United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
March 10, 2016
Executive Summary: The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations reflect traditional green camp antipathy toward the government, antipathy toward civil servants, and antipathy toward the Mainland. Ko Chien-min says the DPP version of the bill will prevail. But as long as the DPP's "Three Antis" mentality remains the rule, the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult to maintain, and Tsai Ing-wen's hope of "maintaining extremely good relations" with the Mainland will remain elusive.
Full Text Below:
Green camp legislators have recently drafted several "two-states theory" versions of the the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. DPP Party Convener Ko Chien-min has indeed drafted a version that "reaffirms the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". But most members of the new DPP-controlled legislature demand passage of the two states theory version. The DPP's long held "three Antis" mentality remains unchanged. It continues to oppose the government, oppose the civil service, and in particular, oppose the Mainland. This constitues a major stumbling block in the way of the Tsai government.
All of these drafts of the oversight regulations are based on the two states theory. Are they merely part of a “good cop, bad cop” approach to cross-Strait negotiations? If not, then their sponsors are intentionally making trouble for Tsai Ing-wen. The You Mei-jen and NPP drafts provide harsh penalties for negotiators who violate its provisions. For example, “undermining national sovereignty” would be punishable by not less than seven years' imprisonment. What constitutes "undermining national sovereignty"? That is left open to interpretation, as the occasion requires. Negotiators will have this Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. No wonder it is being ridiculed as the "No Agreements Allowed” draft bill.
Tsai Ing-wen recently pledged to reaffirm the "ROC constitutional framework". Yet green camp legislators are trotting out various two states theory versions of the oversight regulations. Tsai Ing-wen recently pledged to "maintain good relations with [Mainland] China". Yet green camp legislators are proposing "No Agreements Allowed” draft bills. Tsai Ing-wen recently laid down the law, saying "When I say I intend to maintain the status quo, I intend to maintain the status quo". Yet the DPP's "Three Antis" mentality persists. The "status quo" is likely to be a leaf in the wind.
For starters, the DPP clings to an anti-government attitude. The DPP controlled the central government for eight years. It governed locally for much longer than that. Yet it remains blind to the larger picture. High-ranking officials within the party remain addicted to confrontation. They cannot understand the concept of stable governance. They even ignore the truism that "The master does not make trouble in his own house". Chen government political appointee Hsu Chi-hsiung criticized the DPP, saying that whenever it is in the opposition, it champions one policy. But the moment it is in office, it completely reverses course. When it changes its role, it changes its position. This is not a good thing. Even Chen Shui-bian admitted that it is impossible to change the name of the country. "Impossible means impossible.” After all, many things can be said when one is in the opposition. But once one becomes the ruling party, one must exercise restraint. One can charge ahead heedlessly when one is in the opposition. But once one becomes the ruling party, one must practice impulse control. The DPP's confrontational mentality is hard to change. Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly warned legislators that legislation requires strategic vision and good timing. But in the end DPP legislators invariably fall back on Party Convener Ko to hammer out deals between the DPP and outsiders.
Next, the DPP is contemptuous and suspicious of the civil service. The various green camp versions of the oversight regulations enable the legislature to meddle in cross-Strait negotiations. This blurs legislative and executive responsibilities. It divorces authority from responsibility, and undermines administrative efficiency. In particular, the bill turns a any number of ill-defined actions during cross-Strait negotiations into criminal offenses. They include "undermining our national sovereignty and our international status". Draconian punishments would be meted out to cross-Strait negotiators, who would be impeached or even prosecuted. Is intimidating those responsible for cross-Strait negotiations really better than promoting cross-Strait exchanges and consultations?
Premier Chang San-cheng said civil servants responsible for negotiations must not be treated as criminal suspects. Doing so would be a major blow to civil servants. The DPP has a long history of taking to the streets. It has developed a distrustful, even hostile attitude toward civil servants. If the DPP shows scant respect for the dignity of the civil service, if it refuses to adopt a professional attitude toward civil servants, how can a Tsai government control the vast machinery of state, and lead Taiwan forward?
