United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
March 26, 2016
Executive Summary: Boao is no longer a remote fishing village. Over the past decade, the Mainland has become a colossus. If Tsai Ing-wen is willing to affirm the 1992 Consensus, Beijing will naturally be pleased. But even if she chooses to side with the US and Japan, and to incite cross-Strait enmity, that is already something the Mainland expects and is ready for.
Full Text Below:
Vincent Siew has returned to the lonely Boao Forum. In 2008, as vice president, he attended on behalf of President Ma Ying-jeou. He and Hu Jintao restarted cross-Strait negotiations, which had been severed for over a decade. He made possible the spectacle of the two sides reconnecting after a half century. Today however, this glorious image appears to have faded into memory.
The Boao Forum has become a microcosm of tumultuous cross-Strait relations. Boao was once a mere fishing village on Hainan Island. While blue vs. green battles raged back on Taiwan, a lonely Vincent Siew attended the forum, virtually unnoticed. Ma Ying-jeou later chose him as running mate. Upon winning the election, Boao suddenly became the bright pearl of Hainan Island. Economic and trade officials from all over, as well as the newly elected Vice-President of the Republic of China and the President of the People's Republic of China, spoke freely here. The two sides of the Strait turned a page in history here.
But looking back at Boao and cross-Strait relations, that image scene has become blurred, and now looks bleak. Two years ago, at this very moment, students occupied the Legislative Yuan and smeared this historic occasion as “a betrayal of Taiwan”. Vincent Siew traveled there alone this year. He met with Li Keqiang. But the meeting was strictly pro forma. Siew and Hu held an extraordinary summit. But Tsai Ing-wen has no interest in making it shine any brighter.
History has reversed its verdict, from night to day. This cannot be blamed solely only the youths who occupied the Legislative Yuan two years ago. It must also be blamed on years of DPP Taiwan independence indoctrination. Is Tsai serious about "maintaining the cross-Strait status quo"? After all, the status quo was the handiwork of Ma Ying-jeou. If she is, then how can the DPP repudiate this eight year achievement, and parade Ma Ying-jeou through the streets as if he were a traitor to the nation?
These contradictions show that under Tsai Ing-wen, cross-Strait relations will be dangerously unpredictable. After all, how can Beijing possibly believe that Tsai Ing-wen, author of the two-states theory, will actually concede that “the two sides are part of one China"? How can Beijing possibly believe that Tsai Ing-wen, who pronounced the Republic of China DOA, will do her best to “abide by the ROC constitutional framework"?
Vincent Siew met with Hu Jintao in Boao, mainly because Ma Ying-jeou had long recognized the 1992 Consensus. Vincent Siew was therefore permitted to attend. When Hu Jintao spoke on the Beijing-Washington Hotline, he expressed the desire to resume cross-Strait negotiations. Clearly, cross-Strait exchanges depend on more than mere political declarations. They require a clear record of words and deeds by persons or political parties. Tsai Ing-wen's political masterpiece is the two-states theory. How can she possibly expect Beijing to believe any of her current political rhetoric?
Xi Jinping expects Tsai Ing-wen to affirm that the "two sides are both part of one China" in her inaugural address. Tsai Ing-wen finds it difficult even to utter the term “1992 Consensus”. Xi probably assumes she will find it impossible to utter the words “both are part of one China”. Richard Bush, who shuttles between the Taipei and Beijing, does not think Beijing is seeking common ground with Tsai Ing-wen. Thefore Beijing is not pinning its hopes on Tsai Ing-wen. Instead it is relying on its own political and economic might, rather than Tsai Ing-wen's political rhetoric.
When the People's Daily reported on the 1992 Consensus, it used the terms "historical fact", and "core meaning". These two terms remain the political guideline for cross-Strait interaction. But Tsai Ing-wen cannot possibly respond to them. This makes Xi Jinping's two turns of phrase all the more intriguing. His first turn of phrase was, "shared cross-Strait destiny". His second was, "In order to determine the future of cross-Strait relations, the Mainland must first develop and progress".
The Taiwan Affairs Office recently posted a Xinhua News Agency analysis of Xi Jinping's remarks on its home page. It made the article the lead. The article focused on the meaning of Xi's two phrases. Consider the first phrase. During two party sessions this year, Xi Jinping spoke of "increasing cross-Strait economic and social integration and development", and "narrowing the emotional distance between compatriots, and enhancing awareness of a shared destiny". This probably means that the CCP has no intention of severing cross-Strait economic links in order to punish the public on Taiwan.
