China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 2, 2016
Executive Summary: The new government cannot afford to adopt a passive attitude toward the cross-Strait impasse. It must not assume that the Mainland will be afraid to offend public opinion on Taiwan. People on the Mainland have an increasingly negative perception of Taiwan. The new government must consider public opinion on the Mainland when dealing with cross-Strait disputes. It cannot afford to listen only to its own press releases. The new government must mollify public opinion on the Mainland. It must avoid an official backlash. These are matters of the utmost urgency, and cannot be avoided.
May 20 is fast approaching. It is virtually certain Tsai Ing-wen will not explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus. It is even more certain she will not explicitly recognize the one China principle. The Mainland is expected to adopt tough countermeasures.
Mainland pressure on Taiwan during cross-Strait disputes has become the norm. After May 20 it will become fixed policy. The Kenyan incident set the tone. The Mainland directed the course of events. Malaysia has extradited 32 Taiwanese suspects to the Mainland. In the past, suspects were treated with kid gloves. The optics of them being led away to the Mainland offered a powerful contrast. This time protests on Taiwan had virtually no impact. All Taiwan can do now is cooperate with the Mainland's prosecution.
This leaves Taiwan with very few bargaining chips. Future cross-Strait interaction may be limited to crisis management. There may be little opportunity for Taiwan to take the initiative. The DPP lacks experience interacting with the Mainland. It has not established mutual trust. Future official interaction will be quite different from the KMT era. When problems arise, it will not be so easy to deal with them in a timely manner. Minor problems may easily become major problems, further undermining normal cross-Strait relations.
Even more worrisome is the DPP's long-standing anti-China ideology, which pays scant attention to the feelings of people on the Mainland. When the public on the Mainland reacts with anger, the DPP often derides them as "thin-skinned and brainwashed by officialdom". Little do they realize that in recent years cross-Strait relations is no longer merely a matter of reunification vs. independence. It has become a matter of identity and feelings. People on the Mainland have an increasingly negative impression of Taiwan. Taiwan scam artists for example, have provoked intense dissatisfaction on the Mainland. Anti-Mainland political rhetoric and anti-Mainland political agitation on Taiwan have left people on the Mainland with a negative perception of Taiwan. If these issues are not addressed, Taiwan may find it difficult to obtain future concessions from the Mainland. If the new government's Mainland policy provokes a public backlash on the Mainland, Mainland officials will be forced to apply greater pressure on Taiwan, albeit in a low keyed fashion.
When Mainland officials apply pressure to Taiwan, they must anticipate a backlash. Anything that negatively impacts the general public may be counterproductive. They must exercise discretion. Cross-Strait private sector interactions are increasingly close. If the Mainland severs official relations with the new government, or if the communication process is too constrained, the result could be increased private sector confrontation on concrete issues. If concrete issues in non-governmental exchanges and trade cannot be resolved, compatriots on both sides will be the first to suffer. That will not improve the people on Taiwan's impression of the Mainland.
People on the Mainland may also react vehemently to cross-Strait hostility. This would reduce the Mainland authorities' flexibility in dealing with issues, and would not be conducive to satisfactory solutions.
The Mainland should be concerned. In recent years, more and more people on Taiwan are leaning toward independence, or toward maintaining the status quo and eventual independence. In part this is the result of deliberate manipulation by political demagogues. But in part this is the result of counterproductive actions by the Mainland, by its refusal to recognize the ROC and the ROC's need for international breathing space and dignity. Taiwan may not have enough formal allies to make excessive demands upon the Mainland. The Mainland has its own national interests and foreign policy needs. But if it applies excessive pressure on non-governmental organizations concerned only with personal safety and public welfare, the result could be public resentment. The Mainland wants the new government to honor the 1992 Consensus. But those with an agenda can easily characterize Mainland pressure as directed against everyone, and rally the public to "resist the common enemy". This would paradoxically help the DPP wriggle out of its dilemma. Recently the Mainland and Gambia resumed diplomatic relations. Delegates from Taiwan were ejected from the Belgian steel conference. But the public on Taiwan did not blame Tsai Ing-wen for not recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen purports to act on behalf of public opinion. That of course is mere demagoguery. Nevertheless it has a tangible impact on public support.
The Mainland must determine whether its pressure will be perceived as reasonable, and whether it impacts people's well-being. The Malaysian extradition of Taiwanese scam artists to the Mainland shows that pressure on Taiwan must be perceived as reasonable. Of course, the best approach would be a forward looking policy that directly benefits SMEs, especially the lower middle class in central and southern Taiwan. Such a policy would allow people on Taiwan to realize that Mainland goodwill toward the public did not change as a result of ruling party change.
According to the Mainland's Anti-Secession Law, the government has the authority to lash out against Taiwan independence. But it must be careful when punishing those with "blue skin and green bones", or investigating Taiwan businessmen and forcing them to declare their political stance. We understand Mainland hostility toward Taiwan independence. But the fight against Taiwan independence must respect the rule of law. It must clearly define the scope of Taiwan independence. It must avoid Huang An type incidents that harm innocents.
