Tsai Ing-wen's Perilous Diplomatic Strategy

Tsai Ing-wen's Perilous Diplomatic Strategy
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 27, 2016

Executive Summary: Obama has visited Vietnam and Japan in an attempt to firm up his “Asian-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. The new government has retreated from Chong Zi Niao Reef, and surrendered it to the Japanese. Having chosen sides, Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy path is now strewn with obstacles. She faces more than just a few high hurdles on a race track. She is looking at a tightrope strung across a chasm.

Full Text Below:

No sooner had the Tsai Ing-wen government assumed power, then it retreated from Chong Zi Niao Reef. Taipei-Tokyo relations immediately warmed. Six former directors of the American Institute in Taiwan gathered in Taipei, and together shouted approval of Washington-Taipei relations. Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy road map calls for an alliance with the US and Japan based on “shared democratic values”. This rosy picture blanks out a number of ugly realities. They include Ractopamine-laced US pork imports, irradiated foodstuffs from Fukushima, and Tsai Ing-wen's "cling to America's apron strings, cozy up to Japan, and keep the Mainland at arms length” thinking.

Between her visit to Washington last year and her May 20 inaugural address, Tsai Ing-wen has revealed her diplomatic strategy. It is diametrically opposed to Ma's. Tsai has subordinated cross-Strait relations to regional relations. Tsai's diplomatic strategy reflects her "first the world, then the Mainland" thinking. For her, cross-Strait peace is the product of an Asian-Pacific system of collective security. This reveals her “ally with the US and Japan to counter China” mindset. Her diplomatic strategy includes the New Southern Strategy, an “alliance of democratic values” with the United States, Japan and Europe, international cooperation on global issues, and head of state diplomacy.

On Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy road map, foreign relations trump cross-Strait relations. Cross-Strait relations are less important than the cultivation of regional relations. Cross-Strait relations are subordinated to Asian-Pacific security. Tsai has been careful not to ruffle the tiger's fur. But by turning the policy of the past eight years on its head, and subordinating cross-Strait relations to regional security arrangements, Tsai Ing-wen is walking a dangerous diplomatic policy path.

Ma Ying-jeou's "diplomatic truce" and "flexible diplomacy" put cross-Strait policy first. During his term of office he negotiated Taiwan's international space and a cross-Strait peace agreement with Beijing. Now however, cross-Strait negotiations are on hold. Tsai Ing-wen contemplates cooperation with the Mainland only as part of her "New Southern Strategy", and the cultivation or regional relations. This of course is nonsense. The very reason for the “New Southern Strategy" is to eliminate dependence on the Mainland market. But given her refusal to address the essential issues, is cross-Strait cooperation even possible? Not to mention the marginalization her “New Southern Strategy” will face from Beijing's One Belt, One Road, and the AIIB. Politically she will find it even more difficult to overcome Beijing's pressure on ASEAN and India.

An “alliance of democratic values” is the magic incantation in Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic strategy. Chen Shui-bian held high the banner of human rights in an attempt to insinuate the ROC back into the international framework of human rights. Tsai Ing-wen is placing even stronger emphasis on universal values in an attempt to join a global alliance of values. Her intent is to pit democracy against the human rights situation on the Mainland. With common values as her clarion call, she hopes to cozy up to the United States, Japan and Europe. She hopes to use universal values as her calling card to the international community.

But international diplomacy is based on the harsh realities of international realpolitik, not universal values. EU refugee and humanitarian policy offer a clear lesson in that regard. Obama's lifting of the US arms embargo against Vietnam is intended to counter the Mainland, and has nothing to do with human rights in Vietnam. Chen Shui-bian's "head of state diplomacy" ended up as a "diplomatic lost voyage". That memory lingers. Washington and Beijing's “joint management of Taiwan” makes a mockery of the any “alliance of democratic values”.

Tsai Ing-wen sees international cooperation on global issues as entree to the international community. Humanitarian aid, medical assistance, financial assistance, and anti-terrorism all figure in her "peace activist diplomacy". But in reality great power diplomacy is ubiquitous. For example, the WHO plays an important role in health maintenance, disease prevention, and disease research. Yet during the SARS incident, Taiwan was shut out of the WHO. Vaccinations were made difficult. The US and Japan were unable to open the door for Taiwan. Only when the Ma administration came to power, and the two sides of the Strait reconciled, was Taiwan truly integrated into the global epidemic prevention system and allowed to attend the WHA as an observer. The road to the WHA this year was strewn with obstacles, not without reason. Otherwise, why did the Minister of Health and Welfare never use the term “Taiwan” even once during his lengthy address to the WHA? Why did he consistently use the term "Chinese Taipei"?

