One China, Different Interpretations Means No Immediate Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force

One China, Different Interpretations Means No Immediate Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2011

Summary: The 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?

Full Text below:

Today's editorial asks why Ma Ying-jeou supports the 1992 Consensus. Tomorrow's editorial asks why Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus.

In fact, the 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?

The capsule is not important. The medicine inside is. The 1992 Consensus is merely the wrapping paper. Inside the wrapping paper is One China, Different Interpretations. The recent debate between Ma and Tsai has gradually moved away from the wrapping paper, and towards the contents.

Consider the cross-Strait status quo, One China means "no independence." Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification." Therefore, One China, Different Interpretations is the practical manifestation of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It means maintaining the status quo.

Consider the Ma administration's position. Upholding One China, Different Interpretations safeguards the Republic of China. It adheres to the Constitution of the Republic of China. The One China stipulated within the Republic of China Constitution means "no independence." It also means maintaining the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It means no [immediate] reunification. That is why President Ma says "Supporting the 1992 Consensus means supporting the Republic of China." By implication One China, Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." This is the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy.

Consider Beijing's position. Originally Beijing took the 1992 Consensus to mean "Different Interpretations of One China." It opposed "One China, Different Interpretations." But in 2008 a new opportunity arose. Beijing warmed up to "One China, Different Interpretations." March 26 was the third anniversary of the Bush-Hu "One China, Different Interpretations" hotline conversation. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said "Cross-Strait relations are good. The two sides have different understandings of One China. But we can seek common ground while setting aside differences. That is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." Wang Yi's "seeking common ground and setting aside differences," is One China, Different Interpretations.

For Beijing, the most important aspect of the 1992 Consensus is its opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore it must be mentioned in the same breath as opposition to Taiwan independence and commitment to the 1992 Consensus, When Beijing speaks out against Taiwan independence, it speaks out against the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." It speaks out against de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is clearly not de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China seeks common ground and sets aside differences, under the premise of One China. The Beijing authorities, ironically, are doing their utmost to maintain the status quo. Beijing knows that the Republic of China's policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" Is a manifestation of the cross-Strait status quo -- one that has no substitute.

Consider the 1992 Consensus. To the Ma administration, the ROC is a sovereign and independent nation. Therefore it does not advocate Taiwan independence. It opposes Taiwan independence. It upholds the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It opposes [immediate] reunification. To Bejing, the important point about the 1992 Consensus is that it opposes Taiwan independence. Beijing accepts the status quo, in which the Republic of China opposes [immediate] reunification. The 1992 Consensus implies One China, Different Interpretations.It implies seeking common ground and setting aside differences under the aegis of One China. It implies no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. It may not be the ultimate solution. It may not be the perfect solution. But it is the best solution in 60 years. It is the only way, because it enables the two sides to adopt a rational process leading to clearer solutions.

Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. But talk is cheap. She can say "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But if she goes further, and repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, she will be repudiating the Republic of China and its Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of China, including its amendments, acknowledges that the two sides are temporarily divided and separately administered. This has resulted in a constitution that accommodates One China, Different Interpretations. This is the same constitution former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman and Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen swore an oath to uphold when she assumed office. Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "The Republic of China is a government in exile." She wants to play word games. She wants to exploit the name "Republic of China." She want to use it as a backdoor listing for a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." Of course she has to repudiate the One China, Different Interpretations elements in the Republic of China Constitution. But if she repudiates the Republic of China Constitution, how can she possibly run for Republic of China President? Furthermore, if Tsai Ing-wen repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, how can she advocate "no reunification?" Does she intend to openly advocate Taiwan independence, even while she demands "no use of force?"

The 1992 Consensus was merely a way to put One China, Different Interpretations into a gel capsule. Now however, controversy has arisen over whether the 1992 Consensus exists. The controversy has drowned out rational discussion of One China, Different Interpretations. People should be asking themselves what will happen if there is no One China, Different Interpretations Constitution? What will happen if the "no independence" principle is nullified? What will happen, internally and externally? What will happen if the "temporarily divided, separately administered" elements within the Constitution no longer apply? What will happen to the framework for cross-Strait peaceful development? What will happen to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force?"

