China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 24, 2016
Executive Summary: The clash over the 1992 Consensus has led to an impasse. The two sides should immediately begin the above outlined four-stage process. It should enable them to reach a consensus. In fact, the above process is how the two sides were able to achieve consensus in 1992. That is a valuable experience the two sides' current ruling parties can draw from.
Full Text Below:
The Mainland has responded to Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inaugural address. It has underscored the importance of the 1992 Consensus. The new government has explicitly promised to act in good faith. Will the result be an impasse? Will the impasse lead to confrontation?
That would obviously not a blessing for people on either side of the Strait. The last eight years of hard work would go down the drain. That would not be a rational choice for authorities on either side of the Strait. The current impasse must be reevaluated from a larger, more strategic perspective by both sides in order to arrive at a new solution.
Taiwan must understand a number of realities about its relationship to the Mainland. The first reality is the balance of power. The Mainland is unquestionably more powerful than Taiwan, especially militarily. Taiwan is simply no match for the Mainland. Taiwan's limited retaliatory capacity is probably not a adequate deterrent. In any event direct conflict is obviously not conducive to the well-being of either side. That should not be considered an option.
The second reality is economics. The Mainland is in the middle of an economic downturn. But its leaders are imbued with revolutionary will. Its economic fundamentals pose no major problem. They will not lead to significant short-term fluctuations. On Taiwan by contrast, neither GDP nor exports are likely to grown over the next two years. Income growth will be limited. The new government plans to open up new markets. But in the short-term these will have no effect. The pressures it faces are clearly much greater than those faced by the Mainland. Taiwan's economy cannot reverse its dependence on the Mainland any time soon.
The third reality is the America factor. The balance of power between the Mainland and the US has changed. During the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis the United States sent aircraft carriers to defend Taiwan. But during the South China Sea dispute, American influence diminished. The protection it provides Taiwan is primarily political. Also, it practices “joint management” of Taiwan with the Mainland. It opposes either side unilaterally changing the status quo. The United States hopes the two sides will not provoke a crisis that changes the status quo. Tsai Ing-wen relies on the United States to counter the Mainland. But she must fully understand US policy, lest excessive dependence result in policy misjudgments.
The fourth reality is differences in the two sides' systems and values. Public sentiment on Taiwan is the main reason for Mainland skepticism toward Taiwan. It is also Tsai Ing-wen's most important source of support. Most people on Taiwan want to maintain the status quo. After Tsai Ing-wen delivered her inaugural address, most people agreed with her. Public support for Tsai Ing-wen exceeded 50%. Even the KMT had no objection. After all, Tsai Ing-wen pledged to deal with cross-Strait affairs on the basis of the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This is probably the area of greatest consenuse on Taiwan today. The Mainland must pay closer attention to this, and realize how the public on Taiwan thinks.
Clearly, the Tsai regime faces a difficult situation. It needs to do more to prove it is sincere, and not being provocative. At the same time, the Mainland must understand why the public on Taiwan remains leery. It must resort less to tough talk and tough action. It must minimize the public backlash. Authorities on both sides must of course adhere to their own principles. But they must not clash head on, let alone resort to reunification by military means. There is still room for negotiation. It all depends on the two sides' political wisdom.
The Mainland is deeply skeptical about the DPP, since it has long advocated Taiwan independence. DPP interpolation and governance reeks of cultural Taiwan independence and de jure Taiwan independence tendencies. Therefore the Mainland can never fully trust it. The DPP harbors many prejudices. It frequently spews anti-Mainland hate speech. The result is an utter lack of trust between the two sides. This, along with the lack of communication channels, renders communication between the two parties difficult, and reconciliation between them impossible.
The new DPP government must improve cross-Strait relations. Both sides must be willing to establish communication channels and know each other better. Tsai Ing-wen has called on the two sides to set aside historical grievances and increase dialogue. The official consultative mechanism has temporarily been suspended. Therefore communications should be reestablished through representatives from the two political parties. The two parties should attempt to understand each other and seek solutions. This cannot be achieved by talking past each other.
Communications can enable the two sides to find where their interests overlap, increasing cooperation to the point where the two sides may benefit each other. The two sides each have internal problems that must be addressed. Cooperation will help them achieve a win-win situation, and help them out of their economic predicaments. Only when the ruling parties on both sides seek common interests and profit from their initial cooperation, will further cooperation be possible.
On such a basis, the two sides may move toward mutual understanding. As the two sides find more in common, they will be able to examine their differences more rationally. Only then will they be able to limit them or even resolve them. Only then will they be able carry on a win/win relationship.
The two ruling parties must come to know each other, benefit each other, and understand each other. Only then will they be able to trust each other. Only then can they enter a new stage of cooperation. Only then can the two sides engage in cross-Strait consultations over major differences and find solutions.
The clash over the 1992 Consensus has led to an impasse. The two sides should immediately begin the above outlined four-stage process. It should enable them to reach a consensus. In fact, the above process is how the two sides were able to achieve consensus in 1992. That is a valuable experience the two sides' current ruling parties can draw from.
