Hung Hsiu-chu and the KMT: An Anti-Sinophobia Alliance

Hung Hsiu-chu and the KMT: An Anti-Sinophobia Alliance
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 13, 2015

Executive Summary:
Since 1949, cross-Strait relations have revolved around reunification vs. independence. They have undergone three stages: war, cease fire, and peace. Prior to the 1990s the two sides were at war. During the early 1990s, cross-Strait relations improved. The result was a "fragile stability". In 1994 however, Lee Teng-hui published his "Sorrow of the Taiwanese", inciting separatist sentiment. Lee distorted history, and misrepresented One China in all respects: history, geography, culture, descent. It repudiated the Republic of China. He shattered the fragile stability. Lee Teng-hui adopted a "covert conflict" policy. His successor Chen Shui-bian adopted an "overt conflict" strategy.

Full Text Below:

Since 1949, cross-Strait relations have revolved around reunification vs. independence. They have undergone three stages: war, cease fire, and peace. Prior to the 1990s the two sides were at war. During the early 1990s, cross-Strait relations improved. The result was a "fragile stability". In 1994 however, Lee Teng-hui published his "Sorrow of the Taiwanese", inciting separatist sentiment. Lee distorted history, and misrepresented One China in all respects: history, geography, culture, descent. It repudiated the Republic of China. He shattered the fragile stability. Lee Teng-hui adopted a "covert conflict" policy. His successor Chen Shui-bian adopted an "overt conflict" strategy.

Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. He adopted the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations as the basis of his cross-Strait policy. Cross-Strait exchanges returned to their former "fragile stability". In 2011 Ma tried to take cross-Strait relations a step further, toward peace. He proposed a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. But internal concerns on Taiwan increased, and his approval ratings plummeted. Ma responded with his Ten Major Assurances, and retracted his proposal for a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. Since then Ma Ying-jeou has reverted to a "Go Slow" strategy.

Unfortunately a Go Slow strategy is no longer adequate. Cross-Strait relations are in the deep end of the pool. His appeals has lost their freshness. Especially after last year's 3/18 Sunflower Student Movement. The STA was blocked. Agreement on the MTA and cross-Strait representative offices could not be reached. Internal opposition to cross-Strait agreements grew. Even people on the Mainland expressed dissatisfaction. All of these developments negatively impacted the future of cross-Strait relations. The seven year long fragile stability between the two sides was now at risk.

Hung Hsiu-chu resolved to run for president. She proposed a One China, Same Interpretation and a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement as the main plank in her cross-Strait policy platform. A closer look reveals the constructive vision of its internal logic. Basically it is an attempt to accelerate Ma Ying-jeou's Go Slow cross-Strait policy. It is an attempt to strengthen the peace in the hope that cross-Straits political relations can successfully negotiate the deep end of the pool.

Unfortunately the use of the term "same" in One China, Same Interpretation, has raised concerns within the KMT. Add to this Hung Hsiu-chu's remark that "the Republic of China does not exist", which was misinterpreted and taken out of context by the media. These gave KMT leaders superficial justifications for opposing Hung Hsiu-chu's cross-Strait policy, and for demanding that she cease talking about One China, Same Interpretation. The Kuomintang and the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign are now deadlocked.

One China, Same Interpretation, and One China, Different Interpretations, both affirm One China. But One China, Same Interpretation affirms that One China is neither the Mainland nor Taiwan. As the US State Department put it: The United States accepts the One China Principle, but the United States has its own definition. One China, Different Interpretations and One China, Same Interpretations are not incompatible. The KMT and the Hung campaign need not get stuck on the wording. They should return to the essence of the concept.

President Ma's cross-Strait policy is based on "noit repudiating each other's sovereignty and acknowledging each other's jurisdiction." President Ma said that the two sides' sovereignty claims overlap. They include areas the other side claims. Therefore they cannot recognize each other's sovereignty. But they need not repudiate each other's jurisidiction. This amounts to a pragmatic recognition of the status quo. This means that President Ma does not reject the future recognition of each other's sovereignty. In fact, based on comments he made on other occasions, he would like to see recognition of each other's jurisdiction. This is precisely what One China, Same Interpretation proposes. It proposes overlapping sovereignty with separate constitutional jurisdictions. It is essentially a clearer representation of the goal pursued by One China, Different Interpretations: the non-repudiation of each other's sovereignty and the recognition of each other's jurisdiction. Hung Hsiu-chu need not insist on One China, Same Interpretation. She can simply stress substance and specific goals. The KMT meanwhile, should cease its pettiness and help Hung Hsiu-chu establish firm principles on which the KMT can operate.

Both sides should take a step back. Doing so would lead to three results. One. It would enable the KMT to finally reach internal agreement. Once it has done so and regrouped, it can then lead public opinion. It can persuade the public on Taiwan to identify with the rise of Mainland China. It can persuade the public on Taiwan to examine cross-Strait relations and compare the two sides' relative strength. It can demand that Tsai Ing-wen explain her deliberately incomprehensible, covertly confronational cross-Strait policy. It can demand that Tsai Ing-wen explain how she intends to ensure cross-Strait peace when she rejects the 1992 Consensus and clings to Sinophobia. 

Two. It can further persuade Beijing to recognize the Republic of China's jurisdiction. Meanwhile, those of us on Taiwan may wish to adopt the same attitude towards the People's Republic of China. This would promote political dialogue, remove obstacles to the resolution of more sensitive cross-Strait issues. Successful dialogue would win public support. The two sides could then sign a peace agreement, as equals in their jurisdictional authority. Given the Republic of China's jurisdictional authority, it could participate in international activities. These objectives once achieved, would lead to a third result, the long-held desire of the public on Taiwan to experience international dignity. In one fell swoop, this would remove the key reason for Sinophobia on Taiwan.

