective. Therefore if one wishes to see the 1992 consensus "upheld", then one really must think about "going beyond" it.

Full Text Below:

The 1992 consensus has become the core political issue of the 2016 general election. A storm is brewing. Change is at hand. Everyone has declared where they stand. 

One. Xi Jinping said the 1992 consensus is the political basis for cross-Strait relations. If it is damaged, "The foundation will be undermined, and the ground will shake." Two. Tsai Ing-wen said that if the 1992 consensus is merely a “label”, it cannot improve cross-Strait relations. Three. Eric Chu's father in law Kao Yu-jen said, "We must go beyond the 1992 consensus". Kao said the two sides must negotiate "political relations, foreign affairs, military confidence-building measures, and a peace framework", as soon as possible. Four. Eric Chu remained guarded about "going beyond" the 1992 consensus. He said the KMT “upholds” the 1992 consensus. Five. MAC chairwoman Hsia Li-yen domestic agreement on the 1992 consensus is lacking, as is cross-Strait trust. Therefore talk of “going beyond” the 1992 consensus is premature. He said talk of “going beyond” the 1992 consensus was Kao Yu-jen's personal opinion, and that the time is not yet ripe. Hsia reaffirmed the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Six. Former executive director of the AIT Barbara Schrage said that the DPP should acknowledge the importance of the 1992 consensus and not duck the issue.

These declarations show that the 1992 consensus cannot be ignored during the 2016 general election. Each of the parties talked about either upholding the 1992 consensus, or going beyond it. Tsai Ing-wen said that the 1992 consensus must be more than a "label". She has apparently acknowledged the existence of 1992 consensus, and does not wish to see it reduced to a mere “label”. Hsia Li-yen was blunt, saying domestic agreement on the 1992 consensus was lacking, therefore “going beyond” it was out of the question. In fact the 1992 consensus is already the political basis for cross-Strait relations, precisely because it is a "label". When different parties see this "label", they know exactly where the ambiguity lies. The 1992 consensus is controversial because the "label" remains ambiguous. This leads to a lack of domestic agreement and a lack of cross-Strait trust. This is why some oppose “labeling” the 1992 consensus, some advocate "upholding" the 1992 consensus, and some advocate “going beyond” the 1992 consensus.

Suppose the two sides and the public on Taiwan cannot agree on the meaning of the 1992 consensus? What would "upholding” the 1992 consensus mean? What would “going beyond” the 1992 consensus mean? For example, everyone knows that the core meaning of the 1992 consensus is the "one China framework". But what is “one China”? On that there is no consensus. To the Ma government, "one China" means “one China, different interpretations” under the ROC Constitution. It has repeatedly affirmed that "one China is the Republic of China". Beijing's "one China" means "the defense of one China in accordance with the constitution".  For Beijing, "China is the People's Republic of China", therefore it operates on that basis. But it currently emphasizes peaceful development. Therefore it seldom openly proclaims that "One China is the People's Republic of China". The Ma government openly proclaims that "One China is the Republic of China". But can it continue doing this? Even Beijing is reluctant to assert that "One China is the People's Republic of China". Can it continue doing this? 

Alas, upholding the 1992 consensus is still necessary. It remains the most balanced "one China definition" that still leaves room for interpretation. Under the 1992 consensus, the Ma government can openly proclaim that "One China is the Republic of China", and advocate "one China, different interpretations". Beijing on the other hand, finds it awkward to proclaim that "One China is the People's Republic of China", and to advocate "one country, two systems". That is a good reason to uphold the 1992 consensus. Beijing must acknowledge that under the 1992 consensus, “recognizing the Republic of China does not mean recognizing Taiwan independence". Tacit recognition of the "Republic of China" does not contradict the "one China framework". Meanwhile, we can either uphold the 1992 consensus or go beyond it.

The wise move is not to hack up the 1992 consensus. We should not create another term to replace the 1992 consensus. We should uphold the 1992 consensus, then seek to go beyond it. We can uphold the 1992 consensus "one China framework" even as we seek to go beyond its “one China content”.

Even the DPP should consider upholding the 1992 consensus. The core of the 1992 consensus is the "one China framework” and “opposition to Taiwan independence". Given global and domestic conditions,  Taiwan independence is impossible. If the DPP abandons Taiwan independence, it can only win, not lose. If the DPP is willing to work within the 1992 consensus and the "one China framework", it can go beyond the 1992 consensus and oppose “labeling”. If it rejects the 1992 consensus, to the point where the earth shakes, then even “one China, different interpretations” will no longer be an option.

Upholding the 1992 consensus means upholding “one China, different interpretations” and “different interpretations of one China”. This is something that Hu Jintao pledged Bush Jr. on the hotline. This is what Schrage was covertly authorized by the US to say. This is something that can be upheld for some time into the future, unless of course Taipei, Washington, and Beijing all agree to go beyond the 1992 consensus. Going beyond the 1992 consensus should entail a "big roof concept of China”. It should entail wartime governments transformed into separate ruling governments, consistent with Kao Yu-jen's four questions. This upholds and goes beyond the 1992 consensus. Unless we go beyond the path, all we can do is continue down our own path.

