Both Sides Must Demonstrate Greater Goodwill
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2016
Executive Summary: During an interview with this newspaper, Tsai Ing-wen addressed the Mainland, saying she hoped it would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. She said the two sides should increase mutual trust by a show of goodwill, before May 20. Tsai appears to realize the importance of mutual trust and goodwill in cross-Strait relations. The Ma government maintained successful cross-Strait relations for eight years by recognizing the 1992 Consensus and avoiding provocative behavior. By understanding the requirements for cross-Strait cooperation, the Ma government and the Mainland gradually increased mutual understanding and trust. This enabled exchanges to be held on higher and higher levels, and eventually made the successful Ma Xi summit possible.
Full Text Below:
During an interview with this newspaper, Tsai Ing-wen addressed the Mainland, saying she hoped it would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. She said the two sides should increase mutual trust by a show of goodwill, before May 20. Tsai appears to realize the importance of mutual trust and goodwill in cross-Strait relations. The Ma government maintained successful cross-Strait relations for eight years by recognizing the 1992 Consensus and avoiding provocative behavior. By understanding the requirements for cross-Strait cooperation, the Ma government and the Mainland gradually increased mutual understanding and trust. This enabled exchanges to be held on higher and higher levels, and eventually made the successful Ma Xi summit possible.
But goodwill is more than mere lip service. The Ma government's experience should serve as a lesson for Tsai Ing-wen. If she genuinely wishes to make a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland, she must focus on the Mainland's core concern – the 1992 Consensus. The Ma government's clear recognition of the 1992 Consensus was precisely the right response to the Mainland's policy expectations. The full implementation of direct links, of a diplomatic truce, of Mainland tourism and Mainland exchange student programs, were all gestures of goodwill based on these expectations. The Mainland reciprocated, offering generous concessions to Taiwan. It relaxed restrictions on Taiwan's participation in international organizations and the signing of free trade agreements with other countries. The Mainland refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with many of Taiwan's diplomatic allies out of consideration for the Ma government. Can Tsai Ing-wen's new government achieve the same level of cross-Strait relations as the Ma government? That is highly doubtful. The reason is a lack of mutual trust, especially since Tsai Ing-wen obstinately refuses to issue a clear statement addressing the Mainland's chief concern.
Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland have been gradually narrowing the gap between them. The Mainland issued strong statements, both before and after the election. But during two party sessions this year, Mainland leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed the party's intention to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. This would not change in response to internal political changes on Taiwan. Not only that, he pledged to increase cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation in a number of areas, in order to increase cross-Strait economic and social integration, to ensure the welfare of compatriots, to bring them closer, and to increase their sense of shared destiny. Despite radical rhetoric emerging from among the public, Mainland officials have yet to criticize the new government. Instead, they have merely expressed hopes. Resumption of diplomatic relations between the Mainland and Gambia is widely viewed as mild pressure on Tsai Ing-wen. But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have stated that the Mainland's policy of peaceful cross-Strait relations remains unchanged. The Mainland apparently hopes the event will not be blown out of proportion, and undermine overall cross-Strait relations. Also, the Mainland military has refrained from commenting on the cross-Strait situation. The Mainland clearly has no intention of getting tough with Taiwan. These moves are Mainland expressions of goodwill toward the new government. Their intent is to ensure friendly cross-Strait interactions. Tsai Ing-wen has called on the Mainland to demonstrate goodwill. She needs to appreciate these expressions of goodwill from the Mainland, and reciprocate with enthusiasm.
Tsai Ing-wen has responded positively to the core concerns of the Mainland on two occasions. While visiting the US, she pledged to promote peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations under the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework. She pledged to build on the foundation of 20 years of negotiations and interactions. Upon winning the election, Tsai said she understands and respects the fact that in 1992, ARATS and the SEF held talks, during which the two sides sought common ground. This brought her a step closer to the Mainland's insistence on the 1992 Consensus. That said, Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland remain far apart. The Mainland is not merely talking about acknowledging the fact of the 1992 Consensus, but of accepting its core meaning.
