China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2016
Executive Summary: We believe Beijing still means Taiwan well. We call on Tsai and the new government to treat the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait as their starting point. We call on them to demonstrate wisdom and creativity, and find a way to maintain good cross-Strait public and private sector relations. As long as the two sides affirm that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations, then we may continue to advance along the path of peace.
Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inaugural speech is unlikely to include anything new. Beijing and Washington have each expressed concerns. Susan Thornton is Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs for the US State Department. Thornton supports Tsai Ing-wen's position, but also hopes that Tsai has a clear vision for cross-Strait relations. Clearly Washington perceives the danger behind Tsai Ing-wen's conservative mindset. If Tsai fails to respond to Beijing's core concerns, she could cause trouble for Washington.
Beijing is even more blunt. A People's Daily editorial recently passed a message on to Taipei regarding official policy toward Taiwan. It reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus as the political foundation for cross-Strait exchanges, and issued the incoming government a warning. If it repudiates this political foundation, or rejects its core meaning, then Tsai Ing-wen's "status quo" will be viewed as empty rhetoric. Cross-Strait trust will be shattered, and official consultation mechanisms will collapse. Beijing drew a line in the sand. It expressed the hope that Tsai Ing-wen would come around. It indirectly responded to past statements issued by the DPP. It stressed that the 1992 Consensus was endorsed by the two sides' governments. It is not the intellectual property of any one political party. The Mainland has abided by the 1992 Consensus, and demonstrated goodwill toward Taiwan. The Mainland will continue to conduct cross-Strait consultations and negotiations, on this basis, for the benefit of people on both sides.
Beijing and Washington have each offered Tsai Ing-wen both a carrot and a stick. In particular, in addition to sticking to principles, Beijing has also expressed hope that Tsai will see reason. Beijing genuinely desires peaceful cross-Strait relations. The key lies in Tsai's ability to respond to Beijing's core concern – the two sides' political foundation. On cross-Strait issues, the DPP may indeed have more room to maneuver than the KMT. The Mainland may indeed be prepared to make concessions. , Tsai Ing-wen has refused to explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus. But if she clearly acknowledges its existence and its spirit, especially if she acknowledges that the two sides discussed the one China principle, she may be able to extricate herself from her fix. Can Tsai Ing-wen issue an appropriate statement regarding the foundation for cross-Strait political relations? Can she affirm that it is based on the constitutional framework of the Republic of China? If she can, Beijing may be willing to maintain official cross-Strait relations.
The key is that Tsai Ing-wen must answer the question, “What is the nature of the cross-Strait relationship?" Tsai says she is committed to “maintaining the status quo”. This avoids provocation, but fails to respond to the underlying question. Naturally it fails to satisfy Beijing. Even if Beijing were to grudgingly accept, the issue would resurface during future contacts. Consider cross-Strait relations under Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou. If this matter is not dealt with appropriately, Beijing must respond officially. There will be no room for ambiguity. Tsai Ing-wen must act now, and not wait until a crisis erupts between the two sides before dealing with the matter.
Tsai Ing-wen is under pressure from Taiwan independence fundamentalists within her own party. If she tampers with the DPP's holy of holies, she puts herself at great risk. Major players within the party are speaking out on her behalf, in the hope that she can break through old barriers. Under the circumstances, the best thing Tsai can do, is to acknowledge that the two sides belong to the same culture and have the same blood coursing through their veins. From the perspective of geography and history, the two sides belong to the same entity. On this basis, she can address the two sides' current political status. She can ask Beijing to respect the reality of divided rule. This will enable her to respond to internal pressure, substantively maintain the Taiwan Region's autonomy, and prevent the Taiwan Region from being downgraded politically by the Mainland. This is precisely the spirit of the 1992 Consensus. Taipei does not accept Beijing's claim of sovereignty. Nor does it define Taiwan as something outside the framework of China. This imposes no limits on us. Beijing may not accept the phrase "different interpretations", but it must acknowledge its reality. Taipei will also acquire more space on the international stage.
Tsai Ing-wen must not underestimate the importance of a shared political foundation for cross-Strait relations. Only a shared political foundation between Taiwan and the Mainland enables continued economic, trade, and cultural exchanges. Only then can the two sides establish a permanent social foundation for peace. Only cross-Strait private sector exchanges, without political interference from governments, will enable people on both sides of the Strait to think of each other as family. Only then will confrontation and hostility gradually fade. Within Taiwan, when hostility between the two sides gradually diminishes, internal opposition to improved cross-Strait relations will also be marginalized. It will no longer constitute an obstacle to the new government's policy, and undoubtedly benefit Tsai Ing-wen as well.