With the exception of his peace initiatives for the East China Sea and South China Sea, Ma Ying-jeou made scant reference to values. Instead, through cross-Strait reconciliation, he made numerous diplomatic breakthroughs, including the number of allies and the number of countries that provide visa-free treatment for ROC tourists.  For the Tsai government these were insurmountable hurdles. Foreign Minister Li Ta-wei has announced that the new government will engage in "head of state diplomacy". The planned visits of President Tsai to Panama and Paraguay, which transit the United States, will probably come off without a hitch. But cross-Strait relations may cool or even freeze. Even in the absence of severed diplomatic relations, current diplomatic allies may be difficult to retain.

Obama has visited Vietnam and Japan in an attempt to firm up his “Asian-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. The new government has retreated from Chong Zi Niao Reef, and surrendered it to the Japanese. Having chosen sides, Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy path is now strewn with obstacles. She faces more than just a few high hurdles on a race track. She is looking at a tightrope strung across a chasm.

蔡英文外交路線的風險
2016-05-27 聯合報

蔡英文政府一上台，就從沖之鳥礁退卻，台日關係瞬間回暖；與此同時，美國在台協會歷任六位處長齊聚台北，高喊「美台關係讚」。在蔡英文的外交路線圖上，已勾勒了一個與美日建構民主價值同盟的圖像；圖像半遮半掩的是瘦肉精美豬與福島食品進口的交易，以及「靠美傾日遠中」的交心。

從去年華府之行，到五二○就職演說，蔡英文布建的外交路線圖全然不同於馬政府：兩岸關係放在區域發展中鋪陳，反映「從世界走向中國」的外交軸線；兩岸和平架構在亞太集體安全體系上，隱現「聯美日抗中」的戰略思維。而她的外交政策操作重心，新南向政策、美日歐民主價值同盟、全球性議題的國際合作、元首外交等，皆在這張路線圖上完成標示。

蔡英文測繪外交路線圖的指導原則，是外交政策優於兩岸關係。她把兩岸互動納入「區域發展」的範疇，兩岸關係成為亞太安全的一環。儘管蔡英文小心翼翼，不捋虎鬚，但外交高於兩岸是翻轉了過去八年的路線，蔡英文外交路線圖的挑戰與風險皆在於此。

馬英九的「外交休兵」與「活路外交」，是兩岸政策居上位，任內不斷與對岸就台灣國際空間與兩岸和平協議進行協商。現在，兩岸多項協商擱置，蔡英文僅在「新南向政策」區域發展議題中提到願與對岸尋求合作協力之可能。這當然是空話，「新南向」不就是要擺脫對中國市場的依賴嗎？兩岸必答題沒完成答卷，有合作協力的可能嗎？遑論「新南向」在經濟上必然面臨「一帶一路」與亞投行的擠壓，在政治上更難穿透中共對東協和印度的影響力。

民主價值同盟是蔡英文設計外交地圖的關鍵密碼。陳水扁曾高懸人權價值，要把中華民國重新納入國際人權體系；蔡英文更強調秉持普世價值的精神，加入全球議題的價值同盟。其意在對比中國的民主、人權狀況，以共同價值為號召，深化與美日歐的關係，更標舉普世價值進行國際參與。

然而，外交和國際參與終須回歸國際現實利益和權力規則，而不盡然取決於普世價值。歐盟因難民人道問題而離心離德的教訓就在眼前；歐巴馬全面解除對越南武器禁運，考量的也是制衡中國，而非越南人權。對台灣而言，陳水扁的「元首外交」淪為「外交迷航」的殷鑑不遠，「美中共管台灣」更是對民主價值同盟的嘲諷。

蔡英文也把全球性議題的國際合作，視作通往國際社會的敲門磚；人道救援、醫療救助、經濟援助、反恐合作等，都是她要推動的「積極和平外交」。但現實上大國外交無處不在。例如，世衛組織在醫療援助與疾病防治研究扮演重要角色，但ＳＡＲＳ事件台灣被拒於世衛組織門外，防疫備感艱辛，美日也無法為台灣開門。直到馬政府上台，兩岸和解，台灣才真正被納入全球防疫體系，並以觀察員身分出席世衛大會。今年世衛之路，一波三折，豈是無因；否則，衛福部長林奏延何苦在世衛大會演說隻字未提台灣，只能句句自稱「中華台北」。

除了東海和南海的和平倡議外，馬英九其實沒有太多價值倡議；但通過兩岸和解，卻創造了不少外交突破。從邦交國數、免簽國數到觀光客數，對蔡政府而言，都是難以跨越的高欄。外交部長李大維宣示新政府將積極推動「元首外交」，規劃中的蔡總統出訪巴拿馬、巴拉圭並過境美國，應可順利進行。但是，如果兩岸關係冷和僵持，即使沒有斷交海嘯，迄今累積的外交成果，恐難維持。

歐巴馬串訪越南、日本，意圖鞏固「亞太再平衡」戰略；新政府也藉沖之鳥礁撤艦向日本遞了「投名狀」。選邊後，蔡英文外交路線圖的挑戰與風險，恐怕不只是幾個設在跑道上的高欄，而是一條架在懸崖上的鋼索。