Tsai Ing-wen Must Change DPP Relationship with the Mainland

Tsai Ing-wen Must Change DPP Relationship with the Mainland
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 14, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen must narrow the gap between herself and Beijing on one China. She must rein in the DPP legislative caucus, and prevent them from passing legislation or resolutions that severely impact cross-Strait relations. She must prevent the DPP from using transitional justice to promote cultural and historical Taiwan independence. She must be cautious about Washington, Tokyo, Taipei relations, and East Asian regional strategic issues, particular freedom of navigation and disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Cross-Strait relations may then enjoy some breathing room. will not lead to disaster.

Full Text Below:

The DPP and the CCP are two freight trains on a collision course. Unless one of them changes course, the cross-Strait status quo will be unsustainable after May 20. Neither Beijing, Washington, nor Taipei want the change in ruling parties to harm strategic relations, or increase uncertainty in East Asian regional security. But if Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inaugural speech fails to meet with the other side's satisfaction, cross-Strait relations will descend into “Cold Peace”, or even “Cold Civil War”. This would be detrimental to all parties involved. This would be detrimental to Taiwan, which needs to make an economic breakthrough, reestablish stability, and ensure prosperity.

DPP cross-Strait policy is subject to internal political pressures. It is subject to pressure from Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. It is hampered by a lack of trust and communications between itself and Beijing. The January 16 two in one election is over. The two sides have demonstrated a modicum of goodwill. But on the 1992 Consensus, the two sides continue talking past each other. They are parrying each others' thrusts, and anger seems to be mounting.

The DPP argues that the Ma administration's eight year old cross-Strait policy is a failure. It argues that under ECFA, the Mainland benefited more from the peace divident than Taiwan. It argues that the public on Taiwan failed to experience any benefits, that cross-Strait economic integration failed to facilitate economic restructuring, or increase our breathing room on the international stage. It argues that the DPP won by a landslide, therefore Beijing cannot ignore majority public opinion on Taiwan. It cannot insist that Tsai Ing-wen follow in Ma Ying-jeou's footsteps.

Moreover, many believe that since the DPP is the ruling party, it must mark the end of an era. It must implement "transitional justice" and complete the final mile to democratization. Certain members of the new legislature have begun a “running of the bulls”. They have sponsored bills pertaining to sensitive issues such as national identity and reunification vs. independence. These however, do not represent the ideas of the DPP leadership. The DPP thinks Beijing is mistaken. Tsai Ing-wen will not take the same Taiwan independence path as Chen Shui-bian when he came to power.

Now consider the Mainland. The State Council Taiwan Affairs Office has held numerous press conferences urging the DPP to clarify its stance on the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen may have declared that she "acknowledges the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus”. She may have pledged to “abide by the existing Republic of China constitutional framework”. But she has yet to make the most critical declaration of all. She has yet to declare that "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China". Mainland Foreign Minister Wang Yi even stated, "We hope that the new rulers on Taiwan will accept the premise of their own constitution, that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China". Beijing merely wants Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the ROC Constitution. This should not be difficult. She should then take the next step forward. But the green camp has played word games with Wang Yi. They have argued that Wang Yi's remarks meant Beijing had accepted Tsai Ing-wen's statement of position. Beijing eventually lost patience, became angry, and expressed its position more forcefully than ever. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun clarified. He said that refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus amounted to changing the status quo. The two sides no longer have room for compromise. Mutual resentment and hostility are greater than ever.

Now that the DPP has come to power, cross-Strait relations will inevitably be affected. Is Tsai Ing-wen willing respond to Beijing's three points in her inaugural speech? Xi Jinping repeatedly referred to "two sides, one family". This should be sufficient to maintain the status quo, at least to some degree. It should be enough to ensure the Cold Peace that prevailed in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian came to power. ARATS and the SEF may terminate official contacts and economic and trade negotiations. The number of Mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan may be reduced. But if Tsai Ing-wen's inaugural speech fails to go beyond what she has already put out, the two sides could descend directly into Cold Civil War.

How will the new government handle high level personnel appointments for ARATS and the SEF? How  will the new legislature handle bills pertaining to cross-Strait relations and sensitive national identity issues? How will it handle Taiwan's participation in United Nations related organizations? How will it handle internal matters, such as de-Sinicization in education? Beijing may use these to decide whether the new government is hostile, whether it is moving towards one China, one Taiwan, two Chinas, or Taiwan independence. The two sides could then descend into a Cold Civil War.

Cross-Strait relations descending into a Cold Civil War or even military reunification, is the worst possible scenario for both sides. Both sides face pressure from the current economic downturn and restructuring. The Mainland's "Ten Three Five Plan" touts supply side reforms. Economic growth in 2016 is expected to reach 6.5% to 7%. But if it fails to maintain 6.5%, the Mainland then faces serious challenges. Taiwan's economic situation is equally grim. Will cross-Strait relations result in "the earth moving and the mountains shaking”? They might not. But if cross-Strait official contacts and trade exchanges are severed, Taiwan businesses are likely to exit en masse, the way they did under the Chen regime. The new government could not sustain the impact. Tsai Ing-wen must be willing to move in the same direction as the Mainland in order to minimize any such impact.