Beijing is reluctant to declare that "one China is the People's Republic of China". It realizes that harping on this point too vehemently will kill the 1992 consensus, and there will be nothing left to uphold. Taipei may argue that "One China is the Republic of China". But agreement about this is lacking on Taiwan, and so is trust across the Strait. The 1992 consensus may be defective, but it is nevertheless effective. Therefore if one wishes to see the 1992 consensus "upheld", then one really must think about "going beyond" it.

聯合／九二共識的延續與超越
2015-03-29 01:29:44 聯合報 聯合報社論

九二共識儼然成為二○一六年的核心政治議題。山雨欲來風滿樓，各方相繼表態：

一、習近平稱，兩岸共同政治基礎「九二共識」若遭破壞，將是「基礎不牢，地動山搖」。二、蔡英文說，九二共識若只是「標籤化」，無法有利兩岸關係進展。三、朱立倫的岳父高育仁說，應當「超越九二共識」，兩岸政府盡速協商「政治關係／涉外事務／軍事互信機制／和平架構」四個問題。四、朱立倫諱言「超越」而回應稱，國民黨對「九二共識」是「相延續」的。四、陸委會主委夏立言說：國內對「九二共識」尚無共識，兩岸互信不足，不適合談超越。他說，談超越是高育仁個人意見，但目前時機尚未成熟。夏並再申「九二共識／一中各表」。五、ＡＩＴ前執行理事施藍旗說，民進黨應知「九二共識」的嚴重性，而不是閃躲。

這五人的談話顯示，九二共識在二○一六年是分明繞不過去的，各方折衝只是在九二共識的延續或超越而已。蔡英文說，九二共識不要「標籤化」；她似已承認「九二共識」之存在，只是不願見其成為「標籤」。夏立言則直言，「九二共識」在國內尚無「共識」，更遑論「超越」。其實，「九二共識」之所以成為兩岸「共同政治基礎」，正因其已然「標籤化」，各方見此「標籤」，皆知其中「眉角」何在；但「九二共識」之所以仍有爭議，亦正因「標籤」的內涵不明，致台灣內部迄無「共識」，兩岸互信不足。因而，始有「反標籤化」，及「延續」或「超越」的不同見解。

然而，倘兩岸及台灣內部對「九二共識」的內涵尚無共識，則若論「延續」，究竟在延續什麼？若談「超越」，又在超越什麼？例如：眾人皆知「九二共識」的核心是「一中架構（框架）」；但「一個中國」的定義為何？卻迄無共識。馬政府所持「一個中國」，是在中華民國憲法架構下「一中各表」，並屢申「一個中國就是中華民國」。北京所採「一個中國」，其潛台詞應是「依憲捍衛一個中國」、「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並據此進行實際操作，但自其強調兩岸關係和平發展以來，畢竟已未見或罕見其公開宣揚「一個中國是中華人民共和國」。然則，馬政府雖公開宣示「一中就是中華民國」，但能否延續？而北京連「一中就是中華人民共和國」都覺得不便或不能說清楚，又遑論延續？

但是，九二共識的延續仍是必要的。它大致確立了「一中架構」，但仍為「一中定義」的平衡與發展存留了空間。眼前所見，在九二共識下，馬政府可以公開宣示「一中就是中華民國」及「一中各表」，而北京忌言「一中就是中華人民共和國」及「一國兩制」，這就是「九二共識」值得延續的理由。因為，在九二共識下，北京不啻承認「中華民國不是台獨」，亦即默認「中華民國」的存在與「一中架構」並無牴觸，而其間就存有「九二共識」得以「既延續／又超越」的可能性。

明智之舉，不是要切割九二共識，另創取代九二共識的名詞或架構；而是應維持並延續九二共識，再尋求發展與超越。因為，論述上可延續九二共識的「一中架構」，但亦可尋求「一中內涵」的平衡與超越。

即使對民進黨而言，亦當考慮「延續」九二共識。因為，九二共識的核心是「一中架構／反對台獨」；而在世局國情的發展趨勢下，台獨其實已絕無可能，民進黨之放棄台獨只是自救而非損失，但民進黨卻可在「九二共識」中爭取「一中架構」的發展與超越，反對其「標籤化」。否則，若因否定九二共識而鬧到地動山搖，將連「一中各表」的空間亦失。

九二共識若「延續」，其實即是延續「各表一中／一中各表」的平衡。而且，此一胡錦濤在熱線中曾向小布希承諾的架構，由施藍旗的談話可知已得美國背書，在未來相當期間應當仍可「延續」，除非「九二共識」取得了符合「台／美／中」三方面共識的「超越」。至於談「九二共識」的超越，應是「在大屋頂中國下／兩岸交戰政府轉為分治政府」，並據以處理高育仁所說的四個問題。這是對九二共識的「既延續／又超越」；但若無「超越」的路徑，就只能在各自表述中「延續」。

北京忌言「一中就是中華人民共和國」，應是深知，如果強調此語，「九二共識」即無以「延續」。而台北雖曰「一中就是中華民國」，亦知台灣內部無共識，兩岸互信不足。由此可見，九二共識的功效雖在，但缺陷仍存；因而，九二共識若欲「延續」，確實當思「超越」之道。