The new government cannot afford to adopt a passive attitude toward the cross-Strait impasse. It must not assume that the Mainland will be afraid to offend public opinion on Taiwan. People on the Mainland have an increasingly negative perception of Taiwan. The new government must consider public opinion on the Mainland when dealing with cross-Strait disputes. It cannot afford to listen only to its own press releases. The new government must mollify public opinion on the Mainland. It must avoid an official backlash. These are matters of the utmost urgency, and cannot be avoided.
兩岸政治對抗 民間更需相互體諒
2016年05月02日 中國時報
隨著520的接近，幾乎可以確定的是蔡英文不會正面提及九二共識，更不會針對一中原則做出清晰論述，預計大陸的應對之策將以強硬為主。
先前大陸針對兩岸若干糾紛事件採取的壓力測試行動，現已漸趨常態化，520後勢必成為固定政策。在肯亞事件中，大陸強力主導事件的定調與走勢，現在馬來西亞將32名台籍嫌犯遣送大陸，有了之前輕縱嫌犯的強烈視覺衝擊，這次台灣在抗議之餘，幾乎全無招架之力，恐怕只剩配合參與共同偵辦的選項。
這意味兩岸在進入對抗關係後，台灣的籌碼其實非常有限，而且未來兩岸互動，很可能必須以危機處理為主，難有積極性的開創。尤其民進黨既缺乏與大陸互動的經驗，更未建立互信，未來官方互動關係跟國民黨時代相較完全不可同日而語，一旦交流過程中出現問題，將不容易及時處理，小問題很容易變成大問題，進一步斲傷兩岸關係的正常發展。
更讓人憂心的是，民進黨因長期堅持反中意識型態，不重視大陸民眾的感情，甚至面對大陸民意反彈，往往簡單化譏諷為「被官方洗腦的玻璃心」。殊不知近年兩岸間的許多糾紛，已超越統獨的意識型態範疇，進入認知態度與感情偏好層次，加上大陸民眾對台灣整體印象漸趨負面，比如台灣詐騙犯，就激起了大陸民眾的強烈不滿，台灣內部許多政治論述與對抗行為，也讓大陸民眾對台灣產生負面觀感。相關問題若不解決，就可能限縮台灣人向大陸爭取權益的合理性空間。若新政府的大陸政策引起大陸民意反彈，大陸官方就算想低調處理也會在壓力下被迫強硬。
大陸官方在對台灣施加壓力時，也要預察可能的後座力，特別是對一般民眾的權益和兩岸民間互動關係可能產生的負面作用，更應審慎。兩岸民間互動已日趨緊密，大陸若與新政府停止官方層面的溝通，或在溝通過程中過於緊迫，將會導致民間對立氛圍升高，若民間交流與經貿往來中所產生的具體問題，遲遲不能解決，兩岸同胞將成為首當其衝的受害者，這對大陸改善台灣民眾對大陸的觀感並無好處。
同時，大陸民眾也可能會因為兩岸敵對事件而產生激烈情緒，反而限縮了大陸政府處理相關問題的靈活空間，不利於問題的圓滿解決。
大陸應重視近年來台灣民眾統獨立場的變動趨勢，越來越多人傾向於獨立，或者在維持現狀之後走向獨立，其原因除了政客的刻意操弄外，也跟大陸諸多作為的負面效應有關。不容否認台灣實質政治體的存在，還是需要一定的國際空間和尊嚴。或許台灣在正式邦交國方面沒有立場對大陸提出過度的要求，大陸有自己的國家利益與外交政策需要，但在非政府性質、與民眾切身安全及福祉有關的國際組織方面，若依然全面打壓，就很容易導致社會輿論的反彈和民眾的反感。或許大陸是以新政府為對象，要求其正視九二共識的重要性，但有心者很容易操作成為大陸打壓，引導民眾「同仇敵愾」，如此反而是幫民進黨政府解套。從最近大陸、甘比亞復交及比利時鋼鐵會議事件，可看出台灣民意並沒有因為民進黨不承認九二共識而將責任推給蔡英文。蔡英文所謂依據普遍民意的說法，當然可以視為操作民意的手法，卻產生了實實在在號召民眾支持的力道。
大陸需要慎重評估施壓動作的「合理性」，及其對民眾福祉的客觀影響，再依據理性評估、審慎決策。由馬來西亞將台籍詐騙案嫌犯遣送大陸事件的最新發展看來，對台施壓的「合理性」非常重要。當然，最好的辦法還是以正向政策為主，擴大對民眾的直接讓利，直接與台灣中小企業、中下階層和中南部民眾互動合作，讓台灣民眾感受到來自大陸的善意不因政黨輪替而改變。
依據大陸《反分裂國家法》，官方當然有權力在境內打擊台獨，但在懲罰所謂「藍皮綠骨」，甚至對大陸台商的政治態度作調查、要求表態時，務必慎重。我們可以理解大陸人普遍敵視台獨，但打擊台獨必須依循「依法治國」原則，更應清楚界定台獨範圍，務必避免類似黃安事件傷及無辜。
新政府也不能以消極態度對待兩岸困局，甚至認為大陸會忌憚台灣民意而有恃無恐。大陸民眾對台觀感日趨負面，新政府在處理兩岸糾紛時應考量大陸的民意因素，避免自說自話。對新政府來說，無論是安撫大陸民意，還是避免官方反彈，都是當務之急，沒有逃避空間。
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