Finally, the DPP has a deep-rooted anti-Mainland mentality. The current oversight regulations include the two states theory version and the No Agreement Allowed version. Both violate the Constitution's definition of Taiwan and the Mainland. This reflects the DPP's deep-rooted anti-Mainland mentality. It is also a legacy of the Sunflower Student movement. First, de-Sinicization. Then, genetic engineering that artificially yields "natural Taiwan independence". The DPP has trapped itself on the horns of a dilemma, between "spiritual Taiwan independence" and the harsh reality of domestic and foreign pressure. It is now forced to flip-flop endlessly between the two. Trust between the CCP and DPP is non-existent. The DPP repeatedly misreads the situation and falls flat on its face. This can only be described as reaping what one sowed. Opposing anything having to do with the Mainland has become second nature. The DPP's anti-Mainland mentality is an obstacle to the transformation of the party. It also constitutes a blind spot and a minefield for the incoming Tsai Ing-wen regime.
The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations reflect traditional green camp antipathy toward the government, antipathy toward civil servants, and antipathy toward the Mainland. Ko Chien-min says the DPP version of the bill will prevail. But as long as the DPP's "Three Antis" mentality remains the rule, the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult to maintain, and Tsai Ing-wen's hope of "maintaining extremely good relations" with the Mainland will remain elusive.
草案。儘管總召柯建銘強調黨版草案「 會回到中華民國的憲政體制來談」， 但民進黨多數主導下的新國會不斷出現「兩國論」入法現象， 反映的是民進黨長期以來反對政府、反對公務員、 特別是反對中國的「三反」心態未改， 這將是蔡英文執政之路的大石頭。
兩國論」；此舉，若非刻意在兩岸議題上與蔡英文扮黑白臉唱雙簧， 那就只能說是為「扯小英後腿」了。另一方面，「尤美女版」及「 時代力量版」都設有嚴苛罰則， 對相關人員違反相關規定致損害主權者，議處七年以上徒刑。所謂「 損害主權」，又是可以隨意認定； 有這種懸在談判事務官員頭上的大刀，也難怪被譏稱為「 不協議條例」。
版條例便紛紛出籠；蔡英文才承諾「 一定會與大陸維持非常良好的關係」，綠營「不協議條例」 即大拋絆馬索；蔡英文才霸聲定調，「我說維持現狀， 就是維持現狀」，但民進黨「三反」心結難解，「現狀」 恐成漂移的新常態。
各路諸侯的地方執政經驗更綿延不輟， 但整體心態上仍缺乏主持大局的體認， 黨內大員亦戒不掉在野衝撞體制的脾性， 不僅無法理解平穩執政之要諦，甚至罔顧「當家不鬧事」的道理。 扁政府政務委員許志雄批評，民進黨在野時提一種主張， 執政了就一百八十度轉變，換位子就換腦袋，不是好現象。事實上， 包括陳水扁也曾坦言任內要改國號，「做不到就是做不到」。畢竟， 很多話在野但說無妨，執政就得態度嚴謹；很多事在野可以衝， 執政就是要節制。正因在野衝撞心態難改， 蔡英文雖一再告誡立委提案要有整體戰略觀與節奏感， 卻終須仰賴柯總召黨內黨外忙著「喬」法案。
國會對兩岸談判過程皆高度介入，不僅混淆立法、行政分際， 將致權責難斷，更傷及行政效率。尤其，部分草案以「損害主權、 國際地位」等範圍廣泛但定義不明的罪名，對兩岸協商嚴苛問責， 談判人員將動輒被彈劾甚或科以刑責；如此，嚇阻兩岸談判之意， 豈不更甚於促進兩岸交流協商？
這對公務員是很大的打擊。然而，民進黨長期街頭衝撞， 養成這種不信任、甚至敵視公務人員的心態。試想， 民進黨若經常流露出不尊重公務員尊嚴與專業的態度， 蔡英文執政後將如何駕馭這部龐大的國家機器，帶領台灣前進？
兩國論」到「不協議」的版本，皆違背憲法的兩岸定位， 這一則反映了深植的「反中」心態，二則是太陽花學運遺緒。從「 去中國化」到改造基因培育「天然獨」，民進黨如今在「心靈台獨」 與國內外現實壓力之間擺盪、反覆與拉鋸，民共互信不存， 屢生錯解誤讀，面對兩岸情勢躓踣顛頓，只能說是「種什麼因， 結什麼果」。然而，當「逢中必反」已經變成反射動作，「反中」 心態就不僅是民進黨轉型前進的障礙， 更會形成蔡英文未來執政的盲點與雷區。
反對公務員到反對中國的心態。 柯建銘雖然強調未來審查將以黨版為主，然而只要民進黨「三反」 心態不除，兩岸「現狀」終難維持。如此這般，蔡英文要與大陸「 維持非常良好關係」，恐也終將如同鏡花水月。