Hung Hsiu-chu's Unorthodox Pat Hand

Hung Hsiu-chu's Unorthodox Pat Hand
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2015

Executive Summary: Cross-Strait relations have significantly improved over the past seven years. But the low-hanging fruit has already been picked. Further progress is now more difficult. The Republic of China government on Taiwan will hold a presidential election next year. Cross-Strait relations will soon be in limbo. The foundation for continued cross-Strait relations must be firmed up. Progress must not be set back. This is something the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait must work for.

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Cross-Strait relations have significantly improved over the past seven years. But the low-hanging fruit has already been picked. Further progress is now more difficult. The Republic of China government on Taiwan will hold a presidential election next year. Cross-Strait relations will soon be in limbo. The foundation for continued cross-Strait relations must be firmed up. Progress must not be set back. This is something the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait must work for.

Xi Jinping came to power during the 18th National Congress. Xi did not want "cross-Strait political differences to persist, generation after generation".  Xi hoped to seize the initiative and take concrete action to improve cross-Strait relations. The Ma government hoped to use the 1992 Consensus to institutionalize cross-Strait exchanges. But Ma's effort was limited. It was confined to the MAC and the Taiwan Affairs Office referring to each other by their offiical titles and holding regular meetings. Negotiations over the establishment of representative offices are still ongoing. Other initiatives have met with resistance. The Sunflower Student Movement and the nine in one election results made the Ma government more timid about cross-Strait policy. The STA and MTA have been stalled by DPP pressure. The two associations interact as usual, but progress remains limited.

The presidential campaign is heating up. Most of the focus is on the candidates. Their cross-Strait policies have attracted the most attention. Tsai Ing-wen lost the 2012 election during the final mile over cross-Strait relations. This time she did her homework. First, she pledged to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo" in order to win US support. Then she pledged to comply with the "ROC constitutional framework" in order to win Mainland support. These two pledges have passed muster with the US. But the Mainland still has doubts about her, and disbelieves her assurances.

The Mainland opposes Taiwan independence. In this regard, Tsai Ing-wen has yet to given an inch, After all, these ideals represent her roots. If she yields on these issues, even the Taiwan independence fundamentalists will forsake her. But if she refuses to yield, "the earth will move". She not only refuses to yield on Taiwan independence. She even refuses to yield on "One China". We know that because she has refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus from beginning to end. Therefore even former Defense Minister Lin Chong-pin and former Vice President Annette Lu have predicted "an avalanche of severed diplomatic relations" in the event Tsai Ing-wen is elected.

Consider Hung Hsiu-chu's cross-Strait policy. During the primaries she proposed an upgraded version of the 1992 Consensus. She hoped that the two sides could reaffirm opposition to Taiwan independence and the use of force. This was what she meant by One China, Same Interpretation, and her Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. She crossed the nomination threshold and became the KMT presidential candidate. She was then blasted by her comrades, by party members who argued that the election would be lost under such a policy. After talks with President Ma and Chairman Eric Chu, Hung Hsiu-chu agreed to revert to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

Forbidding Hung Hsiu-chu to promote her cross-Strait policy will obviously hinder progress in cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen's policies are likely to turn the clock back on cross-Strait relations. Improper handling of the South China Sea issue could even offend nationalists on the Mainland, and lead to a repeat of the 1995 Taiwan Straits crisis. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Susan Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, fear an accidental war between the two sides. They want the United States to promote an interim agreement. Taiwan will pledge not to move toward Taiwan independence. The Mainland will pledge not to use military force. This has since become the mainstream view in the US, but obviously back then the time was not ripe. A flurry of interest was followed by silence. After 2008, cross-Strait relations stabilized. Mention of an interim agreement ceased. Why has it now been set forth? The reason is obvious. The United States fears a collision between Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen.

US anxiety is shared by the public on Taiwan, perhaps even more intensely. After all, Tsai Ing-wen is likely to be elected. The Sunflower Student Movement and the nine in one elections show that the public on Taiwan fears being swallowed up by the Mainland. Therefore they fear a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement will sell the into slavery. During the 2012 election campaign, President Ma set forth such a proposal, but withdrew it a mere two days later upon encountering strong public opposition. Hung Hsiu-chu also advanced this concept. But she did not even get a chance to put it into action before being lambasted by fellow party members. She has been force to temporarily abandon it.

The two sides of the Strait require a mechanism to prevent collisions. US think tanks have proposed an "interim agreement" as most appropriate. On the one hand, it would prevent the DPP from moving toward independence upon assuming power. This would reassure the Mainland. On the other hand, it would prevent the Mainland from resorting to military force, saber rattling, and frightening the public on Taiwan. If the two sides can learn to trust each other in the short term, a permanent peace agreement will eventually become possibile.

Cross-Strait relations have reached this point will great difficulty. This is the fruit of many peoples' effort on both sides of the Strait. This is the crystallization of shared wisdom. If a spur of the moment misjudgement leads to a collision, neither side will benefit. The Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will suffer. We realize that the signing of an interim agreement will be difficult. But it is something the two sides must consider. At the very least, the KMT should sign a KMT/CCP peace agreement. This would make "No Taiwan independence, no Mainland use of force" part of Hung Hsiu-chu's presidential campaign. Such an agreement might well turn out to be an "unorthodox pat hand".

