China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
March 7, 2016
Executive Summary: How will the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen respond to Beijing? She has two options. One. Insist on "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence". Two. Make concessions to Beijing. The red and green camps are two freight trains about to collide head on. Two meetings on the Mainland have made clear that Beijing will not back down. Will the red and green trains run into each other head on? Or will one of the two swerve? The answer will be clear during Tsai's inauguration on 5/20.
Full Text Below:
When the Democratic Progressive Party was in the opposition, it obdurately opposed the 1992 Consensus and Two Sides, One China. Most of all it refused to relinquish Taiwan independence. But it is now the ruling party. It enjoys “total government”. It must now confront Beijing directly, on the front lines. This lands the DPP on the horns of a dilemma. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to change her position, she must deal with Xi Jinping. If she accepts Beijing's cross-Strait political premise, she is admitting to the public on Taiwan that the DPP's twenty year long "struggle for Taiwan independence" was merely a way to deceive voters and seize political power, at which point the DPP's credibility will totally collapse.
Tsai Ing-wen realizes her dilemma. That is why before and after the election, she studiously adopted euphemistic rhetoric such as “maintain the status quo”, "uphold the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", and "acknowledge that a meeting was held in 1992", to avoid touching hot button issues. She desperately hopes Beijing will relent, and cross-Strait relations will not revert to the past.
During two Mainland meetings, CPPCC Chairman Yu Zhengsheng and Premier Li Keqiang issued statements. General Secretary Xi Jinping attended delegate deliberations in Shanghai on cross-Strait relations. Xi set the tone with his "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" for the Taiwan issue. He completely dashed DPP hopes in that connection. Yu Zhengsheng said Beijing would continue promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations by adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence.
In Li Keqiang's "Government Work Report", he said "We must adhere to our major policies on Taiwan, to the 1992 Consensus as our political basis, resolutely oppose Taiwan independence separatism, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguard peaceful cross-Straits relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait". Li Keqiang made clear the legal ramifications of the 1992 Consensus, equating it with "safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity."
Xi Jinping's speech on future DPP rule clarified the Chinese Communist Party's Taiwan policy bottom line on DPP rule. It was the first time Xi Jinping addressed the Taiwan issue since the ROC presidential election. His was an important declaration. In his view, recognizing the historical reality of the 1992 Consensus and affirming its core meaning, will give the two sides a shared political basis, one that will maintain a constructive relationship. He vowed to "resolutely curb any form of Taiwan independence separatist activities, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and prevent a secessionist historical tragedy. This is the common and steadfast aspiration of all Chinese people. It is also our our solemn commitment and responsibility to our history and our people." Xi Jinping's remarks confirmed that the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus is to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. He used words such as “desire”, “will”, “commitment”, and “responsibility” to underscore that determination. When Wang Yi addressed a United States think tank, he referred to "Their constitution". He was referring to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation represented by that constitution. He was not referring to divided sovereignty.
Chapter 55 of the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" draft resolution calls for "promoting peaceful cross-Straits relations and the reunification process". From the very beginning it calls for adherence to the 1992 Consensus and the one-China principle, and resolute opposition to Taiwan independence. Based on a principled foundation, it calls for a mutually beneficial, win-win approach to cross-Strait cooperation, including economic cooperation, to promoting the welfare of compatriots on both sides, and consolidating and promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations".
Beijing continues invoking other terms related to cross-Strait relations. For example, the Taiwan Affairs section of this year's government work report, explicitly mentions for the first time "cross-Strait common destiny" and reaffirms "two sides, one family".
Xi Jinping first used the term "cross-Strait common destiny" during the 2013 Lien Xi summit. Xi Jinping referred to "cross-Strait common destiny" when he met with KMT Chairman Eric Chu in 2015. He
made a five-point proposal, of which the core substance was adherence to the 1992 Consensus, opposition to Taiwan independence, and recognition that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China.
From the above speeches delivered by and documents penned by Xi, Li, and Yu, Beijing is issuing the DPP yet another reminder. For Beijing, the core content of the 1992 Consensus is the one China principle, opposition to Taiwan independence, and the indivisibility of China's sovereignty. This is the basis for peaceful cross-Strait relations. Without the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait relations will be as Xi Jinping said, "Without solid foundation. The earth will move and the mountains will shake”. Naturally there would be no "cross-Strait common destiny" and "two sides, one family".