We believe Beijing still means Taiwan well. We call on Tsai and the new government to treat the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait as their starting point. We call on them to demonstrate wisdom and creativity, and find a way to maintain good cross-Strait public and private sector relations. As long as the two sides affirm that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations, then we may continue to advance along the path of peace.
兩岸和平發展需要蔡英文正確抉擇
2016年05月06日 中國時報
蔡英文的520就職演說難有新意，中美兩方乃各自表達關切之意，美國國務院亞太首席副助卿董雲裳對蔡英文的論述表達肯定，但也期望她能針對發展兩岸關係的積極願景有所闡述，顯然，美方也注意到蔡英文保守思維的潛藏危機，若不能積極回應大陸的核心關切，就可能再度給美方帶來麻煩。
大陸的說法就更坦白，《人民日報》以評論員文章形式傳遞官方對台政策訊號，重申九二共識作為兩岸共同政治基礎的地位，並警告若新政府否定這一政治基礎，不認同其核心意涵，蔡英文所謂的「維持現狀」就是一句空話，甚至兩岸互信及制度化協商機制也會坍塌。畫定紅線之外，大陸還是對蔡英文表達期許，並間接回應民進黨過去的一些說法，強調九二共識本身是兩岸雙方授權認可的，不是哪個政黨的專利，而大陸堅持九二共識其實就是對台灣方面釋放的善意，大陸也會在此基礎上繼續推動兩岸協商談判、造福兩岸民眾。
顯然，中美雙方從軟硬兩個方向對蔡英文做了明確的表達，尤其是大陸，在原則的堅持之外還是展現了期許，這也意味著大陸有足夠的誠意繼續推進兩岸關係和平發展，關鍵就在於蔡英文能否回應大陸所關心的政治基礎。在兩岸問題上，民進黨確實可能比國民黨擁有更大的迴旋空間，而且大陸也已經準備做出適當的讓步，也就是說，即便蔡英文不明確說出九二共識，但如果能夠對九二會談的事實及其精神有明確闡述，特別是確認當時雙方各自對一中原則的論述，想必就可以為自己解套。蔡英文若能就中華民國憲政體制下兩岸的政治關係、兩岸民眾交往的基礎問題上做出適當的定位，就可能讓大陸選擇接受，然後在此基礎上繼續推動兩岸關係的發展。
關鍵就是蔡英文不能迴避兩岸到底是何種關係的問題，「維持現狀說」雖然承諾不挑釁，但沒有回應這一根本問題，自然就無法讓大陸滿意。縱然勉強接受，未來只要兩岸雙方進行接觸，這一問題就必定浮現，參考李扁馬三任總統的兩岸互動經驗，在此問題上若沒有相應的處理，大陸斷不會貿然開啟官方層次的互動，完全沒有模糊處理的空間。蔡英文還是早作打算為好，不要等到雙方相見之際再來危機處理。
我們也理解蔡英文承受的內部壓力，黨內基本教義派正不斷向其施壓。蔡英文想搬動民進黨長期堅持的神主牌，要承擔很大的風險，現在黨內要角正紛紛向其喊話，為蔡英文的突破新增了障礙。在這種情況下，蔡英文最好的做法是，首先承認兩岸在文化、血緣上的連結，從地理和歷史的角度確認兩岸一體的事實，在此基礎上再談兩岸分治的現狀，並要求大陸尊重我方作為有效施政的政治體地位，一方面可以回應內部壓力，另一方面也能在實質上維繫並鞏固台灣的自主空間，避免從政治上被大陸矮化。這正是九二共識的精神所在，台灣可以不接受中華人民共和國的主權要求，也不自外於中國的框架，不至於因而限縮了自己的靈活空間，而大陸雖不接受「各表」，卻也不得不接受其事實，台灣有機會獲得更大的國際空間。
蔡英文不能低估兩岸共同政治基礎在兩岸關係中的重要性，台灣只有與大陸在共同政治基礎上達成基本的諒解，才能繼續推進雙方在經濟、貿易和文化上的交流合作，才能持續累積兩岸永久和平的社會基礎。只要兩岸民間往來不受政治因素干擾，兩岸民間的和解進程才會持續，兩岸人民才能真正以「一家人」的思維看待彼此，對立和敵意才會逐漸消弭。對台灣內部來說，當兩岸間的敵意逐漸降低，內部反對兩岸關係發展的聲音就會被邊緣化，不至於成為新政府施政的障礙，這對蔡英文來說無疑也是一項利多。
我們相信，大陸對台灣仍然有善意，我們呼籲蔡英文和新政府應從台海兩岸民眾的福祉出發，展現智慧和創造力，找出兩岸政治關係與民眾交流基礎的解套方法，只要能確認兩岸非國與國關係，兩岸一家與共的關係，當能確保兩岸關係沿著和平的道路繼續前進。
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