洪秀柱的非典型好牌 2015年07月27日 中國時報 儘管兩岸關係過去7年來已大幅改善，但無可否認，在進到深水區前沿後，早已失去繼續前進的動力。台灣明年即將大選，兩岸關係將進入不確定狀態。此刻，如何確保兩岸已經建立的基礎能夠繼續鞏固、兩岸和平發展大勢不會倒退，應是兩岸及全體中國人共同的期望。 中共十八大習近平上台後，不希望「兩岸政治分歧，一代一代傳下去」，對兩岸關係改採「掌握主動」作為，以實際行動催促兩岸關係深化。馬政府曾經計畫要深化九二共識，推動兩岸交流模式制度化，但僅陸委會和國台辦互稱職銜並定期會晤達成目標，兩會互設辦事處談判仍持續進行外，其他項目都受到阻力。太陽花學運和九合一選舉結果，讓馬政府在兩岸政策上更趨謹慎，兩岸服貿和貨貿協議在民進黨壓力下幾乎完全停擺。儘管兩岸兩會互動照舊，但是進展有限。 總統大選選戰火熱，幾乎所有焦點都關注在候選人身上，至今為止，兩黨候選人政策最受矚目的，還是在兩岸。蔡英文2012大選敗在兩岸關係最後一哩路，這次她補足了功課，先是以「維持兩岸現狀」穩住美國，接著以遵守「中華民國憲法體制」意圖穩住大陸。這兩個說法基本上在美國算是過關，但大陸對她仍有疑慮，基本上並未接受她的主張。 原因在於大陸的基調是「反台獨」，蔡英文在這方面一步不讓，因為這是她的根，退讓之後恐怕連台獨基本教義派都要出走。但是這一步不讓，兩岸關係就很可能出現「地動山搖」。別說「反獨」不讓，就是「一中」也不願意鬆口，蔡英文自始至終不肯承認「九二共識」，就是明證。也因此包括前國防部副部長林中斌、前副總統呂秀蓮都認為蔡英文當選後，將出現「雪崩式斷交」局面。 洪秀柱的兩岸政策，在初選之時曾提出九二共識升級版，希望兩岸能夠進一步確立兩岸不獨、不武局面，也就是「一中同表」和「兩岸簽署和平協議」，但在她打破防磚條款被推舉為國民黨總統候選人後，就遭到黨內強烈批判，認為以這樣的政策參選必敗。經過馬總統和朱立倫主席先後協商，洪秀柱已同意回歸到「九二共識，一中各表」。 很顯然，洪秀柱兩岸政策卻步後，將失去進一步推進兩岸關係的動能，蔡英文的政策則很可能導致兩岸關係大退卻，甚至可能因為南海問題處理不當，誤踩大陸民族主義紅線，導致兩岸重演95年台海危機。美國國務院東亞助卿陸士達、副助卿謝淑麗等人曾擔心兩岸擦槍走火，建議美國政府促成兩岸達成「中程協議」，相互保證「台灣不獨，大陸不武」，當時曾經成為美國主流意見，但客觀條件顯然不夠成熟，熱議一陣後就沒有再議。2008年後兩岸關係漸趨穩定，「中程協議」就不再有人提出，現在又被提出，顯見美方出現「習近平和蔡英文撞車」的焦慮。 美方的焦慮其實也是台灣民眾的焦慮，或許台灣民眾的焦慮更強烈，因為蔡英文當選的機率很高。從太陽花和九合一的結果看來，台灣民眾對大陸不放心，擔心「被吃掉」。因此一提到簽訂「兩岸和平協議」，就認為是賣身契，馬總統在2012年大選一度提出這個主張，卻在強大民意壓力下，不到兩天就退縮；洪秀柱提出這個主張，還沒有投入大選試煉就在黨內被打得滿頭包，最後只好暫時棄守。 然而，兩岸之間不能沒有防撞機制，美國智庫提出的「臨時協議」應該是此刻最適宜的過渡機制。一方面「保證不獨」，避免因民進黨執政後「獨影幢幢」，讓大陸不放心；另一方面「保證不武」，避免大陸對台以各種方式展現肌肉，讓台灣民眾不安心。如果雙方經過這一層互信的試煉與成果累積，進入永久和平協議進程就水到渠成了。 兩岸關係走到今天這一步非常不容易，是經過多少人的努力以及兩岸共同智慧的結晶所造就，如果因為誤判情勢或一時意氣而發生撞車造成翻車，對兩岸都不是好事，甚至是兩岸中國人的悲哀。我們理解，簽訂「中程協議」難度非常高，但兩岸不妨好好思量。至少，國民黨應該思考，以簽訂保證台灣不獨、大陸不武的「國共和平協議」作為洪秀柱競選主軸，或能成為一張「非典型好牌」。

People (2) 李正修