United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai must deal with cross-Strait relations. Otherwise one can forget the alarming rhetoric about “the earth moving and the mountains shaking”. Even a hiccup like the WHA will everyone on Taiwan on edge, and set the blue and green camps at each others' throats. Tsai's May 20 bright beginning could well be darkened by just these cross-Strait uncertainties. How can she possibly accomplish anything under such conditions? Both Tsai Ing-wen's inaugural platform and national policy need urgent revision. One can only hope that Tsai administration officials have gotten the message.
Full Text Below:
The design of the stage for the May 20 inauguration ceremony has provoked all manner of criticism. Some have even said that conducting a Daoist ceremony to ward off evil is forbidden. The design team has decided to redesign the stage, a mere nine days before the ceremony.
It is difficult to decide how the stage for Tsai Ing-wen's inauguration ceremony should be redesigned at the moment. Actually, the design of the stage is hardly the only variable that remains up in the air. Seven days from now, Tsai Ing-wen will deliver her inaugural address, and reveal whether she has accepted the 1992 Consensus. Different parties hold different views about whether her address should be rewritten. The stage will be around for one short day. But the inaugural address will constitute the nation's policy blueprint. That will truly set the stage for her administration over the next four years.
Different parties have different views about the “design” of her speech. Tsai Ing-wen will attempt to approximate the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus as closely as possible. She has talked about "promoting cross-Strait relations under the current ROC constitutional framework". She has talked about "understanding and respecting the historical facts, and admitting that in 1992 the two cross-Strait associations held talks and reached an understanding". But she will not utter the words, "1992 Consensus". Therefore some observers hold the following opinions.
One. Tsai Ing-wen need not reject the term, “1992 Consensus”. After May 20, both the KMT and CCP will persist in using the term. The Tsai government will be hounded about it. It will struggle to cope with it. It will lose the opportunity to blaze a new cross-Strait policy path of Tsai's own design. Following the 2005 Lien Hu summit, even though Chen Shui-bian was in power, the cross-Strait agenda was set by the KMT and CCP.
Two. Tsai Ing-wen should seek instead to spin the meaning of the "1992 Consensus" in her own way. She should underscore the "one China, different interpretations" aspect of the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai cannot bring herself to say "one China, different interpretations" she can adopt Wang Yi's "constitutionalist" stance instead.
Three. Tsai will find it extremely difficult to utter the words "1992 Consensus". But she must concede that the 1992 Consensus is the term the two governments have used officially for the past eight years. She would prefer such alternatives as "1992 talks”, “1992 communique”, or “1992 case files”. She must however state clearly that when someone else says "1992 Consensus", she means "1992 communique". The two terms must refer to the same thing. Such an approach may leave her some room to maneuver.
Four. The above suggestions are temporary makeshifts. The Tsai government may concoct terms such as “1992 communique”, but it must eventually revert to "1992 Consensus". Tsai must not treat this matter lightly. If she loses the 1992 Consensus, and Beijing insists on it, she will never see the end of it. Tsai may substitute "1992 communique" for "1992 Consensus". For a time they might become an example of “one term, different expressions”. This would enable her to eventually revert to the "1992 Consensus". She would no longer need to shield herself from reality.
The Tsai administration has obdurately rejected the 1992 Consensus. But such a position is untenable. Take the WHA invitation. The Tsai administration swallowed it whole, including the one China clause in UN Resolution 2758, the basis for cross-Strait relations. The Tsai administration persists in repudiating the 1992 Consensus, and one China, different expressions. Yet it flagrantly contradicts itself in every way, constitutionally, diplomatically, and in cross-Strait relations. Why must the Tsai administration reject the term "1992 Consensus", which forms the strategic framework for "one China, different interpretations"? How long can it cling to such a willful attitude?
Cross-strait relations is the root of all national policy, and the 1992 Consensus is the root of cross-Strait relations. If the Tsai administration rejects the 1992 Consensus, the rejection will be interpreted as a desire to conduct cross-Strait political relations on the basis of the two states theory, and cross-Strait economic relations on the basis of the New Southern Strategy, and Lee Teng-hui's “be patient, avoid haste” policy. This would involve a complete about face, constitutionally, diplomatically, bilaterally, economically, culturally, and socially. If Taiwan's credibility is destroyed over the term "1992 Consensus", can Tsai Ing-wen survive politically?
Take a step back for a moment. Tsai must deal with cross-Strait relations. Otherwise one can forget the alarming rhetoric about “the earth moving and the mountains shaking”. Even a hiccup like the WHA will everyone on Taiwan on edge, and set the blue and green camps at each others' throats. Even now, the May 23 WHA affair remains unsettled. The June 26 Panama affair remains unresolved. Tsai's May 20 bright beginning could well be darkened by just these cross-Strait uncertainties. How can she not be exhausted by them? How can she possibly accomplish anything under such conditions?