啟動民共互信進程 發展兩岸新共識
2016年05月24日 中國時報
大陸接連對蔡英文的520就職演說做了回應，強調了九二共識作為政治基礎的重要性，新政府也明確宣告就職演說已是最大善意。兩岸會不會從此進入僵局，甚至走向對抗局面呢？
這顯然不是兩岸人民之福，更會讓過去8年兩岸付出的辛苦努力付諸東流，不應該是兩岸當局的理性選擇，有必要從更大的格局和戰略高度重新審視當前兩岸執政者之間的僵局，尋求新的解決之道。
首先要弄清楚現在台灣乃至兩岸之間面臨的客觀形勢。第一是實力對比，如今兩岸實力相差懸殊殆無疑問，尤其是軍事實力對比，台灣更不是陸方對手，台灣有限的「報復性武力」，能否產生足夠的嚇阻力量亦大有疑問。不過硬碰硬顯然不利於兩岸人民，應非選項。
第二是經濟問題，雖然大陸正處在經濟下行區間，但上層改革意志堅決，且經濟基本面並無大問題，短期內不至於出現重大波動，反觀台灣，未來2年內無論GDP還是出口都難有起色，民眾收入增長有限，雖然新政府有意開拓新興市場，但也無法短期見效，其所面對的壓力顯然遠大於大陸，而且台灣經濟短期內也難以扭轉對大陸的依賴傾向。
第三則是美國因素，美、中實力對比也同樣今非昔比，1995年台海危機美國或可通過派遣航母來保衛台灣，但如今南海爭議已可看出美軍影響力的式微，其對台灣的保障更多體現在政治層面，而且還是兩方同時管控，亦即兩岸雙方均不應該片面改變現狀，在這種情況下，美方希望兩岸都不要挑釁，以便於維持現狀。蔡英文傾向於依靠美國來平衡大陸的施壓，但必須充分考量美方的政策意圖，切勿過度依賴導致誤判。
第四是制度與價值觀的差異，換句話說就是台灣民意，這是當前台灣面對大陸心存疑慮的主要因素，也是蔡英文此刻最重要的後盾。台灣主流民意還是維持現狀，蔡英文的就職演說發表之後，大部分民眾也表達贊同之意，更讓蔡英文就職後的民意支持度得以突破5成。即便是國民黨，也並不反對蔡英文依據《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》處理兩岸事務的說法，這恐怕是當前台灣內部的最大公約數。對此大陸應該多加注意，並重視台灣民意所展現的基本態度。
顯然，蔡英文政府面對的局面更為艱困，更需要以實際行動證明自己不挑釁與維持交流的誠意；但與此同時，大陸也應該體諒台灣社會對大陸的疑慮，減少強硬言行對台灣民情的衝擊。對兩岸雙方的執政者來說，雖然各有各的原則堅持，但只要不走向激烈對抗乃至武統的局面，就仍有可以轉圜的空間，端看雙方的政治智慧。
大陸對民進黨的疑慮甚深，蓋因民進黨長期主張台獨，且在問政和施政過程中多有文化台獨乃至法理台獨的傾向，因此無法對其充分信賴；而民進黨對大陸也多有偏見，乃至經常發表反中仇中言論，這進一步導致雙方毫無互信基礎，加上雙方缺乏溝通管道，更讓兩黨之間難以及時溝通彼此的想法，也無法有效處理分歧。
但為了民進黨新政府更有效地處理兩岸關係，雙方必須邁開「互知」的第一步，積極建立溝通管道。既然蔡英文已經呼籲兩岸執政黨要放下歷史包袱，展開良性對話，那麼在目前官方協商機制暫停的情況下，就應採取實際行動，由政黨代表建立溝通管道，相互了解彼此想法，並尋求解套方案，也可化解當前只能「隔空喊話」的尷尬局面。
通過溝通雙方才可以找出利益重疊的部分，並加強合作，從而讓雙方走入「互利」階段。兩岸各自有內部問題需要解決，通過合作實現共贏，顯然有助於雙方各自走出經濟困境。只有兩岸執政黨努力發現共同利益，並不斷獲取合作成果，雙方才有進一步溝通合作的可能性。
在此基礎上，雙方可以邁入「互諒」階段，以不斷累積的共同利益為基礎，兩岸雙方可以更為理性地審視雙方存在的分歧，並採取實際行動管控分歧，乃至積極設法解決分歧，以延續雙方互利的進程。
通過一段時間的互知、互利和互諒，兩岸執政黨之間才有可能累積「互信」，從而真正進入理解合作的新階段，也只有在這個階段，雙方才有可能針對兩岸重大分歧進行溝通協商，並積極尋求解決之道。
在「九二共識」陷入僵局之際，兩岸雙方應該立即著手啟動上述四階段進程，積極創造條件，讓雙方重新達成共識。事實上，上述過程也正是1992年雙方會談乃至之前與之後的兩岸溝通之所以能夠達成共識的經驗所在，值得現在的兩岸執政黨借鑑。
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