China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is not expected to meet Mainland expectations regarding the 1992 Consensus during her May 20 inaugural address. We hope nevertheless that president elect Tsai will put the well-being of the Taiwan public first. We hope she will conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with the ROC constitutional framework, and do her utmost to avoid cross-Strait conflict. We hope the Mainland will also remain flexible in its attitude and delicate in its handling of future cross-Strait interactions. We hope it will keep in mind the bigger picture, and formulate new Taiwan policies beneficial to both sides.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen is not expected to meet Mainland expectations regarding the 1992 Consensus during her May 20 inaugural address. We hope nevertheless that president elect Tsai will put the well-being of the Taiwan public first. We hope she will conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with the ROC constitutional framework, and do her utmost to avoid cross-Strait conflict. We hope the Mainland will also remain flexible in its attitude and delicate in its handling of future cross-Strait interactions. We hope it will keep in mind the bigger picture, and formulate new Taiwan policies beneficial to both sides.
The Mainland wants Tsai Ing-wen to reaffirm the 1992 Consensus as the foundation for cross-Strait relations. Over the past six months it has been applying pressure. Taiwan already feels the earth moving and the mountains shaking. But such pressure could be counterproductive. Everyone understands that Beijing's pressure is directed at the Tsai Ing-wen regime. But the effect will not be limited to the new government. The majority of people on Taiwan are likely to feel them. The result could be a backlash.
Tsai Ing-wen is convinced that as long as she does not incite a Taiwan independence incident, the United States, Japan and other countries will stand behind her. Washington has indeed repeatedly expressed its appreciation of Tsai Ing-wen. The US House of Representatives reaffirmed the "Taiwan Relations Act" and its cornerstone "six guarantees".
This ought to remind Beijing that when faced with Tsai regime obstinacy, applying pressure must not be its sole response. Beijing must address 23 million people on Taiwan, not just the DPP government, which will only be in office temporarily. Beijing's Taiwan policy has two parts. One is continued pressure on the DPP government. The other is continued private sector economic, trade, and cultural exchanges. This policy has not changed as a result of changes in Taiwan's political situation. This approach is correct, but may be difficult to implement. After all, the public on Taiwan is to some extent unified. Its perception of the Mainland is subject to government influence. The new government still enjoys considerable public support. If Beijing imposes sanctions on the Taiwan government, the Taiwan public may react negatively. Some members may even side with it against a common enemy. This is especially true in the international arena. Take the WHA for example. If Beijing exerts too much pressure on Taiwan, a public outcry and civil discontent could break out on Taiwan. Beijing may want merely to send the new government a message. But it might wind up hurting the feelings of the public on Taiwan. Therefore Beijing must proceed with caution.
In order to avoid a backlash, Beijing must consider the public reaction on Taiwan when dealing with the new DPP government. It cannot force Taiwan to submit solely by means of pressure and fear. Instead, it should increase public identification with the Mainland through continued peace and cooperation. Any military exercises or threats must be measured. Instead it must demonstrate greater goodwill. In particular it should offer more preferential policies to the general public and SMEs.
Beijing should attempt to win hearts and minds. While attempting to realize the “Chinese Dream”, it must consider the Taiwan issue from a global perspective. Beijing and Washington continue to clash in the South China Sea. Japan longs to pile on. The Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries have seized the opportunity to expand their claims in the South China Sea. But peace remains the main theme of the 21st century. The major powers, and the two sides of the Strait, urgently need to resolve conflicts through communication and dialogue. Beijing must not allow Washington to use the Taiwan issue to apply pressure in the South China Sea, and harm other Chinese strategic interests. Tsai Ing-wen may significantly change ROC foreign strategy. It will cozy up to the United States and Japan, and open up Southeast Asia. This will inevitably affect Mainland China's attempt to establish a new Asian order.
If cross-Strait relations change, if Tsai Ing-wen takes the same path as Chen Shui-bian and defies Mainland China, neighboring countries will gain strategic bargaining chips. This is not beneficial to the Mainland. The Mainland is making every effort to promote One Belt, One Road. The South China Sea dispute may find resolution as the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries improve their political situation. The Mainland must be committed to maintaining peace in the region, and reducing conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This will improve the political atmosphere in the entire region.
The DPP government has adopted a "creeping separatism" approach, hoping to buy time. It imagines that the longer the delay, the wider the division between the two sides. The price the Mainland will have to pay for reunification will then be too high. When the Mainland encounters internal problems, they can then declare independence. The assumption that the Mainland will encounter internal problems is part of a "Coming Collapse of China" theory bandied about for the past 20 years. It has never come to pass, and is long discredited. On the contrary, time is not on Taiwan's side. Mainland China's economy will continue to grow, and with it, its international influence. It is gradually acquiring G2 status. Together with the United States it will maintain order in East Asia. Reunification will merely be a matter of time.