By now Beijing's position should be abundantly clear. For Beijing, "China's sovereign territory may not be divided" is the core of the 1992 Consensus. It is the basis for cross-Strait relations. It is the precondition for the two sides becoming a "community of destiny" and “two sides, one family”.
How will the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen respond? She has two options. One. Insist on "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence". Two. Make concessions to Beijing. The red and green camps are two freight trains about to collide head on. Two meetings on the Mainland have made clear that Beijing will not back down. Will the red and green trains run into each other head on? Or will one of the two swerve? The answer will be clear during Tsai's inauguration on 5/20.
，更不願意「放棄台獨」，但是獲得完全執政的民進黨， 必須站在第一線面對北京，讓民進黨處於兩難之局。 如不調整原有的立場，擋在她前面的是習近平； 如果接受北京的兩岸論述，等於告訴台灣民眾， 這二十多年民進黨有關「台獨」的主張， 其實全是為了騙取政權的工具藉口而已，那麼民進黨從此誠信瓦解。
蔡英文不斷用一些不觸及核心問題的修飾言詞，例如「維持現狀」、 「中華民國現行憲政體制」、「九二事實」等， 企圖能得到北京的理解，讓兩岸關係不至於全面倒退。
特別是習近平總書記在參加上海代表團審議中關於對兩岸關係定調以 及《十三五規畫綱要》有關台灣問題的文件， 等於徹底斷絕了民進黨的期望。俞正聲在發言中表示：「要在堅持『 九二共識』、反對『台獨』的政治基礎上， 繼續促進兩岸關係和平發展」。李克強在《政府工作報告》稱：「 我們要繼續堅持對台工作大政方針，堅持『九二共識』政治基礎， 堅決反對『台獨』分裂活動，維護國家主權和領土完整， 維護兩岸關係和平發展和台海和平穩定」。李克強的談話等於再為「 九二共識」做了法律上更清晰的詮釋，即將其等同於「 維護國家主權和領土完整」。
。這是台灣大選後，習近平有關台灣問題的首次談話， 也是一次重要的宣示。他認為，承認「九二共識」的歷史事實， 認同其核心意涵，兩岸就有共同政治基礎，就可以保持良性互動， 並表示，「將堅決遏制任何形式的『台獨』分裂行徑， 維護國家主權和領土完整，絕不讓國家分裂的歷史悲劇重演。 這是全體中華兒女的共同心願和堅定意志， 也是我們對歷史對人民的莊嚴承諾和責任。」習近平的談話， 再次確認「九二共識」的核心內涵就是「維護國家主權和領土完整」 ，並以「心願、意志、承諾、責任」等言詞強調其決心。 王毅在美國智庫演講所稱「他們的憲法」，也是指《憲法》 所代表的「國家主權與領土的完整」，而不是分裂的主權。
推進兩岸關係和平發展和祖國統一進程」，一開始就提到「堅持『 九二共識』和一個中國原則，堅決反對台獨。 在堅持原則立場基礎上，以互利共贏方式深化兩岸經濟合作， 擴大兩岸合作領域，增進兩岸同胞福祉， 鞏固和推進兩岸關係和平發展。」
上首次提出。2015年習近平在與時任國民黨主席朱立倫會面時， 就「兩岸命運共同體」提出五點主張，其中核心內涵就是：堅持「 九二共識」、反對「台獨」、認同大陸和台灣同屬一個中國。
北京等於再次明確告訴民進黨，對於北京來說，「九二共識」 的核心內涵就是「一個中國原則」及「反對台獨」，即「 整個中國的主權不可以分裂」， 這個原則也是兩岸關係是否能夠和平發展的基礎。如果沒有這樣的「 九二共識」，兩岸關係就會如習近平所說的「基礎不牢、地動山搖」 ，自然不會有「兩岸命運共同體」與「兩岸一家親」。
一是堅持「台灣主權獨立」立場，二是向北京讓步。 紅綠兩輛火車開始迎面對駛，兩會的相關發言表示北京不會退讓。 紅綠兩列車最終是否會相撞或其中一輛最後選擇轉彎，520蔡英文 就職之日就會有答案。