But even more noteworthy is how the article picked up on last year's phrase, "In order to determine the future of cross-Strait relations, the Mainland must first develop and progress", and made it the topic of two party sessions. This was no accident. It suggests that the CCP still subscribes to materialism, and believes that the future of the two sides will be determined by material forces on the Mainland.
Boao is no longer a remote fishing village. Over the past decade, the Mainland has become a colossus. If Tsai Ing-wen is willing to affirm the 1992 Consensus, Beijing will naturally be pleased. But even if she chooses to side with the US and Japan, and to incite cross-Strait enmity, that is already something the Mainland expects and is ready for.
他以副總統當選人身分，銜準總統馬英九之命， 跟胡錦濤拍板重啟已中斷十年的兩岸協商， 開闢了兩岸分隔半世紀後僅有的盛景。而如今， 這個歷史鏡頭彷彿成了羞赧的記號， 它所創造的繁華景象也彷彿不久之後即將消失。
早年博鰲只是海南一座小小漁村，在台灣沉酣於藍綠惡鬥的年頭， 蕭萬長獨自一人寂寞地參與這個論壇，幾乎無人聞問。 在馬英九力邀他搭檔並一舉勝選後，博鰲突然成了耀眼的南島明珠， 在各國經貿人士的見證下，熱騰騰剛當選的中華民國準副總統， 與人民共和國的國家主席在這裡暢敘歡言， 兩岸的新歷史列車也從這裡轟隆啟動。
兩年前的此刻，學生占據國會議場， 將歷史賜予的機遇一竿子皆打成賣台行徑。今年蕭萬長踽踽獨行， 雖然仍與李克強一晤，也只能行禮如儀。 蕭胡會所締造的兩岸另類峰會， 蔡英文毫無興趣將它燒成一口更加紅火的灶。
而在於民進黨經年催化出來的台獨教條。 如果蔡英文真認為馬英九所創造的「兩岸現狀」 就是她想要維持的現狀，那麼，民進黨何以這八年卻全力詆毀， 將馬英九的成績形容成必須遊街示眾的賣國罪行？
禍福難測。因為，北京豈能想像， 一個執筆兩國論的蔡英文竟可能直呼兩岸「同屬一中」？ 又豈能信服，一個曾稱中華民國已然流亡的蔡英文， 真會戮力遵行中華民國的「憲政體制」？
的長期認同，因此蕭萬長獲派出席後， 胡錦濤即在中美熱線裡主動表露重啟兩岸協商的願望。可見， 兩岸的往來基礎絕非僅繫於一句政治表白， 而是在一個人或一個政黨長期各項言行的總和。 蔡英文的政治傑作是其兩國論，那麼， 如何奢望北京輕信她此刻的任何政治語言？
的核心意涵，或許早就料定蔡英文恐怕連「九二共識」 的表面文章都難說出口，遑論「同屬一中」。 這也是卜睿哲穿梭兩岸的重大發現：「 與蔡英文求同存異似乎不是北京的目標。」據此，似可斷定， 北京並不寄希望於蔡英文，它寧可倚恃自己的政經實力， 而不是蔡英文的演說修辭。
兩句話，固然仍是兩岸未來互動的政治準則， 但蔡英文不能回應這兩句話恐已是確鑿的結論。那麼， 習近平新的兩句話更加值得玩味：他的第一句話是「 兩岸命運共同體」；第二句話則是「把握兩岸關係的未來走向， 首先是大陸的發展進步」。
，文章即重點琢磨了這兩句話。關於第一句話， 習近平在今年兩會上表明，將「深化兩岸經濟社會融合發展」，以「 拉近同胞心靈距離，增強對命運共同體的認知」。這或可解讀為， 中共當不會任意斬斷兩岸經濟動脈，以懲罰台灣民眾。
之舊話特別撿拾起來，作為今年兩會談話的補綴，絕非偶然。 這似乎意味信奉唯物主義的中共已意識到：兩岸最終決勝點， 在於大陸的物質力量。
而大陸也已長成魁梧的巨人。對北京而言，蔡英文願答覆九二共識， 固然受到歡迎；就算她選擇附和美日、挑弄兩岸心結， 恐怕也在意料之中，且已有了對案。