Taiwan has a democratic and pluralistic society. It has an open information age society. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party does not represent the whole of Taiwan. It cannot monopolize mass communications and public discourse. Beijing must see the larger strategic picture.
讓台灣價值成就中國夢的實現
2016年05月19日 中國時報
判斷蔡英文準總統就職演說不會對大陸期待的「九二共識」做出回應，但我們依然期待蔡準總統能以台灣民眾的福祉為念，在中華民國憲政架構下發展兩岸關係，盡最大努力避免兩岸發生激烈對撞。我們同時也期待大陸，以更靈活的態度、細膩的方式，應對未來兩岸互動中即將出現的變動，抓準兩岸和平發展大方向，制訂有利兩岸同胞的對台新政策。
為了迫使蔡英文回到九二共識所確立的兩岸互動軌道，大陸最近半年接連對台灣進行壓力測試，已經讓台灣內部感受到地動山搖的可能威力，但負面效果也可能產生，雖然大家都明白這些事件都是針對蔡英文政府而來，但受影響者絕不會僅限於新政府，廣大台灣民眾乃至整個台灣社會都有可能受到影響，甚至可能由此出現反彈情緒。
蔡英文確信，只要自己不製造台獨事端，美、日等國就會給予台灣大力支持。美國確實也一再表達對蔡英文讚賞之意，美國國會眾議院通過重申《台灣關係法》與「六項保證」為台美關係基石決議案。
這就提醒大陸，面對蔡英文政府的堅持，不能只以施壓方式應對，更何況大陸要面對的主要還是2300萬台灣人民，不僅僅是暫時執政的民進黨政府。現在大陸對台政策已經逐漸顯現兩條路線的格局，即針對民進黨政府持續施壓，另一方面則繼續加強與台灣民間社會的經貿、文化交流，不因台灣政局變動而改變。政策思維正確，但操作層次卻會產生困難，台灣社會畢竟是一個整體，台灣民眾對大陸的觀感也會受到政府影響，現在新政府尚有較高民意支持，大陸對台灣政府的杯葛，容易引起台灣民眾的不滿，甚至引發部分人的同仇敵愾。在國際場合尤為明顯，以WHA為例，若屆時大陸對台灣施壓過度，甚至釀成衝突事件，傳回台灣很容易引發輿論譁然和民間的不滿。大陸可能只是要對新政府給予警告，卻可能連帶傷及台灣民眾的感情，大陸不可不慎。
為了避免出現反效果，大陸在針對民進黨新政府制定政策時，應該充分考量台灣民間社會的反應，同時要改變單純依靠施壓的政策思路，不能依靠增加恐懼感來逼迫台灣接受，而應該通過不斷的和平與合作增加台灣社會對大陸的認同感。軍事演習和威脅言論點到即可，反而應該釋出更多善意，特別是針對台灣民眾和中小企業制定更多優惠政策。
除了爭取民心以外，大陸更應留意「中國夢」的實現，要從全球格局看待台灣問題。大陸與美國在南海問題上持續緊張對立，日本也想加入亂局，菲律賓、越南等國趁機擴張南海聲索權，但和平仍是21世紀大國關係主調，中美雙方亟待通過溝通對話解決矛盾，大陸應避免美國藉台灣問題施壓南海及其他中國戰略利益。蔡英文將大幅調整對外戰略，擁抱美、日、開拓南洋，難免影響大陸著力重構的亞洲新秩序。
若兩岸關係生變，蔡英文政府走上與陳水扁類似的對抗中國路線，將提供周邊國家更多的戰略籌碼，這對大陸不見得有利。大陸正全力推動一帶一路建設，南海爭端也可能隨著菲律賓、越南等國家政局的變動而出現改善的曙光，大陸更應該致力於維護區域和平，減少在台海地區出現衝突的可能性，從而為改善區域局勢創造良好氛圍。
民進黨政府採取「穩健分離主義」思維，希望爭取時間，認為時間拖愈久，兩岸認同愈為斷裂，大陸統一要付出的代價及風險就愈高，一旦中國大陸內部秩序出現問題，就是走向分離的最佳時間。這種論調的假設是「大陸內部秩序出現問題」，這是一種流傳已20年卻始終未實現的「中國崩潰論」思維，早已破產。相反地，時間並不站在台灣這邊，中國大陸經濟將持續穩健發展、國際影響力也會持續上升，漸漸取得G2地位，與美國共同維持東亞秩序，統一就瓜熟蒂落。
台灣是民主多元社會，也是資訊開放的社會，執政的民進黨並不能代表整個台灣，更不可能壟斷資訊的傳播及社會話語權，北京需有大戰略思維。
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