Both Tsai Ing-wen's inaugural platform and national policy need urgent revision. One can only hope that Tsai administration officials have gotten the message.
蔡英文的舞台必須急改版
2016-05-12 聯合報
五二○總統就職典禮的舞台設計圖公布，遭致種種批評，甚至有人說，以消災禳禍的「建醮」為發想是「犯忌諱」。設計團隊已決定急改版，時距典禮登場僅九天。
此時，蔡英文的舞台設計尚難定案。其實，不止是就職典禮的舞台仍待改版，她七天後將在典禮舞台上發表的就職演說，由於涉及是否接受「九二共識」等懸念，各方亦有改不改版的爭議。典禮舞台只用一天，但以這篇就職演說所搭建的國政藍圖，始是她未來四年執政治國的真正舞台。
目下，各方對這篇講辭的「設計圖」已有想像。蔡英文將盡量靠近九二共識的核心意涵，她說「在中華民國現行憲政體制下，推動兩岸關係」，又說，「理解並尊重一九九二年兩岸兩會會談的歷史事實所達成的若干共同認知與諒解」；但是，她或許不會說出「九二共識」四個字。因此，有一種「改版」的意見認為：
一、蔡英文不必將心力用在否定「九二共識」四字上。因為，萬一在五二○後國共雙方仍堅持使用這四個字，蔡政府必將不堪其擾、疲於應付，甚至因而失去兩岸走向的主導權。正如二○○五年連胡會後，陳水扁執政，但兩岸關係的主導權落在國共之手。
二、蔡英文應將心力用在爭取對於「九二共識」的詮釋權上，藉勢鞏固「一中各表」在「九二共識」的地位。如果蔡對「一中各表」暫難啟齒，則可以王毅的「憲法說」為出口。
三、蔡此際很難公開接受「九二共識」四字，卻必須設法明說：她並未否定「九二共識」已是兩岸政府正式使用八年且舉世皆曉的標題，但自己則寧可使用「九二會談／九二函電／九二文件 」等替代詞彙。不過，她必須說清楚：你們說「九二共識」，我說「九二文件 」，這兩個名詞所指涉的是同一主體。這樣的嫁接，就可能給未來留下了餘地。
四、以上只是過渡性的策略，蔡團隊最終仍須以自創的「九二函電」等名詞，回頭再著落到「九二共識」上。因為，蔡英文絕對不能輕冒的風險是：她若丟掉了「九二共識」，而國共雙方若都堅持不放，那對蔡政府就後患無窮。蔡若用「九二函電」代換了「九二共識」，暫時形成「一詞各表」，即是自留了以後回到「九二共識」的餘地，不可再作繭自縛。
蔡團隊如今這種堅決否定「九二共識」的舞台是撐不住的。此次ＷＨＡ邀請函事件，蔡團隊居然吞下了框限兩岸關係的總根源《二七五八決議文》及一中原則，卻竟然仍欲否定意在突破此一框限的「九二共識／一中各表」，即暴露了蔡團隊在「憲法／外交／兩岸」立場上無可饒恕的自相矛盾。試問：蔡團隊究竟是反對「九二共識」這四個字，還是反對「一中各表」的戰略架構？此種左手打右手的政策，如何可大可久？
兩岸關係是一切國政的根源，而九二共識又是兩岸關係的根源。蔡團隊不接受九二共識，將被解讀為欲用兩國論來維持兩岸政治關係，再用新南向政策的「新戒急用忍」來操作兩岸經濟關係。這將牽涉到憲法、外交、兩岸、經濟、文化、社會的翻盤改造；而台灣的憑藉，若只在否定「九二共識」四字，這樣的舞台，蔡英文站得穩嗎？
退一步說，若搞不定兩岸關係，且不必說到地動山搖那種危言聳聽的地步，只要三不五時鬧出像ＷＨＡ這樣的事件，就可使整個台灣搞到心神不寧、藍綠反目的境地。即使就目前看，五月二十三日ＷＨＡ的變數仍在，六月二十六日巴拿馬的懸念未解；蔡政府五二○開局的光燦，若迅即掩沒在這類不定時爆發的兩岸角力上，能不精疲力盡？這樣的舞台，蔡英文罩得住嗎？
蔡英文就職典禮的舞台與執政治國的舞台，皆有急改版的必要。希望這兩件事得自蔡團隊的回應都是：「有聽到了！」
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