As a June 27 editorial in the China Times pointed out, Hung Hsiu-chu's 2016 election campaign must have a higher purpose. It must rally the forces opposed to Sinophobia. Same Interpretation or Different Interpretation makes no difference. The Kuomintang and the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign must sort out their cross-Strait policy differences. Time is short. They cannot afford to fall apart. They cannot afford to become an object of outside ridicule. They have already settled on the nomination procedure. They must not allow internal dissent to undermine their opposition to Tsai Ing-wen's Sinophobia.

洪秀柱、國民黨應號召「反反中」聯盟

2015年07月13日 中國時報

從1949年起，兩岸關係始終以所謂「統獨」問題為主軸，並存在「鬥、緩、和」3種戰略路線。1990年代以前是「鬥」的階段，1990年代初期，兩岸關係一度朝向良性發展，形成「脆弱的穩定」。但1994年李登輝發表「生為台灣人的悲哀」，挑動分離意識，將「一個中國」異化為「歷史、地理、文化、血緣」概念，而不再是中華民國。自此，兩岸的「脆弱穩定」實質結束。李登輝採取「暗鬥」策略，接下來執政的陳水扁則採取「明鬥」策略。

馬英九在2008年上台以後，以「九二共識、一中各表」為兩岸論述核心，兩岸交流大開，兩岸關係回到「脆弱的穩定」。2011年馬英九曾嘗試讓兩岸關係推向「和」的階段，提議簽署「兩岸和平協議」，但台灣內部疑慮升起、民調下滑，遂提出了「十大保證」，收回兩岸和平協議主張。自此，馬英九重回「緩」的策略。

「緩」的策略顯然無法因應進入深水區的兩岸關係，論述號召力也出現疲乏現象。特別是去年318的太陽花運動後，服貿協議受阻、貨貿及互設辦事處均難定案。不只台灣內部產生了阻礙兩岸協議簽署的力量，大陸民間也開始出現不滿聲浪，這些都對未來兩岸關係的續進，產生了負面因子。兩岸7年以來的「脆弱穩定」似乎難保。

洪秀柱決心參選，提出「一中同表」及「兩岸和平協議」作為兩岸政策主調。細究其內在邏輯與概念理路，有其宏觀性與建設性，基本上，是企圖在馬英九「緩」的兩岸政策路線上，強化「和」的積極因子，希望未來有利兩岸共渡政治深水區。

然而，一中同表中的「同」字引起國民黨內部疑慮，加上洪秀柱談話中一句不周延的「中華民國不存在」，被媒體斷章取義曲解及綠營的抹紅操作，給了國民黨對洪秀柱兩岸政策開槍的正當理由。要不要續談「一中同表」，國民黨與洪秀柱似乎卡住了。

「一中各表」與「一中同表」都是在表述「一中」，只是「一中同表」進一步表述了兩岸相同的「一中」，但這個 「一中」既不是大陸的，也不是台灣的，正如美國國務院中國政策的表述：美國接受「一中原則」，但美國有自己的定義。「一中各表」與「一中同表」並非不相容的對立概念，國民黨與洪陣營不需要執著於文字，應回歸到理念的本質。

馬總統的兩岸政策核心是「主權互不承認、治權互不否認」，馬總統曾說，這是因為兩岸主權主張相互重疊，涵蓋彼此全部領域，無法相互承認主權；但互不否認對方的治權，則是務實的承認現狀。言下之意，馬總統並未排斥更進一步的「主權互不否認」，而觀諸其在多個場合的談話，他其實樂見「治權相互承認」。這正是「一中同表」主張：「主權宣示重疊、憲政治權分立」的精髓。可以這麼說，一中同表更清楚表述了一中各表想要追求的目標：「主權互不否認，治權相互承認。」因此，洪秀柱不需要繼續堅持滿分的「一中同表」，可以回到實質面去闡述具體目標。國民黨也應收起小鼻子小眼睛，協助洪秀柱建立其與國民黨核心理念的強固銜接。

「各退一步」將可以帶來三個效果。第一，可以在國民黨內部找到論述交集點，融一整合後，就可以帶動社會對中國的崛起、兩岸實力的對比及兩岸關係的再思考，並以此要求與蔡英文「表面模糊、隱含對抗」的兩岸立場進行辯論，質問蔡英文，不接受九二共識、不放棄仇中反中思維，要如何維持兩岸和平發展。

第二，可以進一步要求大陸承認中華民國治權。同時，我方可承諾願採取同樣的態度，承認中華人民共和國的治權。這不但可以順利開啟政治對話、掃除兩岸深水區障礙。對話順利、獲得人民支持，兩岸可以平等的治權實體身分簽訂和平協議，並共議如何在中華民國治權基礎上，共同參與國際社會。這些目標一旦達成，將帶來第三個效果：實現台灣民眾長久的心願，找回台灣人民參與國際的尊嚴後，一舉拆掉台灣反中氛圍的核心燃料。

《中國時報》6月27日社論曾指出，洪秀柱打2016年大選應該有一個更高的定位，就是號召「反反中」大聯盟。同表、各表本無大異，國民黨與洪秀柱陣營要好好整合兩岸論述，時間無多，不要再「庸人自亂」，不但讓外界看笑話，更不值得的是，好不容易確定提名程序後，卻因內部整合不足而減損了「反反中」、「反仇中」聯盟對蔡英文的戰力。