She must narrow the gap between herself and Beijing on one China. She must rein in the DPP legislative caucus, and prevent them from passing legislation or resolutions that severely impact cross-Strait relations. She must prevent the DPP from using transitional justice to promote cultural and historical Taiwan independence. She must be cautious about Washington, Tokyo, Taipei relations, and East Asian regional strategic issues, particular freedom of navigation and disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Cross-Strait relations may then enjoy some breathing room. will not lead to disaster.

調整與大陸關係 蔡英文責無旁貸
2016年03月14日 中國時報

民、共兩列火車正以對撞態勢加速前進，兩岸若無一方願意轉轍，520後兩岸關係就不可能維持現狀。固然中、美、台三方都不希望因台灣政黨輪替而釀成戰略關係的重大損害，更加深東亞區域安全的不確定情勢，但如果520就職演說不能滿足對岸的底線，兩岸關係勢必進入「冷和平」僵局，甚至墜入「冷內戰」，這對任何一方都不利，對台灣亟欲突破經濟困境、再造人民安定繁榮生活更是不利。

民進黨兩岸政策受到台灣內部政治壓縮、美日中關係牽動，以及欠缺和北京當局的互信和有效的溝通管道等三重不利因素影響，自116二合一選舉落幕至今，雙方雖然都展現了一定程度的善意，但關於化解「九二共識」分歧的隔空對話，只是見招拆招，而且火氣似乎愈拆愈大。

民進黨認為，馬政府8年來的兩岸政策是失敗的，在ECFA經貿合作交流機制下，大陸受惠遠比台灣更多，所謂「和平紅利」台灣民眾無感。兩岸經濟整合不利台灣經濟轉型，也無助拓展國際空間。民進黨是在多數民眾支持下才獲得壓倒性勝利，北京不能無視台灣多數民意，硬要民進黨「馬規蔡隨」。

而且，許多民進黨人認為，民進黨既已執政就必須總結歷史，熱切期待完成「轉型正義」，走完民主化的最後一哩路。個別黨員在立法院新會期相關提案如奔牛出閘；其中若干法案涉及敏感的國家定位與統獨意識，但並不代表民進黨的黨意。民進黨認為，北京若據此認定蔡英文上台後將走回陳水扁的台獨衝撞舊路，顯然是誤解。

反觀大陸，已多次透過國台辦、國務院新聞發布會等場合，希望民進黨把如何化解「九二共識」分歧說得更清楚。北京認為，蔡英文雖然宣示「承認『九二共識』的歷史事實」、「遵守中華民國現行憲政體制」，卻缺少最關鍵的一味：「大陸台灣同屬一中」。大陸外長王毅甚至提出：「希望台灣新執政者接受自己憲法規定的大陸、台灣同屬一個中國」，反襯北京認為蔡英文只是回到自己的憲法規定，這一點都不困難，應該再往前走一步。因此，當泛綠營擴大解讀王毅的談話，認為是接受了蔡英文的主張時，北京終於失去耐心，甚至動怒，直接把話越挑越清楚。國台辦主任張志軍明確表示，不認九二共識就是改變現狀；雙方已無妥協的空間，彼此的怨氣和敵意更難消解。

看來兩岸關係在民進黨上台後難免受到衝擊，假設蔡英文願意在就職演說中，對北京提出的三選項做出最低程度的正面回應，譬如習近平多次談及的「兩岸一家親」理念，應該能夠讓兩岸關係一定程度維持現狀，至少可以維持「冷和平」，大致回到2000年陳水扁執政初期，兩岸兩會的官方接觸和經貿談判等可能中斷，陸客來台人數可能減少。但如果蔡英文就職演說的內涵未超過她已經提出的詮釋和承諾，兩岸就可能直接進入「冷內戰」了。

如果新政府在海陸兩會的高層人事安排上，在立法院相關涉及兩岸關係和國家定位的敏感政治性法案的審議上，在台灣參與聯合國功能性組織的動作上，或者繼續在內政、教育採取「去中國化」政策，北京就可能視為新政府是不友善的，是朝「一中一台」、「二個中國」或「台獨化」的敵對操作，兩岸不是不可能由「冷內戰」繼續倒退。

當然，兩岸關係走向冷內戰，甚至「武統」，對雙方都是最壞的選擇，畢竟當前兩岸同樣面臨經濟下行和轉型的雙重壓力。大陸「十三五計畫」吹響供給側改革，2016年經濟增長預期目標6.5%～7%，但能不能保住6.5%是非常嚴峻的挑戰。同樣地，台灣整體經濟形勢仍然嚴峻，新政府上台，就算兩岸關係不「地動山搖」，僅只是兩岸官方接觸中斷，經貿交流開倒車，扁政府執政時的台企出走潮都有可能再次上演，這將是新政府難以承受的打擊。蔡英文至少應表現願意與大陸相向而行的誠意，讓可能的影響降到最低。

一方面她可以繼續努力縮小與北京有關「一中」問題的差距，二方面應責成立院黨團，要約束立法院制定可能造成兩岸嚴重衝撞的法案或決議；也要適當約束民進黨推動的「轉型正義」，不能變成轉向推動文化和歷史台獨，在美、日、台三邊關係與東亞區域戰略問題上，尤其南海主權與自由航行權爭議的表態務必謹慎；這樣，兩岸關係至少還可以保留若干緩衝空間，不至於翻覆釀災。