一中各表就是不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.07

今天社論談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；明天社論談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。

其實，使用「九二共識」這個概念，只是要使「一個中國／各自表述」這八個字進一步「膠囊化」，以便流通使用。所以，辯論九二共識是否存在，形同只是辯論那個膠囊存不存在；但膠囊無關藥理、藥性及藥效，問題的實質在於膠囊裡面的藥粉，亦即：馬蔡藍綠各自是否主張以「一個中國，各自表述」為兩岸角力的基本戰略？

膠囊不重要，重要的是裡面的藥粉。因此，馬蔡雙方近日的辯論焦點，其實已漸漸脫離「九二共識」這張包裝紙，而進入了「一個中國，各自表述」的內容物，亦即「一中各表」。

就兩岸現狀言，「一中」就是「不獨」，「各表」就是「不統」。因此，一中各表，就是不統、不獨、不武的憑藉與實踐，亦即通稱的「維持現狀」。

就馬政府言，「一中各表」就是維護中華民國，堅持中華民國憲法。因為，中華民國憲法主張「憲法一中」，就是「不獨」；並維持兩岸分裂分治的現狀，即是「不統」。因此，馬總統說「支持九二共識，就是支持中華民國」，其潛台詞則是：「支持一中各表，就是支持不統不獨不武的兩岸政策。」

就北京言，原本對九二共識的認定，傾向於「各表一中」，而諱言「一中各表」；但在二○○八年出現「新機遇」後，已向「一中各表」靠攏。北京國台辦主任王毅今年三月二十六日（布胡「一中各表」熱線三周年）指出：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」王毅所稱「一個中國，求同存異」，就是「一個中國，各自表述」。

對北京來說，「九二共識」的重中之重是「反對台獨」，因此必以「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」並稱；而北京今日言反對台獨，是反對「正名制憲」的「法理台獨」，至於中華民國顯非「法理台獨」，而是「一個中國，求同存異」，反而是北京當局全力維持的「現狀」。因為，北京亦知，中華民國的「不統／不獨／不武」，是維持兩岸「現狀」的無可取代的憑藉與實踐。

九二共識，對馬政府言，在主張「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」，因此「不主張台獨」（不獨），而維持兩岸分裂分治的「不統」；就北京言，則九二共識的重點在「反對台獨」，但也因而接受了中華民國「不統」的現狀。所以說，「九二共識」無論是指「一個中國／各自表述」，或指「一個中國／求同存異」，皆是「不統／不獨／不武」的憑藉與實踐。這雖未必是終極方案，亦容非完美的方案，卻是六十年來相對最佳的方案，更是可使兩岸關係「由合理的過程到改善之目的」的唯一途徑。

因此，蔡英文反對「九二共識」雖言之輕易，只消一句「九二共識不存在」即可；但她若進一步要否定「一中各表」，即形同也否定了中華民國與中華民國憲法；因為，中華民國憲法（從增修條文看）即是一部承認兩岸現狀分裂分治的「一中各表」的憲法，這也是曾任陸委會主委及行政院副院長的蔡英文當年宣誓就職的基礎。蔡英文現今若主張「中華民國是流亡政府」，要玩「借殼上市」，自然就要否定「一中各表」的中華民國憲法；但她若否定中華民國憲法，何以參選中華民國總統？進一步言，蔡英文若否定「一中各表」，將如何主張「不統」？更難道要公開主張「台獨」？卻又如何主張「不武」？

當年是為了包裝「一中各表」，而採用「九二共識」這個膠囊；現在，由於對「九二共識」存不存在的爭議，反而掩蓋了對「一中各表」的理性探討。如今國人應思考的是：如果沒有「一中各表」，憲法「不獨」的原則若遭毀棄，將如何因應內外？而憲法「分裂分治」（不統）的憑藉若告失據，又將如何因應內外？更將如何維持「不統／不獨／不武」的兩岸「和平發展」架構？