Nor is that all. Tsai Ing-wen has underscored the importance of public opinion on Taiwan. Perhaps in her mind, the election results amount to a vote of no confidence in the Ma government's cross-Strait policy. Perhaps they represent an attitude of defiance toward the Mainland. Tsai may think public opinion on Taiwan can serve as a shield against the Mainland. She may think she can use this to force the Mainland to accept her position. But she has clearly underestimated the Mainland's iron will. She has misjudged public opinion on Taiwan as well. The public on Taiwan may may object to certain aspects of cross-Strait exchanges. But that does not mean it wants the new government to set cross-Strait relations back to what they once were. For most people, continued normal cross-Strait relations remain indispensable.
Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen must re-examine her hostility toward the Mainland. She must avoid strategic miscalculations. She must think hard about what the public on Taiwan can accept. The Mainland must understand cross-Strait policy rhetoric. Only then can it demonstrate genuine goodwill. We naturally understand Tsai Ing-wen's resistance to the 1992 Consensus. We realize Tsai Ing-wen must cope with pressure from both inside and outside the party. Publicly accepting the One China Principle does indeed present practical difficulties. Tsai may wish to start from the periphery, and show her eagerness to address the Mainland's concerns.
She could, for example, call for a freeze on the expression of Taiwan independence political attitudes in the forthcoming party congress. She could call for a resolution in the legislature, promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations under the existing Republic of China constitutional framework. She could call for a new government policy path, based on the rule of law. She could regulate the behavior of party legislators. She could call on them to reduce rhetorical attacks on the Mainland, or even rethink their Chinese identity. These would demonstrate goodwill toward the Mainland. If Tsai can do these, we believe the Mainland would respond in kind.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2016
Executive Summary: During an interview with this newspaper, Tsai Ing-wen addressed the Mainland, saying she hoped it would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. She said the two sides should increase mutual trust by a show of goodwill, before May 20. Tsai appears to realize the importance of mutual trust and goodwill in cross-Strait relations. The Ma government maintained successful cross-Strait relations for eight years by recognizing the 1992 Consensus and avoiding provocative behavior. By understanding the requirements for cross-Strait cooperation, the Ma government and the Mainland gradually increased mutual understanding and trust. This enabled exchanges to be held on higher and higher levels, and eventually made the successful Ma Xi summit possible.
Full Text Below:
During an interview with this newspaper, Tsai Ing-wen addressed the Mainland, saying she hoped it would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. She said the two sides should increase mutual trust by a show of goodwill, before May 20. Tsai appears to realize the importance of mutual trust and goodwill in cross-Strait relations. The Ma government maintained successful cross-Strait relations for eight years by recognizing the 1992 Consensus and avoiding provocative behavior. By understanding the requirements for cross-Strait cooperation, the Ma government and the Mainland gradually increased mutual understanding and trust. This enabled exchanges to be held on higher and higher levels, and eventually made the successful Ma Xi summit possible.
But goodwill is more than mere lip service. The Ma government's experience should serve as a lesson for Tsai Ing-wen. If she genuinely wishes to make a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland, she must focus on the Mainland's core concern – the 1992 Consensus. The Ma government's clear recognition of the 1992 Consensus was precisely the right response to the Mainland's policy expectations. The full implementation of direct links, of a diplomatic truce, of Mainland tourism and Mainland exchange student programs, were all gestures of goodwill based on these expectations. The Mainland reciprocated, offering generous concessions to Taiwan. It relaxed restrictions on Taiwan's participation in international organizations and the signing of free trade agreements with other countries. The Mainland refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with many of Taiwan's diplomatic allies out of consideration for the Ma government. Can Tsai Ing-wen's new government achieve the same level of cross-Strait relations as the Ma government? That is highly doubtful. The reason is a lack of mutual trust, especially since Tsai Ing-wen obstinately refuses to issue a clear statement addressing the Mainland's chief concern.
Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland have been gradually narrowing the gap between them. The Mainland issued strong statements, both before and after the election. But during two party sessions this year, Mainland leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed the party's intention to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. This would not change in response to internal political changes on Taiwan. Not only that, he pledged to increase cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation in a number of areas, in order to increase cross-Strait economic and social integration, to ensure the welfare of compatriots, to bring them closer, and to increase their sense of shared destiny. Despite radical rhetoric emerging from among the public, Mainland officials have yet to criticize the new government. Instead, they have merely expressed hopes. Resumption of diplomatic relations between the Mainland and Gambia is widely viewed as mild pressure on Tsai Ing-wen. But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have stated that the Mainland's policy of peaceful cross-Strait relations remains unchanged. The Mainland apparently hopes the event will not be blown out of proportion, and undermine overall cross-Strait relations. Also, the Mainland military has refrained from commenting on the cross-Strait situation. The Mainland clearly has no intention of getting tough with Taiwan. These moves are Mainland expressions of goodwill toward the new government. Their intent is to ensure friendly cross-Strait interactions. Tsai Ing-wen has called on the Mainland to demonstrate goodwill. She needs to appreciate these expressions of goodwill from the Mainland, and reciprocate with enthusiasm.
Tsai Ing-wen has responded positively to the core concerns of the Mainland on two occasions. While visiting the US, she pledged to promote peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations under the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework. She pledged to build on the foundation of 20 years of negotiations and interactions. Upon winning the election, Tsai said she understands and respects the fact that in 1992, ARATS and the SEF held talks, during which the two sides sought common ground. This brought her a step closer to the Mainland's insistence on the 1992 Consensus. That said, Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland remain far apart. The Mainland is not merely talking about acknowledging the fact of the 1992 Consensus, but of accepting its core meaning.
Nor is that all. Tsai Ing-wen has underscored the importance of public opinion on Taiwan. Perhaps in her mind, the election results amount to a vote of no confidence in the Ma government's cross-Strait policy. Perhaps they represent an attitude of defiance toward the Mainland. Tsai may think public opinion on Taiwan can serve as a shield against the Mainland. She may think she can use this to force the Mainland to accept her position. But she has clearly underestimated the Mainland's iron will. She has misjudged public opinion on Taiwan as well. The public on Taiwan may may object to certain aspects of cross-Strait exchanges. But that does not mean it wants the new government to set cross-Strait relations back to what they once were. For most people, continued normal cross-Strait relations remain indispensable.
Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen must re-examine her hostility toward the Mainland. She must avoid strategic miscalculations. She must think hard about what the public on Taiwan can accept. The Mainland must understand cross-Strait policy rhetoric. Only then can it demonstrate genuine goodwill. We naturally understand Tsai Ing-wen's resistance to the 1992 Consensus. We realize Tsai Ing-wen must cope with pressure from both inside and outside the party. Publicly accepting the One China Principle does indeed present practical difficulties. Tsai may wish to start from the periphery, and show her eagerness to address the Mainland's concerns.
She could, for example, call for a freeze on the expression of Taiwan independence political attitudes in the forthcoming party congress. She could call for a resolution in the legislature, promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations under the existing Republic of China constitutional framework. She could call for a new government policy path, based on the rule of law. She could regulate the behavior of party legislators. She could call on them to reduce rhetorical attacks on the Mainland, or even rethink their Chinese identity. These would demonstrate goodwill toward the Mainland. If Tsai can do these, we believe the Mainland would respond in kind.
兩岸都需要釋放更多善意
2016年03月23日 中國時報
蔡英文接受本報專訪時向大陸喊話，希望對岸釋放更多善意，並表示
但善意絕不是嘴上說說那麼簡單，馬政府的經驗提醒蔡英文，
當然蔡英文與大陸彼此間的立場落差已逐步縮小，雖然選前、
蔡英文針對大陸的核心關切主要在兩個場合做了正面表態，
定發展。勝選之後蔡英文進一步表示，
不僅如此，蔡英文著重強調台灣民意的重要性，或許在她看來，
因此，蔡英文必須重新審視自己對大陸的消極態度，避免戰略誤判，
譬如，可以在即將舉行的黨代會上推動新決議文的通過，
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